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This PhD thesis is a result of the author‘s research on the limited partnership 
in the context of China. This thesis investigates the fundamental theoretical 
and practical problems within China‘s limited partnership regime from 
doctrinal, comparative and empirical perspectives. This thesis attempts to fill 
the legislative gaps and seeks to provide recommendations for future law 
reform of the limited partnership. 
This thesis concludes that the PRC Partnership Enterprise Law has furnished 
basic provisions on the limited partnership structure. However, the existing 
structural, cultural and regulatory problems undermine the attractiveness and 
creditworthiness of the limited partnership regime.  
This thesis is organized in three parts. Part I examines the evolution of 
Chinese partnership and partnership law. It concludes that the law of 
partnership was developed in a piecemeal way in China. The PRC limited 
partnership is a mixture of western and Chinese models. This part identifies 
various problems in the context of private equity limited partnerships. In 
particular, there are severe conflicts of interest between limited partners and 
general partners. It argues that the PRC Partnership Enterprise Law fails to 
provide sufficient legal protection to Chinese limited partners. This legislative 
xv 
 
deficiency may undermine the limited partnership structure in controlling 
agency costs. 
Part II of this thesis examines the three basic themes underlying the internal 
relationships of the limited partnership regime in the context of China. It 
concludes that although the control rule has once been a useful device in 
deterring limited partners‘ meddling into the management of the firm, there is 
little reason to believe that it continues to be effective in China. It suggests 
that default legal duties shall be imposed on general partners. It argues that 
compared to other intra-partnership dispute resolutions for restricting agency 
problem, the derivative action is more effective since it has strong deterrent 
and compensation functions.  
PART III emphasizes the essential role of organizational law in regulating the 
external relationships between partnerships and their outsiders, specifically in 
regulating the liability shield of limited partners and creditors‘ rights with 
partnerships. This part suggests that whether a strong or weak entity shielding 
should be adopted in the PRC limited partnership depends on the real business 
needs of its potential users. Considering that the limited partnership is 
commonly structured as an asset-pooling vehicle in China, a stronger entity 
shielding shall be adopted. Given the legislative objective of the limited 
partnership, it is suggested that a complete owner shielding to limited partners 
shall be provided. This attribute affords a high degree of protection to limited 
partners against partnerships‘ creditors.  
xvi 
 
The conclusion chapter suggests that, to make the limited partnership achieve 
its legislative goal, it is necessary to promote a well-established venture capital 
market and a business-friendly regulatory environment. Meanwhile, it is 
pertinent to review on a regular basis the rules on the limited partnership — in 
tandem with the developments of the venture capital market — so as to meet 
rapidly-changing business needs as well as to balance the interests of the 






LISTS OF TABLES AND CHARTS 
TABLE 1: INTERVIEW INFORMATION ............................................... 363 
TABLE 2: LPS UNDER THE PEL, THE DRULPA AND THE ULPA 2001: 
A COMPARISON ........................................................................................ 366 
TABLE 3: COMPANY-TYPE PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS, PRIVATE 
EQUITY LPS AND TRUST-TYPE PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS: A 
COMPARISON ............................................................................................ 379  
TABLE 4: LIMITED PARTNERS’ MANAGEMENT RIGHTS UNDER 
THE UK PARTNERSHIPS BILL, THE DRULPA, THE SINGAPORE 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT 2008 AND THE ULPA 2001 ............... 382 
TABLE 5: SAFE HARBOR LISTS UNDER THE PEL, THE UK 
PARTNERSHIPS BILL, THE DRULPA AND THE SINGAPORE 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT 2008 ....................................................... 384 
TABLE 6: ARTICLE 68 OF THE PEL, §303 OF THE RULPA 1985 AND 
§ 17-303 OF THE DRULPA: A COMPARISON ....................................... 298 
 
CHART 1: A TYPICAL STRUCTURE OF THE PRIVATE EQUITY LP 
xviii 
 
........................................................................................................................ 139  
CHART 2: DEPICTION OF A TYPICAL PRC PRIVATE EQUITY 
FUND’S GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE ................................................. 172 
CHART 3: DEPICTION OF A TYPICAL US PRIVATE EQUITY 
FUND’S GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE ................................................. 173 
CHART 4: CREDITOR’S RIGHTS IN THE LP UNDER THE ULPA 
2001................................................................................................................ 343 
CHART 5: CREDITOR’S RIGHTS IN THE PRC LP ............................ 343 
 
FIGURE 1: BUSINESS FORMS OF NEW RAISED VENTURE 
CAPITAL FUNDS IN 2008 ......................................................................... 136 
FIGURE 2: 2008 DOMESTIC SOURCES OF CHINA VENTURE 





GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
In this thesis, unless otherwise specified, ―PRC law‖ and ―Chinese law‖ are 
not used interchangeably. ―PRC law‖ generally refers to legislation 
promulgated after the establishment of the People‘s Republic of China; while 
―Chinese law‖ generally refers to a broader concept which includes all 
legislation and legal traditions in China. 
―Company‖ and ―corporation‖ are used interchangeably to refer to limited 
liability incorporated company.  
General Abbreviations 
China Limited Partnership Association CLPA 
Delaware Limited Liability Company Act  DLLCA 
Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act DRULPA 
Delaware Revised Uniform Partnership Act DRUPA 
Fund of Funds FOF 
Foreign-invested Venture Capital Investment 
Enterprises 
FVCE 
German Civil Code BGB 
Growth Enterprise Board GEB 
Initial Public Stock Offering IPO 
xx 
 
Law Commission Partnerships Bill (UK) UK Partnerships Bill 
Limited Partnership LP 
Limited Liability Partnership LLP 
Leveraged debt financing LBO 
Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission UK Law Commissions 
National People's Congress NPC 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws                    
NCCUSL 
People‘s Republic of China PRC 
Partnership Enterprise Law (China) PEL 
Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (Germany) GmbH 
The China Investment Corporation CIC 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
OECD 
The National Association of Securities Dealers  
Automated Quotations        
  NASDAQ 
United Kingdom UK 
Uniform Partnership Act (USA) UPA  
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (USA)  ULPA 
 
Abbreviations of Law Reform Reports  
xxi 
 
Partnership Law: Report (2003) Law 
Commission No 283; Scottish Law 
Commission No 192 
Singapore Report of the Study Team on 
Limited Partnerships 
 
UK Partnership Law Report  
 
 




TABLE OF LEGISLATION 
China 
National laws 
 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006  
 Partnership Enterprise Law 1997 
 Company Law 2005 
 Contract Law 1999 
 Sole Proprietorship Enterprise Law 1999 
 General Principles of the Civil Law1986  
 Individual Income Tax Law 2005 
 Securities Law 2005 
 Trust Law 2001 
Administrative Regulations  
 Administrative Measures for the Establishment of Partnership 
xxiii 
 
Enterprises within China by Foreign Enterprises or Individuals, Order 
of the State Council 2009 
 Administrative Measures on the Registration of Partnership Enterprises 
2006 
 Provisional Regulations on Private Enterprises 1988 
Administrative Rules 
 460HNotice of the China Banking Regulatory Commission on Issuing the 
Pilot Administrative Measures for Commercial Banks to Make Equity 
Investment in Insurance Companies 2009 
 Notice of China Banking Regulatory Commission on Issuing the 
Guidelines for Trust Companies to Operate the Trust Private Equity 
Investment Business 2008 
 Measures for the Administration of Trust Companies' Trust Plans of 
Aggregate Funds 2007 
 Interim Measures on Administration of Venture Capital Investment 
Enterprise 2005 




Supreme Court Opinion 
 Opinions of the Supreme People‘s Court on Several Issues concerning 
the Implementation of the General Principles of the Civil Law of the 
People‘s Republic of China 1988 
Local rules 
 Pudong New Area Government Trial Measures on the Establishment of 
Foreign-Invested Private Equity Management Enterprises 2009 
 
US 
Delaware Limited Liability Company Act  
Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act 
Delaware Revised Uniform Partnership Act 
Uniform Partnership Act  






Limited Partnerships Act 1907 
Partnership Act 1890 
 
Jersey 
Limited Partnership Law 1994 
Limited Partnership Law 2009 (Amendment) 
 
Singapore 
Limited Partnership Act 2008 
 
New Zealand 





German Civil Code 
German Commercial Code 
 
France 
French Civil Code 
French Commercial Code  
 
Japan 
Japanese Commercial Code 




TABLE OF CASES 
UK CASES 
Aas v. Benham [1891] 2 Ch 244 at 256 
Bury v. Allen [1845] 1 Coll 589 
Craven v. Knight  [1683] 21 Eng. Rep. 664 (Ch.) 
Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562 
Green v. Hertzog [1954] 1 W.L.R. 1309 
Helmore v. Smith  [1885] 35 Ch D 436 
Parker v. McKenna [1894] 
 
LR 10 Ch App 96 
Salomon v. A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] A.C. 22 
Smith v. Croft  [1986] 1 WLR 580  





Ames v. Downing 1 Bradf. 321, 333 (N. Y. 1858) 
Aronson v. Lewis, 461H 73 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) 
462HAppletree Square I Ltd. Partnership v. Investmark, Inc., 494 N.W.2d 889 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993) 
Allright Missouri, Inc. v. Billeter, 829 F.2d631, 639 (8
th
 CIR. 1987) 
463HAnthony v. Padmar, Inc., 320 S.C. 436, 465 S.E.2d 745 (Ct. App. 1995) 
464HBand v. Livonia Associates, 176 Mich. App. 95, 439 N.W.2d 285 (1989) 
Bassan v. Investment Exch. Corp., 83 Wash. 2d, 524 P.2d 233 (1974) 
465HBond Purchase, LLC v. Patriot Tax Credit Props., L.P., 746 A.2d 842 (Del. Ch. 
1999) 
Brown & Jones 167 Misc. 2d 12, 633 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Sup 1995) 
Bakalis v. Bressler 1 Ill. 2d 72, 78, 115 N.E.2d 323 (1953) 
466HCovalt v. High, 100 N.M. 700, 675 P.2d 999 (Ct. App. 1983) 
Corley v. Ott 485 S.E.2d 97 (S.C. 1997) 
xxix 
 
Davis v. Comed Inc (1980) 623 F.2d 28 
467HDavis v. Comed, Inc., 619 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1980) 
468HExxon Corp. v. Burglin, 4 F.3d 1294 (5
th
 Cir. 1993) 
469HF & S Enterprises, Inc. v. Cure, 690 So. 2d 263 (La. Ct. App. 4
th
 Cir. 1997) 
Frazier v. Manson, 651 F. 2d 1078 (5
th
 Cir. 1981) 
470HFleck v. Cablevision VII, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 622 (D.D.C. 1991) 
471HFrigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Prop., Inc., 544 P.2d 781, 784 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1976) 
472HGast v. Petsinger, 323 A.2d 371 (Pa. 1974) 
Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974) 
Holman v. Cole, 11 Wash.App. 195, 522. P.2d 515 (Wash.App. Div. 3 1974). 
Hanover National Bank v. Sirrett 15 Abb. N. Cas. 334 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1883) 
473H ughes v. St. David's Support Corp., 944 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. App. Austin 1997) 
Holzman v. De Escamilla, 195 P.2d 833 (Cal. 1948)  





 Cir. 2001) 




In re Integrated Resources, Inc. 3 F.3d 49, 53 (2d Cir. 1993) 
In re USACafes, L.P. Litigation 600 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 1991). 
Jacquin v. Buisson 11. How. Pr. 385 (N. Y. 1855) 
Jennings v. Kay Jennings Family Ltd. Partnership 275 Va. 594, 659 S.E.2d 
283 (2008) 
Jackson v. Marshall, 140 N.C. App. 504, 537 S.E.2d 232 (2000) 
477HKrebs v. Mull, 727 So. 2d 564 (La. Ct. App. 1
st
 Cir. 1998), writ denied, 478H 40 So. 
2d 119 (La. 1999) 
479HKE Prop. Mgmt., Inc. v. 275 Madison Mgmt. Corp., CA No. 12683, 1993 WL 
285900 (Del. Ch. July 21, 1993) 
480HKlotz v. Klotz, 202 Va. 393, 117 S.E.2d 650 (1961) 
Latta v. Kilbourn, 150 U.S. 524 (1893) 
481HMarquand v. President of the N.Y. Mfg. Co., 17 Johns. 525 (N.Y. 1820) 
xxxi 
 
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E.545 (N.Y.1928) 
Meinhard v. Salmon  482H 49 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928) 
Orley v. Ott 326 S.C. 89, 92 n.1, 485 S.E.2d 97, 99 n.1 (1997) 
483HPeskin v. Deutsch, 134 Ill. App. 3d 48, 89 Ill. December. 28, 479 N.E.2d 1034 
(1
st
 Dist. 1985) 
484HRenton v. Chaplain, 9 N.J. Eq. 62 (Ch. 1852) 
Rosenthal v. Rosenthal  543 A.2d 348 (Me.1988) 
Rosenthal v. Rosenthal  543 A.2d 348, 352 (Me.1988) 
Ross Harper & Murphy v. Banks, 2000 SLT 699 
Remenchik v. Whittington, Tex.Ct.App., 757 S.W.2d 836 (1988) 
Starr v. Fordham   420 Mass. 178, 648 N.E.2d 1261 (1995) 
Slingerland v. Hurley, 388 So. 2d 587(Fla. 4
th
 DCA) 
485HSteeby v. Fial, 765 P.2d 1081 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) 
S. 486HAtl. Ltd. P'ship of Tenn., LP v. Riese, 284 F.3d 518 (4
th
 Cir. 2002) 
Tri-Growth Centre City, Ltd. v. Silldorf, 487H265 Cal. Rptr. 330 (Ct. App. 1989). 
xxxii 
 





MAIN BODY OF THESIS 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1. Background 
On 27 August 2006, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress 
of People‘s Republic of China (PRC) adopted a new business vehicle: Limited 
Partnership (LP) in the revised Partnership Enterprise Law of PRC (PEL).
1
 The 
new PEL went into effect on 1 June 2007. On 25 January 2009, the rule for 
foreigners to set up partnership enterprises, including the LP in China was 
promulgated. It came into force on 1 March 2010.
2
  
The introduction of the LP is a milestone in the partnership legislation in China. 
It is the first time that the LP can be formed under Chinese law. It makes 
available an additional structure on which businesses could be set up or 
organized. Before the introduction of the LP, the general partnership was the only 
partnership form under the PEL.  
In recent years, the LP has become a topical issue in academia and practice. A 
                                                 
1 The Partnership Enterprise Law was first adopted in the 24th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 8th 
National People‘s Congress on 23 February 1997. This law came into force on 1 August 1997 and was 
revised in 2006.  
2 This rule refers to the Administrative Measures for the Establishment of Partnership Enterprises within 
China by Foreign Enterprises or Individuals, Order of the State Council (No. 567) 2009. Text available 
online: the Central People‘s Government of PRC <http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2009-
12/02/content_1478238.htm> (in Chinese).  
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 have recently introduced the LP into their business menus. Some 




 have adjusted 
their LP regimes in order to encourage the growth of venture capital investment. 
The introduction of LPs in China is thus in line with current international 
practice.  
In China, there has been a tremendous increase in the use of LPs since the 
adoption of the LP in 2006, especially in the area of China‘s venture capital and 
private equity markets.
10
 Right after the enactment of the revised PEL, the very 
                                                 
3 The Singapore Limited Partnership Act 2008 came into force on 4 May 2009. Text available online: Statue 
Online < http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/>.  
4 The New Zealand Limited Partnerships Act 2008 came into force on 2 May 2008. See New Zealand 
Companies Office, News Release, ―Introducing Limited Partnerships‖ (3 December 2008), online: New 
Zealand Companies Office <http://www.companies.govt.nz/cms/other-registered-entities/limited-
partnerships/introducing-limited-partnerships/>. 
5 Taiwan Executive Yuan passed the Limited Partnership Law on 27 June 2007. See Taiwan Council for 
Economic Planning and Development, News Release, ―Council Passed the Limited Partnership Bill‖ (10 
August 2007), online: Taiwan Council for Economic Planning and Development, < 
http://www.cepd.gov.tw/m1.aspx?sNo=0008466> (in Chinese). 
6 In 1999, the National Diet of Japan passed the Limited Partnership for Investment Act (投資事業有限責
任組合契約に関する法律) to enable the formation of "the Limited Partnership for investment". Text 
available online: < http://www.meti.go.jp/topic/data/e40430aj.html> (in Japanese). 
7 A special form of limited partnership which was designed for collective investments in the alternative 
investment area was introduced into Swiss law in 2007. See Remy Bärlocher, ―the Swiss Limited 
Partnership - an attractive structuring alternative for Private Equity in Europe‖ (2007 December/2008 
January) European Lawyer 77. 
8 The British Government announced in 2006 that it would reform the Limited Partnership Act 1907 so as to 
clarify and modernise the law relating to limited partnerships. Certain changes based on these 
recommendations were brought forward in a Legislative Reform Order (LRO) laid before Parliament in June 
2009. For further information on the reform of the Limited Partnership Act 1907, see Department for 
Business Innovation and Skills, ―Partnership Law‖, online: Department for Business Innovation and Skills < 
http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/businesslaw/partnership/page25911.html>.  
9 In 2007, a Tax Laws Amendment (2007 Measures No. 2) Bill was introduced to Australia in order to relax 
the eligibility requirements for foreign residents investing in venture capital LPs and Australian venture 
capital funds. See Minister for Revenue and the Assistant Treasurer, Media Release, ―Government to Make 
Further Improvements to the Tax System‖ (29 March 2007), online: the Treasury Portfolio Ministers Portal 
<http://assistant.treasurer.gov.au/pcd/content/pressreleases/2007/028.asp>. 
10 For detailed statistics on China‘s venture LPs, see China Venture Capital Institute ed., China Venture 
Capital Yearbook 2009 (Beijing: Democracy and Construction Press, 2009, [China Venture Capital 
Yearbook 2009] at 232-233 (copy in Chinese). 
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first PRC LP (Nanhai Chengzhang Venture Investment Limited Partnership)
11
 
was set up in June 2007. Till the end of 2008, hundreds of private equity funds 
were registered as LPs in China,
12
 reflecting overwhelming positive attitudes in 
the PRC business community towards this new business vehicle. A 2008 survey 
shows that, the LP has become the most popular business vehicle in the venture 
capital fund raising in China. More than half of new venture capital funds raised 
in 2008 were organized as LPs.
13
 
Nevertheless, with the increasing use of the LP in China, especially in China‘s 
venture capital and private equity markets, several problematic areas within the 
PRC LP have been detected. Therefore, there is an imperative need to examine 
the fundamental problems of the law of LPs and to provide viable and efficient 
legislative recommendations to solve the problems and guide the future 
legislation.  
Generally speaking, the LP is a special type of partnerships. It is similar to the 
general partnership in certain aspects. Both the LP and the general partnership 
are governed by partnership agreements and formed by two or more partners. For 
many jurisdictions,
14
 the law applicable to the general partnership may generally 
                                                 
11Huang Jintao and Ding Chang, ―The First Venture Capital Limited Partnership was Established‖ Shanghai 
Securities News (29 June 2007) (copy in Chinese). 
12See Xu Huiying, ―LP Investee Companies face IPO Problems‖ First Securities Daily (15 October 2008), 
online: Sina News <http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/y/20081015/02105390391.shtml> (copy in Chinese). 
13 China Venture Capital Yearbook 2009, supra note 10 at 252. 
14 Examples include Delaware, the UK and Germany. 
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be extended to the LP.
15
 Tax regulations, for example, regard the general 
partnership and the LP similarly as tax transparent (although the legal nature of 
partnerships varies among jurisdictions).
16
 
The critical feature that distinguishes the LP from other partnership forms is that 
there are two categories of partners — limited and general partners.  In a general 
partnership, there is only one category of partners who are all required to share 
unlimited liability for the debts and obligations incurred by the partnership firm. 
In contrast, each limited partner in the new LP structure can enjoy limited 
liability to the extent of his contribution in return for non – participation in the 
management of the partnership firm.  
The novelty of this thesis is that it examines the LP in the context of China. This 
thesis seeks to identify the major features and problems within the PRC LP 
regime. It attempts to provide viable suggestions to the PEL and to fill the 
perceived gap in the PEL and partnership law literature.  
The primary objectives of this thesis are:  
  (1) To consider the goals of the PEL;  
  (2) To consider theoretical and practical problems within the PRC LP 
regime and make recommendations to solve the problems;  
                                                 
15 In the UK, the rules of equity and common law applicable to partnerships also apply to the LP. In the US, 
the ULPA 1916 and the RULPAs were not a comprehensive statement of the law of LP, but a supplement of 
their general partnership law. Only until the promulgation of the ULPA 2001 did the LP law de-link from 
the general partnership law and became a comprehensive statute.  
16 See infra text accompanying notes 392-398. 
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 (3) To demonstrate what further approaches and changes will be 
required to best implement the LP legislation in China and best achieve the 
legislative goals; and 
 (4) To discuss whether the Chinese sample sheds light on future law 
reform of the LP. 
2. Research Methodology 
The research is mainly conducted in doctrinal, qualitative and comparative 
perspectives. 
2.1 Doctrinal Research  
The primary objective of this thesis is to consider the PRC LP under the PEL and 
consider how to make the PRC LP effectively achieve the legislative goal. 
Therefore, doctrinal research will be conducted to examine the theoretical issues 
behind the LP structure, such as the legal nature of partnerships, liability of 
partners and duties of partners. This thesis also will discuss the case authority 
and legislation governing the PRC LP. It is hoped that the theoretical inquiry 
developed in this thesis contributes towards the aim of clarifying the ambiguities 






2.2.1 Purpose  
The legislative objective of the PRC LP is to encourage China‘s venture capital 
market.
18
 Since the adoption of the LP in China in August 2007, the LP has 
become a popular business vehicle in China‘s venture capital and private equity 
markets.
19
 Statistics show that the number of LPs is increasing significantly in 
China. More than two-hundred LPs were established in China before August 
2009.
20
 This is consistent with the initial legislative objective that the LP is to be 
used primarily as specialized entity for asset pooling in the venture capital and 
private equity markets. Given the importance of the LP in these markets, it is 
crucial to discuss how the LP structure works in the context of China‘s venture 
capital and private equity markets.  
The purpose of the qualitative research is to gather an in-depth understanding of 
partners‘ behavior and the reasons that govern such a behavior within the PRC 
LP. It is important to collect feedback from practitioners in China‘s venture 
                                                 
17  For this research method, see, e.g., Miller, Steven I. an Fredericks, Marcel, Qualitative Research 
Methods: Social Epistemology and Practical Inquiry (New York: P. Lang, 1994); Miller, Delbert Charles, 
Handbook of Research Design and Social Measurement (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1991). 
18  Yan Yixun, ―Reasons of Revising the Partnership Enterprise Law‖ (8 May 2006), online: National 
People‘s Congress website <http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/bmzz/caizheng/2006-05/08/content_1383740.htm> 
(copy in Chinese). 
19 Li Jianfeng, ―Limited Partnership Becomes Popular for Private Equity Funds; More than Ten Private 
Equity Limited Partnerships were Set Up‖ Shanghai Securities News (12 September 2007), online: 
EZCapital < http://www.ezcap.cn/News/20083152.html> (copy in Chinese). 108 RMB private equity funds 
completed fundraising in 2008, raising a total funding of US$23.70Billion. See Zero2IPO Research Centre, 
―Analysis of Fund-raising of RMB Private Equity Funds" Zero2IPO (16 September 2009), online: Zero2ipo 
news <http://www.zero2ipo.com.cn/en/research/200991691809.shtml>. 
20 See Chen Shuangqing, ―Limited Partnerships were Permitted to Open Securities Accounts‖ Economic 
Observer (9 August 2009), online: < http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/qsth/20090807/22516588947.shtml> 
(copy in Chinese). 
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capital and private equity markets and ascertain whether they have encountered 
or realized any problems-in-law or problems-in-practice regarding the PRC LP.  
2.2.2 Methodology  
2.2.2.1 Interviews and Consultations 
This study covers the author‘s personal interviews, telephone interviews and 
email consultations during August 2008 and December 2009. For each personal 
and telephone interview, the average time spent was one to two hour. The 
interview is used to support the theoretical arguments of this thesis but not a 
separate empirical study on its own. 
The interviewees include twenty lawyers, partners, professionals and academics 
who specialize in the LP, venture capital and private equity investment in China. 
The interviewees come from six cities which are the major places of venture 
capital and private equity investment in China,
21
 including Beijing, Shanghai, 
Tianjin, Shenzhen, Chongqing and Guangzhou.
22
 To attract venture capital and 
private equity investment in these regions, these cities issued advanced 
implementation rules on registration and taxation of LPs. 
23
  
Additionally, the author prepared a questionnaire for personal/telephone 
                                                 
21 For the major cities of venture capital investment in China, see China Venture Capital Yearbook 2009, 
supra note 10 at 257. 
22 See Wu Lanfang and Tang Zhenlong, ―Private Equity Centres: Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai‖ Shanghai 
Securities Journal (8 September 2008) (copy in Chinese).  




interviews and email consultations (see Appendix 1 - Table 1 Interview 
Information). The questionnaire seeks to collect feedback from the practitioners 
on the popularity and usage of the PRC LP in China‘s venture capital and private 
equity markets. It also seeks to estimate as comprehensively as possible the 
problematic areas within the PRC LP. The main hypothesis of the study is: are 
there any theoretical and practical problems within the PRC LP regime?  
The questionnaire is drafted on the basis of: (1) the existing provisions of the LP 
under the PEL, particularly the legislative vacuum and ambiguous provisions 
within the PEL; and (2) recent news and reports concerning the PRC LP. The 
questions are not rigid, but are open-ended. The interviewees were asked to 
provide their opinion not only in relation with the companies or institutions they 
worked with, but also their observations on the LP generally. The contents of the 
questionnaire (Appendix VI) contain the following: 
 the centralized management of the LP;  (e.g., management rights and 
obligations of partners, conflict of interest between partners in the 
management of the LP) 
 limited liability of limited partners; (e.g., liability for participating in the 
management of the firm) 
 duties of partners; 
 derivative actions by limited partners; 
 nature, registration and taxation of the partnership; and 
 distribution and liquidation. 
9 
 
2.2.2.2 Prototypical Partnership Agreements of Private Equity LPs 
The author collected three private equity LP agreements from Chongqing 
Zhonghao Law Firm and Shenzhen Huashang Law Firm. Moreover, the author 
obtained two prototypical partnership agreements which are published in the 




2.2.2.3 Other Qualitative/Quantitative Data  
Additionally, as an extra effort to understand and examine the PRC LP in the 
context of China‘s venture capital and private equity markets, the author also 
collected the following data:  
 observations of general partners and limited partners in a number of 
private equity LPs;  
 comprehensive statistics on the PRC LP (e.g., the number of LPs 
which are used for venture capital funds in China and the percentages 
of the LP in venture capital and private equity funds); and 
 authoritative news and reports on the PRC LP in China‘s venture 
capital and private equity sectors. 
First, the observations are mainly collected from the published meeting minutes 
                                                 
24 Li Shoushuang, China Private Equity Fund- Raising and Establishment (Beijing: Law Press China, 2009) 
(copy in Chinese), [Li, China Private Equity Fund- Raising and Establishment] at 395; Zou Jing, Placement 
and Operation of Private Equity-Legal Practice and Cases (Beijing: Law Press China 2009) (copy in 
Chinese), [Zou] at 223. 
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of various forums and symposiums on venture capital and private equity held in 
China. Their practical feedback reflects recent developments and teething 
problems in China‘s venture capital and private equity markets. References in 
this thesis have been given to the following forums:  
 the International Private Equity Forum 2008; 25  
 the 2008 China Venture Capital and Private Equity Forum;26  








 China RMB Private Equity Summit 2009;29  
 Global Private Equity Beijing Forum;30 and  
 the Ninth China Venture Capital and Private Equity Annual Forum.31  
Second, the statistics on the PRC LP are mainly published in China Venture 
                                                 
25 China International Private Equity Forum 2008 (19 January 2008 and 20 January 2008), online: < 
http://focus.jrj.com.cn/special/08zggjsmgq.html>. 
26 The 2008 China Venture Capital and Private Equity Forum (11 April 2008 and 12 April 2008), online: 
<http://www.cvcri.com/forum/2008/sz/forum/index.asp>. 
27 The Second Annual China International Private Equity Forum (10 June 2008 and 12 June 2008), online: 
<http://economy.enorth.com.cn/system/2008/06/02/003344602.shtml>. 
28 China Venture Capital and Private Equity Semi-Annual Forum 2008 (9 July 2008 and 10 July 2008), 
online: <http://tech.sina.com.cn/focus/2008_Investment/xcsl.shtml>. 
29  China RMB Private Equity Summit 2009 (6 September 2009 and 7 September 2009), online:  
<http://money.163.com/special/00252T6M/capitalforum.html>. 
30 Global Private Equity Beijing Forum (8 November and 9 November 2009), online:  
<http://events.chinaventure.com.cn/news/20091109/28135.shtml>. 
31 The Ninth China Venture Capital and Private Equity Annual Forum (9 December 2009 and 10 December 





 the websites of local and national Administrations for 
Industry and Commerce
33
 and the website of the most authoritative research 




Third, authoritative news and reports are collected from various authoritative 
newspapers, magazines and journals.
35
 This information reflects the most 
updated events and incidents in China‘s venture capital and private equity 
markets, including the collapse of LPs in China, the case study of famous private 
equity LPs and the recent development and problems on the use of the LP in 
China. 
2.2.3 Empirical Findings 
The qualitative study on the PRC LP provides vital insights into the LP in the 
context of China. The general observations of the interviewees reveal that the LP 
is a useful business vehicle in China, especially in China‘s venture capital and 
private equity markets. However, there are interesting theoretical and practical 
problems within the PRC LP. There are also cultural, structural and political 
                                                 
32 References in this thesis have been given to: China Venture Capital Institute ed., China Venture Capital 
Yearbook 2007, China Venture Capital Yearbook 2008 and China Venture Capital Yearbook 2009 (Beijing: 
Democracy and Construction Press, 2007, 2008 and 2009) (copy in Chinese).  
33 This website contains various statistics on business forms, see, e.g., the ―Report on the Major Business 
Entities in China-First Quarter of 2009‖, online:  State Administration for Industry and Commerce 
<http://www.saic.gov.cn/zwgk/tjzl/zhtj/bgt/200905/t20090511_47153.html>. 
34  This website contains various statistics on private equity investment, e.g., the China Private Equity 
Annual Report 2008, online: Zero2ipo news < 
http://research.zero2ipo.com.cn/en/research/2009224134308.shtml >. 
35  The authoritative news and reports can be generally collected from the relevant newspapers and 
magazines, including 《经济观察报》 [Economic Observer], 《中国证券报》 [China Securities Journal],
《上海证券报》 [Shanghai Securities News] and《21 世纪经济报道》 [21st Century Journal].     
12 
 
constraints in the business community concerning the PRC LP.  
Most of the interviewees observed the existing conflict of interest within China‘s 
private equity LPs, particularly, the conflict of interest between limited partners 
and general partners regarding the management of the fund and the conflict of 
interest between local fund managers and foreign investors regarding investment 
allocation. Some private equity LPs have even dissolved due to these conflicts.
36
 
Most of the interviewees indicated that amendments to the PRC LP were 
necessary. They also expressed a desire for a well-tailored LP agreement. 
The examination of prototypical samples of the private equity LP agreements 
reflects several areas which partners are most concerned with, especially, the 
management rights of limited partners, the compensation to general partners and 
the distribution of profits. Nevertheless, these samples indicate that duties of 
general partners are not given sufficient attention in practice.  
These empirical findings set forth starting points for the subsequent discussion of 
the legal rules governing the PRC LP.  
2.3 Comparative Research  
The research is comparative. As indicated in the drafting materials of the PEL,
37
 
the PRC LP is not intended to model a specific or single foreign LP regime, but 
                                                 
36 See infra note 523-524 and accompanying text; see infra note 556 and accompanying text. 
37 See generally in Zhu Shaoping and Ge Yi eds., The Review of “the Partnership Enterprise Law of 
People‟s Republic of China” (Beijing: Citic Publishing House, 2004) (copy in Chinese), [Zhu and Ge].  
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has taken different legal institutions and provisions from the existing LP regimes 
around the world.
38
 Therefore, a comparative study will assist to identify the 
potential problems and deficiencies that have not been adequately addressed by 
the PEL and offer suggestions for this new Chinese business vehicle. It is 
necessary to consider the experiences of other countries and see how the doctrine 
has been understood, interpreted and developed.  
The primary focus of the comparative analysis in this thesis is the LP in the US. 
In discussing the PRC LP, references will be made to the LP regimes in the UK, 
Singapore, New Zealand, Germany, France and Japan. References to these 
countries will be made in the context of specific discussions in this thesis. For 
instance, the French LP regime is discussed in detail in the control rule issue.
39
  
Delaware business legislation has long been regarded as business oriented.
40
 The 
Delaware LP is a popular form in the US.
41
 Among the various LP Acts in the 
United States (US), the Delaware Code on Limited Partnerships (also termed as 
―Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act‖, hereinafter ―DRULPA‖)42 
is considered as the most popular LP regime that many countries model after.
43
 It 
                                                 
38 Ibid.  
39 The rationale of the control rule in the French LP regime is discussed in Section 5.1 of Chapter 5 in this 
thesis. 
40 Robert W. Hamilton, ―Corporate General Partners of Limited Partnerships‖ (1997) 1 J. Small & Emerging 
Bus. L. 73 [Hamilton] at 92. 
41 ―Since the LP Act became effective on January 1, 1983, over 68,500 Delaware limited partnerships have 
been formed.‖ Paul M. Altman, ―Delaware Limited Partnerships‖ in Corporate Law and Practice Course 
Handbook Series PLI Order No. 14028 (Practising Law Institute, 2008). 
42 The text of the DRULPA is available online at: < http://delecorp.net/ltdpartneract.htm >. 
43 For instance, the Singapore LP regime is modelled on the Delaware LP regime. See Law Reform and 
Revision Division of Singapore, Singapore Report of the Study Team on Limited Partnerships, online: < 
http://www.mof.gov.sg/consultation_archives/public_con_lp_bill_2006.html> [Singapore LP Report]. 
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provides substantial flexibility to the parties and great incentives for equity 
investment.
44
 Thus, reference will be made to the DRULPA.  
Moreover, the US has a vast experience in LP legislation. The Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act (ULPA) 1976, the ULPA 1985 and the ULPA 2001 have been 
enacted into law in many states in the US.
45
 This thesis will make references to 
these statutes. Additionally, in the US, the LP is also governed by statutes and 
rules which are applicable to the general partnership. Accordingly, references 
will be made to the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA).  
References also will be made to the joint consultation paper by the Law 
Commission and Scottish Law Commission (UK Law Commissions) on the 
Limited Partnerships Act 1907
46
; the joint report by the UK Law Commissions 
on partnerships
47
 (UK Partnership Law Report); the Singapore Limited 
Partnership Act 2008, the New Zealand Limited Partnerships Act 2008, the 
German Commercial Code and the French Commercial Code. 
At this juncture, the choice of jurisdictions for comparison merits explanation. 
                                                 
44 §17-1101 of the DRULPA has played a crucial role in the development of venture capital investment. 
Pursuant to this provision, venture capitalists are able to waive almost all fiduciary and other duties imposed 
upon them by state law. David Rosenberg, ―Venture Capital Limited Partnership: a Study in Freedom of 
Contract‖ (2002) Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 363 at 365. 
45 In the US, the 1916 and 1976 versions of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act were adopted in 49 states, 
the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. States which adopted the ULPA 2001 include: 
Arkansas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, New 
Mexico, North Dakota and Virginia. See ―The ULPA 2001 Legislative Fact Sheet‖, online: NCCUSL 
<http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ulpa.asp>. 
46 UK Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Limited Partnerships Act 1907: A Joint 
Consultation Paper (2001) (Consultation Paper No 161; Discussion Paper No 118). [UK Joint Consultation 
Paper on Partnership]. 
47 UK Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Partnership Law: Report (2003) (Law Commission 
No 283; Scottish Law Commission No 192). [UK Partnership Law Report]. 
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(1) The legislative goal of introducing the LP in China is to encourage venture 
capital and private equity investment in China.
48
 The drafters of the PRC LP are 
optimistic that as the LP has already proven to be a useful means for venture 
capital investment, the adoption of this new LP vehicle will assist in the 
attraction of more venture capital to high-tech enterprises and facilitate the 
economic development in China.
49
  
Particularly, the LP has become a common and popular business vehicle in the 
US venture capital and private equity markets since the 1970s.
 50
 The popularity 
of the LP in the US is consistent with Chinese legislative goal on the PRC LP. 
Also, the US has a long history of LP legislation from the first LP statute of New 
York in 1822, to the ULPA 1916 and to the ULPA 2001.
51
 The US story may shed 
light on the PRC law. 
In fact, the drafters of the PRC LP have substantially referred to the US 
legislation when drafting the PRC LP.
52
 It appears that the PRC LP borrows 
several legal institutions from the US, such as the safe harbor list and the concept 
of limited partner derivative action. Nevertheless, the LP regimes in Germany, 
                                                 
48 Yan Yixun, ―Reasons of Revising the Partnership Enterprise Law‖, National People‘s Congress, News 
Release (8 May 2006), online: <http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/bmzz/caizheng/2006-
05/08/content_1383740.htm> (copy in Chinese).  
49 Ibid.  
50 Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004) [Gompers 
and Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle] at 10. David Rosenberg, ―Venture Capital Limited Partnerships: A 
Study in Freedom of Contract‖ (2002) Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 363, n 5 and the accompanying text. 
51 For the history of the LP in the US, see infra the text accompanying notes 329-341. 
52 ―Discussion on the Revision to the Partnership Enterprise Law‖, National People‘s Congress, News 
Release (30 April 2006), online: < http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2006-08/24/content_351511.htm > 
(copy in Chinese). 
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France and Japan do not provide equivalent rules on these two issues.
53
 
(2) The English LP has also been proved to be the standard structure in the UK 
and European venture capital funds since 1987.
54
 In recent years, the UK Law 
Commissions has launched a reform of the English LP
55
 so as to maintain the 
UK‘s competitive position in the venture capital market. 56  Their law reform 
reports reflect the new developments and the major problems regarding the LP.
57
 
Singapore and New Zealand introduced the LP in 2008 mainly for the purpose of 
encouraging investment in the region. Since their legislative goals are similar to 
that of the PRC‘s, 58 it is believed that their LP regimes may shed light on the 
PRC law.  
(3) The reason why this thesis does not include major civil law jurisdictions as 
                                                 
53 See further discussion in Chapter 5 and Chapter 7 in this thesis. 
54 The UK Law Commissions, ―Limited Partnerships Act 1907 Consultation‖, online: 
<http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/cp161sum.pdf > at 1. It states that, ―On 26 May 1987 the Inland Revenue 
and the Department of Trade and Industry approved a statement on the use of limited partnerships as venture 
capital investment funds. Since then, limited partnerships have become the standard structure used by 
venture capitalists not only for United Kingdom funds but also for European funds.‖  For the popularity of 
the English LP, see, e.g., ―American Venture Capital Industry Overview‖, online:  National Venture Capital 
Association <http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=141&Itemid=133>.  
 55 For updates on the UK partnership reform, see UK Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 
online: <http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/businesslaw/partnership/page25911.html>. 
 56 UK Joint Consultation Paper on Partnership, supra note 46 at 5. 
57 Since 2000, the UK Law Commissions have published several joint reports and consultation papers on 
partnership law. These joint reports raised tremendous discussion on the theoretical and practical aspects of 
the partnership in the UK, such as the entity issue, the fiduciary duty issue, and the simplification of solvent 
dissolution. For further information, see ―Partnership Law: Earlier History of Limited Partnership 
Proposals‖, online: British Department for Business Innovation and Skills 
<http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/businesslaw/partnership/page25911.html>; Elspeth Deards, ―Limited 
Partnerships: limited reforms?‖ (2003) J.B.L. 435; Saleem Sheikh, ―Limited Partnership Act 1907: Time for 
Reform‖ (2002) 23(6) Comp. Law 179; J.J. Henning, ―Partnership Law Review: the Joint Consultation 
Papers and the Limited Liability Partnership Act in Brief Historical and Comparative Perspective‖ (2004) 
25(6) Comp. Law 163 [Henning, ―Partnership Law Review‖].  
58 For the legislative background of the Singapore LP and the New Zealand LP, see Law Reform and 
Revision Division of Singapore, Singapore Report of the Study Team on Limited Partnerships, online: < 
http://www.mof.gov.sg/consultation_archives/public_con_lp_bill_2006.html>; New Zealand Companies 





the primary focuses of the comparative analysis is threefold. 
Firstly, in Japan, Germany and France, their traditional LP regimes are not the 
most popular business forms in their venture capital and private equity markets. 
For example, in Japan, the common organisational form for venture capital 
investment is the partnership for investment purposes (toshi jigyo kumiai), which 
is roughly equivalent to the general partnership, but not the LP.
59
 In France, few 
venture capital funds are organized as LPs. The French LP regime also 
encounters tax and regulatory restrictions.
60
 In Germany, a more recent structure 
in the venture capital fund raising is the GmbH & Co. KGaA (a 
Kommanditgesellschaft with freely transferable shares where the general partner 
is a private company).
61
 Under German Commercial Code, the GmbH & Co. 
KGaA is considered as a type of companies but not a partnership form. 
Secondly, there are some differences between the PRC LP and its counterpart in 
France, Germany and Japan. The PRC LP is a type of partnerships under the PEL. 
However, the LP regimes in France, Germany and Japan are considered 
companies in their respective commercial codes, but not partnerships. For 
instance, the Japanese LP (合資会社) is regulated under the section of Gomei 
Kaisha,
62
 the German LP (Kommanditgesellschaft) is regulated under the section 
                                                 
59 Curtis J. Milhaupt, ―The Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan: Venture Capital and the 
Comparative Corporate Governance Debate‖ (1997) 91 Nw.U.L.Rev 865 at footnote 118.  
60 Benjamin Aller, ―The FCPR and the limited partnership: a tale of two fund structures‖ (2003) European 
Venture Capital Journal (1 May). For further discussion on French LP regime, see infra text accompanying 
notes 305-320 in this thesis. 
61 Editorial, ―Limted Partnerships under Review‖ (2002) 23(6) Comp. Law 165. 
62 Japanese Commercial Code, Book Two, Chapter 2. 
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of Share Companies en Commadite
63
 and the French société en commandite 
simple is regulated under the section of Des sociétés commerciales.
64
 Moreover, 
unlike France, Germany and Japan where there is no separate consolidated 
partnership Act governing the partnerships, the PRC has a separate PEL to 
govern the partnership enterprises. Further, as will be discussed in Chapter 2 of 
this thesis, although the civil law, particularly, German Law has had influence on 
modern Chinese law, the PEL as a stand-alone enterprise law promulgated in 
1997, does not bear strong influence of Germany law due to the piecemeal 
development of Chinese partnership law in modern China.
65
  
Thirdly, due to the limited English material on the LP in Japan, France and 
Germany,
66
 and the fact that the author does not speak Japanese, French or 
German, there are limitations for providing in-depth analysis on the LP regimes 
in these countries.   
3. Literature Gap  
Generally, the literature on LPs can be divided into three categories: (1) general 
discussions on LPs from a legal perspective; (2) historical and comparative 
studies on LPs; (3) economic analysis on LPs; and (4) discussion on venture 
capital or private equity LP.  
                                                 
63 German Commercial Code §161- §176. 
64 French Commercial Code Art. L222- 1-Art. L222- 12. 
65 See infra text accompanying note 277.   
66 There are many English-written articles on corporations in Japan, France and Germany. However, English 
-written articles on partnerships in these jurisdictions are comparatively limited.  
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3.1 General Discussion on the LP 
Among various early scholarly writings on the LP,
67
 the Bromberg and Ribstein 
on Partnership,
68
 488H iggins and Fletcher the law of partnership in Australia and 
New Zealand
69
 and Lindley on the Law of Partnership can be deemed as 
classics.
70
 However, the LP was only discussed in separate chapters of these 
books. There is scant comprehensive monograph on the LP.  
There are papers introducing the recent legislative changes on LPs.
71
 There are 
also law reform reports and consultation papers presenting the legislative 
background and the contents of the on-going partnership reforms.
72
 In China, the 
adoption of the LP awakens great interest in Chinese academia and practice.
73
 
                                                 
67 Weber, Max, The History of Commercial Partnerships in the Middle Ages, Translated and Introduced by 
Lutz Kaelber. (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). For the history of LP, see, e.g., Cooke, Colin 
Arthur, Corporation, Trust and Company: An Essay in Legal History (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1950); Holdsworth, William Searle, Sir, A History of English Law (London: Methuen, 1956), 
[Holdsworth, A History of English Law] vol. 8 at 196.  
68 Alan R Bromberg and Larry E. Ribstein, Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership 1st ed. (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1988) [Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership]. 
69 See, e.g., Fletcher, K. L. Higgins and Fletcher, the Law of Partnership in Australia and New Zealand 
(Pyrmont, N.S.W.: Thomson Legal and Regulatory Group Asia Pacific, 2001), [Fletcher] ; William 
Mitchell, ―Early Forms of Partnership‖ in Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History (New York: 
Oceana, 1968). 
70 Ernest H. Scamell and R.C. I'Anson Banks, Lindley and Banks on Partnership, 15th ed. (London: Sweet 
and Maxwell, 2005), [Lindley and Banks on Partnership]. 
71 See, e.g., Joseph A. McCahery and Erik P.M. Vermeulen, ―Limited Partnership Reform in the United 
Kingdom: A Competitive, Venture Capital Oriented Business Form‖ (2004) 5 European Business 
Organizational law Review 1; Elspeth Deards ―Partnership law Reform in the twenty-First century ‖ (2001) 
J.B.L. 357; Carter G. Bishop, ―The Limited Liability Partnership Amendments to the Uniform Partnership 
Act (1994)‖, (1997) 53 Business Lawyer 1001; Hwee Ying Yeo, ―Liability of Partners in a Limited Liability 
Partnership Regime‖ (2003)15 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 392; Geoffrey Morse, ―Partnerships for 
the 21st Century? - Limited Liability Partnerships and Partnership Law Reform in the United Kingdom‖ 
(2002) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 455; Judith Freedman, ―Limited liability partnerships in the 
United Kingdom: Do They Have a Role for Small Firms?‖ (2001) 26 Journal of Corporation Law 897.  
72 See, e.g., UK Partnership Law Report, supra note 47; Law Reform and Revision Division (LRRD) of 
Singapore, Singapore Report of the Study Team on Limited Partnerships, online: < 
http://www.mof.gov.sg/consultation_archives/public_con_lp_bill_2006.html>. 
73 See, e.g., Wang Baoshu ed. China Commercial Law Annual Review 2006: Legal System of Partnerships 
and Cooperation (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2007) (copy in Chinese), [Wang, China Commercial 
Law Annual Review 2006]; Zhu and Ge, supra note 37. 
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Nevertheless, given the short history of the LP in China, inadequate academic 




3.2 Historical and Comparative Study on the Partnership Form 
Another category of work examines the LP from historical and comparative 
perspectives,
75
 such as: 489Hthe Evolution of Legal Business Forms in Europe and the 
United States: Venture Capital, Joint Venture and Partnership Structures,
76
 A 
Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships: the Islamic world and Europe, 
with Specific Reference to the Ottoman Archives,
77
 ―Law and the Rise of the 
Firm‖,78 ―The New Business Entities in Evolutionary Perspective‖79 and ―Entity 
Shielding and the Development of Business Forms: a Comparative 
Perspective‖.80  
Although thorough study has been conducted on the evolution of the partnership 
                                                 
74 See, e.g., Fang Liufang; Xia Yuantao; Sang Binxue; Danian Zhang, ―Chinese Partnership‖, (1989) 52(3) 
Law and Contemporary Problems 43, [Fang, ―Chinese Partnership‖]. This paper presents a historical review 
on Chinese partnerships. However, it does not discuss the partnership enterprise under the PEL. 
75 These papers can be found in (1997) Symposium on the Future of the Unincorporated Firm; (2001) 
Symposium: Uncorporated Business Entities; (2004) Closely-held Business Symposium: The Uniform 
Limited Partnership Act and (2005) University of Illinois College of Law Conference on ―Uncorporation: A 
New Age?‖. 
76 Vermeulen, Erik M.,  ―The Evolution of Legal Business Forms in Europe and the United States‖ (London: 
Kluwer Law International, 2003) [Vermeulen, ―The Evolution of Legal Business Forms in Europe and the 
United States‖]. 
77 Cizakca, Murat, a Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships: the Islamic World and Europe, with 
Specific Reference to the Ottoman Archives (New York: E.J. Brill, 1996). This book examines the evolution 
of medieval partnership forms in Europe and their role in Ottoman Economy. 
78 Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman and Richard Squire, ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖ (2006) 119 
Harv. L. Rev. 1333 [Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖]. 
79  Hansmann, Henry, Kraakman, Reinier H. and Squire, Richard C, ―The New Business Entities in 
Evolutionary Perspective‖ (2007) 8(1) E.B.O.R 59 [Hansmann et al., "The New Business Entities in 
Evolutionary Perspective"]. 
80 Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, ―Entity Shielding and the Development of Business 
Forms: a Comparative Perspective‖ (2006) 119 Harv. L. Rev. F. 238. [Lamoreaux and Rosenthal, ―Entity 
Shielding and the Development of Business Forms‖]. 
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reform in the US and the Europe, the underlying theory, economic forces on the 
evolution of Chinese partnerships and the legal features of Chinese LPs is under-
researched. There is limited comparative study on the PRC LP with the American 
or English LP regimes.
81
 
3.3 Economic Analysis on Partnerships 
There are some economic analyses of the partnership forms. Economic analysis 
is very useful in assessing and predicting the effect and desirability of business 
organizations.
82
 Applying economic theories to law may help us identify some 
―blind spots‖ in the subject. For instance, ―A Theory of Partnerships‖83 compares 
the costs and benefits of partnerships relating to the corporate form of 
organization. ―An Applied Theory of Limited Partnership‖ 84  examines the 
benefits and cost of personal liability. The second part of 490Hthe Evolution of Legal 
                                                 
81 See, e.g., Yong Wu and Thomas Earl Geu, ―The New PRC Limited Partnership Enterprise Law and the 
Limited Partnership Law of the United States: A Selective Analytical Comparison‖ (2007) 25 UCLA Pac. 
Basin L.J. 133.  
82 See, e.g., Coase, Ronald H., "The Nature of the Firm", (1937) 4 Economica 386; Kenneth E. Scott and 
Richard Posner, eds., Economics of Corporation Law and Securities Regulation (Boston, MA: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1980); Robert Brown and Alan S. Gutterman, Asian Economic and Legal Development: 
Uncertainty, Risk and Legal Efficiency (London : Kluwer Law International, 1998); Henry Hansmann, The 
Ownership of Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996); Henry 
Hansmann, ―Organizational Law as Asset Partitioning‖ (2000) 44 European Economic Review 807; 
William W Bratton and Joseph A. McCahery, ―An Inquiry into the Efficiency of the Limited Liability 
Company: Of Theory of the Firm and Regulatory Competition‖ (1997) 54 Wash. and Lee L. Rev.687; 
Wittman, Donald A, Economic Foundations of Law and Organization (Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); John Armour, Michael J Whincop ―An Economic Analysis of Shared Property in 
Partnership and Close Corporations Law‖ (2001) 26 Journal of Corporation Law 983. In addition, Richard 
A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2007); Frank H. Easterbrook, Daniel 
R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991); 
Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., Progressive Corporate Law (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995); William A. 
Klein and John C. Coffee, Jr., Business Organization and Finance: Legal and Economic Principles, 10th ed. 
(New York: Foundation Press, 2007).  
83 Levin, Jonathan D. and Tadelis, Steven, ―A Theory of Partnerships‖ (October 2002). Stanford Law and 
Economics Olin Working Paper No. 244., online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=311159 or 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.311159>. 
84 Larry E. Ribstein, ―An Applied Theory of Limited Partnership‖ (1988) 37 Emory Law Journal 837. 
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Business Forms in Europe and the United States: Venture Capital, Joint Venture 
and Partnership Structures applies an efficiency test to examine the partnership 
forms and to identify the default rules which are likely to resolve the main 
problems in partnerships.  
Nevertheless, there are few papers examining the PRC partnerships from an 
economic perspective.
85
 Several parts of the arguments developed in this thesis 
attempt to assess the PRC LP from both legal and economic perspectives.  
3.4 Discussion on Venture Capital/Private Equity LP 
There are substantial theoretical inquiries on venture capital LPs in US 
academia.
86
 Nevertheless, in China, private equity and venture capital are new 
business sectors and the LP is a brand new business vehicle in these areas. There 
is a few papers providing in-depth analysis on China‘s venture capital or private 
equity LPs. This thesis attempts to examine these LPs from legal and 
comparative perspectives. The Chinese case study would also contribute to the 
existing jurisprudence in the area.  
                                                 
85 Prof. Li Qingchi attempts to examine business organizations, including corporations, partnerships and 
trusts in the context of China by applying the theory of organizational law and economics. Nevertheless, the 
book does not discuss the PRC LP in detail. See generally in Li Qingchi, The Legal Structure of Business 
Organizations (Beijing: Law Press China, 2008) (copy in Chinese).  
86 See, e.g., David Rosenberg, ―The Two ―Cycles‖ of Venture Capital‖ (2003) 28 J. Corp. L. 419. For 
general discussions of the structure of venture capital limited partnerships, see Paul Gompers and Josh 
Lerner, ―The Use of Covenants: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Partnership Agreements‖ (1996) 29 J.L. 
and Econ. 463; David Rosenberg, ―Venture Capital Limited Partnerships: A Study in Freedom of Contract‖ 
(2002) Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 363; William Sahlman, ―The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital 
Organizations‖ (1990) 27 J. Fin. Econ. 473; Terence Woolf, ―The Venture Capitalist's Corporate 
Opportunity Problem‖ (2001) Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 473; Houman B. Shadab, ―The Law and Economics of 
Hedge Funds: Financial Innovation and Investor Protection‖ 6 Berkeley Bus L J (forthcoming 2009), online 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1066808>. (Analyzing the structure of limited partnership hedge funds); Harris, 
Lee, ―A Critical Theory of Private Equity‖ (2010) 35 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 259, [Lee]. 
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4. Research Significance  
As the LP is a new business vehicle in China, research on the LP remains limited 
on scholarly and teaching sides. On the one hand, those who study company law 
tend not to give partnership law much attention, assuming that partnership is not 
governed under the Chinese company law. On the other hand, many Chinese 
articles mainly discuss the necessity and feasibility of introducing the LP into 
China, but do not sufficiently examine their underlying theories and practical 
problems. This thesis is aimed at filling these gaps. It seeks to:  
 offer a historical review on the evolution of Chinese partnerships; 
  provide a critical assessment on the fundamental theoretical and 
practical issues on the PRC LP from comparative, empirical and 
economic perspectives; 
 suggest solutions to best implement the PRC LP and to make the 
PRC LP achieve the legislative goal; and 
 discuss whether the Chinese sample contributes to the LP 
jurisprudence and the on-going debate on LPs. 
It is believed that this thesis may be valuable to scholars who are interested in the 
area of partnership law; to overseas legislature and academics who are involved 
in the recent or future partnership law reform.; to Chinese lawmakers and policy 
makers who are to review the PEL and to law practitioners who are involved in 




It is believed that the fundamental legal problems of the PRC LP discussed in 
this thesis would exist and apply in different jurisdictions. The innovative work 
may have ramifications in different jurisdictions, and may receive serious 
attention from overseas legislature and academics.  
Several articles, derived from earlier drafts of chapters in this thesis were 
published in several refereed Journals and were presented in several international 
academic conferences. They include the following articles: 
 Lin Lin, ―The Limited Liability Partnership in China: A Long Way 
Ahead‖ (2010) 7 International Company and Commercial Law Review 
259; 
 Lin Lin, ―Limited Partnership - the New Business Vehicle in China‖ 




 Lin Lin, ―Special General Partnership in China‖ in David A. Frenkel and 
Carsten Gerner-Beuerle eds, Challenges of the Law in a Permeable World  
(ATINER, 2009) at 87;  
 Lin Lin, ―The Organizational Choices for Private Equity Funds in China‖, 
(Paper presented to the 5
th
 Asian Law Institute Conference, Faculty of 
Law, National University of Singapore, 23 May 2008);  
 Lin Lin, ―The Specialty of the Special General Partnership in China‖, 
                                                 
87 This article is co-written with HY Yeo. 
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(Paper presented to the 5
th
 International Conference on Law, 491HAthens 
Institute for Education and Research, Athens, Greece, 20 July 2008); and 
 Lin Lin, ―A New Business Vehicle for Venture Capital Investment in 
China: Under the Partnership Enterprise Law‖, (Paper presented to the 
2007 ALIN International Academic Conference, Faculty of Law, 
Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 6 December 2007).  
5. Thesis Statement 
PART I: Challenging the PRC LP - Problems Ahead  
This thesis is organized in three parts. Part I, consisting of Chapter 2, 3 and 4, 
sets forth the starting points of Part II and Part III. Part I inquiries into the 
evolution of partnership and partnership law in China, the major features of the 
PEL and the PRC LP, and the special empirical and theoretical problems of the 
PRC LP in the context of China‘s venture capital and private equity markets.  
Chapter 2 draws a picture of the historical and legislative evolution of 
partnerships and partnership law in China, from the Spring and Autumn period to 
early modern China, from the establishment of the PRC to the revision of the 
PEL in 2006. In order to explain and evaluate the PEL today, it is necessary to 
understand how and why it emerges, changes or persists. To avoid making the 
analysis abstract or shallow, a comparative method is applied when describing 
the Chinese story of partnerships and partnership laws. For example, when 
examining the Song maritime partnerships, references are made to the business 
form in comparatively-developed medieval Italy - the commenda. 
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Asset partitioning scholarship is also used to advance the analysis on ancient 
Chinese partnerships. Hansmann, Kraakman and Squire (Hansmann et al.) in 
their article ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖88 explain that entity shielding has 
been a necessary feature in organizational law throughout the history of business 
organizations. However, this scholarship does not mention China, which is one of 
the world's oldest civilizations. Evidence presented in Chapter 2 shows that large 
ancient Chinese enterprises were not provided with entity shielding. This 
debunks Hansmann et al.‘s recent thesis.  
This chapter further illustrates the slow development of partnership law in 
modern China. It points out that the socialist ideology and public-ownership 
economy has long been the major obstacles in the introduction and codification 
of partnerships during Mao‘s era in China. It is also argued that due to the 
piecemeal partnership legislation in the last five decades, the PEL today is not 
naturally developed out of private partnership practice. In contrast, it is a policy-
driven enterprise law promulgated in the transitional period of the PRC. This 
historical background helps us understand why the PEL still contains ambiguous 
and inconsistent concepts and rules.   
Chapter 3 reviews the origin, evolution and recent developments of the LP in 
major civil law and common law jurisdictions, including Germany, France, the 
US and the UK. This analysis points out how the popularity of the various LP 
                                                 
88 Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78. 
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regimes is affected by the economic and legislative changes in their jurisdictions. 
It is argued that although the introduction of new limited liability vehicles and 
the elimination of tax incentives on partnerships have negatively affected the 
take-up rate of the LP, the LP still has its vibrant life and plays an important role 
in the business world, especially in the venture capital and private equity markets. 
This is largely due to the incentives inherent in the LP mechanism, namely, the 
combination of limited liability and personal liability, the flexible, confidential 
and contractual nature of partnerships. 
 By reviewing the legislative background of the PRC LP, this chapter argues that 
the PRC LP is an ―imported‖ creation of law aiming at facilitating the 
development of venture capital investment in China. By comparing the PRC LP 
with its counterparts in the US, the UK, Germany and France, this chapter 
identifies the major problems which have not been addressed or addressed well 
within the PRC LP. These problems include the ambiguous legal nature of 
partnerships, the lack of the control rule, the lack of fiduciary duties, the lack of 
detailed rules of the limited partner derivative action and the ambiguous liability 
shield of limited partners.  
Chapter 4 examines the PRC LP in the context of China‘s venture capital and 
private equity markets by employing the qualitative research method. The 
author‘s empirical study in China‘s venture capital and private equity markets 
identifies a serious problem within China‘s private equity market - the severe 
conflict of interest between limited partners and general partners in China‟s 
private equity LPs. This chapter attempts to identify the economic, cultural, 
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regulatory and structural reasons for such a conflict.  
Based on the theoretical and empirical findings in Chapter 3 and 4, Part I 
suggests that the major legal problems within the PRC LP can be divided into 
two parts: 
(1)  rules which govern the internal relationship between limited partners and 
general partners (the control rule, the duties of partners, the derivative 
action);  and 
(2)  rules which govern the external relationship between these partners and 
outsiders (liability of partners and creditors‘ rights). 
PART II: Internal Rules of the PRC LP 
Building upon the findings in Part I, Part II and Part III are concerned with 
solving the internal and external problems within the PRC LP respectively, 
especially, to what extent do these problems require special legal rules.  
Part II, consisting of Chapter 5, 6 and 7, examines the legal rules which govern 
the internal relationship between limited partners and general partners. This part 
emphasizes three basic themes underlying the internal relationships between 
limited partners and general partners: (1) the control rule which prevents the 
limited partners from participating in the control of the firm; (2) the statutory 
duties provided by the partnership law and the contractual duties in partnership 
terms; and (3) the derivative action for limited partners to protect their interests 
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in the LP and the interests of the LP.  
This part attempts to make a theoretical and empirical assessment on several 
contractual designs in China‘s private equity LPs. It is argued that those 
innovative contractual arrangements do reduce agency problems within the LP, 
but they have severe limits. For instance, the various internal governance 
mechanisms in China‘s private equity LPs not only create substantial monitoring 
and transaction costs, but are also the potential cause of internal disputes. This 
thesis argues that alternative contractual design alone should not be overstated in 
regulating internal relationship between limited and general partners. Even 
though the very nature of a partnership is ―contractual‖, law still plays an 
essential role in anticipating and mitigating the agency problem within the LP. 
Chapter 5 seeks to provide satisfactory legal solutions to solve the control rule 
problem within the PRC LP. Based on the author‘s empirical study, this chapter 
first presents the typical internal structure in China‘s private equity LPs. That is, 
various investment advisory committees are established by limited partners for 
the purposes of reviewing and approving fund investment. General partners‘ 
management rights, however, are largely diluted by these mechanisms. To 
understand the reasons for Chinese limited partners‘ strong desire to control, this 
chapter examines the cultural, structural and social aspects regarding the PRC LP. 
Considering that the control rule originated from France and was reinforced in 
the US, this chapter reviews the evolution of the control rule in these two 
jurisdictions. It argues that while there was a social demand for the control rule in 
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the Old Regime France, such an element was missing in the US when the control 
rule was transplanted into the US. Also, while the aged-old control rule has once 
been an effective rule in preventing limited partners‘ meddling in the LP firm, it 
may not be useful in the context of China. The Chinese sample also challenges 
the conventional theory on the control rule. 
This chapter then examines the alternative rules provided in the PEL and 
discusses whether they do serve a similar deterrent function as the control rule. 
While the answer is positive, it is argued that, in order to meet the business needs 
of the users of the PRC LP, a few more amendments shall be made to the PEL. 
Chapter 6 attempts to justify statutory duties in the PRC LP and proposes the 
contents of partners‘ duties in the context of China. It argues that while fiduciary 
duties are fundamental in regulating the internal relationship among partners in 
common law jurisdictions, they are incompatible with China‘s legal tradition and 
culture. By applying the theory of incomplete contract and the theory of 
transaction cost, it argues that contractual design alone may not function 
effectively in anticipating and mitigating managerial abuse of general partners. 
Considering the codification tradition of Chinese law, the recent international 
trend of codifying partners‘ duties, and the pressing business needs in China‘s 
private equity market, selected statutory duties are proposed. 
Chapter 7 inquires into the theories and operation of the limited partner 
derivative action in the context of China. Based on the author‘s empirical studies, 
this chapter first emphasizes the business needs for the limited partners 
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derivative action in China‘s private equity market. It then evaluates the benefits 
and costs of strengthening this remedy in the context of China. It argues that, 
compared to alternative legal remedies, the derivative action is more effective in 
reducing management costs within a PRC LP. By comparing the US‘ legislative 
and judicial experience in the limited partner derivative action, this chapter 
proposes recommendations on this legal rule in China.  
PART III: External Rules of the PRC LP 
Part III, consisting Chapter 8, examines the major issues which govern the 
external relationship between the partners and outsiders, especially the liability 
of limited partners and the creditors‘ rights. According to the asset partitioning 
scholarship, limited liability is deemed as a strong owner shielding while rules 
that protect a firm's assets from the personal creditors of its owners is deemed as 
a strong entity shielding. Chapter 8 seeks to clarify the ambiguities within these 
issues by applying the asset partitioning scholarship.  
 
Chapter 8 criticizes that the PEL‘s failure in providing clear rules of entity 
shielding has created a practical problem to creditors of partnerships and 
personal creditors of partners. As the PEL fails to specify the situation when both 
the partnership and its partner are insolvent, it is not clear whether creditors of 
the firm have priority over personal creditors in the division of firm assets. It is 
also argued that the PRC LP is not embodied with a strong owner shielding in the 
sense that limited partners still have to be personally liable for the debts of the 
firm in specific circumstances.  
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Chapter 9 provides a conclusion. It summarizes the principal findings and 
suggestions on the PRC LP and provides a roadmap for further regulations and 




PART I CHALLENGING THE LIMTED PARTNERSHIP IN CHINA: 
PROBLEMS AHEAD 
CHAPTER 2  THE EVOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND 
PARTNERSHIP LAW IN CHINA: FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF 
ASSET PARTITIOINING 
1. Introduction 
It would be difficult to understand the LP without reference to the evolution and 
the legal framework of partnerships. Today, the PEL is the fundamental 
legislation governing both the LP and the general partnership in China. Under the 
PEL, there is a strong linkage between the general partnership and the LP. The 
PRC LP is regulated under a separate Chapter III of the PEL which contains only 
25 provisions. Where this Chapter does not specifically provide for a specific 
situation, there is a fall-back clause that the provision on the general partnership 
and its partners that applies to the LP.
89
  
A deep understanding of the background and growth of the Chinese partnerships 
and partnership law can offer insight into the culture, social relationships, trends, 
and future possibilities of Chinese partnerships. The evolution of partnerships in 
                                                 
89 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 60. 
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China may have certain legal implications on the PEL today and has 
subsequently given rise to the specialties of the PRC partnerships today. 
In a recent important contribution, Hansmann and Kraakman developed the 
theory of asset partitioning and provided a non-traditional view of the shielding 
analysis. They argue that "characteristic of all legal entities ... is the partitioning 
off of a separate set of assets in which creditors of the firm itself have a prior 
security interest".
90
 An important component of asset partitioning is the 
assignment to creditors of priority in the distinct pools of assets that result from 
the formation of a legal entity.
91
 It takes two forms according to the assignment 
of priorities: (1) the ―affirmative asset partitioning‖ and (2) the ―defensive asset 
partitioning‖.92 They further developed this theory in the subsequent articles93 
and labeled the two forms of asset partitioning as ―entity shielding‖ and ―owner 
shielding‖. Entity shielding refers to rules that protect a firm‘s assets from the 
personal creditors of its owners.
94
 Owner shielding refers to the rules that protect 
the personal assets of a firm‘s owners from the firm‘s creditors.95 Hansmann et 
al.
96
 in the thesis ―The Rise of the Firm‖ argues that entity shielding; the inability 
of investors' creditors to gain access to the assets of an enterprise, has been 
central to the rise of the business enterprise. 
                                                 
90 Hansmann and Kraakman, ―The Essential Role of Organizational Law‖ (2000) 110 YALE L.J. 387 at 391. 
91 Hansmann and Kraakman, ―The Essential Role of Organizational Law‖, supra note 90 at 393. 
92 Hansmann and Kraakman, ―The Essential Role of Organizational Law‖, supra note 90 at 394-395. 
93 Hansmann et al., "The New Business Entities in Evolutionary Perspective", supra note 79; Hansmann et 
al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78.  
94 Hansmann and Kraakman, ―The Essential Role of Organizational Law‖, supra note 90 at 1337. 
95 Hansmann and Kraakman, ―The Essential Role of Organizational Law‖, supra note 90 at 1339. 
96 As defined in the Thesis Statement in Chapter 1, the term ―Hansmann et al.‖ refers to Henry Hansmann, 
Reinier Kraakman and Richard Squire. 
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However, their article presents a ―western story‖ of the development of entity 
shielding with no mention of China, which is one of the world's oldest 
civilizations. The hypothesis is that China has once possessed the most advanced 
society and economy in the ancient world through successive 492Hdynasties, there 
might be a form of entity shielding in large ancient Chinese enterprises. It may 
reinforce Hansmann et al.‘s recent research by adding a ―Chinese story‖. On the 
contrary, if large ancient Chinese enterprises lacked entity shielding, this would 
debunk their primary thesis.
 97
  
Considering the subject of this thesis is partnership law, this Chapter mainly 
discusses ancient Chinese partnerships. To answer this critical historical question: 
did entity shielding appear in ancient China and when it did? This chapter takes 
steps toward an answer by analyzing three historical epochs in the development 
of partnerships in ancient China
98
: (1) From the Spring and Autumn Period to the 
Tang Dynasty (722BC - 907); (2) the Song Dynasty and the Yuan Dynasty (960 -
1368);
99
 and (3) the Ming Dynasty and the Qing Dynasty ( 493H1368 - 494H1911).  
Evidence and observations presented in this Chapter are thrilling. It seemed that 
large Chinese enterprises in ancient China were not provided with rules of entity 
                                                 
97 I would like to express my deep thanks to Dr. Dan W. Puchniak for inspiring and encouraging me to write 
this chapter from the perspective of asset partitioning. His valuable insight on this matter is most helpful in 
producing this chapter. 
98 In this thesis, ―ancient China‖ refers to the Chinese history from the Xia Dynasty to the Qing Dynasty 
(2100BC-1911). Republic of China period (1911-1949) and the People‘s Republic of China Period (1949 to 
present) are considered as the modern China period. 
99 Between the Tang Dynasty and the Song Dynasty, there was a political disunity period called the ―Five 
Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms‖ (907-960). During this era, five regimes succeeded one another rapidly in 
control of the northern China and ten more regimes occupied several parts of southern and western China. 
Considering that this era lasted for only five decades and the limited historical materials on partnerships 
during this period, this Chapter does not attempt to explore the partnership forms during this period. 
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shielding. This result does not imply that the medieval law was more successful 
than its Chinese counterpart in addressing creditors‘ rights. Instead, it is argued 
that ancient China‘s reluctance to deploy entity shielding reflected a deep anti-
commercial cultural norm, a strong demand for imperial control, a low demand 
for legal entities, the lack of workable accounting method and bankruptcy 
concept, preferences for social mores in local judgment making etc. 
This chapter also seeks to explore whether there existed an LP form throughout 
Chinese history. Especially, although there was a consensus among many 
scholars that the modern LP originated from the commenda in medieval Italy,
100
 
it is of essential importance to investigate whether there existed a partnership 
form similar to the commenda in ancient China, particularly, in the Song Dynasty 
which was also one of the most prosperous and advanced economies in the 
medieval world. Large partnerships in the Ming and Qing Dynasties are also 
highlighted in this chapter. 
 In summary, this chapter seeks to conduct an inquiry into the following 
questions: 
(1) When and how did partnerships and partnership law evolve in China?  
(2) Was there a similar legal form of the LP in ancient China?  
                                                 
100 Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership, supra 68 at vol. 3, § 1102; Holdsworth, A History of English 
Law, supra note 67; Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78.at 1372. Cf. Cizakca, 
Cizakca, A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships, supra note 77 at Chapter 2 (arguing that the 
commeda is originated in the world of Islam and the Islamic mudaraba is an earlier form of the commeda). 
Infra text accompanying notes 286-329 provides a brief introduction of the commenda. 
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(3) Were large ancient Chinese enterprises provided with entity shielding?  
(4) What are the major features of the PEL and the PRC partnership enterprises 
under the PEL?  
2. The Evolution of Partnerships in Ancient China: from the Perspective of 
Asset Partitioning 
2.1 From the Spring and Autumn Period to the Tang Dynasty (between 495H722 
BC- 496H 07) 
It is widely acknowledged that the earliest business partnerships in China can be 
traced back as far as to the 497HSpring and Autumn Period (between 498H722 BC and 499H 81 
BC).
101
 The emergence of partnerships was a natural result of the economic 
development during this period. During this period, hereditary nobles (诸侯) 
promulgated policies to promote business in their controlled regions. Hereditary 
noble states (诸侯国) even concluded treaties to ensure cross border trading 
among them. These incentives facilitated trading and boosted the financial state 
for the wealthy merchant class as well.
102
   
The Chinese classic, the Spring and Autumn of Master Lü (Lüshichunqiu, 吕氏
                                                 
101 See Liu Qiugen, ―The Origin and Emergence of Ancient Chinese Partnerships – From the Warring States 
Period to the Sui Tang Five Dynasties‖ (2007) Hebei University Journal vol.3 (copy in Chinese), [Liu, ―The 
Origin and Emergence of Ancient Chinese Partnerships‖]; Zhou Jinwen, ―Comparative Study on Partnership 
Business in Ancient China and Western Countries‖ (1996) Commercial Economy and Management vol.2 
(copy in Chinese). 
102 See Zhu Honglin, ―Features of Business Development in the Spring and Autumn Period‖ (2004) Jilin 
Normal University Journal vol.6 at 89 (copy in Chinese). See also Liu Qiugen, Preliminary Studies on 
Ancient Chinese Partnerships (Beijing: Renmin Press, 2007) (copy in Chinese), [Liu, Preliminary Studies 
on Ancient Chinese Partnerships] at 57. 
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春秋)103 records a much-told story, which can be deemed as the earliest record on 
partnerships in Chinese history. ―Guanzhong (管仲) and Bao Shuya (鲍叔牙) 
carried on businesses in common in Nanyang. Though more profits were 
distributed to Guanzhong, Bao Shuya did not consider him to be a greedy person 
because he understood that Guanzhong had to support his mother…‖104 Strictly 
speaking, this business relationship had little in common with the modern 
partnership form. The two parties did not carry on business purely for profits as 
they put a greater emphasis on their personal relationship. Moreover, there was 
no liability or agency concept within this relationship.
105
  
From the Warring States Period (476-221 BC) to the Tang Dynasty ( 500H618–501H907), 
partnerships as a business device had gradually emerged and developed, but they 
had not yet become formal business firms. Most of them were simply temporary 
relationships among partners formed for various purposes. There were 
partnerships where all partners provided capital and carried out business in 
common. There were also partnerships of capital and labor which partners 
contributed either in the form of capital or labor.
106
 In the Sui Dynasty (502H 81-503H619) 
and the Tang Dynasty, formal partnership contracts named He Ben (合本) were 
                                                 
103 Spring and Autumn of Master Lü is a collection of essays complied by the scholars under Chancellor Lü 
Buwei's patronage during the Qin Dynasty.  
104 See Fang, ―Chinese Partnership‖, supra note 81 at 43. See Yuan Bihua, Expansion of Limited Liability 
(PhD Thesis, Southwest University of Political Science and Law, 2008) (copy in Chinese), [Yuan, 
Expansion of Limited Liability] at 161- 162 (noting that there was no limited liability in ancient China). 
105 Ibid. 
106 See Liu, Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships, supra note 102 at 58. 
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extensively used in business operations.
107
 Nevertheless, although large-scale 
production was not unknown in this period, especially in industries of iron, salt, 
well drilling and agriculture which were characterized by labor specialization,
108
 
it did not appear to possess any sophisticated legal business forms with clear 
distinction between the obligations and assets of the firms and those of its 
members,
109
 thus precluding the rules of asset partitioning. 
2.1.1 Gong Mai (共买) 
In the Han Dynasty (202BC-220), Gong Mai (共买) arose as a common business 
model in the areas of delivery trading and small business shop trading.
110
 
Merchants purchased goods for sale and shared profits arising from the sale of 
the goods jointly.
111
 In the Wei and Jin Dynasties (220-589), Gong Mai was 
developed into a more stable partnership where all partners were required to 
provide capital jointly.
112




                                                 
107 See Zhou, ―Comparative Study on Partnership Business in Ancient China and Western Countries‖, supra 
note 101. In addition, the partnership was widely used by individuals and government to conduct salt 
business. See Ji Chenming, ―The Method of Salt Industrial Management in the Tang Dynasty‖ (2001) 3 
History of Salt Industry 18 at 20 (copy in Chinese). 
108 For economic development in ancient China, see, e.g., Qi Tao, Economic History of Ancient China 
(Shandong University Publisher, 2004) (copy in Chinese). 
109 This proposition is verified by Dr. Liu Qiugen, professor of ancient Chinese economic history, the author 
of the Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships. The author conducted a telephone interview 
and email consultation with Liu Qiugen on 18 June 2010 and 20 June 2010 respectively. (on file with the 
author). 
110 The Origin and Emergence of Ancient Chinese Partnerships, supra note 101 at 5. 
111 The Origin and Emergence of Ancient Chinese Partnerships, supra note 101 at 4.  
112 See Wei Minkong, ―2007 Economic History Research on the Weijin, Southern and Northern Dynasties, 
the Sui Dynasty, the Tang Dynasty and the Five Dynasties‖ (2008) China Economic History Research vol.2 
(copy in Chinese). 
113 Liu, Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships, supra note 102 at 59. 
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However, Gong Mai was formed not necessarily for the purpose of profits. In 
many cases, partners purchased goods for family or clan consumptions only.
114
 
As Gong Mai was not a separate business firm but a temporary relationship for 
members to purchase goods, there was no clear distinction between the 
obligations and assets of the Gong Mai and those of its members. This precluded 
the rules of weak or strong entity shielding. 
2.1.2 Ling Ben Business (领本经营)  
In the Warring States Period and the Qin Dynasty, with the substantial growth of 
social wealth, the number of prosperous landlords, noble family and slave 
owners also increased. It was a common practice for the master (主人) to provide 
capital (本钱) to their slaves and servants (奴仆) for the purpose of a business 
pursuit.
115
 Because of the trust between the masters and their slaves and servants, 
the masters normally did not get involved in the daily operation of the business, 
but simply benefited from profits gained from the business venture. Besides the 
above typical form of Ling Ben business, it was common for wealthy merchants 
to provide capital for talented individuals to engage in business ventures.
116
 In 
the Tang Dynasty, there were Dajiazhangs (the head of a prosperous household, 
大家长) who provided capital for their children and descendants for business 
                                                 
114 Liu, Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships, supra note 102 at 58. 
115 Liu, Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships, supra note 102 at 65. 




ventures. However, profit distribution was unclear in these cases.
117
 
Ling Ben business was a bit similar to the Rome peculium in the sense that the 
master in a typical Rome peculium also provided his slave or even his sons a set 
of assets (the peculium) for use in a business venture.
118
 However, in contrast to 
the Roman peculium which exhibited a degree of owner shielding/limited 
liability - the master‘s liability was capped at the value of the peculium as long as 
he had not participated in the management,
119
 Ling Ben business did not appear 
to exhibit such a sophisticated concept. Ling Ben business was merely a 
temporary relationship between the capital providers (e.g., the masters) and those 
who used the capital in business ventures (e.g., the slaves of the masters and the 
children of the Dajiazhang). Limited liability was not present in Ling Ben 
business as losses and risks arising out of the business ventures were usually 




2.2 The Song Dynasty and the Yuan Dynasty (960-1368) 
The Song Dynasty (504H960- 505H1279) and the Yuan Dynasty ( 506H1271-507H1368) was a 
milestone in the development of ancient Chinese partnerships. During this period, 
partnerships developed into advanced business devices, especially in delivery 
                                                 
117 Liu, Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships, supra note 102 at 66. 
118 Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78 at 1358-1359. 
119 Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78 at 1358. 
120 Liu, Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships, supra note 102 at 59. 
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trading and overseas maritime trade.
121
 According to forms of contribution, 
partnerships in this period can be categorized into two types: (1) the capital 
partnerships（资本与资本的合伙）and (2) the capital and labor partnerships  
(资本与劳动的合伙). 
 (1) In the capital partnerships, all partners provided capital, participated in the 
management of the business and shared the risk and profit of the partnership 
jointly. Partners would sometimes hire outsiders to manage the partnership. This 
type of partnerships was popular in the area of tea trading, inland maritime 
trading and usury business.
122
   
In medieval Italy, an early partnership form, the compagnia
123
 had also evolved.
 
However, the Song Yuan capital partnership was different from the compagnia in 
various ways. Firstly, unlike the compagnia which was developed out of 
merchant laws and customary law governing the household,
124
 there appeared to 
be no written law governing the Song Yuan capital partnership.
125
 The structure 
                                                 
121 See Liu, Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships, supra note 102 at 163-176. 
122 Ibid. 
123 For discussion on the compagnia, see, e.g., Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 
78 at 1365; Mitchell, supra note 69 at vol.3, p186. 
124 See Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78 at 1365. 
125 The author has checked the following ancient Chinese written codes and relevant literature but no written 
law or rules of partnerships is found.《宋刑统》[Song Code];《庆元条法事类》  (a comprehensive 
collection of economic and legal rules in the Southern Song Dynasty);《名公书判清明集》(a collection of 
judicial precedents in the Southern Song Dynasty); 杨一凡 总主编,《中国法制史考证》(中国社会科学出
版社, 2003) [Yang Yifan ed., Chinese Legal Hisotry Textual Research (China Social Science Publisher, 
2003)]; 杨一凡, 徐立志主编,《历代判例判牍》 (中国社会科学出版社, 2005) [Yang Yifan and Xu Lizhi 
eds., Precedents and Precedential Archives of Successive Dynasties (China Social Science Publisher, 
2005)]. This proposition has also been verified by Dr. Liu Qiugen, professor of ancient Chinese economic 
history, the author of the Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships. The author conducted a 
telephone interview and email consultation with Liu Qiugen on 18 June 2010 and 20 June 2010 respectively. 
(on file with the author). 
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of the Song Yuan capital partnerships varied from place to place and even 
differed in different industries. Secondly, the Song Yuan capital partnership did 
not acquire mutual agency and joint and several liability as that of the 
compagnia.
126
 There were cases where partners shared profits pro rata according 
to their capital contribution. When there were only two partners and their 
contributions were almost the same, they shared profits equally.
127
 Presumably, 




(2) In the capital and labor partnerships,
 
there were two types of partners: the 
passive investors who solely or mainly provided capital, and the active partners 
who merely/mainly contributed labor and initiative. In the area of overseas and 
inland maritime trading, ordinary business trading and usury, this type of 
partnership was common.
129
 For example, there was also Ling Ben business in 
the Northern Song Dynasty (960–1127) where prosperous people provide capital 
for businessmen (行钱) to conduct business ventures. However, the wealthy 
people did not take part in the business operation. Both the capital provider and 
the businessmen shared risk and profit jointly.
 130
  
A point worth noting is that, there existed a typical Song maritime partnership 
                                                 
126 See Liu Qiugen, ―China‘s Partnerships during the Tenth to the Fourteenth Century‖ at 114 and 120 (copy 
in Chinese). 
127 See Liu, ―China‘s Partnerships during the Tenth to the Fourteenth Century‖, supra note 126 at 113, 114 
and 119. 
128 See Liu, Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships, supra note 102 at 180. 




which was very similar to the medieval commenda
131
 in the comparatively-
developed period.   
2.2.1 Song Maritime Partnerships 
In Southern Song Dynasty (1127–1279), a maritime partnership regime arose as 
a financing device for inland or overseas maritime trade. In the prototypical 
regime, a large number of individual investors provided capital to the maritime 
traders (海商) before the overseas voyage. The maritime traders then conducted 
the maritime trade. At the end of the voyage, the merchandise obtained in foreign 




This partnership regime was similar to the commenda in medieval Italy in that 
both regimes separated the roles of the capital providers and the business 
managers. In a commenda, a passive investor provided capital, and a traveling 
trader contributed labor and initiative. However, unlike the commenda which 
provided limited liability for passive partners, there was no liability shield for 
investors in the Chinese regime. In fact, there appeared no concept of limited 
liability in the Song maritime partnerships.
133
 Moreover, unlike the commenda 
                                                 
131 For discussion on commenda, see, e.g., Mitchell, ―Early Forms of Partnership‖, supra note 123 at vol.3, 
183. 
132 See《宋史》卷一百八十六《食货志八》 [History of the Song Dynasty at vol. 186, ―Shihuozhiba‖], 
cited in Liu, ―China‘s Partnerships during the Tenth to the Fourteenth Century‖, supra note 126 at 118.  
133 See Liu, Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships, supra note 102 at 182. 
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 , the UK and the US, the Song 
maritime partnership appeared not to have been codified by written law.
136 
They 
were temporary business relationships which lasting for a single voyage only.  
 Was There Entity Shielding in the Song Maritime Partnerships?  
Logically, it seemed that the Song maritime partnerships exhibited basic 
prerequisites for a strong asset partitioning. Like the medieval commenda, the 
assets of the Song maritime partnership were also sequestered in the hull of the 
ship. Presumably, the hull of the ship acted as a boundary for the firm. It was 
thus unlikely for creditors of the investors to seize or claim a right over the assets 
of the partnership directly. 
However, in contrast to the commenda which provided creditors of the firm 
priority over the personal creditors of the partners in their claim over the 
partnership assets,
137
 the Song maritime partnerships did not appear to be 
endowed with any form of entity shielding as a result of the absence of specific 
written laws on partnerships.
 138
  
This begs the question why the commenda was codified in medieval Europe but 
not the Song maritime partnership even though China during the Song Dynasty 
                                                 
134 The société en commandite simple was firstly sanctioned by the Commercial Ordinance of 1673 in 
France.  
135 The Kommanditgesellschaft (KG) is regulated in German Commercial Code.  
136 Supra note 125. 
137 Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78 at 1366. 
138 Supra note 136. 
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was also a prosperous and advanced economy in relation to the rest of the 
countries in the medieval period? Arguably, the deep anti-commercial cultural 
norm and a strong demand for imperial control were possible reasons.  
In the Southern Song-Qiandao era, local governments imposed harsh fines on 
individual merchants who attempted to engage in overseas maritime trade.
139
 
This policy inevitably strangled the development of these maritime partnerships.  
In fact, maritime partnerships continued to be restricted in later dynasties. For 
instance, the Yuan Dynasty also took a negative approach towards maritime 
partnerships. Under the Government-Merchant Maritime Trade Policy (官本船
贸易制度), the local governments provided capital and built ships for maritime 
venture, while the maritime traders (usually the ship captains) contributed labour 
only.
140
 In practice, however, maritime traders were forced by local governments 
and/or their officials to conduct overseas ventures with little capital. At the end 
of the voyage, the overseas merchandise was sold to the government at a low 
price.
141
 The Ming Dynasty even enacted a strict sea ban (海禁) policy on private 
maritime activities. Under this policy, private individuals were not allowed to 
engage in maritime activities. Those who violated the policy would be subject to 
harsh criminal punishment.
142
 The Qing Dynasty not only maintained the sea ban 
                                                 
139《宋史》卷一百八十六《食货志》下三 [History of the Song Dynasty at vol. 186, ―Shihuozhi‖]. 
140 See Liu, Preliminary Study on Ancient Chinese Partnerships, supra note 102 at 172.  
141 Supra note 139. 
142《明史》卷二百零五《朱纨传》[History of the Ming Dynasty at vol. 205, ―Zhuwan Zhuan‖]. 
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policy of the Ming Dynasty,
143
 but also further promulgated the isolation policy (
闭关锁国) in 1757, which imposed huge hardships on the maritime community 
for centuries. 
Although the above mentioned policies had a disastrous effect on maritime trade, 
the imperial government found it justified to implement these sea ban policies, 
namely, to prevent the potential threat of overseas invasion and the rise of new 
economies in coastal areas, so as to maintain its centralized and bureaucratic 
control over the nation.
144
 At this point, it is not surprising to learn that imperial 
Chinese governments played no or a negative role in the growth of merchant law 
in ancient China.  
2.3 The Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) and the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) 
Chinese economic historians conventionally believed that the Ming and Qing 
Dynasties were on the cutting edge of the development of ancient Chinese 
partnerships. There was a prevalence of capital-intensive partnerships in this era. 
As will be discussed below, partnerships in this period were more advanced than 
those in the Song and Yuan Dynasties in that unlike the Song Yuan partnerships 
which did not specify the liability issue on passive partners,
145
 limited liability 
                                                 
143《清史》卷一百二十五, 志一百《食货六》[History of the Qing Dynasty at vol. 125, ―Shihuoliu‖]. 
144 For discussion on sea ban policies in ancient China, see, e.g., Kent G. Deng ―Development and Its 
Deadlock in Imperial China, 221 B.C.-1840 A.D.‖ (2003) 51(2) Economic Development and Cultural 
Change 479; Gang Zhao, ―Reinventing China: Imperial Qing Ideology and the Rise of Modern Chinese 
National Identity in the Early Twentieth Century‖ (2006) 32(1) Modern China 3. 
145 See Liu, Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships, supra note 102 at 185. 
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for passive partners was found in some Ming Qing partnerships.
146
  
Moreover, with the expansion of industry and trade during this period, large-size 
partnerships with dozens of partners were formed in areas of agriculture, coal 
mining, well mining, manufacture industry etc.
147
 Formal partnership agreements 
were also extensively used.
148
 Apart from the liability of partners and creditors‘ 
rights which were hardly mentioned in partnership agreements,
149
 issues relating 




Like their Song Yuan ancestors,
151
 there were also two major types of Ming Qing 
partnerships according to the forms of contributions: (1) the capital partnerships 
under which all partners provided capital, managed the partnership business and 
shared risk and profit of the partnerships jointly. These partnerships were 
commonly used in agriculture production, handicraft business, delivery trading, 
usury industry etc.
152
 (2) The capital and labor partnerships
153
 generally referred 
to partnerships with two types of partners: passive investor partners who 
                                                 
146 See Liu, Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships, supra note 102 at 360. 
147 The number of partners was usually between ten to twenty, but not more than fourty. Peng Jiusong and 
Chen Ran, ―China Contractual Shareholding System‖ (1994) China Economic History Research vol.11, 
[Peng and Chen] at 58 (copy in Chinese). 
148 See Zhou, ―Comparative Study on Partnership Business in Ancient China and Western Countries‖, supra 
note 101 at 79; Yang Guozhen, ―The Contractual Form of Businessmen‘s Heben Business since the Ming 
and Qing Dynasties‖ (1987) China Society Economic History Research vol. 3 (copy in Chinese). 
149 China Social Science Institute ed., Huizhou Millennium Contractual Documents (The Qing Dynasty and 
the Republic of China) (Huashan Wenyi Publisher, 1993) at vol.3 (copy in Chinese). 
150 See Li Li, ―Concepts of ‗Huo‘ in the Qing Civil Contracts‖ (2003) Faxuejia vol. 6 (copy in Chinese). 
151 See supra text accompanying notes 122-131. 
152 See Liu, Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships, supra note 102 at 189-218, 264-268.  
153 See Liu, Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships; supra note 102 at 219-244; Liu Qiugen, 
―Partnership Types in Industrial and Commercial Areas of the Ming Dynasty‖ (2001) China Society 
Economic History Research vol. 4 at 219 (copy in Chinese).  
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provided capital and active partners who mainly contributed labor. The point to 
take note is, the liability of the partners varied from partnership to partnership. 
For instance, unlimited personal liability
154
 and pro rata personal liability
155
  
were specified in different partnership contracts. 
2.3.1 He Hui (合会) 
In the Ming and Qing Dynasties, a wide range of partnerships forms were used in 
a variety of handicraft and usury business (up to seventeen industries).
156
 He Hui, 
as a long existed voluntary association,
157
 was also extensively used in these 
areas. In a prototypical He Hui, members pooled their assets or capital under 
these industries. The name of the He Hui and the He Hui assets were used for 
making investments in various businesses, especially in usury business, such as 
charging interests/fees on loans to internal or external members.
158
 Usually only 




In fact, the He Hui was not a business vehicle used purely for the pursuit of 
                                                 
154 For relevant cases, see, e.g., [同治]《桂阳直隶州志》卷二十《货殖》[Guiyang Zhilizhou History at 
vol. 20, ―Huozhi‖], cited in Liu, Preliminary Study on Ancient Chinese Partnerships, supra note 102 at 348. 
155 See Sichuan Archives and Sichuan University eds., A Selective Collection of Baxian Archives in Qing-
Qianlong, Jiaqing and Daoguang Period (vol.I)(Sichuan University Press, 1989), [―Baxian Archives‖] at 
391, 340 and 341 (copy in Chinese); Li Yu, ―Features of Traditional Partnerships - from the Perspective of 
Baxian Archives‖ (2000) Guizhou Normal University Journal vol.3 at 36 (copy in Chinese). 
156 See further in Xu Jianqin, ―Partnerships in Handicraft Industries in the Qing Dynasty‖ (1995) China 
Economic History Research vol.4 at 127 (copy in Chinese).  
157 He Hui was emerged since the Tang dynasty and the Song dynasty as an association for the purpose of 
cultural, political or economic cooperation. See Liu, Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships, 
supra note 102 at 117.  
158 See Liu, Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships, supra note 102 at 209.  
159 See Liu, Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships, supra note 102 at 210.  
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profits only. A number of He Huis were formed by families or clan relatives for 
the purpose of the family and the clan‘s activities, such as family unity, cultural 
appreciation, 508Hoffering 509Hsacrifices to 510Hgods or 511Hancestors (祭祀) etc. The names of the 
He Huis usually incorporated the common surname of all members. These He 
Huis had an indefinite lifespan, remaining intact over multiple generations.
160
 
Arguably, there exhibited a clear distinction of the assets of the He Hui from the 
personal assets of the members. As the assets of the He Hui were frequently used 
for family or clan activities after the approval of all members, outsiders or 
personal creditors of the He Hui members were unlikely to be able to levy a 
direct claim on the assets of the He Hui directly. However, as at the date of this 




2.3.2 Well Salt Partnerships
162
 
As an important and profitable industry,
163
 the salt industry had been run as a 
                                                 
160 For He Hui formed before the Tang Dynasty, it was unclear whether there was a distinction between the 
assets of He Hui and the assets of its members. See Liu, Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese 
Partnerships, supra note 102 at 92.  
161 This proposition is verified by Dr. Liu Qiugen, professor of ancient Chinese economic history, the author 
of the Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships. The author conducted a telephone interview 
and email consultation with Liu Qiugen on 18 June 2010 and 20 June 2010 respectively. (on file with the 
author). 
162 Some scholars consider the well salt firm as a joint venture company with share (契约股份制). Peng and 
Chen, supra note 147 at 65. 
163 Salt has been a major industry in China for centuries, mainly because salt is a daily necessity for human 
life and also as a taxed commodity. For further introduction of the salt industry in ancient China, see Tao-
Chang Chiang, ―The Salt Industry of Ming China‖ (1975) 65 (1) Geographical Review 93 at 93; Tao-Chang 
Chiang ―The Salt Trade in Ch'ing China‖ (1983) 17(2) Modern Asian Studies 197 at 197;  
Joseph Earle Spencer, ―Salt in China‖ (1935) 25(3) Geographical Review 353. The Tao-Chang Chiang, 
―Production of Salt in China, 1644-1911‖ (1976) 66(4) Annals of the Association of American Geographers 
516; Ping-ti Ho, ―The Salt Merchants of Yang-Chou: A Study of Commercial Capitalism in Eighteenth-
Century China‖ (1954) 17(1/2) Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 130. 
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state-licensed monopoly since the seventh century B.C. in China.
164
 In the Qing 
Dynasty, the well salt mining and production was opened to private 
individuals.
165
 Thereafter, private well salt workshops were extensively 
established in the Sichuan (四川) area, especially in the ―salt city‖- Zigong (自
贡).166  
In Sichuan, well salt was obtained by boiling brine raised from deep wells.
167
 The 
difficulty and complexity of well salt mining called for an advanced business 
vehicle with intensive capital and labor.
168
 Hence, one of the best-developed 
partnership forms in the Qing Dynasty and early modern China,
169
 the well salt 
partnership (井盐合伙), arose as a financing device for well salt mining.170  
The prototypical well salt partnership consisted of three parties: (1) the landlords 
(地主), (2) the contractors (承首人/承首办井人) and (3) the investor partners 
                                                 
164 Tao-Chang Chiang, ―The Salt Industry of Ming China‖ (1975) 65 (1) Geographical Review 93 at 93. 
165 Tao-Chang Chiang, ―Production of Salt in China, 1644-1911‖ (1976) 66(4) Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers 516 at 527. 
166For further discussion on Sichuan well salt contracts, see, e.g., Wu et al., China Salt Industry Contracts – 
Sichuan Early Modern Salt Industry Contracts (Southwest Jiaotong University Press, 2007) (copy in 
Chinese); Zhang Honglin, ―The Partnership Relationship in Qing Sichuan Salt Well Production‖ (1997) 
Modern Legal Studies vol.3 (copy in Chinese) [Zhang, ―The Partnership Relationship in Qing Sichuan Salt 
Well Production‖]; Zhang Honglin, ―Reasons for Disputes in Sichuan Salt Well Contracts in the Republic of 
China Period‖] (2009) Ningxia University Journal vol.3 at 81 [Zhang, ―Reasons for Disputes in Sichuan Salt 
Well Contracts in the Republic of China Period‖] (copy in Chinese) ; Zhang Zhongmin, ―Two Different 
Forms in Ming Qing Partnerships Economic‖ (2001) Shanghai Social Science Institute Quarterly vol.1 at 
159 (copy in Chinese); He Lanping, ―Transaction Costs in Zigong Salt Well Partnerships‖ (2008) Research 
on the History of Salt Industry vol. 2 (copy in Chinese); Zhi Guo, ―Debts in Traditional Salt Well 
Partnerships‖ (2007) Sichuan Polytechnic Institute Journal vol.3, [Zhi] (copy in Chinese). 
167 See Zhang, ―Reasons for Disputes in Sichuan Salt Well Contracts in the Republic of China Period‖, 
supra note 166 at 80. 
168 Ibid. 
169  Zigong Archives and Records Administration et al. eds., Selective Zigong Salt Industry Contracts 
Achieves (China Social Science Publisher, 1985), [Zigong Archives] at 45 (copy in Chinese). 
170 Zhang, ―The Partnership Relationship in Qing Sichuan Salt Well Production‖, supra note 166 at 109; 
Zhang, ―Reasons for Disputes in Sichuan Salt Well Contracts in the Republic of China Period‖, supra note 
166 at 80 and 81. ―There are more than 3000 well salt partnerships agreements in the Zigong Archives and 
Records Administration.‖ See Peng and Chen, supra note 147 at 58.  
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(客人/客伙/股伙).171 As all of these parties were entitled to partnership shares,172 
they will be collectively referred to as ―shareholders‖ hereafter.  
The landlords contributed to the partnership in the form of land, specifically, the 
so-called ―yijing sanji‖- the salt well, the land attached to the well house, storage 
room and boiling room (一井三基: 盐井, 井房, 车房, 灶房所占土地). However, 
the landlords did not participate in the management of the partnership and did not 
bear any expenses arising out of the business operations.
173
  
The role of the contractors varied from partnership to partnership. Some 
contractors only contributed labor and initiative
174
 while there were other 
contractors who provided both capital and labor to the partnership.
175
 In either 
case, contractors were mainly in charge of the well salt mining, including 
inviting external investor partners to provide capital, collecting monthly capital 




The investor partners only provided capital to the firm but did not participate in 
                                                 
171Zhang, ―The Partnership Relationship in Qing Sichuan Salt Well Production‖, supra note 166 at 109-110. 
172The landlords were entitled up to 20% of the total partnership shares, known as ―Dimai Rifen‖ or ―Dimai 
Guokou‖ (地脉日份/地脉锅口). The contractors were entitled to partnership shares known as Chengshou 
Gufen (承首股份). See Baxian Archives, supra note 155 at 268; Zigong Archives, supra note 169 at 49; 
Zhang, ―Reasons for Disputes in Sichuan Salt Well Contracts in the Republic of China Period‖, supra note 
166 at 80-82; Peng Jiusong ed., China Contractual Shareholding System (Chengdu Technology University 
Publisher, 1994) at 173 and 265 (copy in Chinese). 
173Zhang, ―The Partnership Relationship in Qing Sichuan Salt Well Production‖, supra note 166 at 109. 
174They might invite other investors to provide capital to the well salt partnership. See Zhang, ―The 
Partnership Relationship in Qing Sichuan Salt Well Production‖, supra note 166 at 110. 
175Zhang, ―The Partnership Relationship in Qing Sichuan Salt Well Production‖, supra note 166 at 110.  
176Zhang, ―The Partnership Relationship in Qing Sichuan Salt Well Production‖, supra note 166 at 109. 
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the management of the firm.
177
 Depending on the size of the partnership, the 
number of investor partners ranged from two to twenty or more.
178
  
 Jingzhai jinghuan – A Strong Owner Shielding? 
Jingzhai jinghuan (井债井还) was a typical regime used in most of the well salt 
partnerships in late Qing Dynasty (late nineteenth century). Under this regime, 
debts of the firm were paid with the firm assets. Shareholders of the salt well 
firm were not liable for the debts of the firm. Creditors of the firm had no right to 
claim from the shareholders.
 
Shareholders of the firm were entitled to reject any 
claim from the creditors of the firm.
179
 
Arguably, strong owner shielding was exhibited in the well salt partnership as the 
personal assets of firm owners were protected from the claims of the creditors of 
the firm. Then why was there a form of owner shielding in these well salt 
partnerships? 
Firstly, as the well salt mining was a long-term, high-risk business with great 
uncertainties, it was difficult to predict the exact amount of contribution required 
for the whole project. Therefore, investor partners of the firm were not required 
to make fixed contributions in one sitting. Capital contributions could be made in 
                                                 
177They were entitled to partnership shares in the salt well (锅份/日份). See Zhang, ―The Partnership 
Relationship in Qing Sichuan Salt Well Production‖, supra note 166 at 110. 
178Zhang, ―Reasons for Disputes in Sichuan Salt Well Contracts in the Republic of China Period‖, supra 
note 166 at 80 at 81. 
179See further in Liu, Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships, supra note 102 at 348-352; Zhi, 





 Moreover, in order to maintain the stability of 
the salt well firm, those investor partners who were unable to provide capital on 
time would be required to dissociate from the partnership and other investor 
partners would be invited to join the partnership.
181
  
In the Qing-Tongzhi Emperor era, a more advanced regime named as 
―shangzhongxiajie‖ (上中下节) was developed – when the investor partners had 
difficulty in providing capital to the firm, they were entitled to transfer their 
entire partnership shares to outsiders. The previous investor partners were called 
―shangjie (上节)‖ and the new investor partners were called ―xiajie (下节)‖.182 
In particular, there were a certain number of descendants well called ―Zisunjing‖ 
(子孙井) in Zigong, meaning that the well could possibly last for an indefinite 
lifespan. Where the salt well was interrupted because of lack of funding or mine 
accidents, e.g., mine wall failures or vehicle collisions occurred, descendants of 
the salt well owners were entitled to take over and continue the firm by inviting 
other investor partners and contractors to join the partnership.
183
 
These flexible mechanisms made the well salt partnership less likely to be 
interrupted or bankrupted due to insufficient funding or change of owners. 
Meanwhile, as investor partners changed from time to time, it would be 
                                                 
180 See Zigong Archives, supra note 169 at 332, 336, 347 and 413, cited in Liu, Preliminary Studies on 
Ancient Chinese Partnerships, supra note 102 at 349-350. 
181 See Liu, Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships, supra note 102 at 350. 
182 Liu, Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships, supra note 102 at 351-352. 
183Zigong Archives, supra note 169 at Contract No. 24, Contract No. 25 and Contract No.29. 
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practically impossible for creditors of the partnership to levy a claim on the 
partners‘ personal assets since the partners against who the creditors attempt to 
levy a claim at the initiation of the claim might no longer remain as partners in 
the partnership by the conclusion. It might be a likely contributor to the strong 
owner shielding. 
 Strong Entity Shielding? 
Arguably, there was a clear line between the assets of the well salt partnership 
and assets of its partners.
184
 Assets of the salt well mainly referred to the salt well 
itself and the equipment brought into the salt well for the purpose of salt mining 
and production, such as the mining tools and salt boiling machines. Besides the 
tangible mining tools and salt boiling machines, the major assets of the salt well 
firm were sequestered in the salt well itself as a profitable intangible property. 
Therefore, it was likely impractical for the shareholders (namely, the landlords, 
the contractors and the investor partners) to draw out or receive a part of their 
contribution separately from the salt well. The intangible nature of the salt well 
itself also impaired the ability of personal creditors of these shareholders to levy 
a claim on any part of the assets of the firm.  
If this assumption was true, the Qing salt well partnership exhibited a relatively 
strong degree of asset partitioning - the salt well itself acted as a boundary for the 
firm which reduced the risk of personal creditors of its owners attempting to levy 
                                                 
184See further in Liu, Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships, supra note 102 at 349. 
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a claim on the assets of the firm. 
Presumably, the demand for a set of entity shielding rules might be low in these 
well salt partnerships. As mentioned earlier,
185
 the investor partners were 
permitted to transfer their shares to outsiders under the ―shangzhongxiajie‖ 
mechanism. Descendants of the owners of the Zisunjing were also entitled to 
invite new investor partners to join the firm from time to time. Therefore, in the 
event that the investor partners were insolvent, they might no longer be the 
partners in the partnership and had no partnership share. Hence creditors of that 
debtor partner would not have any right to levy a claim on the assets of the 
partnership directly.  
 Was There Any Entity Shielding Rules on These Well Salt 
Partnerships?  
Regrettably, though the well salt partnerships had a history of more than two-
hundred-year from early Qing Dynasty to early modern China, there was no 
relevant written law (成文法) (either national law (律) or provincial law (省例)) 
governing the well salt partnerships.
186
 The well salt partnerships were generally 
governed by the customary law (习惯法) developed by ordinary people in the 
region, specifically, the firm rules (厂规) or the well rules (井规).187 Again, there 
                                                 
185 See supra text accompanying notes 181-182. 
186 Peng and Chen, supra note 147 at 61. 
187Zhang, ―Reasons for Disputes in Sichuan Salt Well Contracts in the Republic of China Period‖, supra 
note 166 at 80 and 85. 
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were very limited written customary laws on the well salt partnership.
188
 As at 
the date of this thesis, the author has not seen any well rules or firm rules 
providing entity shielding to these partnerships.
189
 In addition, the existing well 
salt partnership agreements hardly mention or specify the issue of personal 




In 1912, a resolution by Zigong local council committee specifically stated that: 
―as most of the salt well firm rules were made in oral form and there was no 
specific written rule, we had no law to follow and our government and courts had 
no legal basis on which to make judgment on this matter.‖191  
Arguably, the above mentioned ―shangzhongxiajie‖ regime 192  and the other 
flexible regimes in Zisunjing
193
 which entitled the shareholders of the firm to be 
changed from time to time were effective regimes which ensured consistent and 
sufficient funding to the firm and prevented the firm from going bankrupt. 
Moreover, with these flexible and well-developed mechanisms available, 
creditors presumably would have some reason to believe that the firms would 
generally maintain reasonable levels of assets and, in particular, that the owners 
                                                 
188 Ibid. 
189 The available written firm rules on the Qing well salt partnerships can be found in some local historical 
records, see, e.g., 同治《富顺县志》卷三十《盐政新增》 [Tongzhi Fushun Xianzhi at vol.30 
“Yanzhengxinzeng”]. See further in Zigong Archives, supra note 70 at 47.   
190 As at the date of this thesis, no relevant partnership terms on entity shielding was found in the Zigong 
Archives. 
191黄永增, 《自贡地方议事会第一月议事录》树人学堂印刷部石印本, 页 54, 55 [Huang Yongzeng,  
The First Month Memo of the Zigong Local Council] at 54 and 55.  
192 See supra text accompanying note 182. 
193 See supra text accompanying note 183. 
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of the firms would not easily withdraw assets from the firms or otherwise keep 
firms undercapitalized. Therefore, the demand for a set of entity shielding rules 
by law was reasonably low. 
2.3.3 Coal Mining Partnerships 
Besides salt mining partnerships, large partnerships
194
 also sprung up in the Qing 
Dynasty in response to the financing needs of capital-intensive workshops in the 
mining industries of various 512Hvaluable 513Hminerals (e.g., coal, iron and 514Hbase metals), 
and especially in Jingxi (京西) and Baxian (巴县). Coal mining partnerships in 
the Jingxi area normally had more than a hundred people.
 195 
Like the well salt 
partnerships, a prototypical coal mining partnership also had three parties: (1) the 
landlord who provided the coal mountain, (2) the contractors who contributed 
labor and initiative, and (3) the investor partners who provided capital. 
Perhaps due to the similarity in the business model of the well salt partnerships 
and coal mining partnerships, the above mentioned ―shangzhongxiajie‖ 
mechanism
196
 – investor partners who were unable to provide capital consistently 
were entitled to transfer their entire partnership shares to outsiders and the 
transferees were entitled to be admitted as partners in the firm were also 
                                                 
194 It is difficult to estimate the size of these partnerships; however, evidence shows that these partnerships 
are capital-intensive. See Liu, Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships, supra note 102 at 336.  
195 Xu, ―Partnerships in Handicraft Industries in the Qing Dynasty‖, supra note 156 at 127-128. 
196 See supra text accompanying note 182. 
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available in the coal mining partnerships.
197
  
Again, as investor partners were changed from time to time, the debts of the 
partnership were unlikely to be paid with the personal assets of these changing 
partners. Thus a certain level of limited liability for investor partners would 
probably exist in these partnerships. However, limited liability did not seem to be 
embodied in these partnerships. There were coal mining partnership agreements 
specifying that partners had to be personally liable for the debts of the firm pro 
rata to their capital contributions.
198
  
Arguably, there might be a form of strong entity shielding in these coal mining 
partnerships. In essence, there appeared a clear distinction between the assets of 
the coal mining partnership and those of its investor partners. Many coal mining 
partnership agreements specified that partners were not permitted to withdraw 
the partnership assets freely.
199
 Since the coal mountain itself acted as a clear 
boundary on firm assets, it was unlikely for personal creditors of the investor 
partners or even the investor partners to levy a claim on the assets of the firm 
freely. 
It is worth noting that, a Qing coal mining partnership agreement clearly stated 
that: ―… external debts of (personal) partners are irrelevant to the 
                                                 
197 China Renmin University Qing History Institute, Archives Department eds., Mining Industry in the Qing 
Dynasty (Zhonghua Book Company, 1983) at 415, Contract No.2, cited in Liu, Preliminary Studies on 
Ancient Chinese Partnerships, supra note 102 at 353. 
198Baxian Archives, supra note 155 at 268 and 301; see also Liu, Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese 
Partnerships, supra note 102 at 356-357. 
199 See, e.g., Baxian Archives, supra note 155 at 259 and 268.  
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partnership.‖200 In the oft-chance that such a dispute arose in court and the court 
enforced this term of the partnership agreement by preventing the debtor partner 
or his personal creditors‘ from demanding a payout of the partner's share of firm 
assets, this would demonstrate strong entity shielding. Unfortunately, as at the 
date of this thesis, the author has yet to observe any evidence of the hypothetical 
scenario above.  




3.1 The Great Divergence 
122BHansmann et al. argued that entity shielding had been a necessary feature in 
organizational law throughout history. Even the slave-managed peculium firms in 
ancient Rome had a degree of de facto entity shielding.
202
 They also tested this 
proposition with reference to the development of entity shielding in four 
historical epochs in the Western world. 
Throughout its history, ancient Chinese partnerships were developed with the 
vibrant economy as a natural response to the various business needs in different 
eras. They also played a crucial role in ancient Chinese economy. However, 
ancient China did not see the prevalence sophisticated legal institutions, 
                                                 
200  Baxian Archives, supra note 155 at 258; see also Liu, Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese 
Partnerships, supra note 102 at 349. 
201 In ancient China, there were also a large number of ―quasi partnerships‖ whereby parties carried on 
businesses not purely for a view of profits. See Liu, Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships; 
supra note 102 at Chapter 2. 
202 Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78 at 1358-1359. 
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including rules of entity shielding in the diverse partnership forms.    
As illustrated in the last section, the Chinese story on the evolution of 
partnerships indicated the following findings:  
 It appeared that ancient Chinese written law did not offer a general-
purpose unified and independent legal partnership form. Partnership 
relationships were mainly governed by partnership agreements (if any), 
customs (习惯) and business rules (行规).203  
 It appeared that ancient Chinese written law did not grant weak or strong 
entity shielding to the various large partnerships in ancient China, even in 
the last ruling dynasty – the Qing Dynasty. 204  It appeared that the 
customs and business rules governing the specific partnerships were also 
silent on the issue of entity shielding.
205
  
                                                 
203  The author has also checked the following ancient Chinese written codes and rules and relevant 
literature. However, no law of partnership is found.《大明律》[Ming Code],《大清律例》 [Qing Code],
《湖南省例成案》（嘉慶年間） [Hunan Provincial Rules (Jiaqing Emperor Era)],《治浙成規》（道光
年間）[Zhejiang Provincial Rules (Daoguang Emperor Era)],《福建省例》[Fujian Provincial Rules], 《粤
东省例新纂》[East Guangdong Provincial Rules],《广东省例》[Guaong Dong Provincial Rules],《江苏
省例》 [Jiangsu Provincial Rules], Yang Yifan, Liu Ducai eds., Ancient China Local Legislation (vol.1) (a 
comprehensive collection of local legal documents in and before the Ming Dynasty) (Shijietushu Publisher, 
2006) (copy in Chinese); Yang Yifan ed., Chinese Legal Hisotry Textual Research (China Social Science 
Publisher, 2003) (copy in Chinese); David Faure and Chen Chunsheng, ―Company and the Emergence of 
Early Modern Shanghao‖ (2002) China Economic History Research vol.2 (copy in Chinese); David Faure, 
China and Capitalism, A History of Business Enterprise in Modern China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press 2006). This proposition is verified by Dr. Liu Qiugen, professor of ancient Chinese 
economic history, the author of the Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships. The author 
conducted a telephone interview and email consultation with Liu Qiugen on 18 June 2010 and 20 June 2010 
respectively. (on file with the author). 
204  Supra note 203. 
205 This proposition is verified by Dr. Liu Qiugen, professor of ancient Chinese economic history, the author 
of the Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships. The author conducted a telephone interview 




 We have seen a substantial logic to the forms of asset partitioning (e.g., 
strong entity shielding at least with respect to the investor partners) 
exhibited in ancient Chinese partnerships, such as the Song maritime 
partnership, the Qing well salt partnership, the Qing coal mining 
partnership and the Ming Qing commercial He Hui. In these business 
firms, there was a clear distinction between the assets of the partnership 
and those of its partners. Thus it was practically impossible for personal 
creditors of the partners to levy a claim on the assets of the partnership at 
will.
206
 Therefore, it is not prudent to state conclusively that the ancient 
Chinese courts had never granted priority to partnership creditors over 
individual partners‘ personal creditors with respect to any partnership 
assets, or that the Chinese courts had never prevented the partners‘ 
creditors from levying a claim on the assets of the partnership directly. 
Nevertheless, as at the date of this thesis, the author has yet to observe 
any entity shielding rule in the ancient Chinese verdicts.
207
  
It is worth mentioning that, although the Qing government had made an effort to 
codify the partnership in the Civil Code of the Qing Dynasty 1911 (draft) (大清民
                                                 
206 This proposition is verified by Dr. Liu Qiugen, professor of ancient Chinese economic history, the author 
of the Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships. The author conducted a telephone interview 
and email consultation with Liu Qiugen on 18 June 2010 and 20 June 2010 respectively. (on file with the 
author) 
207 See, e.g., Xihua Normal University and Nanchong City Archives Administration eds., Qing Southern 
Xianya Archives (Zhonghua Book Company, 2010) (copy in Chinese);  Yang Yifan and Xu Zhili eds., 
Precedents and Precedential Archives of Successive Dynasties (China Social Science Publisher, 2005) (copy 
in Chinese). This proposition is verified by Dr. Liu Qiugen, professor of ancient Chinese economic history, 
the author of the Preliminary Studies on Ancient Chinese Partnerships. The author conducted a telephone 
interview and email consultation with Liu Qiugen on 18 June 2010 and 20 June 2010 respectively. (on file 
with the author). 
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律草案),208 this partnership form was never enacted as this draft code was not 
promulgated due to the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911.
209
 Written rule on 
entity shielding was absent from this draft code as well. Moreover, although the 
Company Regulation of Republic of China 1914,
210
 and the later Civil Code of 
Republic of China 1929
211
 codified several business forms, including the 
commandite company (两合公司),212 the silent partnership (隐名合伙),213 and 
the commandite company with stock (股份两合公司),214 these partnerships were 
not naturally developed out of Chinese business practice, but were transplanted 
                                                 
208 The 1911Civil Code (Draft) of the Qing Dynasty was the first separate civil code in Chinese history. It 
was drafted when China was experiencing a century of instability, suffering from both internal rebellion and 
foreign domination. Modern business forms, such as the limited liability company and the limited 
partnership were transplanted into China during this transitional period. This code incorporated substantial 
provisions from the German Civil Code of and the Japanese Civil Code.  
209  The Xinhai Revolution (also known as the 1911 Revolution) was a republican revolution which 
overthrew the Qing Dynasty, and which established the Republic of China. The war lasted from 10 October 
1911 and ended on 12 February 1912.  
210 Such Regulation was promulgated by the Yuan Shikai government. It came into force on 13 January 
1914 after reviewing the Company Law of late Qing Dynasty and after consulting Japanese professors. This 
Regulation was modelled on the German Commercial Code. See Hu Wentao, ―The Formation, Features and 
Influence of ‘The Company Bill of the Republic of China‘ in 1946‖ (2000) Journal of Henan Normal 
University vol.1 (copy in Chinese); G. H. B. Kenrick, ―The New Commercial Code of Germany‖ (1900) 
2(2) Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation 342.   
211 However, due to wars, the rise of communist party and the Japanese invasion, the draft work of Civil 
Code of Republic of China was not completed until 1929. For legislative history of this code, see Li Xiuqing, 
―New Trend of Civil Law in Early Twentieth Century and the Civil Code of Republic of China‖ (2002) 
Journal of China University of Political Science and Law vol.1 (copy in Chinese). 
212 The commandite company is deemed as a separate legal entity formed with the view for profit. It has two 
types of partners: unlimited partners who are liable for all debts and obligations of the firm and limited 
partners who enjoy limited liability. See the Company Law of Republic of China 1929, Art.1, 3, 89 to 98. 
213 See The Company Law of Republic of China 1929, Art. 703 and 705. Today, the silent partnership still 
exists in several civil law jurisdictions, such as Germany, the Netherlands and Chinese Taiwan. See 
Commercial Code (Germany) s. 230; J.M.J. Chorus, P.H.M. Gerver, E.H. Hondius, Introduction to Dutch 
law, 4thed. (Kluwer Law International, 2006) at 224; Civil Code (Taiwan) s.700. 
214  See Du Xuncheng, National Capitalism and Old China Government (1840-1937) (Shanghai Social 
Science Press, 1991)] at Annex ―Table of Civil Mines, Ships and New Financial Enterprise (1840-1927) 
(copy in Chinese). See also Li Yu, History of the Enterprise Structure during Beiyang Government Period 
(Social Science Academic Press, 2007) (copy in Chinese); Li Yu, ―Lianghe Gongsi and Gufen Lianghe 
Gongsi during the Modern China‖ (1997) Guizhou Normal University Journal Vol.1 at Table 1 and 2 
(noting that the commandite company and the commandite company with stock were used widely in various 
industries, including transportations, banking, manufacture, etc.) (copy in Chinese). 
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from Germany in early modern China.
215
 Moreover, these business forms were 
shortly discarded by the PRC government in 1949 and thus failing to influence 
PRC legislation thereafter.  
In fact, not only did partnerships in ancient China not embody entity shielding 
rules, the PRC partnerships also contain uncertainties with regard to the rules of 
entity shielding. Particularly, PRC law is silent in cases where both the 
partnership and the partners are insolvent. It is not clear whether partnership 
creditors have prior claim over partners‘ creditors in the division of partnership 
assets or whether partners‘ creditors have prior claim over partnership creditors 
in the division of partners‘ assets. Chapter 8 of this thesis will discuss this issue 
in detail. 
3.2 Why Great Divergence? 
At this juncture, many interesting and open questions came to mind: why did 
ancient Chinese written law not offer a general–purpose partnership form? Why 
did ancient Chinese written law not grant weak or strong entity shielding to the 
various partnership forms?  
In fact, before the first Company Law 1904 in early modern China, very little in 
written Chinese law addressed the regulation of private economic activity.
216
 In 
                                                 
215These partnerships forms were mainly modelled on the German kommanditgesellschaften, the stille 
gesellschaft, and the kommanditgesellschaft auf aktien (KGa A). 
216William C. Kirby, ―China Unincorporated: Company Law and Business Enterprise in Twentieth- Century 
China‖ (1995) 54(1) The Journal of Asian Studies 43 at 46.  
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contrast to ancient Rome, medieval Italy and early modern Europe where 
merchant law was well developed, the converse was true in ancient China. 
Unlike continental jurisdictions, e.g., Germany and France which had 
comprehensive civil and commercial codes since early nineteenth century, there 
was no separate civil or commercial code or independent merchant court 
throughout ancient China.
217
 Therefore, it is not surprising to learn that there was 
no single partnership legislation or any legal rule of asset partitioning in ancient 
Chinese partnerships. 
We may have to look at historical, cultural and other noncommercial aspects of 
Chinese society to find possible reasons. 
(1) State‘s restrictions towards commercial activities and the agriculture-based 
civilization affected the development of commercial law in ancient China. Early 
imperial China had begun to restrict commercial practices since the Western Han 
Dynasty by enforcing a policy called ―looking after farmers and confining 
merchants‖ (重农抑商).218 Measures such as state monopoly and profiteering 
(e.g., high taxation) with some ―key commodities‖ (e.g., salt, iron, coal, wine, 
silks, tea etc); strict licensing control (often applied to long-distance trades); 
occasional bans (e.g., Sea Ban on maritime trade in the Ming and Qing Dynasties) 
created obstacles for merchants for centuries. Moreover, there existed severe 
                                                 
217 Although the late Qing government drafted a civil code, this code was never promulgated due to the 
collapse of the Qing Dynasty. 
218 See generally, Wang Yin, ―Minben Thoughts and Yishang Policy in Feudal China‖ (2000) Shixuejikan 
vol.3 (copy in Chinese); Deng, Kent, ―Development and its deadlock in Imperial China, 221 B.C.–1840 
A.D.‖ (2003) 51 (2) Economic Development and Cultural Change 479 at 502. 
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governmental discrimination of merchants. For example, in Han Gaozu Emperor 
era, high levels of taxation were imposed on wealthy merchants and their 
descendants were not permitted to serve in the government. In the Tang Dynasty, 
merchants were considered as low class in the social hierarchy.
 219
  
Because of these disincentives, commodity practices were largely restricted to 
local and small levels. China was locked into a self-sufficient small-scale peasant 
economy (自给自足经济). Without a nation-wide commodity market, merchant 
law, including bankruptcy law was unable to evolve and develop smoothly. 
Particularly, since ancient Chinese partnerships had long been used in a wide 
range of industries ranging from small family businesses to large-scale 
workshops, from inland agriculture production to overseas maritime trading, the 
need for a national-wide unified partnership form embodied with single structure 
was low as well.   
The reluctance and failure of the imperial Chinese governments to facilitate 
commercial activities did indeed hinder the development of commercial laws in 
ancient China. As a huge centralized imperial state with vast territory, a big 
population and dynamic economy, the prevalent task of the government is to 
maintain its absolute control over the state. Therefore, penal law was used as an 
effective supplementary means for maintaining a hierarchical social relationship 
that continued for centuries. From the first written legal code Fa Jing (法经), to 




the last 515Hfeudal legal code of 516HChina, the Great Qing Legal Code (大清律例), 
criminal laws constituted the majority of these written codes. This contributed to 
the traditional legal value in China – ―criminal law precedes civil law‖ (重刑轻
民). Civil and commercial issues, however, were largely left to social norms, 
mores and Confucianism to resolve.
220
 
Moreover, not only did ancient legislature fail to stress or address civil or 
commercial laws, the ancient judiciary also failed to facilitate the development of 
civil and commercial law. Above all, in the formulation of civil verdicts, local 
magistrates rarely relied on or cited any specific codes, customs or precedents,
221
 
but elected to respect social norms, especially, sentiment (情) and rationality 
(理).222  
For instance, in a Qing partnership dispute, partner B borrowed money from 
partner A repeatedly. Before A‘s death, B still owed A a certain amount of money. 
A transferred the creditor‘s right (债权) to his daughter-in-law, C, in front of 
witnesses (A‘s son was away at that time). C brought an action against B for 
                                                 
220 Wang Weiguo ed., China Civil Law Forum (Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law 
Press, 2006) at 130 (copy in Chinese). 
221 In fact, no collection of precedents was compiled in ancient China. Mar Debin, ―Law and Commerce in 
Traditional China, an Institutional Perspective on the ‗Great Divergence‘‖ (March 2006) Keizai-Shirin, vol. 
73, No. 4, 69-96. [Ma]. 
222 See Shuzo Shiga et al., Ming Qing Civil Proceedings and Civil Contracts (translated by Wang Yaxin et 
al.) (Law Press China, 1998)], [Shuzo Shiga et al.] (copy in Chinese);  Mark A. Allee, ―Code, Culture, and 
Custom: Foundations of Civil Case Verdicts in a Nineteenth-Century County Court‖ in Kathryn Bernhardt 
and Philip C. C. Huang eds., Civil Law in Qing and Republican China Civil Law in Qing and Republican 
China (Stanford University Press, 1994); see also Ma, supra note 221; See further in Huang Zongzhi, Qing 
Law, Society and Culture: Expression of Civil Law and Reality (Shanghai Book Company, 2007) (copy in 
Chinese); Huang Zongzhi, Code, Custom and Judicial Practice: Comparison between Qing and Republic of 
China (Shanghai Book Company, 2007) (copy in Chinese).  
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payment after the death of A‘s son. The magistrate explained that ―C has the book 
account proving the existence of the debt, while B also has the contract certifying 
the termination and liquidation of the partnership between A and B. (We) need to 
make a compromise, so as to (make the verdict) be consistent with Qing and Li.‖ 
The ultimate judgment was that: C should not claim on debts which occurred 
before Daoguang-10 (AD 1830). As to the debt of 140 dollars (diaoqian, a 
currency number in the Qing) incurred after Daoguang- 10, 20 dollars should be 
waived as it had been paid (although this fact was disputed by the parties). A sum 
of 20 dollars should also be deducted as a compromise between parties. Thus 
only 100 dollars was required to be paid by B to C.
223
   
Apparently, the magistrate did not cite any written law or custom in reaching the 
verdict, but endeavored to avoid souring the relationship (伤和气) between the 
two parties so as to maintain social order and the government‘s control. Without 
enforceable legal rules on business activities as well as sophisticated courts to 
interpret and enforce merchant custom and practice, it was understandable why 
ancient Chinese lex mercatoria lagged behind its counterparts in comparatively-
developed Europe. 
(2) Confucianism had been adopted by the ruling class since the Han Dynasty 
(206 BCE – 220 CE) as the guiding principle and strongly influenced the ruling 
strategy of each emperor, the enforcement of laws and people‘s pattern of 
                                                 
223(Qing) Qiu Huang ed., Fupan Lucun at vol.4 (22a), cited in Shuzo Shiga et al., supra note 222 at 32. 
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thought across the millennial of the feudal society. Confucianism was generally 
against the use of formal laws to achieve social order. Confucius advocated that 
―if people are guided by fa (law), and order among them is enforced by the 
means of punishment, they will try to evade the punishment, but have no sense of 
shame. However, if they are guided by virtue, and order among them is enforced 
by li (rite), they will have the sense of shame and also be reformed‖. 224 Under 
such an ideology, written law, especially written legislation in the civil sphere 
progressed slowly in ancient China. 
Indeed, social norms, customs and other non-law institutions played an essential 
role in regulating civil and commercial activities and worked as effective 
substitutes of written law in ancient China. Particularly, many partners were 
blood relatives of the same lineage or same clan (同宗同族) or close friends from 
the same group of merchants (商帮). For instance, Anhui merchants (徽商), 
which had once been a wealthy community in ancient China, had a tradition of 
conducting business only with their clan members or those who came from the 
same place (同乡 ). 225  The basis among partners, namely, trust and credit 
underlied their close relationships. Ties of friendship and comradeship were also 
highly emphasized in partnership contracts. As a partnership contract specified, 
―…we seven shall treat each other as one. If anyone treats the others unfairly, he 
                                                 
224 For discussion on the influence of Confucianism in ancient Chinese law, see Qu Tongzu, Chinese Law 
and Chinese Society (Zhonghua Book Company, 1981) at 328-346 (copy in Chinese).  
225See generally, Zhong Tiande, ―An Aspect of Huizhou Merchants‖ in Liu Miao (translated), Huizhou 
Social Economic Hisotry Translated Collection (Huangshanshushe, 1987) (copy in Chinese); Chen Zhiping 
and Lu Zengrong, ―The Changes of Business Operation Models in Qing Industrial and Commercial 
Industry‖ (2000) China Social Economic History Research vol.2 at 27 (copy in Chinese). 
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shall not be forgiven by heaven or hell.‖226 Because of these social norms formed 
by families and clans, the interests of partners and partnerships were well 
protected, thus the demand for written law was relatively low.  
(3) Hansmann et al. argued that ―the enforcement of entity shielding, and of 
weak entity shielding in particular, generally requires the creation of a 
sophisticated bankruptcy system.‖227 To determine whether a personal creditor 
should be permitted to seize assets of the firm, a court must accurately assess the 
ratio between firm assets and debts. It also requires ―the court to exercise the 
broad powers associated with a bankruptcy system: the powers to determine the 
division of firm assets and their aggregate value, simultaneously evaluate the 
validity and worth of the claims of multiple creditors, and oversee ongoing firm 
operations during the proceedings.‖228  
Arguably, the lack of comprehensive bankruptcy law was a likely contributor to 
the absence of the rule of entity shielding in ancient China. 
Unlike in medieval Italy where bankruptcy rules had began to develop by the 
thirteenth century,
229
 and in contrast with Europe which enabled an individual 
merchant to be subjected to bankruptcy since the medieval era,
230
 the first 
Chinese bankruptcy law (破产律) was not promulgated until 1906, during the 
                                                 
226 Baxian Archives, supra note 155 at 258. 
227 Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78 at 1353. 
228 Ibid. 
229 Yao Xiulan, ―Early Modern China Bankruptcy Law‖ (2003) Modern Legal Studies vol.5, [Yao] at 151 
(copy in Chinese). 
230 Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78 at 1367. 
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late stage of the last imperial dynasty.
231
 Before that, there was no equivalent 
concept of bankruptcy in ancient China. Regrettably, this law was abolished 
shortly in 1908 due to severe disputes between governments and individuals 
regarding the treatment of foreign creditors.
232
 Later, although there were 
additional attempts by the Republic of China to enact bankruptcy legislation in 




The need for bankruptcy law in China
234
 did not arise until the mid-1980s when 
the corporate legal entity system was gradually established during the transitional 
period. Nonetheless, the modern PRC Enterprise bankruptcy law applicable to all 
private enterprises was not promulgated until 2006.
235
 Until today, personal 
bankruptcy law is still not available in China.  
Why was there a low demand for bankruptcy law, which resulted in a low desire 
for entity shielding rules in ancient China?  
In essence, there existed a well-recognized cultural tradition of non-forgiveness 
of debts in feudal Chinese society - "debts incurred by the father shall be 
assumed by the son.‖(父债子还). This concept would also be extended to a 
                                                 
231Yao, supra note 229. 
232Yao, supra note 229 at 152. 
233Yao, supra note 229 at 153-154. 
234During the planned economy period, the state-owned enterprises in China would have any losses offset by 
subsidization by the State. This meant that bankruptcy was never an issue. See Will Fung, ―Policy-Oriented 
vs. Market-Oriented Bankruptcy: A Tour on the PRC New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law‖ (2007) 3 China L. 
Rep. 7.  
235 Though the first PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law was promulgated in 1986 on a trial basis, it was 
applicable only to enterprises owned by the whole people (全民所有制企业). 
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grandson, making him responsible for his grandfather's debt or obligation even 
before he was born.
236
 In some extreme cases, not only did the debtors and their 




This strict tradition towards debt inevitably had a negative impact on the 
legislation of bankruptcy.
238
 Arguably, since the debts were passed from one 
generation to another, creditors could always enforce their debts by claiming 
from the debtor‘s children or even grandchildren.239.  
Moreover, in contrast to medieval Europe where members‘ unlimited personal 
liability for the contractual obligations of the firm was an important basis for the 
creditworthiness of the firm‘s assets, 240  the basis for the creditworthiness of 
ancient Chinese forms was this strict tradition towards debts. Interestingly, the 
Tang Code (唐律疏义) imposed criminal penalties, e.g., beating of debtors who 
failed to repay contractual debts with wooden staves (杖刑). Under this code, 
creditors (after applying for petition to the courts) were entitled to levy on the 
debtor‘s assets (up to the amount of the debts), or to require the debtor and his 
male laborer to repay debts in the form of services to be performed (役身折
                                                 
236 See Yao, supra note 229 at 151; Roman Tomasic and Margaret Wang, The Long March Towards China's 
New Bankruptcy Law, in Insolvency Law in East Asia (Ashgate Publishing Limited, Aldershot, 2006) at 93 
and 94.  
237 See Yuan, Expansion of Limited Liability, supra note 104 at 162. 
238 Alan C W Tang, Insolvency in China and Hong Kong: A Practitioner‟s Perspective (Hong Kong: Sweet 
and Maxwell Asia, 2005) at para. 1.07. 
239 See Rebecca Parry, Yongqian Xu, Haizheng Zhang eds., China's New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law: 
Context, Interpretation and Application (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2009) at 4. 
240 Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78  at 1353. 
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酬).241 Nevertheless, debtors still had to repay the debts after being subjected to 
the criminal penalties. 
In view of the above, bankruptcy law as well as entity shielding rules were less 
desired as a remedy for creditors in ancient China. It is also understandable why 
ancient Chinese partnerships rarely specified joint or unlimited personal liability 
of the partners. 
(4) Hansmann et al. also argued that the medieval revolution in bookkeeping 
methods, especially the innovation of double-entry accounting which was the 
workable method for tracking a firm's net value, was a likely contributor to the 
rise of entity shielding in the Middle Ages.
242
  
In China, though the single-entry system based upon a simple principle had 
emerged since the Qin Dynasty, a local double-entry accounting method- the 
―dragon gate ledger‖ (龙门帐) was not developed until the late Ming and early 
Qing Dynasty (early nineteenth century) by Shanxi bankers.
243
 Nevertheless, 
only a small number of large-scale commercial establishments employed the 
longmenzhang or its improved versions.  Bookkeeping in the Qing Dynasty still 
employed single-entry systems in the majority of small- and medium-sized 
commercial institutions based on the sizhujiesuanfa (四柱结算法 ), a local 
                                                 
241《唐律疏议》卷二十六 [Tang Code, vol.26]. 
242 Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78 at 1367. 
243  See Robert Gardella, ―Squaring Accounts: Commercial Bookkeeping Methods and Capitalist 
Rationalism in Late Qing and Republican China‖ (1992) 51(2) The Journal of Asian Studies 317 at 324. For 
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accounting method developed in late Tang Dynasty.
244
 The Western accounting 




The development of the Chinese accounting system was comparatively slower 
than its European counterpart where the double-entry accounting system started 
being used in the fourteenth century and spread thereafter.
246
 Without a 
comprehensive accounting method, it was difficult for owners and creditors to 
assess the value of the firm‘s assets and distinguish the permissible from the 
impermissible distributions. It was thus understandable why entity shielding rules 
were absent for such a long period in ancient China. 
3.3 Conclusion of Section 3 
This section does not imply that there are defects in ancient Chinese law, or that 
medieval law is more successful in addressing creditors‘ rights than its Chinese 
counterpart. The possible reason why the ancient Chinese enterprises did not 
exhibit a comparatively-developed entity shielding vis-à-vis their European 
counterparts may be due to their divergence and difference between the two 
societies, such as, the different cultural norms (e.g., attitudes towards commerce), 
cultural tradition (e.g., traditions towards debts), legal systems (e.g., the 
                                                 
244  See Robert Gardella, ―Squaring Accounts: Commercial Bookkeeping Methods and Capitalist 
Rationalism in Late Qing and Republican China‖ (1992) 51(2) The Journal of Asian Studies 317 at 324. 
245 Ibid. 
246 Alfred W. Crosby, The Measure of Reality: Quantification and Western Society, 1250-1600 (Cambridge 
University Press, 1997) at 206; Raymond de Roover, ―The Commercial Revolution of the Thirteenth 
Century‖, in Frederic C. Lane and Jelle C. Riemersma eds., Enterprise and Secular Change (Homewood, 
IL,1953) at 80 and 81. 
75 
 
existence and development of bankruptcy law and law merchant), the level of 
accounting methods and capital markets etc. Indeed, all these factors influenced 
the level of entity shielding displayed by firms.
247
 Though some of these 
elements were missing in the context of ancient Chinese society, there were 
alternative means for ordering behavior and protection of creditors and investors, 
such as the well-recognized Confucianism, custom, social norms and mores.   
4. PRC Partnership Laws and PRC Partnerships (1949 - present) 
4.1 Mao’s China (1949-1976): Elimination of Partnerships and Partnership 
Laws  
After experiencing two decades of instability, suffering from both Japanese 
invasion and the civil war, partnerships still existed on the eve of the founding of 
the PRC in 1949. Among 1.3 million industrial and commercial enterprises, 
about 10,000 were companies, the rest were sole proprietorships or 
partnerships.
248
 According to a survey in 1956, among 533.7 million private 
industrial enterprises, 53.8 % were partnerships.
249
  
Unfortunately, after the establishment of the PRC, the communist Party 
abolished all the law of Republic of China, including the various partnership 
forms which were introduced in the Republic of China period. After the 
                                                 
247Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78 at 1355. 
248 Fang, ―Chinese Partnership‖, supra note 81 at 47. 
249 See Drafters of the Partnership Enterprise Law, ―A Few Thoughts on Drafting the Partnership Enterprise 
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completion of the ―Three Socialist Reforms‖ in 1956, partnerships, together with 




The reason why the PRC discarded the partnerships, together with other business 
forms was the belief of communist justice and the fear that any creation of 
business law would infringe the sanctity of socialist public property system, 
which is the basis of the socialist economic system stated in the PRC 
Constitution.
251
 Particularly, partnerships and other business forms are 
considered as ―for-profit‖ vehicles and are results of capitalism.  
4.2 Post-Mao Period (1976-1997): Various Quasi Partnerships Forms with 
Chinese Characteristics 
After the 517HCultural Revolution, China‘s policy was shifted from strict adherence to 
socialist state ownership to the economic reform. As the result of the ―reform and 
opening-up‖ policy (改革开放 ) since 1982, the institutional and business 
environment of China had significantly changed. The legal basis of law was also 
changed from a socialist-inspired instrumental approach to a market-oriented 
approach. A great effort had been made to develop sophisticated partnership laws 
                                                 
250 Chinese socialist economy was created in the 1950s as a result of China‘s efforts to transform private 
ownership into the ―socialist ownership‖. It is based on a combination of the state and private ownership 
over various businesses in cities or townships or a collection of nominal private ownership over land in the 
countryside. 






Nevertheless, the communist heritage was still influencing Chinese legislation in 
the 1980s. As ―partnership‖ had once been considered as a part of private 
ownership economy and a term of capitalism, people had to avoid using the term 
"partnership" in daily business operation. Under this social background, several 
quasi partnership forms with socialist characteristics were created:
253
 cooperative 
operation organization (合作经营组织), new economic association (新经济联合
体 ), commune members' joint enterprise (社员联营企业 ), joint household 
business (联户企业) 254 and agriculture cooperative (农村合作社). Nevertheless, 
these partnership forms were not codified in national law but merely appeared in 
the temporary local regulations. 
In the second part of the 1980s, three partnership forms, the individual 
partnership (个人合伙),255 the joint operations (联营)256 and the Chinese-Foreign 
Contractual Joint Ventures (中外合作企业)257  were created. However, these 
                                                 
252 Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Central Committee of the 
China Communist Party in December 1978, there have been significant developments in its construction of 
the legal system. 
253 See Fang, ―Chinese Partnership‖, supra note 81 at 47. 
254 For discussion on these business forms, see Fang, ―Chinese Partnership‖, supra note 81. 
255 The individual partnership is governed by six provisions of the General Principles of Civil Law 1986 
only. It is defined as an association formed by two or more individuals in accordance with a partnership 
agreement.  
256 See General Principles of Civil Law 1986 (PRC) Art. 51-53. The Joint Operation is an economic entity 
which can be formed by enterprises or institutions. There are three types of Joint Operations under the 
General Principles of Civil Law 1986: (1) the Entity-type Joint Operation; (2) the Partnership-type Joint 
Operation; and (3) the Contractual Joint Operation.   
257 It is also known as the ―Co-operative Enterprise‖ or the ―Co-operative Joint Venture‖. The Chinese- 
Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures is primarily a contractual arrangement between a foreign party and a 
Chinese party. It can be a loosely connected co-operation between the contracting parties if it does not 
obtain the status of legal person, or it can be a limited liability company if it possesses the status of a legal 
78 
 
partnerships were regulated by different laws and are applied to different groups 
of users.
258
 The individual partnership applies to individual partners; the joint 
operation applies to enterprises and institutions and the Chinese-Foreign 
Contractual Joint Ventures applies to foreign individuals and legal persons. The 
fact that different laws regulate different partnership forms inevitably created 
difficulties and inconsistence in the use of partnerships. 
259
  
Today, there is a consensus that the individual partnership and the partnership 
enterprise are the two basic partnership forms within the meaning of PRC civil 
law.
260
 Because this thesis mainly examines the PEL which governs partnership 
enterprises only, and because the individual partnership is rarely used in China 
today, the subsequent chapters will only deal with the partnership enterprises.
261
 
4.3 A Milestone: the Promulgation of the PEL 1997  
In 1997, the promulgation of the first consolidated law governing partnerships, 
the PEL marked the milestone in the development of partnership law. 
                                                                                                                                    
person. For further discussion on the Chinese- Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures, see Art. 2 of the PRC 
Law on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures; Li Mei Qin, ―Attracting Foreign Investment into the 
PRC: the Enactment of Foreign Investment Laws‖ (2000) 4 Sing. J. Int'l and Comp. L. 159. 
258 Jiangping and Long Weiqiu, ―The Various Forms of Partnerships and Partnership Legislation‖ (1996) 
China Legal Studies vol.3 at 43 (copy in Chinese).  
259 The individual partnership and the joint operation are regulated by the General Principles of Civil Law 
1986. The Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures is regulated by the PRC Law on Chinese-Foreign 
Contractual Joint Ventures 1988 (revised in 2001).   
260 Wang Baoshu, ―The Thoughts on Partnership‘s Organizational Capability‖ in Wang, China Commercial 
Law Annual Review 2006, supra note 73 at 3 (copy in Chinese).  
261 The partnership enterprise is different from the individual partnership in several aspects. Firstly, the 
formation requirements are different. Individual partnerships are not required to be registered by law. 
However, partnership enterprises must be registered according to law. Secondly, partnership enterprises 
have the ability to sue and be sued under its own name; while only registered individual partnerships have 
this ability. Third, partnership enterprises have the ability to hold separate assets; while individual 
partnerships normally do not have this ability. 
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Unlike the UK and the US where legislation on partnerships were promulgated 
earlier than the legislation on companies, PRC promulgated the PEL 1997 later 
than the PRC Company Law 1993. One may then ask why there was still a need 
for the PEL 1997 since limited liability forms were already available at that time. 
In fact, the promulgation of the PEL 1997 and the PRC Company Law 1993 
were both parts of the economic and law reform in the 1990s which aimed at 
establishing a modern enterprise system so as to develop the private economy.
262
  
Two major reasons called for the promulgation of the PEL1997. 
First, in 1988, the PRC Constitution was amended to change the basis of the 
socialist economic system from the socialist public ownership (社会主义公有
制 ) 263  to permit ―a private economy to exist and develop within the limits 
prescribed by law.‖ With the aim of encouraging the development of private 
enterprises and providing legal protection to private enterprises, the PRC 
Provisional Regulations on Private Enterprises 1988 ( 518H中华人民共和国私营企
业暂行条例) was promulgated. This regulation specified three types of private 
enterprises: (1) companies, (2) partnership enterprises and (3) sole proprietorship 
enterprises.
264
 Subsequently, Chinese legislature began to make laws one by one 
                                                 
262 See generally, ―A Few Thoughts on Drafting the Partnership Enterprise Law‖, supra note 249. 
263 Under the Constitution of the PRC 1982, the basis of the socialist economic system is the socialist public 
ownership which includes the ownership by the whole people and collective ownership by the working 
people. 
264 Art. 8 of the Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Private Enterprises specifies 
that a ―partnership enterprise‖ is an enterprise where two or more individuals carry on a business in common 
and all the partners are jointly liable to the debts of the enterprise. 
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according to the three types of enterprises.
265
 The PRC Company Law, the PRC 
Partnership Enterprise Law and the Sole Proprietorship Enterprise Law were 
promulgated in 1993, 1997, and 1999 respectively.
266
  
Second, partnerships became an important part of the market economy after the 
Open-Door policy. In 1993, among 237,919 private enterprises, 56,719 were 
partnerships, accounted for 23.8% in the total private enterprises.
267
 In 1995, 
there were nearly 1.2 million partnerships in China.
268
 However, many 
important issues regarding partnerships (e.g., partnerships ability to hold 
property, duties of partners etc) were not regulated by the applicable laws, 
especially the General Principles of Civil Law of People‟s Republic of China 
1986 (General Principles of Civil Law).
269
 Therefore, there was an imperative 
need to promulgate a separate consolidated partnership law.  
4.4 A Step Further- The Revision of the PEL in 2006  
After a decade of the PEL 1997, the National People‘s Congress decided to 
revise the law. On 27 August 2006, the Standing Committee of the 8
th
 National 
People‘s Congress of PRC adopted the amendments to the PEL 1997. The 
revised PEL came into force on 1 June 2007. 
                                                 
265 See ―A Few Thoughts on Drafting the Partnership Enterprise Law‖, supra note 249 at 43.  
266 Liu Ruifu, General Review on Enterprise Law (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2006), [Liu, General 
Review on Enterprise Law (copy in Chinese); Gan Peizhong, Enterprise and Company Law, 4th ed. (Beijing: 
Peking University Press, 2006 at 229 (copy in Chinese). 
267 ―A Few Thoughts on Drafting the Partnership Enterprise Law‖, supra note 249 at 43. 
268 Huang Yicheng, “Explanations on the Draft Partnership Enterprise Law of the PRC, delivered to the 22nd 
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269 The General Principles of Civil Law 1986 contains only six articles on individual partnerships. 
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4.4.1 Why the PEL 1997 Was Revised? 
Although a decade‘s implementation of the PEL 1997 accelerated the usage of 
partnership enterprises in China,
270
 the general partnerships have become less 
popular in recent years. Statistics indicated that partnership enterprises 
accounted for 7.1% in total private enterprises in 2005, but such a number 
dropped to 2.7% at the end of September in 2006.
271
 Several reasons led to the 
unsatisfactory result. (1) The fact that partnership enterprises were subjected to 
double taxation before 2000
272
 had caused the partnership enterprises lose its 
advantages in a variety of business arrangements. (2)The fact that only 
individuals were permitted to establish partnership enterprises restricted the 
usage of the partnership enterprises. (3)The traditional preference for stated-
owned enterprises had lead to the shortage of labor in partnership firms. (4)The 
considerable incoherence in the partnership legislation had created uncertainty 
in the implementation of the partnership law. (5)The development of the 519Hmarket-
oriented economy
273
 and an increasing demand for modernization and 
                                                 
270 In 2003, there were 1.21 million partnership enterprises registered in China. For legislative background 
of the revision of the PEL, see Hong Hu, ―Law Committee of the National People‘s Congress‘ Report of the 
Revised Partnership Enterprises Law (Draft)‖ (2006) 7 National People‘s Congress Gazette 598 (copy in 
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issued a notice to write off the tax for partnership enterprises by promulgating ―Circular of the Ministry of 
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legalization of various business forms triggered the National People‘s Congress 
to consider a comprehensive reform of partnership laws.  
4.4.2 New Amendments to the PEL1997 
The 2006 amendment to the PEL 1997 include: (1) the introduction of the LP 
and the Special General Partnership.
274
 Under the PEL 1997, there was only one 
type of partnership enterprise, namely, the general partnership.
275
 (2) Legal 
persons are permitted to establish partnerships. The PEL 1997 does not permit a 
legal person to be a partner.
276
 (3) Partnership‘s creditors have the option, when 
the partnership is unable to pay its debts, either to apply to the people‘s court for 
bankruptcy, or to claim directly against the general partners. (4) The revised 
PEL expressly exempts partnerships from paying enterprise income tax.  
4.5 The PEL: An Enterprise Law but not a Pure Partnership Law 
As indicated in its name, the PEL is a separate ―enterprise law‖ (企业法) 
                                                 
274 The special general partnership is a sub-type of the general partnership enterprise. It resembles the 
general partnership in that all the partners in the special general partnership are jointly liable for the debts of 
the partnership, but the special general partnership shields co-partners from liabilities due to the wilful 
misconduct or gross negligence of one or more partners. 
275 The introduction of the LP was not accepted by the Law Commission of the National People‘s Congress 
when the PEL was drafted in 1997. The said reason was the fact that China had little practice on LPs at that 
time. For legislative background on the PEL 1997, see Huang, ―Explanations on the Draft Partnership 
Enterprise Law of the PRC‖, supra note 268; Li Yining, ―Report of the Law Commission of the National 
People‘s Congress on the Draft Partnership Law of the PRC‖, delivered to the 24th Meeting of the Standing 
Committee of the 8th National People‘s Congress on 19 February 1997 (1997) 1 Gazette of Standing 
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governing the partnership enterprise only.
277
 Unlike the US and the UK where 
there are separate partnership Acts governing general partnerships and LPs, both 
the general partnership and the LP are regulated by the PEL.  
Under PRC legal system, enterprise law is a branch of economic law (经济
法).278 Economic law is generally accepted as an independent legal discipline 
which governs the relationships arising from the economic activities.
279
 
Compared with the DRULPA and the UPAs which place great emphasis on 
individualism and freedom of contract, the PEL in China focuses more on the 
control and supervision of the partnership transaction from the perspective of the 
state. Especially, the PEL focuses more on the external relationships between 
the partnership and outsiders rather than the internal relationship among partners.  
As stated in Article 1 of the PEL, the legal objective of the PEL is “to regulate 
the actions of partnership enterprises; to protect the legal interests of 
partnership enterprises, partners, and the creditors of the partnership; to 
maintain social economic order and to promote socialist market economy‟s 
development”. Moreover, the PEL provides a chapter regulating the 
―relationship between partnership enterprises and the third parties‖. The PEL 
                                                 
277 There were three proposals as to the legislative models of the partnership law before the PEL was 
promulgated in 1997. See ―A Few Thoughts on Drafting the Partnership Enterprise Law‖; supra note 249 at 
44-45.  
278 See Liu, General Review on Enterprise Law, supra note 266 at 67; Gan Peizhong, Enterprise and 
Company Law, supra note 266 at 229.  
279 Liu, General Review on Enterprise Law, supra note 266 at 67; Gan Peizhong, Enterprise and Company 
Law, supra note 266 at 229. 
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also provides a separate chapter on ―Legal Liabilities‖ in order to regulate the 
illegal actions by partners, liquidators, and even government officers who have 
authority on the regulations of partnerships. However, the PEL fails to provide 
detailed rule governing the internal relationships among partners. 
In addition, the PEL is a stand-alone enterprise law which is promulgated as a 
part of the state‘s economic and legislative reform during the transitional period 
of the 1990s. Unlike common law which considers each partner as both a 
principal and an agent for the other partners in the partnership business,
280
 not 
every partner is regarded as agents of the partnership under the PEL. The agency 
of partners is achieved through specific provisions.
281
 
 Article 26 of the PEL provides that each partner has equal rights in the 
conduct (执行) of the partnership affairs.  
 Article 26 of the PEL also provides that subject to the partnership 
agreement or the consent of all partners, a partnership enterprise may 
mandate ( 委托 ) one or more partners to represent the partnership 
enterprise and to conduct partnership businesses. If the authorized partner 
is a legal person, or other organization, the partner may entrust (委派) its 
                                                 
280 F. Burdick, The Law of Partnership 133 (1906) at 177. 
281  For further discussion on partnership agency, see, e.g., Wei Zhenying and Wang Xiaoneng, 
―Comparative Studies on Agency Laws in Mainland China and Hong Kong‖ (1998) Peking University Law 
Journal vol. at 101 and 102 (copy in Chinese); Wee Meng Seng, ―China‘s Partnership Enterprise Law: A 
Comparative Study‖ (1998) 19 Asia Business Law Review 21 at 23. 
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representative to execute partnership affairs. 
282
  
 Article 27 of the PEL further provides that, when there are partners who 
are mandated to conduct partnership affairs, other partners shall no longer 
conduct partnership affairs; but they have the right to supervise the 
conduct of the partnership business.
283
 
 Article 68 of the PEL provides that limited partners shall not conduct 
partnership affairs, or to act on behalf of the LPs.  
The above provisions suggest that, if there is no partnership agreement 
specifying the authority for partner(s) to act on behalf of the partnership, all 
general partners have rights to act as agents of the partnerships. If there is a 
partnership agreement specifying so, only the authorized partner can act on 
behalf of the partnership. Particularly in a LP, only the authorized general 
partners can conduct the partnership business, while limited partners cannot act 
on behalf of the LP.  
5. Conclusion: A Piecemeal Development of Partnership laws in China  
This chapter concludes that the emergence and evolution of various partnerships 
was a natural response to the needs of commerce during the several millennia of 
Chinese history. Though there is a vibrant economy with vibrant partnerships, 
                                                 
282 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 26. 
283 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 27.  
86 
 
there was no separate partnership form or written law governing partnership in 
ancient China. Without several missing elements, e.g., comprehensive law 
merchant, bankruptcy law and advanced accounting method, it appeared that 
entity shielding was not a necessary feature in ancient Chinese firms. Based on 
the available materials as at the date of this thesis, entity shielding rules were not 
found in ancient Chinese partnerships either. This is different from Hansmann et 
al.‘s primary argument that entity shielding has been a necessary feature in 
organizational law.    
The evidence in this chapter also proves that the law of partnership was 
developed in a piecemeal way across Chinese history. Apart from the absent of 
written partnership law in ancient China, the several Republican legislation on 
partnerships were discarded shortly by the PRC government in 1949. During the 
thirty decades from the establishment of PRC to the promulgation of the PEL 
1997, various partnership forms were either not codified or simply regulated by 
different regulations. The existing PEL is not developed naturally out of the 
traditional Chinese law, but a part of the state‘s economic and legal reform in the 
transitional period. Under this premise, the partnership enterprise today does not 
succeed the legal tradition and legacy in its Chinese ancestors. It is simply a 
creation of law which has only a-decade-history.  
This finding has significant implications for the understanding of the PEL and 
the PRC partnerships enterprises. As the PRC LP is a type of partnership 
enterprises, the PRC LP is also embodied with the features of partnership 










This chapter reviews the origin, evolution and recent developments of the LP in 
major civil law and common law jurisdictions, including Germany, France, the 
US and the UK. This comparative analysis points out how the popularity of the 
various LP regimes is affected by the economic and legislative changes in their 
jurisdictions. It is argued that although the introduction of new limited liability 
vehicle and the elimination of tax incentives on partnerships may inevitably 
affect the take-up rate of the LP, the LP still plays an important role in the 
business world, especially in the venture capital and private equity markets. This 
is largely due to the inherent attributes and special structure of the LP, namely the 
combination of limited liability and personal liability, the flexible, confidential 
and contractual nature of partnerships.  
By comparing the PRC LP with its counterparts in the US, the UK, Germany and 
France, this chapter identifies the major problems which have not been addressed 
                                                 
284 Parts of this section have been published and presented in academic journals and conferences during the 
author‘s PhD tenure. See, e.g., Lin Lin, ―Limited Partnership - the New Business Vehicle in China‖ (with 
HY Yeo), (2010) 25(2) Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 104; Lin Lin, ―The 
Organizational Choices for Private Equity Funds in China‖, (Paper presented to the 5th Asian Law Institute 
Conference, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore, 23 May 2008); Lin Lin, A New Business 
Vehicle for Venture Capital Investment in China: Under the Partnership Enterprise Law‖, (Paper presented 
to the 2007 ALIN International Academic Conference, Faculty of Law, Chulalongkorn University, 
Bangkok, 6 December 2007). 
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or addressed well within the PRC LP. These areas include, but not limited to: the 
ambiguous legal nature of partnerships, the lack of the control rule, the lack of 
fiduciary duties, the lack of details rules of the limited partner derivative action 
and the ambiguous liability shield of limited partners.  
The first part compares the rationales and development path of the LP in major 
common law and civil law jurisdictions. The second part introduces the reasons 
and the background of the PRC LP. The third part identifies the major features of 
the PRC LP through in-depth comparative studies.  
2. Rationale and Development of the LP 
Given the fact that the modern LP is developed from the medieval commenda, 
this part will briefly discuss the rationale for the creation of the commenda. 
Moreover, because the commenda was later reinforced in the separate LP Acts in 
the US and the UK; and because the LP is an important business vehicle for 
venture capital and private equity investment in these jurisdictions, references 
also will be given to the LP in the US and the UK. Further, the LP has been 
recently adopted in Singapore, New Zealand, Japan and other jurisdictions for 
the purpose of encouraging venture capital investment,
285
 a study on the rationale 
for the LP regimes in these jurisdictions are also necessary.   
                                                 
285 See supra note 3-9. 
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2.1 The Origin of the Modern LP: the Medieval Commenda
286
  
There is a consensus among many scholars that the roots of the LP can be traced 
far back to the commenda in continental Europe of the Middle Ages.
287
 The 
commenda was created as a device for financing maritime trade during the tenth 
and eleventh centuries.
288
 There were two major features of a typical commenda. 
Firstly, there were two classes of partners - the passive investor who provided 
capital and a traveling trader (often the ship captain) who contributed labor and 
initiative;
289
 secondly, the passive partner usually enjoyed limited liability while 
lacked control over firm matters.
290
  
The reasons for the creation and development of the commenda in maritime trade 
at that time were threefold.
291
 First, the passive partners could not exercise 
control over the firm because the commenda usually lasted for a single or round-
trip voyage. The assets of the firm were away from the passive partners. Second, 
the liability shield for passive partners made sense because on the one hand, the 
passive partner‘s lack of control was a way of shielding him/her from imprudent 
borrowing by the active partner. One the other hand, ―the passive partner's lack 
of control disabled him from causing the firm to make opportunistic distributions 
                                                 
286 The origin of the LP can be found in many scholarly writings, see, e.g., Robert W. Hillman, ―Limited 
Liability in Historical Perspective‖ (1997) 54 Wash. & Lee L.Rev.615 [Hillman, ―Limited Liability in 
Historical Perspective‖]; L.C.B. Gower, Gower‟s Principles of Modern Company Law, 5th ed. (London: 
Sweet and Maxwell, 1992), [Gower] at 20. 
287 Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership, supra 68 at vol. 3, §1102; Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 
supra note 67; Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78 at 1372. 
288 Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78 at 1372. 
289 Ibid. 
290 See Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78 at 1372; see also Holdsworth, A 
History of English Law, supra note 67 at 195.  
291 See Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78 at 1372 -1374. 
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to him at the expense of firm creditors.‖ 292  Third, active partners‘ personal 
liability for any shortfall in firm assets acted as an incentive for preventing active 
partners‘ opportunistic activities or distributions to passive partners that might 
cause insolvency to the firm. 
The commenda was later developed for terrestrial use, including internal trade, 
banking, and even for local industry.
293
 The commenda had evolved into a non-
maritime form, the société in accomandita by the fifteenth century for the 
purpose of short-term terrestrial use.
294
 The separation of management and 
ownership was said to be typically useful to those firms whose assets were 
remote from the limited partners.
295
 The société in accomandita was very similar 
to its ancestor in the way that they were both generally used for a definite 
period
296
 and they both had two classes of partners.   
2.2 The LP in Civil Law Jurisdictions 










                                                 
292 See Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78 at 1372. 
293 Cizakca, A comparative evolution of business partnerships, supra note 77 at 14-15. 
294 It was adopted by statute in Florance in 1408.See Raymond De Roover, The Rise and Decline of the 
Medici Bank 1397–1494, at 89, 284, 325 (1963);  Mitchell, ―Early Forms of Partnership‖, supra note 123 at 
vol.3, 185; Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78 at 1373.  
295 Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78  at 1373. 
296 See Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78 at 1372 to 1374.  
297 In some jurisdictions which do not have a separate commercial code, such as Switzerland, partnerships 
are regulated under the civil code. The societas, which is another early form of commercial partnership 
existing in the middle ages, had a different origin and a different development with the commenda at the 
time. The modern general partnership can be deemed as the descendant of the societas. See Mitchell, ―Early 
Forms of Partnership‖, supra note 123. 












 The distinctive feature of these LP 
regimes is the presence of one or more passive partners who are liable only to the 
extent of their investment in the partnership, and the active partners whose 
liability is unlimited. Considering that the US LP was modeled on the French LP, 
the historical influence that the Germany law has had on the partnerships during 
the Republic of China era, the following mainly discussed the LP in the two 
major civil law jurisdictions, France and Germany. 
2.2.1 France 
In France, the société en commandite simple, was firstly sanctioned by 
the 520HCommercial Ordinance of 521H 673 (the Ordonnance du commerce of 1673). 
However, this law did not provide comprehensive definition of the société en 
commandite simple, but left the task to contemporary jurists.
305
 The principle 
feature of the société en commandite simple was that the limited partners did not 
participate in the management of the firm and they enjoyed limited liability.
306
 
Nevertheless, the Commercial Ordinance of 1673 did not specify what effect 
would have to the limited liability status of the secret partner should they 
                                                                                                                                    
299In Germany, the Kommanditgesellschaft (KG) was reinforced under the German Commercial Code.  
300 See société en commandite under the Swiss Code of Obligations. 
301 Known in Austria as kommanditgesellschaft. 
302 See R.C.I‘anson Banks, Lindley and Banks on Partnership, supra note 70 at 33. 
303 See Tokumei kumiai under Art. 535 et seq of the Japanese Commercial Code. In many respects, the 
tokumei kumiai is similar to a common law LP, but it is formed by the partnership agreement rather than 
formed by registration.  
304 See “Yinmin hehuo‖, Art. 400 et seq in the Civil Code of Republic of China 1929. However, this code 
was abolished after the establishment of the PRC in 1949. 
305 Amalia D. Kessler, ―Limited Liability in Context: Lessons from the French Origins of the American 
Limited Partnership‖ (2003) 32 Journal of Legal Studies 511. [Kessler] at 519. 
306 ―Jousse, Daniel. 1761. Nouveau commentaire sur les ordonnances des mois d'août 1669, et mars 1673: 
ensemble sur l'Édit du mois de mars 1673 touchant les épices, nouvelle édition, corrigée et augmentée. 
Paris: Chez Debure l'aîné, pp. 41-42‖, cited in Kessler, supra note 305 at 522.  
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participate in the management of the firm.
307
 
There were deep social and culture roots for the enactment of the société en 
commandite simple in the Old Regime France. At that time, noblemen were 
traditionally prohibited from practicing commerce due to the particular social 
order.
308
 Nobles who engaged in commercial activities would risk the loss of 
noble status. In order to enable noblemen to invest in commerce without 
threatening their noble status, the société en commandite simple set forth a legal 
rule that allowed noblemen to engage in investment secretly - passive partners 
were not required to disclose their name and to provide labour to the partnership 
business.
309
 For the noblemen and those hoping to join the nobility to be owners 
without being managers, they were able to invest in commerce without letting 
outsiders know their names and status; and without having to participate in the 
management of the business.  
The société en commandite simple was later regulated by the French Commercial 
Code.
310
 Under this code, limited partners are liable for the debts of the 
partnership only up to the limit of the amount of their contribution. A limited 
partner may not undertake any act of external management, otherwise the limited 
partner is held to be jointly and severally liable with the general partners for all 
                                                 
307 Kessler, supra note 305 at 541. 
308 Kessler, supra note 305 at 517. 
309 ―Toubeau, Jean. 1700. Les institutes du droit consulaire ou les elemens de la jurisprudence des 
marchands, d'un tres-grand secours au palais, utiles à tous marchands et négociants, et necessaires aux juges 
et consuls. 2 vols. Bourges: Chez Nicolas Gosselinat 2:73‖, citing in Kessler, supra note 305 at 516-517. 




or some of the debts and obligations of the partnership (the control rule).
311
  
Another LP form which was similar to the société en commandite simple, the 
société en commandite par action is also recognized in France.
 312
 The major 
difference of these two partnerships is that the former can have special partner‘s 
shares being bought and sold while the latter does not.
313
 It is worth mentioning 
that, in 1966 when French company was undergone reform, consideration was 
given as to whether the société en commandite par action should continue to 
exist as it was rarely used in practice.
314
 Also, as this form is more analogous to a 
company, it is not further considered here.  
The société en commandite simple became a popular business form in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century France. Statistics shows that during the 1830s 
and the 1960s, one-third to one-half of all new firms took this form.
315
 However, 
its popularity seemed to be reduced by the adoption of the new business entity 
with stronger liability shield, especially, the new corporation form: the société 
anonyme.
 316
   
                                                 
311 French Commercial Code Art. 222. Chapter 5 of this Thesis will discuss the control rule issue in detail. 
312 See Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, ―Legal Regime and Contractual Flexibility: A 
Comparison of Business‘s Organizational Choices in France and the United States during the Era of 
Industrialization‖ (2005) 7 American Law and Economics Review 1 [Lamoreaux and Rosenthal, ―Legal 
Regime‖] at 34. 
313 The LP has been a popular business form in France from the 1830s to 1925. See Lamoreaux and 
Rosenthal, ―Legal Regime‖, supra note 312. 
314  Simon Lowe, ―A Guide to French Business Entities‖ (1995) 6(2) International Company and 
Commercial Law Review 38 at 44-46. 
315 Lamoreaux and Rosenthal, ―Entity Shielding and the Development of Business Forms‖, supra note 80.  
316 Ibid.  
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Today, the société en commandite simple is rarely used in France.
 317
 Apart from 
the new development of other forms of legal entity, it is partly due to the 
particularly complicated tax treatment and risk sharing attributed to it.
318
 
Particularly, the limited partners (commanditaies) and the general partners 
(commandites) have totally different tax treatments. As the limited partners are 
treated as if they were shareholders in the societe anonyme, the société en 




In French venture capital and private equity sector, the investment vehicle that is 
most often proposed to institutional investors is not the société en commandite 
simple, but the Private Equity Investment Fund (FCPR), which is a co-ownership 
of securities with a limited life. It is not a separate legal entity and enjoys 




The Kommanditgesellschaft was recognized in Germany under the German 
Commercial Code.
321
 This vehicle is comparable to the French société en 
commandite in that both exclude the limited partner from the management of the 
                                                 
317 Simon Lowe, ―A Guide to French Business Entities‖ (1995) International Company and Commercial 
Law Review 6(2) 38 at 44-46. 
318 Ibid. 
319 Ibid. 
320 For further information on the FCPR, see ―AFIC‘s Response to the Report of the Alternative Investment 
Expert Group Relating to European Private Equity‖, online: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/investment/docs/consultations/comments/associationfradlafic.pdf>. 
321 German Commercial Code § 161-177a. 
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business. However, unlike the French société en commandite which provides 
penalty of forfeiting limited partners‘ limited status should they participate in the 
management (the control rule), no equivalent control rule is found in the 
Kommanditgesellschaft. Limited partners‘ liability in the Kommanditgesellschaft 
is excluded once the contribution has been paid.
322
 Switzerland does not provide 
such a penalty rule either.
323
 
15BA more advanced partnership form was developed in the 1920s.
324
 That is the 
Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung & Compagnie Kommanditgesellschaft 
(GmbH & Co KG), whereby a private company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter 
Haftung, ―GmbH‖) acts as a sole general partner bearing unlimited liability in the 
LP. It is an attractive business form in Germany
325
 because the firm is unaffected 
by the death of any limited partners by having a private company as a general 
partner.  
New partnership forms were developed in recent years for specific investment in 
Germany. They are (1) the Auslanderkapitalgesellschaft & Co KG, in which the 
limited partner is an overseas capital company; (2) the Stiftung & Co KG, in 
which a foundation is the unlimited partner; and (3) the GmbH & Co KGaA, 
which is a Kommanditgesellschaft with freely transferable shares where the 
                                                 
322 German Commercial Code § 171 (1). 
323 R.C.I‘anson Banks, Lindley and Banks on Partnership, supra note 70 at 33. 
324  See Norbert Horn, Hein Kotz and Hans G. Leser; translated by Tony Weir, German Private and 
Commercial Law: an Introduction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), [Horn, Kotz and Leser l.] at 250. 
325 Frank Woldridge, ―The German Private Company Limited Partnership‖ (2006) EBLR 1561 [Woldridge]; 
Horn, Kotz and Leser l., supra note 324.  
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general partner is a private company (GmbH).
326
Among these three business 
vehicles, the GmbH & Co KGaA is currently an attractive form for raising 
venture capital in Germany.
327
 In 1997, Germany decided that a juristic person 
could be the general partner of a Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien (KG aA, an 




2.3 The LP in Common Law Jurisdictions 
2.3.1. The US  
In the US, the first LP statute was enacted in New York in 1822.
329
 In early 
nineteenth century, there was a great desire to avoid the doctrine of partnership 
liability to third person, and to encourage investment of capital in trade.
330
 
However, the state of New York and its sister states did not guarantee limited 
liability to their investors.
331
 As the LP was not available in the UK
332
  at that 
time, New York imported the French société en commandite simple in order to 
―afford guaranteed limited liability in a type of business organization whose 
                                                 
326 Woldridge, supra note 325. 
327 See Henning, ―Partnership Law Review‖, supra note 58 at 163-170.  
328  Editorial, ―Limited Partnerships under Review‖ (2002) 23(6) Company Lawyer 165, ―influence of 
outsider shareholders may be limited; the duties relating to financial disclosure may be narrower; the effect 
of workers' participation in the management organs of the business may be more limited; and the effect of 
corporate double taxation can be more effectively addressed‖. 
329 After that, most of the eastern seaboard states soon followed the legislation trend by using New York‘s 
Act as a model. Joseph J. Basile, Jr., ―Limited Liability for Limited Partners: An Argument for the Abolition 
of the Control Rule‖ (1985) 38 Vand. L. Rev. 1199, [Basile]. One of the first American court opinion to deal 
with the LP dates back to Ames v. Downing, I. Bradf. (Surr.) 321 (I850); Jacquin v. Buisson, 11. How. Pr. 
385 (N. Y. 1855), cited in Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership, supra note 68; Alan L. Feld, ―The 
‗Control‘ Test for Limited Partnership‖ (1968) 104 U.Pa.L.Rev.125. 
330 Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership, supra note 68. 
331 See Kessler, supra note 305 at 535. 
332 The UK Limited Partnership Act was not promulgated until 1907. 
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establishment did not require special legislative authorization.‖ 333 Indeed, New 
York legislature's passage of the 1822 LP state was ―... an attempt to provide 
readily available limited liability through the back door, circumventing the highly 
contentious question of corporations and their place in American society.‖ 334 
However, the early American LP statutes were very restrictive in the sense that it 
contained the strict court interpretation on limited liability. The acquiring of the 
liability shield was conditioned on exact compliance with statutory requirements. 
Because of these factors, the LP form was rarely used at the time.
335
   
The first Uniform Act regulating the LP, the ULPA 1916, was promulgated in 
1916.
336
 This Act was subsequently revised in 1976 and 1985.
337
 In 2001, a 
―stand alone‖ Act, the ULPA 2001 was promulgated to provide a more flexible 
and stable basis for organizing the LP.
338
  
The role of LPs in the business world has also seen many changes in history. 
Because of its tax advantage, the LP was used extensively in the 1970s and the 
1980s, especially in real estate development and finance investment.
339
 Since the 
                                                 
333 See Kessler, supra note 305 at 534. 
334 Ibid. 
335 Lamoreaux and Rosenthal, ―Legal Regime and Contractual Flexibility‖, supra note 312 at 36. Brumder, 
supra note 575. 
336 This Act was drafted by the NCCUSL. It was closely linked to the Uniform Partnership Act 1914. The 
Uniform Partnership Act was revised in 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996 and 1997 respectively. 
337  For legislative history of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, see NCCUSL's Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act Archive Information, Prior Revisions, and Drafts, online: 
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ulc.htm>. 
338 There are two major changes provided by the ULPA 2001. See NCCUSL's Legislative Fact Sheet and list 
of states adopting Uniform Limited Partnership Act , online: < 
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ulpa.asp>. 
339See Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership, supra note 68 at §11.01.  
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second part of the 1970s, it has also become a dominant organizational form in 
the US venture capital industry.
340
 The vast majority of funding for venture 
capital has derived from funds organized as LPs.
341
  
2.3.2 The UK 
In the UK, however, the commenda was not addressed until the Limited 
Partnership Act 1907 came into force.
342
 This was relatively slower than many 
other jurisdictions in continental Europe at the time.
343
 The reasons for the late 
introduction of the commenda were three-fold as summarized by Sir 
Holdsworth.
344
 One of the crucial reasons was that, by the time the LP was 




The English LP has become a popular form in venture capital investments in the 
                                                 
340 Gompers and Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle, supra note 50 at 10. 
341 Duke K. Bristow and Lee R. Petillon ―Public Venture Capital Funds: New Relief from the Investment 
Company Act of 1940‖ (1999) 18 Ann. Rev. Banking L.393 at 395. 
342 R.C.I‘anson Banks, Lindley and Banks on Partnership, supra note 70 at 842. The concept of Commenda 
was said to be revived in the common law jurisdictions by the Irish Anonymous Partnerships Act of 1781. 
Fletcher, supra note 69 at 267. 
343 ―In 1837, the Board of Trade instructed a Chancery barrister, H.Bellenden Ker, to prepare a report on the 
law of partnership with particular reference to the expediency of introducing limited partnerships on the 
continental model. However, his report was pigeonholed.‖ 1825 Parliamentary History and Review, at 711, 
cited in Gower, supra note 286 at 38. 
344 Cf. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, supra note 67. Sir Holdsworth in his History of English Law 
discussed the causes of the late introduction of the commenda: firstly, the conquest by the courts of common 
law and equity of the field of commercial jurisdiction made English commercial law very insular. Secondly, 
the commenda was discouraged in the trades controlled by the later regulated companies because it afforded 
a means by which persons not free of the company might succeed in trading without being free of the 
company. Thirdly, England‘s trade did not begin to develop rapidly till the latter part of the sixteenth 
century. Fourth, at the beginning of the eighteenth century legislative opinion was hostile to the limitation of 
liability, which was the essential feature of the commenda.  
345 Some scholars observed that the reason why the commenda never took root in English law and the reason 
why English business practice lagged behind continental was the limited book-keeping technique at that 
time. See Cooke, Colin Arthur, Corporation, Trust and Company: An Essay in Legal History (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1950) at 46; Gower, supra note 286 at 20. 
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UK after it was approved for use in this area since 1987.
346
 The reason for its 
popularity is threefold: first, it met the business needs of the passive fund 
investors who do not wish to take an active role in the management of their funds. 
It also offers liability shield to investors. Second, it offers privacy to the fund 
managers as accounts of the partnership are not generally disclosed.
347
 Third, it 
contains tax advantages to the investors as the LP is not treated as an entity 
distinct from its members for the purpose of income tax or capital gains tax.
348
 
Since 2003, the UK Law Commissions has launched a reform of the English LP. 
In 2009, the British Government decided to implement some of the 
recommendations proposed by the UK Law Commissions.
349
 One major reason 
for the UK to modernize its LP regime is to increase the use of the LP and 
maintain the UK‘s competitive position in the venture capital market.350 
2.4 Recent Adoption and Adaption of the LP  
In recent years, a number of jurisdictions have introduced new LP regimes into 
their business menus, including Japan, Singapore, New Zealand, Australia, 
Switzerland and Taiwan. 
                                                 
346UK Joint Consultation Paper on Partnership, supra note 46 at 2. See also Joseph A. McCahery and Erik 
P.M.Vermeulen, ―Limited Partnership Reform in the United Kingdom: A Competitive, Venture Capital 
Oriented Business Form‖ (2004) 5 EBOR. 65, [McCahery and Vermeulen, ―Limited Partnership Reform in 
the United Kingdom‖]. 
 347 UK Joint Consultation Paper on Partnership, supra note 46 at 3. 
 348 Ibid. 
 349 For the legislative history on the English partnerships, see UK Department for Business Innovation and 
Skills, online: <http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/businesslaw/partnership/page25911.html>. 
 350 UK Joint Consultation Paper on Partnership, supra note 46 at 5. Another major purpose of the UK 
partnership law reform was to revise the theoretical weakness regarding the legal treatment of the LP under 




For instance, in 1999, the National 522HDiet of Japan passed the Limited Partnership 
for Investment Act (投資事業有限責任組合契約に関する法律) to enable the 
formation of the ―limited partnership for investment‖.351  Singapore enacted the 
Limited Partnership Act 2008 to ―enable Singapore to better meet the diverse 
business needs, and offer entrepreneurs and investors an additional form of 
business structure to choose from.‖352 To make Singapore an attractive place for 
investment, the Singapore LP is not a separate legal entity and has transparent tax 
treatment for income tax and GST purposes.
353
 The New Zealand Limited 
Partnership Act 2008 was also enacted in 2008 for the purpose of facilitating 
sustainable growth in New Zealand's venture capital and private equity 
industries.
354
 In 2007, Taiwan introduced the LP with separate legal entity nature 
in order to ―promote industrial development and increase its regional 
competitiveness‖. 355  In Switzerland, the ―Limited Partnership for Collective 
Investment‖ (LPCI) was introduced in 2007 to attract private equity investment 
in Switzerland.
356
 Australia has also recently introduced a Venture Capital 
Limited Partnership (VCLP) and an Early Stage Venture Capital Limited 
Partnership (ESVCLP) to stimulate Australia‘s venture capital sector by 
attracting foreign investors.
357
 This programme provides flow-through tax 
                                                 
351 Text available online: < http://www.meti.go.jp/topic/data/e40430aj.html> (in Japanese). 
352 The Singapore Limited Partnership Act came into operation on 4 May 2009. Text available online: < 
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/>.  
353 See Satish Cheney, ―Parliament passes bill to allow limited partnerships in Singapore‖ (18 November 
2008), online: Channel NewsAsia 
<http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporebusinessnews/view/390624/1/.html>. 
354 Supra note 4. 
355 Supra note 5. 
356 See Remy Bärlocher, ―the Swiss Limited Partnership - An Attractive Structuring Alternative for Private 
Equity in Europe‖ (2008) European Lawyer 74. 
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treatment and a complete tax exemption for income, both revenue and capital, 
received by the eligible venture capital partners. 
3. The LP’s Popularity in the Venture Capital Market 
The above historical review shows that although the LP is an old business vehicle, 
it is still viable and popular in the business world, especially in the venture 
capital and private equity investment.  
In fact, many economic and legal scholars have addressed the benefits provided 
by the LP. These benefits include reducing the owner‘s risk, facilitating the 
market efficiency,
358
 and minimizing the agency and operating costs.
359
 From the 
above discussion, we could conclude that there were three major advantages of 
the LP. 
 First, the combination of limited liability and personal liability meets the 
needs of both the limited partners and the general partners. In the US and the 
UK, as the venture capital investors are usually pension funds, university 
endowments and other institutional investors who are in no position to 
oversee and monitor their investment; the LP is attractive to the passive 
                                                                                                                                    
357 Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Australia, Press Release, No.037, ―Further Boost to Australia‘s 
Venture Capital Sector‖ (9 May 2006), online: 
<http://www.treasurer.gov.au/tsr/content/pressreleases/2006/037.asp>. ―Venture Capital Limited 
Partnerships‖ (VCLPs) Customer Information Gude‖, online: AusIndustry < 
http://www.ausindustry.gov.au/VentureCapital/VentureCapitalLimitedPartnershipsVCLP/Documents/VCLP
CustomerInfoGuide_FEB10.pdf >. 
358 See Larry E. Ribstein, ―An Applied Theory of Limited Partnership‖ (1988) 37 Emory Law Journal 835 
[Ribstein, ―Applied Theory‖]. 
359 See William A. Sahlman, ―The Structure and Governance of Venture-capital Organizations‖ (1990) 27 
Journal of Financial Economics 473. 
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investors who do not wish to take an active role in the management of the 
business and who prefer to entrust the management of the business to the 
fund managers. 
360
 Meanwhile, the investors can take advantages of the 
experienced and management talent of the fund managers by using the LP 
form.
361
 Moreover, the personal liability imposed on the fund managers 
provides an effective safeguard for the investors as well as the incentive to 
avoid the risk of negative net asset outcomes.
362
  
 Second, the flexibility and privacy of the LP align the interests of both 
limited partners and general partners. Compared to corporations, the LP is 
more flexible in the sense that it is governed by the partnership agreement. 
Partners may negotiate terms and conditions flexibly in order to make the 
firm best meet their business needs. Also, the LP offers the investor more 
privacy as compared to corporations in the sense that the accounts of the 
partnership are not generally disclose.  
 Third, the tax incentives attract investors. The taxes and fees imposed on the 
firm may be a significant consideration in choice of form, particularly if 
other factors are equally balanced.
363
 As a commentator observed, ―the 
greater the tax advantage a particular organizational form enjoys, the more 
                                                 
360  See generally in David Rosenberg, ―Venture Capital Limited Partnerships: a Study in Freedom of 
Contract‖ (2002) Colum.Bus.L.Rew. 363, [Rosenberg, ―Freedom of Contract‖]. 
361 Ibid. 
362 Ribstein, ―Applied Theory‖, supra note 358. 
363 Bromberg, Alan R. and Larry E. Ribstein, Bromberg and Ribstein on Limited Liability Partnerships, the 
Revised Uniform Partnership Act and the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001) (Aspen Publisher, 2006), 
[Bromberg and Ribstein on Limited Liability Partnerships] at 21.  
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the tax advantage functions like a law requiring the use of that 
organizational form‖.364 Compared to the corporation, the formality cost of 
the LP is considerably lower. The LP is usually treated as tax transparent 
while the corporation is subject to taxation both on the company level and 
upon distribution. In particular, to encourage more venture capital onshore, 
some jurisdictions have created a special LP with certain tax-privileged 
treatments. 
In line with international practice, China also introduces the LP. The next part 
will introduce the PRC LP. 
4. The Adoption of the LP in China365 
4.1 The Legislative History 
Since the first part of the 1990s, the drafter of the PEL had considered 
introducing the LP into China.
366
 In 1996, the LP was introduced by the PRC 
legislature in the draft PEL bill.
367
 Regrettably, the proposal was not taken by the 
Standing Committee of the National People‘s Congress.368 
Even though there was no national law governing the LP until the revision of the 
PEL in 2006, some local governments had made local rules governing the LP. 
                                                 
364 Christopher Gulinello, ―Venture Capital Funds, Organizational Law, and Passive Investors‖ (2006) 70 
Alb.L.Rev.303 [Gulinello , ―Venture Capital Funds, Organizational Law, and Passive Investors‖] at 327. 
365 For legislative history of the LP in China, see also Yong and Geu, supra note 81. 
366 See Huang, ―Explanations on the Draft Partnership Enterprise Law of the PRC‖, supra note 268 at 15. 
367 See Huang, ―Explanations on the Draft Partnership Enterprise Law of the PRC‖, supra note 268. 
368 See Li, ―Report of the Law Commission of the National People‘s Congress on the Draft Partnership Law 
of the PRC‖, supra note 275 at 18. 
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These rules include the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, Partnership 
Regulations 1994; the Beijing Zhongguancun Science and Technology Zone 




In February 2004, a working group was established by the National People‘s 
Congress Standing Committee to get in charge of the revision of the PEL 1997. 
In April 2006, the Financial and Economic Subcommittee of the National 
People‘s Congress issued the first version of the revised PEL. After two 
subsequent drafts, the revised PEL was ultimately passed on 27 August 2006. 
The new PEL became effective on 1 June 2007.
370
  One of the major 
amendments to the PEL 1997 was the introduction of the LP.  
4.2 The Need for the LP in China  
The primary reason for the PRC adopting the LP is encourage the investment of 
capital in innovative high-technology enterprises and to facilitate the 
development of the venture capital market amidst the overhaul of the economic 
infrastructure.
371
   
First, the business needs in China‘s venture capital market call for the 
introduction of the LP. China has become one of the most aggressive emerging 
                                                 
369  For the contents and further information on these three regulations, see Li Fei, Interpretation of 
Partnership Enterprise Law of the People‟s Republic of China (Beijing: Law Press China, 2006), [Li, 
Interpretation of Partnership Enterprise Law] at 258 (copy in Chinese). 
370 For the major amendments to the PEL 1997, see supra text accompanying notes 274-276. 
371 Yan Yixun, ―Reasons of Revising the Partnership Enterprise Law‖, supra note 270. 
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markets for venture capital, having been admitted into the World Trade 
Organization in 2001. Since 2006, China has become the second largest country, 
after only the US, in attracting venture capital investment.
372
 However, even with 
the steady increase in venture capital funding over this high-growth period, there 
is still a severe lack of capital for the financing of new projects in China.
373
  
Two factors underlie this reluctance of domestic and foreign venture capital 
managers to invest in China: (1) the inadequate ―menu‖ of business vehicles for 
the venture capital community; and (2) the harsh tax system.  
Before the adoption of the LP, the major principal legal structures available 
generally for venture capital firms in China were the Limited Liability Company, 
the Joint Stock Company and the general partnership. However, these vehicles 
were gradually declining in popularity. The reasons are as follows: for the 
Limited Liability Company and the Joint Stock Company, the double tax 
treatment and the substantial formation costs proved dampening.
374
 As for the 
general partnership, the unlimited liability of all the partners and the harsh tax 
burden
375
 were major drawbacks. In addition, since 2003, foreign investors have 
been permitted to engage in venture capital activities in China by establishing 
                                                 
372See Zero2IPO Research Centre, ―Top 10 Events of China Venture Capital Industry 2006‖ (31 December 
2006), online: Zero2ipo news < http://www.zero2ipo.com.cn/en/n/2006-12-31/20061231213405.shtml>. 
373 ―China Venture Capital Investment: Inside ‗Cold‘, Outside ‗Hot‘‖ (29 October 2006), online: Xinhua Net 
<http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2006-10/29/content_5264286.htm> 
(copy in Chinese). 
374 Before the revision of the PRC Company Law 2005, it was not easy to incorporate a company in China as 
the minimum capital required for the Limited Liability Company and the Joint Stock Company was 500,000 
RMB and 10 million RMB (US$ 73000 and US$1450000) respectively.  
375 Before 2000, the PRC partnership enterprise was subject to taxation both at the enterprise level and upon 
distribution. Since 2000, the partnership enterprise has been considered tax transparent. 
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―Foreign-invested Venture Capital Investment Enterprises‖ (FVCE). 376  The 
FVCE enjoys substantial tax advantages. However, this Regulation only applies 
to foreigners. Local investors are not entitled to this preferential treatment.  
In particular, there was a case reflecting the urgent need for a national law 
governing the LP in China. In 2001, the first LP venture capital, Beijing Tianlü 
Venture Capital Investment Center (北京天绿投资中心 ) 377  was established 
according to the Beijing Administration Regulation on Limited Partnership.
378
 
Later the Center applied for public listing in the stock exchange. Unfortunately, 
the application was not approved because the stock exchange did not recognize 
the LP as a legal business form based on the fact that the Beijing Regulation is a 




Second, the adoption of the LP is a part of the government‘s strategy to develop 
scientific innovation. In 1999, the State Council adopted a policy encouraging 
scientific innovation. It recognized the risk-return tradeoff required for 
innovation and that innovative research and development required capital.
380
 
Meanwhile, the adoption of the LP is a part of the government's latest national 
                                                 
376 The Regulation on the Administration of Foreign-Invested Venture Capital Enterprises 2003 (China) 
Art.2 
377 Yangqi and Weixingao, ―The First Limited Partnership Venture Capital was born in Zhonguancun‖, 
Zhongguancun Weekly (24 August 2001), online: Sina News <http://tech.sina.com.cn/it/c/2001-08-
24/81797.shtml> (copy in Chinese). 
378 Zhu and Ge, supra note 37 at 6. 
379 Lin Jing and Wei Xingao, ―The First Domestic Limited Partnership is Dissolved‖ Beijing Wanbao (11 
May 2005), online: Yonghua Net < 
http://news.yonghua.net.cn/htmldata/2005_05/2/15/article_382073_1.html> (copy in Chinese).  
380State Councile‟s Notice on Establishing Venture Capital Mechanism 1999 (PRC) Guobanfa No. 105 
(copy in Chinese). 
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development strategy as articulated in its 11
th
 Five-Year Plan (2006-2010).
381
 
Enacted in 2005, this Five-Year Plan identified promoting venture capital 
investment as a critical element for achieving "independent innovation" and 
sustainable economic progress of China. The LP has already proven to be a 
useful means for venture capital investment internationally because of its tax 
transparency, limited liability and the contractual flexibility it provides for 
investors. The government is optimistic that the adoption of this new LP vehicle 
will assist in the attraction of more venture capital to high-tech enterprises and 
facilitate the economic development of the country. 
Third, in recent years, a number of jurisdictions have introduced LP legislation or 
adjusted their LP regimes in order to encourage the development of venture 
capital investment. The adoption of the PRC LP is thus in line with current 
international practice.  
5. Features of the PRC LP: A Mixture 
The PRC LP possesses basic features of a modern LP regime.  
 Under the PEL, a LP enterprise refers to a partnership formed by general and 
limited partners where the general partners are jointly and severally liable 
for the debts of the LP with the limited partners only liable to the extent of 
                                                 
381  See Central Committee of the China Communist Party, ―The Eleventh Five Year Plan‖, online: 





 Among the partners of the LP firm, there must 
be at least one who is expressly identified as a general partner bearing 
unlimited liability for the debts of the firm.
383
 The general partners exercise 
control over the day-to-day management of the LP while the limited partners 
must desist from participation in management activities in order to remain 
under the limited liability shield.
384
 Subject to the partnership agreement or 
the consent of all partners, one or more general partners can be entrusted to 




 The LP is deemed to be valid from the date of issue of the partnership 
enterprise business license.
386
 The words ―Limited Partnership‖ (有限合伙) 
must be incorporated into the name of every LP firm
387 
so that creditors and 
customers will not be misled to assume that they are dealing with a different 
business structure. The documents to be tendered during the application for 
LP registration include the partnership agreement, identification papers of 
partners and other requisite documents.
388
   
 The partnership itself is not subject to taxation while each partner will have 
                                                 
382 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 2. 
383 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 61. 
384 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 2, 67 and 68. 
385 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art.26 reads with Art. 68. 
386 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 11. 
387Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 62 and 56. 
388 Regulations on Administration of Registration of Partnership Businesses 2007 (PRC) Art.11. 
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to be individually taxed on his share of the profits generated by the firm.
389
 
In China, the income tax to be paid by an individual partner is based on a 
progressive rate ranging, at present, from 5% to 35%.
390
 In addition, the PRC 
Ministry of Finance and State Administration of Taxation announced a tax 
reform exercise in 2007 to encourage investment in small- and medium-size 
high-technology enterprises as well as to encourage foreign investment. 
Under this preferential taxation policy, 70% of a venture capital enterprise‘s 
investment in unlisted high-technology companies (via equity investment) 
for at least two years may be deducted from its taxable income if certain 




5.1 Special Features 
The PRC LP contained features which are different from its common law 
counterparts, e.g., the US LP and the English LP.
392
 Appendix II - Table 2 
highlights the differences among LPs under the PEL, the DRULPA and the ULPA 
2001 respectively. Some of these features also exist in civil law LPs, e.g., the 
German LP and French LP. 
                                                 
389 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 6. 
390 Individual Income Tax Law 2005 (PRC) Art. 3(2). 
391 Taxation Circular on Tax Policies Promoting Development of Venture Capital Enterprises, PRC Finance 
and Taxation Administrative Regulations 2007 (PRC) Art. 1.  
392 The LP is treated differently in England and Scotland. Under Scots law a partnership is a legal entity but 
under English law a partnership is not a separate legal entity. For avoidance of doubt, the partnership under 
English law is referred to ―English LP‖ in this thesis. 
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5.1.1 Ambiguous Nature of Partnerships 
In contrast to the jurisdictions which unambiguously adopted either the entity or 
aggregate approach to partnerships (e.g., the US law considers the partnership as 
a separate legal entity while the English law considers the partnership as an 
aggregate of partners
393
), the PEL is silent on whether the partnership enterprise 
is a legal entity with separate legal personality.
394
  
Whether the partnership has a separate legal personality is not clear in many civil 
law jurisdictions.
395
 In France, Luxembourg, Norway and Sweden, commercial 
partnerships were conferred with some degree of legal personality.
396
 France 
grants separate legal personality to commercial companies, including the LP, if 
they are duly registered.
397
 In Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland, partnerships do not have legal personality but have certain attributes 
which are consistent with legal personality.
398
  
As indicated in its name, the PEL considers the partnership enterprises as an 
―enterprise‖. However, the term ―enterprise‖ (企业) has neither been defined nor 
explained by PRC law. Some commentators defined the enterprise as an 
                                                 
393 See T Prime and G Scanlan, ―Limited Partnership Reform — The Entity, the Fiduciary Duties and the 
Execution of Deeds‖ (2007) Comp Law 262 at 265. The aggregate approach regards a partnership as an 
aggregation of the individual partners whereas the entity approach views the partnership as an entity 
separate from its partners. 
394 Under PRC law, ―legal persons‖ refer to organizations which possess the capacity for civil rights and 
independently enjoy civil rights and undertake civil obligations. 
395 See generally in Vermeulen, ―The Evolution of Legal Business Forms in Europe and the United States‖, 
supra note 76 at 125-127.  
396 See UK Partnership Law Report, supra note 47 at 52. 




organization carrying on a business with four characteristics:
 399
 (1) it must be 
legally formed; (2) it must have at least two members; (3) the parties must carry 
on business with a view for profit; and (4) it usually obtains separate legal 
personality. The first three features exist in the partnership enterprise,
400
 but the 
forth requirement is missing.  
Though the partnership enterprise has never been granted separate legal 
personality by PRC law, it appears that the PRC partnership enterprise possess 
certain attributes that are consistent with the entity approach.
401
 It has the right to 
hold assets,
 402
 to sue and be sued
403




5.1.2 Partnerships without Fiduciary  
The fiduciary nature between partners has long been recognized at case law. The 
intimate relationship between the partners is essentially a matter of mutual 
confidence and trust, thus it gives rise to fiduciary considerations.
405
 Several 
fiduciary duties are also codified in the various RULPAs.
406
   
However, like many civil law jurisdictions, such as Germany, France and Japan, 
                                                 
399 Yang Zixuan eds., Economic Law (Beijing: Peking University Press and Higher Education Press, 1999) 
at 106 (copy in Chinese). 
400 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 3 states that ―non-for profit institution and other social 
associations cannot be general partners‖; Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 14 states that the 
partnership enterprise must have at least two partners.  
401 For the entity approach, see Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership, supra note 68 at vol.I, §1.03 (b). 
402 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 20, 21 and 22. 
403 See Civl Procedural Law 2007 (PRC) Art. 49. 
404 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 48. 
405 Fletcher, supra note 69 at 6. 
406 For example, Revised Uniform Partnership Act §404 (1997); Partnership Act 1890 (UK), s. 29 and 30. 
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China has no equivalent fiduciary duty in partnership law. Partners are not 
fiduciaries of each other under PRC law. The internal relationship among 
partners is mainly regulated by partnership agreements or the statutory provisions 
of the PEL. The PEL only outlines a few broad rules to govern the conduct of 
partners. Although the PRC Company Law 2005, for the first time, imposes on 
directors a separate ―obligation of loyalty‖ (忠实义务 ) and ―obligation of 
diligence‖ (勤勉义务);407 these obligations are statutory duties without equity.  
It is argued that the PEL provides insufficient internal rules between limited 
partners and general partners. Chapter 6 will provide in-depth analysis on this 
issue.  
5.1.3 The LP without Control Rule 











 require limited partners to be liable for debts of the firm should 
they participate in the control of the partnership (the control rule). However, the 
PEL, like its German and Japan counterparts, does not provide a control rule.
 413
  
                                                 
407 PRC Company Law 2005 (PRC) Art. 148(1). 
408 Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 17-303. 
409 Limited Partnership Act 2008 (New Zealand) s.30. 
410 Limited Partnership Act 2008 (Singapore) s.6. 
411 Limited Partnership Act 1907 (UK) s.4 (2). 
412French Commercial Code Art. L222-6 provides that ―A limited partner may not carry out any external act 
of management, even by virtue of a power of attorney. In the event of infringement of the prohibition 
specified in the preceding subparagraph, the limited partner shall be held jointly liable with the active 
partners for any debts and obligations of the partnership which may result from the prohibited acts. 
According to the number and size of these, they may be declared jointly liable for all obligations of the 
partnership or for some only.‖ 
413 See German Commercial Code §161-§176; French Commercial Code Art. L222- 1- L222- 12; Japanese 
Commercial Code Book II, Chapter 2. 
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There is no direct control rule penalty forfeiting limited liability of limited 
partners should they participated in the management of the firm. Chapter 4 will 
provide in-depth study on this issue. 
5.1.4 The LP without Limited Partners’ Derivative Action 
In contrast to the ULPA 2001 and the DRULPA which provide detailed rules on 
limited partners‘ derivative actions, the PEL and many its civil law counterparts 
(e.g., Germany, France and Japan) do not provide such a remedy for limited 
partners.
 414
 According to Article 68 (7) of the PEL, the limited partner may bring 
an action in his name to safeguard the interests of the LP where the partner 
responsible for the conduct of the partnership affairs has neglected the exercise 
of his rights.
415
 However, the PEL does not spell out any rules on such a 
matter.
416
 Chapter 7 will discuss this issue in detail. 
5.1.5 Contractual Liability Shield 
Generally, the PEL does not allow any waiver of liability shield between parties 
in an LP regime. The rules governing the liability shield of the partners under the 
PEL are mandatory and cannot be varied by the partnership agreement. 
Nevertheless, partners have the freedom to choose their liability shield by 
                                                 
414 Ibid. 
415 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 68 provides that a limited partner will not be considered as 
managing and conducting LP‘s activities if he brings a derivative action.  
416 For example, the law is silent on whether the limited partner has to fulfill certain eligibility requirements 
before commencing the action, whether the limited partner should exhaust his remedies within the firm who 
can be the defendant, what constitutes ―neglect in exercising of partner‘s rights‖, and who should bear the 
expenses incurred if the action is successful. 
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conversions. Under the PEL, with the unanimous consent of all partners, a 
general partner may convert to a limited partner or vice versa.
417
  However, 
Germany and France do not provide equivalent provision on the conversion of 
limited and general partners.
418
 Any general partner who has converted to a 
limited partner need only to bear unlimited jointly and severally liability for the 




Therefore, when a general partner converts to a limited partner with unanimous 
consent of all partners in the LP; the partner would enjoy limited liability for the 
debts incurred after his conversion.
420
 It is of some concern that creditors lack a 
right to object to the conversion of a general partner to a limited partner as this 
conversion will weaken the pool of assets available to creditors.  
5.1.6 Joint and Several Liability 
At traditional common law, partners' liability for torts is joint and several, while 
their liability for contracts is joint but not several.
421
 With joint liability, creditors 
must exhaust remedies against the firm before pursuing the assets of individual 
partners. With joint and several liabilities, creditors can proceed directly against 
                                                 
417 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 82. 
418 German Commercial Code §161- §176; French Commercial Code Art. L222- 1- L222- 12. 
419 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 83. 
420 Wang, ―Limited Liability for Limited Partners‖, supra note 696 at 95. 
421 The original UPA also adopted such approach. See Uniform Partnership Act, §15 (1914). However, such 
differentiation has been watered down recently at common law. 
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the partners without exhaustion.
422
  
Under the PEL, a judgment creditor of a partnership in debt shall levy execution 
against the assets of the partnership first before levying execution against 
partners‘ assets.423 If the partnership asset is sufficient to satisfy the judgment, 
then the partners do not have to bear any personal liability to the debts.
424
 As 
between general partners themselves, it follows that if the creditor pursues one 
partner, and receives payment in full, that partner can then pursue the other 
partners for a contribution to their share of the liability.
425
  
In the PRC LP, if the assets of the LP are insufficient to satisfy its debts, the 
creditors of the LP have the following options. 
  They may either apply to the People‘s Court for bankruptcy liquidation or 
claim directly against the general partners. Where a partnership enterprise 
is declared bankrupt pursuant to the law, general partners shall continue 




  They may levy execution against the assets of the general partner to 
satisfy a judgment based on a claim against the partnership.  
  If the limited partners have not made full contribution to the LP as 
promised; creditors of the LP may also request limited partners to pay the 
                                                 
422 Bromberg and Ribstein on Limited Liability Partnerships, supra note 363 at 121. 
423 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 38. This rule applies both to contractual or tortious debts. 
424 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 39.  
425 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 41.  
426 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 92; See also Li, Interpretation of Partnership Enterprise 
Law, supra note 369 at 146-147. 
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shortfall up to the extent of their promised contribution to the firm.   
5.2 Too Many Mandatory Rules vs. Insufficient Default Rules? 
60BLegal rules are generally categorized into two types -- default rules and 
mandatory rules. The default rules govern only if the parties do not explicitly 
provide for something different; but the mandatory rules leave parties no option 
but to conform to them.
427
  
It is argued that on the one hand, the PEL contains too many mandatory rules, 
which imposes unnecessary rigidity on the PRC LP and constrains the choices of 
partners. On the other hand, several issues have not been addressed or addressed 
properly by the PEL. A few more default rules are required to facilitate the use of 
the LP in the context of China.  
5.2.1 Constituents 
The PEL provides that the LP should comprise of at least two partners and not 
exceed fifty in total (unless otherwise provided by law).
428
  The major concern of 
the drafters is that people may engage in illegal fundraising if there is no upper 
limit on the number of investor partners.
429
 However, many jurisdictions do not 
provide upper limit on the number of partners in the LP regimes, such as 
                                                 
427 Reinier Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) [Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law] at 31. 
428 Nevertheless, some interviewees said that this restriction was not an obstacle in fund raising, especially 
when the investor is an institutional investor. Given that the national pension fund has been approved by the 
State Council to engage in venture capital or private equity investment, it is assumed that the limitation on 
the number of limited partner will not have considerable side-effect in fund raising.  











 Although the UK used to 
impose an upper limit on the number of partners, there is no longer such a limit 
for all types of partnerships since 2001.
434
 







 and social 
organizations shall not be general partners in a LP. It is suggested that such 
reservations on the part of the National People‘s Congress may be misconceived 
and there is in fact no real necessity to preclude these companies from being a 
general partner. This also fails to gel with international practice: many 
jurisdictions, such as France, Germany, the UK, and Delaware
438
 do not impose 
such restrictions.  
In practice, the above provisions create obstacles in fund raising and 
                                                 
430 Singapore LP Report, supra note 43 at para.8.4.1. 
431 See French Commercial Code Art. L. 221-2 and L.222-1. 
432 See Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 17-101.  
433 Singapore LP Report, supra note 43 at para. 8.4. 
434 Singapore LP Report, supra note 72 at para. 8.4.1. 
435 The National People‘s Congress has defended this proposition on the basis that allowing state-owned 
companies to be general partners may trigger the stripping of state-owned assets and that allowing listed 
companies to be general partners may also unduly prejudice the interests of shareholders. The latter‘s 
investment in the company may then be exposed to ‗double risks‘  in that the company will have to bear 
unlimited liability not only for the debts incurred by the limited partnership but also liability for its own 
corporate debts. See Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 24; See also Li, Interpretation of 
Partnership Enterprise Law, supra note 369 at 4. 
436 In fact, the PRC company law and PRC security laws have provided sufficient mechanisms to protect the 
shareholder interests. Moreover, the requirement that partners be registered will in principle provide the 
means for any third party who deals with (or propose to deal with) the LP to easily identify whether the 
listed company is a general partner in the firm. There is no need to prevent the listed company from being a 
general partner. 
437 The preclusion of charitable institutions and social organizations from being general partners has been 
justified by the National People‘s Congress on the ground of protection of ‗public interest‘. As many 
activities of these organizations involve the public and publicly donated funds, it may be inappropriate to 
expose such organizations to potential unlimited liability.  
438 See German Commercial Code §161-§176; French Commercial Code Art. L222- 1- L222- 12; the UK 





 While the purpose of adopting the LP is to encourage fund 
raising in the venture capital and private equity sector, these administrative 
restrictions will unduly departure from the ultimate legislature goal.   
5.2.2 Contributions  
Under the PEL, limited partner may offer contributions in the form of cash, 
tangible goods, intellectual property, land use rights or other property rights, but 
not in the form of service.
440
 French Commercial Code does not permit limited 
partners to make contribution in form of services either.
441
 However, the 
DRULPA
442
 and the ULPA 2001
443
 permit the contributions of a partner to be in 
cash, property or even services rendered. 
In the context of private equity LPs, the expertise of the limited partners, 
typically the professional investors is an invaluable asset to the success of the 
private equity fund. Moreover, allowing the limited partners to pay in kind may 
provide businessmen with more flexibility when they set up LPs for the conduct 
of their business activities.
444
  It is therefore suggested that the PEL shall remove 
this restriction and allow limited partners to make contribution in form of service. 
                                                 
439 Nonetheless, it seems that businessman can always develop a practical path to get around the compulsory 
rules.  
440Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 64 read with Art.16. 
441 French Commercial Code Art. L.222-1. 
442 Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act §17-501. 
443 Uniform Limited Partnership Act §404(b) (2001).  
444 Where capital contribution that takes the form of in-kind benefits, intellectual property, land use rights or 
any other form of property rights requires valuation, Art.16 of the Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) 
additionally provides that all the partners may determine the value of the contribution or appoint a statutory 
organization to conduct the valuation. It is submitted that allowing the partners to determine the value of 
their own contributions is inappropriate since such practice will invariably prejudice the interests of any 
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5.2.3 Newly Admitted Partners 
The UK and the US do not require a newly admitted partner to be personally 
liable for the prior obligations of a partnership.
445
 Logically, the newly-admitted 
partner ought not to bear any liability for the prior debts of the firm since he was 
not a partner then and has not been involved in any management of the firm. 




 counterparts, the PEL also requires 
that a general partner will assume joint liability with the existing partners for the 
debts incurred by the LP before he joins the firm. Correspondingly, a new limited 
partner will bear liabilities to the extent of her capital contribution even for the 
LP‘s debts incurred before he joined the firm.448   
5.2.4 Dissolution 
The PEL requires the LP to be dissolved if the firm is left with only limited 
partners after the departure of all general partners.
449
 In the event that the firm is 
left with only general partners, the LP must be converted to a general 
                                                                                                                                    
third party dealing with the LP firm.  In particular, the venture capitalist‘s contribution in a venture capital 
LP firm is usually non-monetary property and it is suggested that the partners should appoint a neutral party 
instead to perform the appraisal. 
445See Partnership Act 1890 (UK) s.17 (1); Delaware Revised Uniform Partnership Act §15-306 (b); 
Uniform Partnership Act §306 (1997). 
446German Commercial Code §130 provides that a new partner is liable as the other partners for partrnership 
obligations incurred before he joined. German Commercial Code §173 also provides that a new limited 
partner shall be liable for partnership obligations incurred before he joined the firm. 
447Japanese Commercial Code Art. 82 provides that in a corporate partnership (Gomei Kaisha), ―a corporate 
member which joined the corporation after its establishment is also liable for the obligations of the 
corporation arising before the corporate member joined the corporation.‖ 
448 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 44 and 77. 





 if there is only one general partner left in the LP, the firm has to 
be dissolved. However, equivalent provisions are not found in its German, 
French or US counterparts.
451
 It is therefore suggested that a PRC LP with only 
one general partner should similarly be allowed to continue operating over a 
longer grace period so as to provide flexibility for the firm to explore more 
options and minimize unnecessary wastage and costs entailed by enforced 
dissolution. 
5.2.5 Transfer of Shares 
Under the PRC LP, the general partner and the limited partner are allowed to 
transfer their partnership shares to outsiders (subject to different 
requirements).
452
 An assignee (of general partner) will become a (general) 
partner and be subject to the rights and obligations according to the amended 
agreement and the PEL.
453
 In stark contrast, the assignee‘s position is quite weak 
under the US law. A transfer in whole or in part of a partner‘s transferable 
interest in the partnership does not entitle the transferee to participate in the 
management of the partnership business.
454
 
                                                 
450 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 24; See also Li, Interpretation of Partnership Enterprise 
Law, supra note 369 at 122. 
451 For example, under the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 17-801, the LP will not be 
automatically dissolved if the sole remaining partner is either a limited partner or a general partner; instead, 
the Delaware LP is allowed to appoint another limited or general partner within a grace period of 90 days 
(or such other period as provided for in the partnership agreement). 
452 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 22 and 73. A general partner must obtain the consent of all 
the partners before the transfer (unless otherwise provided by the partnership). A limited partner may 
transfer his partnership shares according to the partnership agreement; however, he is required to give 30 
days‘ notice to the other partners before transferring his partnership shares. 
453 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 24; See also Li, Interpretation of Partnership Enterprise 
Law, supra note 369 at 37. 
454 Uniform Partnership Act §503 (1997). 
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It is submitted that the PRC should adopt the US position to facilitate greater 
certainty of the partnership and protection for the creditor. As general partners 
play an important role in the management in the partnership, any changes of the 
identity of the general partner is likely to result in to serious consequence for the 
existing partnership. In addition, a change in general partner will have adverse 
effects on the liability of creditors who rely on the personal liability of the 
general partner to pay the debts of the firm.  
5.2.6 Conversion, Merger and Consolidation of LPs 
The PEL does not provide any rule spelling out how an existing company or 
partnership may convert to a LP or vice versa. Recently, some private equity LPs 
are considering converting back to companies because they are facing difficulties 
in listing in the stock exchange.
455
 Moreover, there is a possibility that one or 
more domestic LPs may merge or consolidate with or into one or more LPs or 
one or more other business entities.
456
 Apart from the government venture capital 
enterprises which have been increasingly dependent on listed and cash-rich 
companies (although they receive funds from local governments),
457
 there are 
also many corporate venture capital enterprises in China primarily funded by 
listed companies.   
                                                 
455 Yang Guang, ―RMB Funds Change Face: A Trend to Convert Back to Companies through Increasing 
Capital Contribution by GP‖ Chinese Venture (2 June 2009), online: Zero2ipo news 
http://news.zero2ipo.com.cn/n/2009-6-2/200962104146.shtml, [Yang] (copy in Chinese). 
456 Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 17-211(b) and Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 
1106 (2001) provide rules on merge and consolidation of LPs. 




In order to accommodate the needs of varies types and sizes of LP businesses, 
this thesis calls for a seamless conversion procedure on conversion, merge and 
consolidation of LPs.
458
 One possibility is to consider Delaware‘s rules for the 
conversion process: before a certificate for ‗conversion‘ to LP can be filed with 
the Secretary of State, the proposal for conversion should be approved internally 
by the company or partnership and there should be a partnership agreement that 
includes the approval of those who have agreed to be the general partners of the 
LP after the conversion process.
459
 
5.2.7 Capital Withdrawal 
The PEL is silent on the question of what happens in the event of capital 
withdrawal by a limited partner. The PEL only provides that partners are not 
allowed to transfer or sever the partnership assets before the liquidation of the 
partnership,
460
 and that a LP shall not distribute all profits to some partners only.
461
 
German Commercial code provides that a reduction of the contribution of a 
limited partner shall be ineffective vis-à-vis the creditors if it is not registered 
duly.
462
 It is submitted that the PEL should demand that certain prerequisites be 
met before the capital can be withdrawn. Allowing a limited partner to withdraw 
                                                 
458 It is suggested that the law drafter may consider Delaware‘s rules for the conversion process: before a 
certificate for ‗conversion‘ to LP can be filed with the Secretary of State, the proposal for conversion should 
be approved internally by the company or partnership and there should be a partnership agreement that 
includes the approval of those who have agreed to be the general partners of the LP after the conversion 
process. See Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act §17-217.  
459Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act §17-217. 
460 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 21. 
461 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 69. 
462 German Commercial Code §174. 
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This chapter concludes that the various LP regimes in common law and civil law 
jurisdictions perform different roles in different historical period. The popularity 
of the LP, to some extent, has once been affected by the relative advantages of 
incorporation and the hash taxation treatment, but the LP does not lose its 
attractiveness in the business world today, especially in the venture capital and 
private equity sector. In addition, based on the historical evidence presented in 
this Chapter, it concludes that a simple legal transplantation of rules and 
institutions of partnerships may not work well in the borrowing countries. 
This chapter also concludes that the PRC LP is a mixture of both western 
(including the LP regimes in both civil law and common law jurisdictions) and 
Chinese models.  
 First, the PEL furnishes basic provisions on the LP structure, such as the 
two classes of partners, the limited liability for limited partners and the 
limited management rights for limited partners.  
 Second, the PRC LP lacks several concepts, which are available in its 
common law counterparts (typically the US LP), including the lack of 
                                                 
463 Under the current PRC LP regime, judgment creditors of the firm must exhaust partnership assets before 
proceeding against general partners. Since limited partners‘ contributions normally constitute a substantial 
part of the partnership‘s assets, it is likely that the partnership‘s assets will be insufficient to pay the debts of 
the firm if limited partners are allowed to take out their contributions without restrictions. 
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control rule, the lack of fiduciary duties, the lack of limited partners‘ 
derivative action etc. In fact, some of these mechanisms do not exist in its 
civil law counterparts either, e.g., the LPs in Germany, France and Japan 
either.  
 Third, several issues have not been addressed or addressed properly by 
the PEL. One the one hand, there are too many mandatory rules on the 
PRC LP, such as the upper limit on the number of partners, the liability 
for newly admitted partners and the compulsory dissolution of 
partnerships upon insufficient number of partners. On the other hand, 
default rules which are greatly desired by the users of the LP, such as the 
conversion, merge and consolidation of LPs are not provided by the PEL.  
The lack of adequate and straightforward rules and concepts in the PRC LP 
indicate that the PRC LP might be simply drafted on various LP regimes
464
 
without deep understanding of the business needs of the potential users of the 
PRC LP.  
Arguably, although the PRC LP is drafted by technically trained draftsmen, 
research on the LP remains limited on legislative, scholarly and teaching sides in 
China. Partnership law is given much less attention as compared to company law. 
Moreover, as the LP is a brand new business vehicle in China, there was little LP 
practice before its adoption in 2006. Therefore, the law of the PRC LP still left 
                                                 
464 It is noted that before the promulgation of the PEL, several consultation exercises were conducted 
between the drafter of the PRC LP and the partnership law experts from the US, Germany, Australia and 
Switzerland. See generally, Zhu and Ge, supra note 37. 
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much to be desired. It is suggested that more specific and consistent rules are 
required and more concepts need to be fully fleshed out in the context of PEL. 
Indeed, different legal cultures invest similar legal rules with different 
meanings.
465
 The next chapter will examine the LP in the context of the targeted 
sector of the LP, namely, the venture capital and private equity markets.  
                                                 
465 See Pierre Legrand, ―What Legal Transplants‖ in David Nelken and Johannes Feest eds., Adapting Legal 




CHAPTER 4  THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP IN CHINA’S VENTURE 




As the primary motive for adopting the LP is to encourage venture capital 
investment in China, it is necessary to examine the PRC LP in the context of 
China‘s venture capital and private equity markets and to identify the major legal 
constraints and problems confronting the LP in this targeted market. Moreover, 
as the LP in China‘s private equity market is an under-researched area in Chinese 
legal academia, it is believed that the potential problems detected in the chapter 
would guide the subsequent discussion and legislation on the PRC LP in China.  
Statistics show that the LP has become the most popular business vehicle in 
China‘s venture capital and private equity markets. More than half of new 
venture capital funds raised in 2008 were organized as LPs.
467
 In December 2009, 
68 out of 115 venture capital and private equity funds were registered as LPs in 
                                                 
466 Parts of this section have been published and presented in academic journals and conferences during the 
author‘s PhD tenure. See, e.g., Lin Lin, ―Limited Partnership - the New Business Vehicle in China‖ (with 
HY Yeo), (2010) 25(2) Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 104; Lin Lin, ―The 
Organizational Choices for Private Equity Funds in China‖, (Paper presented to the 5th Asian Law Institute 
Conference, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore, 23 May 2008); Lin Lin, A New Business 
Vehicle for Venture Capital Investment in China: Under the Partnership Enterprise Law‖, (Paper presented 
to the 2007 ALIN International Academic Conference, Faculty of Law, Chulalongkorn University, 
Bangkok, 6 December 2007). 
467 China Venture Capital Yearbook 2009, supra note 10 at 252. For the popularity of the LP in China, see 
Zhou Min, ―Limited Partnership VS Company: Competitions of Forms of Organization for China private 
equity‖ China Securities Journal (23 June 2008) (copy in Chinese).  
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Tianjin Equity Investment Fund Center.
468
 Till the end of 2009, almost half of 
this venture capital and private equity funds were organized as LPs in Beijing.
469
 
The LP is used widely in the venture capital and private equity fund raising and 
has raised substantial amounts of capital.
470
 This is consistent with the initial 
legislative objective that the LP is used primarily as specialized entities for fund 
raising in the venture capital market. 
Considering the practical nature of the PRC LP, and to collect first-hand 
feedback from practitioners in China‘s venture capital and private equity LPs, a 
qualitative research has been conducted by the author from September 2008 to 
December 2009.
471




- Interviews with twenty lawyers, partners, academics and fund managers 
who specialize in the LP, venture capital and private equity investment 
in China (See Appendix I- Table 1 Interview Information);
 
 
- Observations of general partners and limited partners in a number of 
famous  private equity LPs; 
- Comprehensive statistics on the LP; 
- Authoritative news and reports reflect the most updated events and 
                                                 
468  This number is calculated by the author based on the name list published in the Tianjin Equity 
Investment Fund Centre (last visited on 17 December 2009), online: 
<http://www.tianjinfund.com/index.asp>.  
469 See ―Statistics on Business Forms for Beijing Venture Capital Investment Enterprises‖ (3 November 
2009) online: Houde Lawyer Web < http://www.hotelawyer.com/?p=228>. 
470Zero2IPO Research Centre, Research Report, ―Analysis of Fund-raising of RMB private equity Funds‖, 
online: Zero2ipo news <http://www.zero2ipo.com.cn/en/research/200991691809.shtml >, 
471 For the qualitative research, see supra text accompanying notes 19-24. 
472  See supra note 25-35 and accompanying text. 
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incidents in China‘s venture capital and private equity markets; and  
- Prototypical Partnership Agreements of private equity LPs. 
The empirical findings identify various conflicts of interest in China‘s venture 
capital and private equity markets. Particularly, there is a severe conflict of 
interest between limited partners and general partners in China‘s private equity 
LPs. As will be shown below, that fact that Chinese limited partners have a 
strong desire to control the fund is caused by several economic, cultural, 
regulatory and structural problems in China. This chapter further argues that, as a 
result of the set of default rules and lack of certain legal rules in the PRC LP 
regime (e.g., the centralization management without control rule, the lack of 
detailed statutory duties, the lack of comprehensive rules of limited partners‘ 
derivative action), limited partners in private equity LPs face a familiar agency 
problem. That is, general partners may be emboldened enough to pursue their 
own self-interest at the expense of the interests of limited partners.  




Compared to the US which has over forty-year experience in the venture capital 
and private equity investment,
474
 China has relatively shorter history in this 
market. The beginning of venture capital in China can be traced back to 1985 
                                                 
473 For further information on the legislative development of China‘s venture capital/private equity market, 
see ―A New Business Vehicle for Venture Capital Investment in China: Under the Partnership Enterprise 
Law‖ (Paper presented to the 2007 ALIN International Academic Conference, Faculty of Law, 
Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 6 December 2007). 
474 See Gompers and Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle, supra note 50 at 1. 
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when the concept of ―venture capital‖ was first mentioned in the Decision to 
Reform the Chinese Science and Technical System by the central government.
475
 
In 1985, the first venture capital enterprise, the Hi-tech Venture Capital 
Corporation, was established.
476
 However, most of the venture capital enterprises 
during the initial period (1985-1997) were government-backed.
477
  
Since 1998, China‘s venture capital has experienced a rapid growth with the 
government‘s continuing efforts to develop a market economy and the deepening 
economic reform.
478
 Foreign venture capital has also begun to invest in China. 
During this period, the venture capital development in China, the China Venture 
Investment Association (中国风险投资协会) and the China Venture Capital 
Research Institute Limited (中国风险投资研究院) were formed. 
Nevertheless, due to the burst of the ―dot-com bubble‖ and the global economic 
slowdown during this period, the number of venture capital firms has declined 
severely from 2002 to 2004.
479
 Since 2006 China has become the second largest 
                                                 
475After that, the government provided several regulatory guidelines to accelerate the development of 
venture capital in China, such as the Circular of the State Council Concerning the Approval of the National 
Development Zones for New and High Technology Industries and Relevant Policies and Provisions 1991, 
the PRC Law on Promoting and Transformation of Scientific and Technological Achievement, the 
Decisions Concerning Technology Innovations, Development of High-Technology, the Realization of 
Industrialization 1999 and the Several Opinion on the Establishment of the venture capital Mechanism 1999. 
476  Zhu and Ge, supra note 37. See also Lu Haitian, Tan Yi, Chen Gongmeng, ―Venture Capital and the Law 
in China‖ (2007) 37 HKLJ 229.  
477 See Research Report on China Private Equity (China Finance and Economic Press, 2007) at 69. 
478See also ―Review the Development of China‘s private equity Fund‖, online: China Private Equity Fund 
Net <http://www.fund.ac.cn/smjj/2.htm> (25 January 2007) (copy in Chinese).  
479 During this period, foreign individuals and entities were not permitted to make venture capital investment 
in China.  
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country in generating venture capital, after only the US.
480
 Many famous global 
private equity companies have increased their investment in China.
481
 A large 
number of private equity funds were established as LPs after the revision of the 
PEL in 2006. China's private equity investment has been slowing down in 2008 
because of the international financial crisis of 2007. Nevertheless, Renminbi 
(RMB) funds have been very active in capital raising during this period. Statistics 
show that, the RMB funds raised US$21.33 billion, accounting for 34.9% of total 
capital raised in 2008.
 482 
   
Since 2008, the Chinese government has gradually eased the policy restriction on 
equity investment on financial and assets management institutions. For instance, 
the National Social Security Fund has been approved to engage in equity 
investment, and has made its debut in investment on private equity funds. 
Besides, many other securities traders /companies have been approved to carry 
out direct investment. In October 2009, the Growth Enterprise Board (GEB) 
483
 
was launched in China, providing a new exit channel for the private equity 
backed enterprises in China.
484
   
                                                 
480 Zero2IPO Research Centre, ―Top 10 Events of China venture capital Industry 2006‖ (19 January 2007), 
online: Zero2ipo news <http://www.zero2ipo.com.hk/china_this_week/detail.asp?id=4517>. 
481 These firms include Carlyle, Newbridge, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs. See Asiamoney, ―Private 
Equity Trends in China‖ (1 February 2007), online: AsiaMoney 
<http://www.asiamoney.com/Article/2056057/Channel/18813/Private-equity-trends-in-China.html >. 
482 ―Zero2IPO Research Centre, ―2008 Saw Rational Return in the Private Equity Market, with Growth in 
Fund Raising, Drop in Investment and Downturn in Exit‖ (6 February 2009), online: Zero2ipo news 
<http://news.zero2ipo.com.cn/en/n/2009-2-6/20092493400.shtml>. 
483 ―China to Launch its Nasdaq-style GEM on October 23" (17 October 2009), online: Xinhua Net 
<http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/6785880.html>‖. 
484 See Cherry Zheng, ―Norms for IPO on GEB Rolled Out - First Move to Warm up Venture Capital 
Exists‖, online: Zero2ipo news <http://research.zero2ipo.com.cn/en/n/2009-4-2/200942120241.shtml>. 
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3. What is Private Equity, Venture Capital in the Context of China? 
There is no standard definition of the term ―private equity‖ and ―venture capital‖ 
in literature.
485
 Generally, private equity is defined as ―a medium to long-term 
finance provided in return for an equity stake in potentially high growth 
unquoted companies.‖486 It contains three major characteristics. (1) It is an asset 
class pooled from specific investors (e.g., institutional investors, pension funds 
and wealthy individuals).
487
 (2) It is structured as equity or near equity 
investment, but not in the form of debt.
488
 (3) It is invested in unquoted 
companies which cannot be purchased or sold in the public market.
489
  
Venture capital is defined as ―investment by specialized venture capital 
organizations ... in high growth, high risks, often high technology firms that need 
capital to finance product development of growth and must, by the nature of their 
business, obtain this capital in the form of equity rather than debt‖.490 Broadly 
speaking, venture capital can be deemed as a subset of the private equity asset 
class.
491
 The difference between private equity and venture capital is their 
investment stages. Venture capital focuses more on companies at an early stage 
                                                 
485 In fact, attempting a universal definition of private equity or venture capital is problematic because the 
connotation of them varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
486 See the British Venture Capital Association, ―An Introduction to Private Equity‖, online: 
<http://www.bvca.co.uk/publications/guide/intro.html>.  
487 Li Bin and Feng Bin, Private Equity Fund: the China Opportunity (China Economic Publishing House, 
2007) at 7 (copy in Chinese). 
488 Vance H. Fried, ―Private Equity Funding for Minority Media Owner‖ (1998) 51 Fed. Comm. L.J. 609 at 
610. 
489 Ibid. 
490 Bernard S. Black and Ronald J. Gilson, ―Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks 
versus Stock Markets‖ (1998) 47 J. Fin. Econ. 243 at 245. 








In China, owing to the sensitive nature of the term ―privacy‖, the term ―private 
equity‖ (私募股权), has not been used by the Chinese government for a certain 
period. In the old days, the Chinese government officials tended to not use the 
term ―private equity‖, but preferred to use the term ―venture capital‖ (创业投资/
风险投资).493 In recent years, however, with the rapid development of China‘s 
venture capital and private equity sectors, the term ―private equity‖ becomes 
more popular. Local governments also actively participate in the venture capital 




Interestingly, the line between venture capital and private equity has become 
blurred in China. Due to the economic crisis, venture capital investors shift their 
investment directions to the private equity sector so as to gain quick return of 
their investment. Meanwhile, private equity investors also tend to show more 
interests in later stages portfolio companies.
495
 This special phenomenon 
indicates the immature attitude of Chinese business community towards venture 
                                                 
492 Douglas Cumming and Sofia A. Johan, Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An International 
Perspective (Elsevier, 2009) at 5. 
493  Venture capital is defined as ―an equity investment in growing companies‖ in the PRC Provisional Rules 
of Administration of Venture Investment Companies 2005 Art. 2.  
494 For instance, in August 2009, Shanghai‘s government set up a joint venture with Blackstone group to 
raise RMB funds in China. Cristina Alesci and Cathy Chan "Blackstone‘s Shanghai Venture May Boost 
Chinese Private Equity" Bloomberg (16 August 2009), online: Bloomberg 
<http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601080&sid=a.qsxi9IpDGk>. 
495 Zhou Ming, ―Private Equity and Venture Capital Investment are Both Extended to Later Stage‖ China 
Securities Journal (17 Mar 2008) (copy in Chinese). 
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capital and private equity investment. 
4. Private Equity Funds in China: An Overview496 
Generally speaking, the private equity fund is a 523Hpooled investment vehicle used 
for equity investment. Typically, a private equity fund is raised and managed by a 
professional private equity firm, through a fixed-life LP. The private equity firm 




In China, the concept of the venture capital and private equity fund is always 
confused with the ―industrial investment fund‖ (产业投资基金) 498  and the 
―private fund‖ (私募基金). The industrial investment fund is usually backed by 
governments and mainly invests in unlisted companies with high growth 
potentials. The significant difference between the industrial investment fund and 
the ordinary private equity fund is that its establishment must be approved by the 
Chinese government. The government normally directs the fund‘s investment.499 
Today, various industrial investment funds are established in China and have 
become a mainstream. 
As to the private fund, it is a concept opposite to ―public fund‖ (公募基金) 
                                                 
496 Parts of this section have been presented in ―The Organizational Choices for Private Equity Funds in 
China‖ (Paper presented to the 5th Asian Law Institute Conference, Faculty of Law, National University of 
Singapore, 23 May 2008). 
497 See Darryl J. Cooke, Private Equity: Law and Practice (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2008) at 1. 
498 For discussion on industrial investment fund, see Zou, supra note 24 at 82. 
499 Ibid. Li, China Private Equity Fund- Raising and Establishment, supra note 24 at 2.  
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which means that the fund is raised from private sources rather than from the 
public market. Unlike the private equity fund which is mainly invested in 
unlisted companies in the form of equity, the private fund invests widely in the 
stock exchange.  
In China, according to the currency of funding, private equity funds can be 
categorized into RMB funds (人民币基金) and foreign funds (外资基金). RMB 
funds are raised in RMB.
 500
 Foreign funds are raised in foreign currency. Due to 
the stringent currency control by the Chinese government, foreign funds are not 
allowed to investment in China freely. The current Chinese policies on 
establishment, examination, exit and taxation of foreign funds are inadequate and 
remain to be specified.
501
 Currently, the RMB Fund is the most popular and 
important type of private equity funds in China.
502
 Statistic shows that 82 out of 
90 funds raised in November 2009 were RMB funds, accounted for 91.1% of the 
total funds.
503
 Given the popularity of the RMB funds, the subsequent discussion 
will mainly focus on the PRC LP used in the RMB funds. 
                                                 
500 RMB funds can be classified into three types: (1) the purely domestic RMB funds (neizi jijin); (2) the 
Foreign-invested RMB fund (waizi renminbi jijin) and (3) the Sino-foreign RMB fund (zhongwai hezi 
renminbi jijin). The establishment of both the foreign-invested RMB fund and the Sino-foreign RMB funds 
shall be approved by the PRC Ministry of Commerce.  
501 Since 2008, more and more foreign funds have been permitted to operate as RMB –denominated onshore 
funds. In September 2008, the State Council approved on ten RMB funds with capital size of more than 100 
billion RMB. See Zhang Wang, ―State Council Promotes Legislation, RMB Funds Filling System was 
Drafted‖ 21st Century Business Herald (9 September 2008) (copy in Chinese). 
502 Xu Chang, ―RMB Funds will Become the Major Structure of Venture Capital‖ China Securities Journal 




5. The Major Business Forms in China’s Venture Capital and Private 
Equity Markets 
Today, the three major business forms of private equity funds in China are the LP, 
company and trust.
504
 A recent survey (See Figure 1
 505
) shows that, among the 
newly raised venture capital funds in 2008, the private equity LPs accounted for 





5.1 Company-type Private Equity Funds 
PRC private equity funds may establish as companies under two different 
regimes: 
                                                 
504 Zou, supra note 24 at 17; Li, China Private Equity Fund- Raising and Establishment, supra note 24 at 
30.  
505 Source: China Venture Capital Yearbook 2009, supra note 10 at 252. 
506 China Venture Capital Yearbook 2009, supra note 10 at 252.  
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(1) A Joint Stock Company or a Limited Liability Company  under the 
PRC Company Law 2005;
507
  and 
(2) A venture capital investment enterprise (VCIE) under the 2005 
Interim Measures on Administrative Rules on Foreign-Invested Venture 
Capital Investment Enterprises (FIVCIE Rules).  
The VCIE is more preferable than a simple Joint Stock Company or Limited 
Liability Company in fund raising in China in the sense that the VCIE enjoys 
substantial tax incentives in specific areas. Namely, 70% of the VCIE‘s 
investment in unlisted high-technology companies (via stock investment) for two 
or more years can be deducted from its taxable income if certain criteria are 
satisfied by the venture capital enterprise and the investee company.
508
 
Usually, a company-type private equity fund is raised and managed by itself or 
by an outside professional investment firm. Management fees and carried 
interest
509
 will be paid to the fund‘s manager as a performance incentive. 
                                                 
507 There are two major types of companies under Chinese law: the Joint Stock Company and the Limited 
Liability Company.  
508 Minister of Finance and State Administration of Taxation Circular on Tax Policies Promoting 
Development of Venture Capital Enterprises 2007 Cai Shui. No. 31 (PRC) Art.1. The main criteria include 
the following: (1) The venture capital enterprise itself must be properly registered in China and be operating 
in compliance with the Provisional Measures on Administration of Venture Capital Enterprises issued in 
2005; (2) The size of the investee is restricted to no more than 500 employees, and neither gross sales nor 
total assets can exceed RMB 200 million (about US$25 million); (3) When the venture capital enterprise 
files the application for the special tax deduction, the investee must be certified as a ―high-technology 
enterprise‖ in accordance with the relevant high-technology enterprise certification rules. These rules 
require that the investee‘s annual high-technology R&D expenditures represent at least 5% of the investee‘s 
gross annual sales, and that the aggregate income derived from technical services and sale of high-
technology products represent at least 60% of the investee‘s annual gross revenues. 
509The carried interest refers to the general partner's interest in the profits of the investment. See Marco v. 
Masotti, Private Equity Funds: Current Terms and Trends, 1617 PLI/CORP 213 (2007) at 223. ―When 
venture capital funds invest in a company, they are given part ownership of the enterprise, which is called a 
profits interest (an interest in the profits). The fund receives returns on the investment when it realizes 
profits, but the portion of the return that the general partner takes for himself is carried interest‖, cited in 
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Investors gain profits through the dividends of the company. 
5.2 Trust-type Private Equity Funds 
The trust-type private equity funds have emerged in China since 2007.
510
 In a 
typical trust-type private equity fund, a trust company acts as ―trustee‖ of the 
funds and conducts equity investment in portfolio companies with the pooled 
assets in the trust plan. A trust company would usually hire a professional 
investment company as the investment consultant, or directly conducts private 
equity investment on its own.
511
 
5.3 Private Equity LPs 
A private equity LPs can be formed under the PEL. Statistics show that private 
equity LPs account for more than one fourth of the private equity funds in 
China.
512
 A typical private equity LP is raised and managed by a professional 
private equity firm or professional individuals. The fund managers usually act as 
the general partner of the LP and decide which firms or portfolio companies to 
invest in. 
                                                                                                                                    
Andrew Kirkpatrick, ―The Shield of "Unintended Consequences": Analyzing Venture Capital's Defense 
Against Increased Carried Interest Taxation‖(2008) 2 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 483. 
510 This type of fund is regulated by the Operational Guidelines for the private equity Investment Trust 
Business of Trust Companies 2008 (PRC) (The China Banking Regulatory Commission, Yinjianfa 2008 No. 
45). Before that, trust companies were not allowed to invest in the private equity sector directly. 
511 For further discussion on trust-type LP funds, see Zou, supra note 20 at 25-30. 
512 Yang, supra note 455. 
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Chart 1: A Typical Structure of the Private Equity LP 
 
 
Appendix III-Table 3 shows that the private equity LP is more preferable than 
the other two types of private equity funds in the sense that it is less costly and 
more flexible in terms of establishment and governance. The disadvantages of 
the private equity LP include several regulatory and policy obstacles with regards 
to the entry and exit of the fund. 
6. Major Empirical Findings in China’s Private Equity LPs  





 This part mainly discusses the potential or existing conflict of 
interest in the context of the PRC LP. Through the author‘s qualitative 
research,
514
 some major problems within China‘s fledgling private equity market 
are perceived. Significantly, there are severe conflicts of interest between limited 
partners and general partners in China‘s private equity LPs. 
6.1 Conflicts of Interest in the Control of the Firm 
The current orthodox view is that investors in the US‘ and the UK‘s venture 
capital funds are passive.
515
 Nevertheless, through the author‘s interviews,516 the 
general observation is that, it is common for Chinese limited partners to attempt 
to manage in the firm. Lawyers generally need to persuade them not to 
participate in the management of the firm.  The recent news reports
517
 also 
                                                 
513 Müller, Kay, Investing in Private Equity Partnerships: the Role of Monitoring and Reporting (Wiesbaden 
: Gabler, 2008). 
514 For the interview information and the author‘s qualitative research in the subject, see text accompanying 
notes 17-35 under the heading of ―Qualitative Research‖. 
515 See Gulinello, ―Venture Capital Funds, Organizational Law, and Passive Investors‖, supra note 364 at 
303. (noting the passive investors in the US). UK Joint Consultation Paper on Partnership, supra note 46 at 
48.(noting the passive investors in the UK) 
516 Telephone interview with Mr. Chen (anonymity requested), associate, China King and Wood Law Firm, 
Beijing Office on 19 October 2008 in China; personal interview with Mr. Liu (anonymity requested), 
partner, Guangdong Everwin Law Office, in Guangzhou on 18 October 2008. Telephone interview with Mr. 
Liu (anonymity requested), legal adviser, Shenzhen Private Equity Mgmt. Co. (anonymity requested) on 20 
November 2009; telephone interview with Ms. Shao (anonymity requested), associate, Beijing Global Law 
Firm on 16 October 2009; Ms. Kang (anonymity requested), associate, Beijing Global Law Firm on 17 
December 2009; Ms. Li (anonymity requested), legal counsel, China Construction Bank, Shanghai on 23 
September  2009; telephone interview with Ms. Dai (anonymity requested), associate, Chongqing Zhonghao 
Law Firm, Chongqing on 23 October 2009; telephone interview with Mr. Feng  (anonymity requested), 
associate, Chongqing Zhonghao Law Firm, Chongqing, on 27 an 29 October 2009; email consultation with 
Mr. Miao (anonymity requested), partner, a foreign law firm (anonymity requested), Shanghai 
Representative Office on 20 September 2009; email consultation with Ms., (anonymity requested) associate, 
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP Shanghai Representative Office on 29 November 2009.  
517 See Chen Wei, ―Private Equity Observations: Distance Between LP and GP‖, New Fortune (18 
September 2008), online: New Fortune Website 
<http://www.p5w.net/newfortune/pexd/200809/t1903707.htm>, [Chen, ―Distance Between Limited Partners 
and General Partners‖] (copy in Chinese); Hao Fengling ―Annual Investigation on Limited Partnership: 
Vague Roles between China‘s Limited Partners and General Partners‖ 21st Century Business Herald ( 30 
August 2008), online: Zero2ipo news <http://www.zero2ipo.com.cn/n/2008-8-30/200891103016.shtml>, 
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indicate that Chinese investors are active in China‘s private equity market. There 




Many PRC private equity LPs do not follow the international practice which 
prevents the limited partner from management of the business. On the contrary, 
limited partners are unwilling to fully entrust their investment to general partners 
and do not fully recognize the value of general partners.
518
 They are able to carry 
out management activities in various ways.
519
  
Such interventions would inevitably create conflicts and tension between the 
limited partner and the general partner. Many Chinese general partners 
complained that limited partners‘ participation had affected their investment 
strategy and even delayed the investment process. The general partner-limited 
partner conflicts would be more acute in bigger - sized funds which have 
considerable numbers of partners. In addition, limited partners have been accused 
of being too ―shortsighted‖ as they prefer to ―flip‖ the investment within a short 
time.
520
 Some general partners complained that the individual limited partners 
                                                                                                                                    
[Hao, ―Annual Investigation on Limited Partnership‖] (copy in Chinese); Yang Yongxiang and Xu 
Xiaocheng, ―The Emergence of Limited Partners‘ Community in China‖ Investment and Cooperation (5 
August 2008), online: The EZCapital <http://www.ezcap.cn/News/20089983.html>, [Yang and Xu] (copy in 
Chinese); Yang Yang, ―Limited Partners: Seeking Management Rights‖ 21st Century Business Herald (20 
October 2008), online: 
<http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/epaper/21cn/content/20081020/ArticelJ30002FM.htm>  (copy in 
Chinese). 
518 Chen Zhi, ―Investigation on Foreign RMB Funds‖ 21st Century Business Herald (24 November 2009), 
online: Zero2ipo news <http://news.zero2ipo.com.cn/n/2009-11-24/2009112485220.shtml> (copy in 
Chinese). 




had not fully understood the nature of venture capital and private equity and they 
had unrealistic expectations for large and quick returns.
521
 
Due to the global financial crisis of 2007, this conflict has become more severe 
recently. On the one hand, to ―secure‖ their investment, domestic limited partners 
become more active in the fund‘s management. On the other hand, as there is less 
capital invested in the private equity sector, general partners are facing more 
difficulties in fund raising. Under this circumstance, they have less bargaining 
power in managerial power‘s allocation. Some general partners even sacrifice 
their controlling power in the management of the fund. 
522
  
The conflict between limited and general partners in China‘s private equity 
market has also led to failures and dissolutions of the private equity LPs. One 
typical case is the Wenzhou East Ocean Limited Partnership Enterprise (温州东
海创业投资有限合伙企业 , hereinafter refers to the ―East Ocean Limited 
Partnership‖). This LP was the first private equity LP established in Wenzhou in 
2008. However, it was dissolved only one year after its establishment. It is 
reported that the major reason for the dissolution was the severe conflicts 
between the limited partners and the general partners. On the one hand, the 
limited partners were unsatisfied with the management skill of the general 
partner and the compensation paid to the general partner. On the other hand, the 
                                                 
521 Yang and Xu, supra note 517; Chen, ―Distance Between Limited Partners and General Partners‖, supra 
note 517. 
522 Xu Xiaowei, ―Imbalance between China‘s Limited Partners and General Partners‖ China Securities 
Journal (1 December 2008), [Xu] (copy in Chinese).  
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general partner complained that because the limited partners always interfered in 
the management of the firms, he was unable to make investment decisions 
efficiently or to carry on the investment smoothly.
523
  
Another example which reflects the conflicts between limited partners and 
general partners is the Bohai Industrial Investment Fund (渤海产业基金). The 
CEO of the corporate general partner left the fund because he was unsatisfied 
with the fact that the limited partners always intervened in the investment process 
and requested for disclosing the investment information.
524
 
6.2 Conflicts of Interest Arise when a General Partner Acts for both 
Domestic and Foreign Limited Partners
525  
 
Based on the current policy and regulations in China, foreigners are restricted 
from raising funds independently in the currency of RMB in China.
526
  
                                                 
523  See Lin Zhe, ―East Ocean Dissolution‖ China Securities Journal (22 September 2008), online:< 
http://stock.jrj.com.cn/cgem/2008/09/2211472112502.shtml > [Lin, ―East Ocean Dissolution‖] (copy in 
Chinese); Yuan Yuan, ―The First Private Equity Firm in Wenzhou - East Ocean Venture Capital Dissolved 
due to Internal Conflicts‖ Everyday Economic News (1 August 2008), online: Sina < 
http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2008-08-01/09572365834.shtml>, [Yuan, ―The First Private Equity Firm in 
Wenzhou‖] (copy in Chinese). 
524Qin Yi, Lin Guangsong and Yao Xinchun, ―Three Difficulties in Developing RMB Fund‖ Modern 
Financer (15 October 2009), online: P5W.Net <http://www.p5w.net/fund/smjj/200910/t2610868.htm>  
(copy in Chinese). 
525See Xu Chang ―Sino Conflict of Interest; Challenges for Foreigners in Raising RMB Funds‖ China 
Securities Journal (31 August 2009), online:< http://www.p5w.net/exchange/hsxw/200908/t2540411.htm >, 
[Xu, ―Sino Conflict of Interest‖] (copy in Chinese); ―Foreigners who Raise RMB Funds shall be Aware of 
Conflict of Interest‖ ChinaVenture (16 December 2008) , online: 
ChinaVenture  <http://interview.chinaventure.com.cn/10/20850.shtml> (copy in Chinese). 
526 See Ada Pearson ―RMB-denominated Fund Investment Evolves into Mainstream on China's private 
equity Market‖ Zero2IPO Research Centre (28 August 2008), online: Zero2ipo news 
<http://www.zero2ipo.com.cn/en/n/2009-8-28/2009828103514.shtml>; Wu Ming and Wan Jing, ―RMB 
Funds Come Nearer‖ China Securities Journal (14 April 2008), online: < 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2008-04/14/content_7971550.htm > (copy in Chinese). 
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Foreigners would have to raise RMB funds through a domestic fund management 
company in China. Such RMB funds are generally organized as LPs. In a typical 
LP-type RMB fund, the foreign fund serves as the limited partners; while the 
domestic management company serves as the sole general partner.  
Conflicts of Interest would easily arise when a sole general partner, who is 
usually a Chinese fund management company, operates a RMB fund and a US 
dollar-denominated fund at the same time. Specifically, in the absence of clearly 
defined investment policies and governance, conflicts can occur between 
investors in separate funds operated by the same fund manager. For example, in 
relation to the allocation of investment opportunities, the timing for the 
divestment of joint holdings or the transfer of assets between funds. There is a 
reasonable concern that the fund managers may fail to treat each investor equally. 
They may fail to allocate investment equally.
527
  
Two leading domestic fund management companies in China, namely, the CDH 
Investments (鼎晖投资) and Hony Capital (弘毅投资), have encountered such 
problems.
528
 These two management companies have several previous foreign 
limited partners. However, they have recently begun to raise pure RMB private 
equity funds for other Chinese limited partners, for instance, the PRC Social 
Pension Fund. Therefore, conflicts of interest arise as it is difficult for them to 
work in the best interests of every limited partner, either the existing limited 
                                                 




partners or incoming limited partners.
529
 In addition, conflict of interest arises 
because interests of various limited partners are not always aligned.  
It is predicted that, with more and more foreign investment being permitted to 
raise RMB funds in some local areas in China, such as the Shanghai Pudong new 
district;
 
this conflict of interest would become more serious in the near future.
530
 
6.3 Conflicts of Interest in a LP with Sole Corporate General Partner 
Firstly, in practice, the corporate general partner may at regular intervals replace 
its representatives who participate in the management of the LP. Hence, it may be 
difficult for the limited partner to control the transfer of managerial authority to a 
third party for a LP with corporate general partners (as compared to a LP with 
only individual general partners). The limited partner must thus be able to clearly 
identify the specific representative(s) appointed by the corporate general partner 
to run the LP business.
531
 
Secondly, an unscrupulous general partner hoping to evade personal liability may 
establish a shell company
532
 to function as a corporate general partner of the LP. 
In effect, the shell company is merely a ―dummy‖ acting as an agent for the 
                                                 
529 Liu Dong and Ma Jinying, ―Three Paths for Foreigners to Make Onshore Venture Capital Investment‖ 
(16 September 2009), online: Caijing. Com <http://www.caijing.com.cn/2009-09-16/110251988.html> 
(copy in Chinese).  
530See Ada Pearson, ―RMB-denominated Fund Investment Evolves into Mainstream on China's Private 
Equity Market‖ (28 August 2009), online: Zero2ipo news <http://www.zero2ipo.com.cn/en/n/2009-8-
28/2009828103514.shtml>. 
531 See Hamilton, supra note 40 at 86. 
532 See Qiu Jianxin, ―The Impact of New Partnership Enterprise Law on Venture Capital Activities‖, (in 





individual general partner. For such a variation of the LP structure, the corporate 
general partner has no substantial assets to be liquidated in the event of the LP‘s 
bankruptcy and there may in the worst-case scenario be no one actually bearing 
unlimited liability. It is thus incumbent upon investors to assess the financial 
status of the sole corporate general partner before entering into any agreement 
with such a LP.  
6.4 Conflicts of Interest regarding the General Partner’s Compensation 
Another significant conflict between limited partners and general partners in 
China‘s Private equity LPs arises from the general partners‘ compensation. That 
is, there are conflicts between (1) the self-interests of general partners to be paid 
management fees, carried interests and other compensation and (2) the self-
interests of limited partners (capital contributions to the private equity funds) to 
make money on their investment.  
In the context of China‘s private equity market, it is reported that many domestic 
limited partners are not satisfied with the level of compensation, especially the 
management fees and carried interests paid to the general partners. Many 
domestic limited partners even suggested that investment profits should be firstly 
distributed to limited partners, and then distribute the profits to general partners 
according to the capital contribution to the firm.
533
  
                                                 
533 Xu, supra note 522. 
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This is inconsistent with international practice where a management fees 
typically range from 1.5% to 3% of total capital commitments of the fund would 
be paid to the general partners on an annual basis; and a carried interest typically 
up to 20% of the profits of the partnership would be paid to general partners as a 
performance incentive.
534
 One possible reason for such conflict is that, as the LP 
is a new business form in China, domestic limited partners do not fully recognize 
the value of the general partner. It is reported that the limited partners in the East 
Ocean Limited Partnership also did not recognize the inherent value of the 
general partners.
 535
 This was one of the factors which caused the East Ocean 
Limited Partnership dissolved ultimately. 
7. Special Features of China’s Private Equity Market  
7.1 Lack of Qualified Limited Partners 
―Finding qualified investors is an important strategy not only for maximizing the 
value of investor input, but also for reducing conflicts between the fund manager 
and investors.‖536 Fund managers in Taiwan also generally prefer to raise fund 
from corporate investors rather than individual investors because individuals 
generally create more problems for the fund manager.
537
 In Taiwanese venture 
capital market, investors are also active in decision-making and other aspects of 
                                                 
534 James M. Schell, Private Equity Funds: Business Structure and Operations (Ring-bound, 1999) at §1.03 
(3). 
535  See supra note 523-524and accompanying text. 






 However, due to legislative and regulatory restrictions, 
there are a few qualified institutional investors in China. At the moment, 
commercial banks, insurance companies and local pension funds are not 
permitted to make private equity investments freely in China.
539
 Therefore, many 
private equity LPs have to raise capital from individuals and private enterprises. 
This is very different from the American venture capital market where the 
majority of funding is from private pension funds and insurance companies.
540
  
According to the China Limited Partners Association (CLPA) Report 2007-2008, 
China‘s limited partner community can be divided into six types.541 
1. Sovereign Wealth Fund (e.g., The China Investment Corporation (CIC) 中
国投资有限责任公司) 
2. Pension Funds (e.g., National Social Security Fund (全国社会保障理事
会),  Local Pension Fund (地方养老金) and Company Pension Fund (企
业年金)) 
3. Institutional Investors  (e.g., Insurance Companies, Commercial Banks, 
Trust Companies and Securities Companies) 
                                                 
538 Gulinello , ―Venture Capital Funds, Organizational Law, and Passive Investors‖, supra note 364 at 304. 
539 Art. 7 of the State Council‟s Decision on Setting up a Unified Enterprise Employees‟ Basic Pension 
Insurance System 1997 states that pension funds are not permitted to engage in the venture capital 
investment. Art. 105 of the PRC Insurance Law 2002 states that an insurance company is not permitted to 
engage in establishing security organizations or in investment irrelevant to insurance.  Art. 43 of the PRC 
Commercial Banking Law 2003 states that commercial banks are not permitted to invest in non-banking 
organizations or enterprises. 
540  See National Venture Capital Association, ―The Venture Capital Industry–An Overview‖, online: 
<http://www.nvca.org/def.html >. 
541  See Xu Gang, China Limited Partners Development Report 2007-2008, China Limited Partners 
Association (10 October 2008), online: Sina News 
<http://finance.sina.com.cn/hy/20081014/19445389619.shtml >, [Xu, China Limited Partners Development 
Report] (copy in Chinese); China Venture Capital Institute ed., China Venture Capital Yearbook 2007 
(Beijing: Democracy and Construction Press, 2007) at 12 and 247. 
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4. Wealthy Individuals and Private Enterprises 
5. Fund of Funds (FOF) (e.g., Governmental Direct Fund) 
6. Charity Funds (including: University Foundation; Charity Foundation, 
Donation Foundation) (e.g., Far East Charity Foundation 远东基金会 and 
Peking University Education Foundation 北大基金会) 
As indicated in the Figure 2 below, among these investors, individuals and 
private enterprises are the major sources of RMB private equity funds in 
China.
542
 A 2008 survey estimated that 39.7% of domestic venture capital 
funding in China was from enterprises; 25.24% was from governments; 19.28% 




                                                 
542 See Xu, China Limited Partners Development Report, supra note 541. 
543 China Venture Capital Yearbook 2009, supra note 10 at 244. 








Arguably, conflicts would easily arise due to the lack of qualified limited partners.  
 Venture capital and private equity is by its very nature a high-risk and 
high-return investment. Limited partners in this market are supposed to 
be able to afford capital locked for a long period and are able to risk 
losing significant amount of money. However, wealthy individuals and 
private enterprises are major limited partners in China. They are generally 
risk averse.
544
 Moreover, most wealthy individuals in China currently are 
the first wealthy generation (富一代) grown with the development of 
China‘s economic in the past two decades who have less risk tolerance. In 
order to preserve their wealth, they generally seek to participate in the 
management of the fund. 
545
  
 Many Chinese limited partners have not yet fully recognized the inherent 
value of the general partner due to the limited experience in the venture 
capital market.
 546
 Particularly, as many Chinese investors are successful 
entrepreneurs in various industries, they are confident of their 
management skills and are unwilling to fully entrust their investment to 
the general partners.
547
 Also, as these investors are from different 
                                                 
544 ―Risk averse‖ is an economic term meaning the reluctance of a person to accept a bargain with an 
uncertain payoff rather than another bargain with more certain, but possibly.  See Richard A. Posner 
Economic Analysis of Law, 5th edition (New York: Aspen Law & Business, 1998) at 432.  
 545 See Zhang Yufeng, ―Three Future Kingdoms in China‘s Private Equity Market: Observation of Mr. 
Shang Xuanyu (Partner of Cybernaut Investment)‖ China Securities Journal (18 June 2009), online: Neimu 
< http://www.neimu.cn/tech/061VZ02009.html > (copy in Chinese). The CEO of the Citic Industrial Fund, 
Mr. Liu Lefei is also of this opinion. See the conference minutes of the 2009 Global Private Equity Beijing 
Forum (28 November 2009), online: <http://events.chinaventure.com.cn/news/20091109/28135.shtml>.  
546 Ibid.  
547 This opinion is also expressed by Mr. Hu Xucang in an interview regarding the dissolution of the East 




industries with diverse business sense, conflicts would easily arise from 
different opinion towards investment allocation. 
Path dependence – three major restrictions in Chinese law have long 
mandated the choice of the Limited Liability Company
548
 in China‘s 
venture capital market: (1) Under the PEL 1997, legal persons, including 
various corporate forms were not permitted to establish partnerships. (2) 
Chinese partnerships were subject to double taxation until 2003 when the 
Tax authority changed the tax policies. Therefore, partnerships did not 
enjoy substantial tax advantages as compared to corporations. As 
investors are used to employ the corporate form in venture capital 
investments, they have not yet fully appreciate the structure of the LP.
 549  
 
Also, as many Chinese individual investors are used to invest in the stock 
market and real estate market, which are the markets characterized by 
quick return, these investors are less patient in the long-term private 
equity investment, but prefer to invest in pre- Initial Public Stock 
Offering (IPO) projects.
550
 Conflicts would easily arise due to different 
investment attitudes towards investment between limited partners and 
general partners. 
 Finally, many Chinese private equity fund managers observed that the 
                                                 
548 The Limited Liability Company under the PRC law is different from the Limited Liability Company 
under the US law in the sense that the former is a body corporation while the later is not considered as a 
body corporation. 
549 See Hao Yuqiang, ―Preventing Legal Risk from Limited Partners‖ (2009) CFO World vol. 2 at 49 (copy 
in Chinese). 
550 See Hao, ―Annual Investigation on Limited Partnerships‖, supra note 517. 
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idea that who made more contributions to the firm should have more 
controlling rights in the firm existed among many Chinese individual 
investors.
551
As limited partners are normally the major contributors to the 
fund, it is difficult for this special business community to accept the 
default legal principles in LPs that day-to-day operational decisions are 
made by general partners, not limited partners.  
7.2 Lack of Qualified General Partners 
Due to the the short history of China‘s private equity market, there is a shortage 
of qualified general partners who have both managerial and technical talent in 
China.
552
 Statistics show that fund managers who have more than 10-year 
relevant experience accounts for only 9.5% among all the investigated 
managers.
553
 Domestic venture capitalist who have MBA or PhD degrees account 
for 17% and 9% respectively.
554
  
There are a number of general partners who have little track records in private 
equity investment.
555
 They may have less business experience and knowledge 
than the limited partners (especially those who are entrepreneurs) in the selection 
                                                 
551 See Wang Lan, ―The Popularity of ‗Wife Managers‘ in China‘s Private Equity Market‖ (8 March 2010), 
online: Zero2ipo news <http://news.zero2ipo.com.cn/n/2010-3-8/20103884600.shtml> (copy in Chinese); 
―The Disputes between Chinese Limited Partners and General Partners‖, Southern Metropolis Daily (9 
March 2010), online: < http://chuangye.sina.com.cn/bi/2010-03-09/10553919854.shtml > (copy in Chinese); 
―Chinese Venture Capital Dilemma: Henpecked General Partners‖, Economic Weekly (15 March 2010), 
online: < http://news.chinaventure.com.cn/2/20100314/33782.shtml> (copy in Chinese); Chen, ―Distance 
Between LP and GP‖, supra note 517. 
552 See Tan Hongqing, ―How Do New Local General Partners Become Mature‖ (30 October 2009), online: 
Hote Lawyer < http://www.hotelawyer.com/?p=203> (copy in Chinese). 
553  China Venture Capital Research Institute ed., China Venture Capital Investment Yearbook: 2007 
(Democracy and Construction Press, 2007) at 227 (copy in Chinese). 
554Ibid. at 266. 
555 See Tan, supra note 552. 
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of portfolio companies. The incompetence of general partners not only creates 
conflicts between general partners and limited partners, but also has led to 
failures of private equity investment.
556
   
To ensure fund raising, some general partners are willing to ―sacrifice‖ their 
management powers to the limited partners. They are also widely described as 
―hen-pecked husband‖ for the limited partners in the sense that they are ―limited 
partners-oriented‖ and only engage in investments which are approved by their 
―wife‖- the limited partners.557 Such a situation is more acute during the recent 
global financial crisis because the general partners are facing more difficulty in 
fund raising. Limited partners therefore have more bargaining power in 
negotiations. 
 As mentioned earlier, there is no clear line between private equity and 
venture capital funds in China.
558
 Statistics show that a large number of 
venture capital in China is changing the investment direction from the 
early stage start-ups to the late stage of companies.
559
 Theoretically, 
private equity investment and venture capital investment differ primarily 
with respect to the stage of development of the entrepreneurial firm in 
which they invest.
560
 The different nature of private equity and venture 
                                                 
556 See Zhu Anhua, ―Failed Cases: Venture Capital Industry May be in Crisis‖ Legal Person (1 July 2009), 
online: Sina Finance <http://finance.sina.com.cn/leadership/case/20090701/17286426450.shtml> (copy in 
Chinese). 
557 Supra note 551.  
558 See supra text accompanying note 495. 
559 See China Venture Capital Yearbook 2009, supra note 10 at 259. 
560 Douglas Cumming and Sofia A. Johan, Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An International 
Perspective (Elsevier, 2009) at 5. 
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capital requires different investment strategies. In China, as many 
general partners are investment bankers or securities traders without 
adequate experience in selecting late-stage of pre-IPO projects, this 
increases limited partners‘ concerns and reduces the trust between 
limited partners and general partners.
561
 
 The reputation market plays in important role in ensuring the competence 
of fund managers.
562
 Due to the lack of a credit system and the lack of 
Personal Bankruptcy Law, general partners‘ market reputation becomes a 
critical issue in China‘s venture capital and private equity markets. 563  
 As foreigners were not permitted to establish the LP in China until 1 
March 2010,
564
 and because foreigners are not permitted to engage in 
private equity investment in China freely, there are only a few foreign 
fund managers in china‘s private equity LPs. This reduces the cooperation 
and learning opportunity of Chinese general partners. A 2008 survey 




                                                 
561 See Yang and Xu, supra note 517. Mr. Cao Darong (Managing Director of the Lightspeed Venture 
Partners), ―China is in the Early Stage of Cooperation between Venture Capital/Private Equity and Venture 
Capitalist‖, Minutes of the 11th China Venture Capital Investment Forum (8 June 2009), online: < 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/hy/20090608/03596315901.shtml > (copy in Chinese). 
562 William A. Sahlman, ―The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations‖ (1990) 27 J. 
Fin. Econ. 473 at 502. 
563 Supra note 561. 
564 The Administrative Measures for the Establishment of Partnership Enterprises within China by Foreign 
Enterprises or Individuals 2009 (PRC) allows foreigners to set up partnership enterprises in China. Text 
available online: <http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2009-12/02/content_1478238.htm> (copy in Chinese).  
565 China Venture Capital Yearbook 2009, supra note 10 at 237. 
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7.3 Insufficient Legal Protection to Limited Partners 
Apart from the aforesaid reasons, the fact that the PEL fails to provide sufficient 
protection to limited partners another likely contributor to the conflicts between 
limited partners and general partners.  
 
 Centralized Management without Control Rule  
Under the default rule of the PRC LP regime, limited partners have no right to 
manage the partnership and have to serve a passive role in the fund operation.
566
    
However, as discussed in Chapter 3,
567
 the PEL does not impose direct control 
rule liability on limited partners should they participate in the management of the 
firm. This legislative gap creates a ―backdoor‖ for the limited partners. They are 
able to establish various committees to take part in the management of the 
fund.
568
 Many interviewees also expressed the pressing need of filling this 
legislative gap.
569
 The next chapter will deal with this issue in detail.  
                                                 
566 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 68. 
567 See supra text accompanying notes 408-412. 
568 See infra discussion accompanying note 598-609. 
569 Telephone interview with Mr. Chen (anonymity requested), associate, China King and Wood Law Firm, 
Beijing Office on 19 October 2008 in China; personal interview with Mr. Liu (anonymity requested), 
partner, Guangdong Everwin Law Office, in Guangzhou on 18 October 2008. Telephone interview with Mr. 
Liu(anonymity requested), legal adviser, Shenzhen Private Equity Mgmt. Co. (anonymity requested) on 20 
November 2009; telephone interview with Ms. Shao (anonymity requested), associate, Beijing Global Law 
Firm on16 October 2009; Ms. Kang (anonymity requested), associate, Beijing Global Law Firm on 17 
December 2009; Ms. Li (anonymity requested), legal counsel, China Construction Bank, Shanghai on 23 
September  2009; telephone interview with Ms. Dai (anonymity requested), associate, Chongqing Zhonghao 
Law Firm, Chongqing on 23 October 2009; telephone interview with Mr. Feng (anonymity requested), 
associate, Chongqing Zhonghao Law Firm, Chongqing, on 27 and 29 October 2009; email consultation with 
Mr. Miao (anonymity requested), partner, a foreign law firm (anonymity requested), Shanghai 
Representative Office on 20 September 2009; email consultation with Ms. , (anonymity requested) 




 PRC LPs without Fiduciary Duty  
As discussed in Chapter 3,
570
 there is no equivalent concept of fiduciary in the 
PRC partnership law. Meanwhile, there are only a few broad principles 
regulating general partners‘ conduct. Indeed, the lack of fiduciary duty in the 
legal system may have increased the attractiveness of active-investor in the 
venture capital and private equity funds. The reason is that an investor would be 
more active in the management of the fund's business since there is no duty 
posing a significant risk of sanction on him.
 571
 In fact, Taiwan, which is also a 
traditional civil law jurisdiction without comprehensive concept of fiduciary, 
shares a similar phenomenon. Commentator Gulinello has pointed out that the 
slow development of fiduciary duties in Taiwan helps to explain the 
predominance of active-investor funds in Taiwan.
572
 Chapter 6 will dwell into 
this issue. 
 
 No Comprehensive Rule on Limited Partners’ Derivative 
Action  
                                                 
570 See supra text accompanying note 405-407. 
571 Gulinello, ―Venture Capital Funds, Organizational Law, and Passive Investors‖, supra note 364 at 352. 
See also, Christopher John Gulinello, ―The Revision of Taiwan's Company Law: The Struggle Toward a 
Shareholder-Oriented Model in One Corner of East Asia‖ (2003) 28 Del. J. Corp. L. 75, 104-06 . 
572 Gulinello, ―Venture Capital Funds, Organizational Law, and Passive Investors‖, supra note 364 at 352. 
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As discussed in Chapter 3,
573
 the PEL does not provide a regulatory framework 
governing limited partners‘ derivative action. In addition, it is difficult for the 
limited partner (who is not permitted to freely dissociate from the LP) to reclaim 
his/her contribution to the partnership when he or she dissociates.
574
 Since the 
limited partner is generally more vulnerable than the general partner, he or she 
ought to be granted the right to lodge an 524Haction in the name of the LP against 
errant general partners who either wrongfully fail to prosecute a partnership 
claim or breach their partnership duties.
575
 Without a clear definition of and 
detailed procedure for the ―derivative‖ action, the current bare provision cannot 
be viewed as affording effective protection for the limited partners (who lack 
rights to participate in the LP‘s management).  Chapter 7 will provide legal 
analysis on this issue. 
8. Conclusion: Major Legal Problems within the PRC LP  
This chapter presents interesting empirical findings and major legal problems 
within the PRC private equity LPs. The author‘s qualitative research shows that 
there are various conflicts of interest between Chinese limited partners and 
general partners in China‘s private equity LPs. In particular, there is a strong 
desire for limited partners to take part in the control of the firm. It is observed 
that, such conflicts are caused by several cultural and institutional constraints, 
                                                 
573 See supra text accompanying note 415. 
  574  Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 51 and 52 provide the conditions for reclaiming a 
partner‘s contribution to the partnership; e.g., if there is any pending partnership affair at the time the partner 
dissociates from the partnership, the settlement shall not be made until the matter has been concluded. 
  575 Mary E. Brumder, ―Investor Protection and the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act‖ (1980) 56 
Wash. L. Rev. 99, [Brumder]. 
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including the restrictions which prevent qualified institutional investors to 
engage in private equity investment and the lack of national credit system and 
personal bankruptcy law.  
In addition, the insufficient legal protection of Chinese limited partners also 
contributes to the conflicts between limited partners and general partners. Based 
on the discussions in this and the last chapter, the following aspects of the LP 
have not been addressed or well addressed by the PEL. (1) The law is silent on 
whether the limited partners will lose liability shield should they participate in 
the management of the firms. (2) The law does not provide equivalent concept of 
fiduciary duties and there is few statutory duties on general partners. (3) There is 
no detailed procedure for the limited partner derivative action. (4) The liability 
shield of limited partners is ambiguous. (5) The PEL is silent on whether 
creditors of the firm have priority over personal creditors in the division of firm 
assets when both the firm and partners are insolvent.   




(1)  rules which govern the internal relationship between limited 
partners and general partners (the control rule, the duties of partners, 
the limited partner derivative action);  and 
                                                 
576 The UK Law Commissions also use this dichotomy in discussing the law on partnership. See UK 
Partnership Law Report, supra note 47.  
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(2)  rules which govern the external relationship between these partners 
and outsiders (liability of partners and creditors‘ rights) 
Part II consisting of Chapter 5, 6 and 7, will inquiry into the legal rules which 
govern the internal relationship between limited partners and general partners. 
Part III consisting of Chapter 8, will deal with the legal rules which govern the 
external relationship between these partners and outsiders. These two parts will 
discuss: to what extent do these features and problems require special legal rules 
in the context of China? 
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PART II INTERNAL GOVERNANCE WITHIN 20BTHE PRC LIMTED 
PARTNERSHIP 
CHAPTER 5  THE CONTROL RULE IN THE LP 
1. Introduction  
The last chapter identifies a severe problem within China‘s private equity market 
- Chinese limited partners are generally very active in funds‘ management. 
Limited partners‘ strong desire to participate in the management of the firm may 
create conflicts between the limited partners and general partners, and may even 
lead to the dissolution of private equity LPs. One typical case is the mentioned 
East Ocean Limited Partnership. The general partner of this partnership 
complained that the limited partners‘ intervention in the fund‘s management had 
affected their investment allocation. While the limited partner believed that their 
proposals were in the best interest of the fund.
577
 This conflict would be more 
acute in bigger -sized funds which have a large number of partners, and be more 
serious during the global financial crisis since 2007 where general partners have 
difficulties in raising funds.
578
  
The long-lived legal default rule which forbids limited partners from meddling 
with the management of the firm is the so-called ―control rule‖. It makes a 
                                                 
577 See supra note 523-524 and accompanying text.  
578 See supra note 522 and accompanying text. 
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limited partner personally liable for the obligations of the partnership if, like a 
general partner, the limited partner takes part in the management and control of 
the partnership‘s affairs. 579  Put another way, the liability shield of a limited 
partner will be forfeited once he or she participates in the management of the 
firm.  









 and the UK
584









The PEL does not provide the control rule. Arguably, without the control rule 
which precludes limited partners from sharing decision-making power with the 
                                                 
579  Carter G. Bishop, ―The New Limited Partner Liability Shield: Has the Vanquished Control Rule 
Unwittingly Resurrected Lingering Partner Estoppel Liability as Well as Full General Partner Liability?‖ 37 
(2004) Suffolk U. L. Rev. 667, [Bishop] at 669. See further in Alan L. Feld, ―The ‗Control Test‘ for Limited 
Partnerships‖ (1969) 82 HARV. L. REV. 1471.  
580French Commercial Code Art. L222-6 provides that ―A limited partner may not carry out any external act 
of management, even by virtue of a power of attorney. In the event of infringement of the prohibition 
specified in the preceding subparagraph, the limited partner shall be held jointly liable with the active 
partners for any debts and obligations of the partnership which may result from the prohibited acts. 
According to the number and size of these, they may be declared jointly liable for all obligations of the 
partnership or for some only.‖ 
581 Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 17-303. 
582 Limited Partnership Act 2008 (New Zealand) s.30. 
583 Limited Partnership Act 2008 (Singapore) s.6. 
584 Limited Partnership Act 1907 (UK) s.4 (2). 
585 German Commercial Code §164 provides that ―Limited partners are excluded from the conduct of the 
partnership business; they have no right to forbid any transaction being entered into by a general partner 
unless such transaction is outside the usual scope of the business of the partnership, provided always that 
nothing contained in this section affects the rules laid down in sect. 116, paragraph 3.‖ 
586 Particularly, under Japan‘s new LP regime, the Limited Partnerships for Investment (tōshi jigyō yūgen 
sekinin kumiai) which was adopted in 1999, there is no control rule which forfeit limited partners‘ limited 
liability should they participate in the management of the partnership. Japan Limited Partnership Act for 
Investment 1999 Art. 7. 
587 Cf. Taiwan Limited Partnership Act 2007 (draft) Art. 26 prevents a limited partner from conducting a 
partnership‘s business or to act on behalf of the partnership externally. The limited partners who conduct the 
partnership‘s business will be deemed as a general partner and thus be made to bear full personal liability. 
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general partners, internal conflicts between limited partners and general partners 
would inevitably arise. As will be discussed below, the author‘s empirical study 
shows that various investment advisory committees are established in China‘s 
private equity LPs to seek for controlling rights in the firms. It argues that as 
general partners‘ management rights are largely diluted by these mechanisms, 
potential conflicts of interest between limited and general partners would easily 
arise.  
Moreover, as every limited partner will naturally care about what actions by 
themselves will cause them lose the liability shield and be personally liable for 
the debts of the firm,
588
 the PEL‘ silence on this issue may also threaten the 
popularity of the PRC LP. Further, few academic attempts have been made to 
assess the control rule issue and the PRC LP‘s internal governance in the context 
of China. Therefore, the discussion in this chapter would fill the perceived 
literature and legislative gap. 
Considering that the control rule originated from France and was reinforced in 
the US,
589
 this chapter reviews the evolution of the control rule in these two 
jurisdictions. It argues that while the aged-old control rule have once been an 
effective rule in preventing limited patters‘ meddling in the LP firm, it may not 
be useful in the context of China.  
                                                 
588 See R. Kurt Wilke, ―Limited Partnership Control: A Reexamniation of Creditor Reliance‖ (1984) 60 
Ind.L.J. 515 at 515. 
589 See infra text accompanying notes 631-646. 
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This chapter also examines the alternative rules provided in the PEL and 
discusses whether they do serve a similar deterrent function as the control rule. 
While the answer is positive, it is argued that, in order to meet the business needs 
of the users of the PRC LP, a few more amendments shall be made to the PEL. 
In summary, this chapter considers the issues of: 
 Whether the PEL should provide a control rule liability and to impose a 
liability on limited partners who participate in the control of the business 
of the partnership?  
 To what extent shall we provide management rights to the limited 
partner in a PRC LP? 





extensively in the US, references will be made to the ULPA 1976, the ULPA 
1985 and the ULPA 2001 when making suggestions to the PEL. Given the 
popularity of the Delaware LP, the subsequent arguments also will make 
reference to the DRULPA.   
                                                 
590 Literature on the control rule issue includes: R. Kurt Wilke, Note, ―Limited Partnership Control: A 
Reexamination of Creditor Reliance‖ (1985) 60 Ind. L. J. 515 at 517;  Alan L. Feld, ―The 'Control' Test For 
Limited Partners‖ (1969) 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1471; Basile, supra note 329; Feldman, ―The Limited Partner's 
Participation in the Control of the Partnership Business‖ (1976) 50 CONN. B.J. 168; Schwartz, Edward R 
―Limited Partnership Association: An Alternative to the Corporation for the Small Business with Control 
Problems‖ (1965) 20 Rutgers L. Rev. 29.  
591 Such as Holzman v. De Escamilla, 195 P.2d 833 (Cal. 1948) and Gast v. Petsinger, 323 A.2d 371 (Pa. 
1974).   
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2. The Lacuna within the PEL  
Article 68 of the PEL is the basic provision regulating the management rights of 
limited partners in the PRC LP. It provides that:  
 “a limited partner may neither carry out the partnership affairs nor represent 
the limited partnership when dealing with other parties. The following activities 
of limited partners shall not be deemed as „executing the partnership affairs‟: 
(1) participation in a collective decision to admit or remove a general 
partner; 
(2) making a proposal relating to the business management of the LP firm;  
(3) participation in the selection of an accounting firm to audit the LP firm; 
(4) receiving an audited financial report of the LP firm;  
(5) inspection of accounting books and other financial information of the 
LP business which involve self-interest;  
(6) commencement of legal proceedings against an accountable partner 
when the LP‟s interests have been infringed;  
(7) initiation of legal action in one‟s own name to safeguard the LP‟s 
interests where the partner responsible for the conduct of partnership 
affairs has neglected the exercise of his rights; and 
(8) providing guarantee for the LP”.   





 It seems that the Article 68 is a mixture and has taken different 
approaches from different jurisdictions, including the US and Germany.
593
 On the 
one hand, like its German counterpart, the Article 68 does not provide the control 
rule. On the other hand, like its Delaware counterpart, it provides a ―safe harbor‖ 
list to clarify what activities by limited partners do not constitute ―carrying out 
partnerships‘ affairs.594  
However, it appears that the draftsmen of the PEL do not fully appreciate the 
rationale and value of the control.
 595 
Article 68 is deficient in the following: 
 It is not clear what constitute ―carry out the partnership affairs‖. 
 The safe harbor list is much shorter than the lengthy and comprehensive 
ones provided in various RULPAs, the DRULPA, the New Zealand 
Limited Partnership Act 2008 and the Singapore Limited Partnership 
Act 2008.  
 It is not clear whether the list is exhaustive.596 Therefore, it is not clear 
whether a limited partner will lose limited liability if he or she 
participates in activities not included in the list. 
 It does not provide the control rule. It does not spell out unambiguously 
                                                 
592This concludsion is made based on the legislative background of the PEL. Zhu and Ge, supra note 37. 
593 See the legislative interpretation on Art. 68 of the PEL in Li, Interpretation of Partnership Enterprise 
Law, supra note 369 at 110; Wang Jihong and Chen Yimin eds., Interpretation of Partnership Enterprise 
Law of People‟s Republic of China (China Legal Publishing House, 2006), [Wang and Chen] at 210-211 
(copy in Chinese). 
594 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 68. However, there is no equivelant ―safe harbor‖ list under 
the German LP regime. See German Commercial Code §164. 
595 This conclusion is made based on the legislative material of the PEL: Wang and Chen, supra note 593; 
Li, Interpretation of Partnership Enterprise Law, supra note 369 and Hong, ―Law Committee of the 
National People‘s Congress‘ Report of the Revised Partnership Enterprises Law (Draft)‖, supra note 270.  
596 Some commentators suggest that it is not an exhaustive list. See Liu Qingfei, ―Discussion on Limited 
Partner‘s Execution of Partnership Affairs‖ (2007) 6 Politics and Law, [Liu] at 101 (copy in Chinese). 
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the extent of the limited partner‘s liability should he or she be ―carrying 
out the partnership affairs‖ not included in the list. In other words, the 
PEL does not share an equivalent concept of the control rule under 
various RULPAs. 
Presumably, the fact that there was scant LP practice in China before the 
adoption of the LP in 2006
597
  may restrict the draftsmen‘s understanding of the 
control rule.   
3. Various Innovative Internal Governance Mechanisms 
Many private equity LPs in China do not follow the PEL‘s default rule which 
prevents the limited partner from management of the business. In order to 
participate in the management of the firm, several novel internal governance 
mechanisms are employed in China‘s private equity LPs.  
3.1 Investment Strategy Committee (投资决策委员会) 
Recent news reports
598
 indicate that the investment strategy committee is a 
common governance structure in PRC private equity LPs. This committee is 
responsible for the review and approval of all proposed fund investments. It 
consists of either purely general partners or both general partners and limited 
partners. Each member has one vote in the committee.  
                                                 
597 See Zhu and Ge, supra note 37 at 21.  
598 See Yang and Xu, supra note 517.  
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China‘s largest private equity LPs to date, the Shenzhen Oriental Fortune Capital 
(深圳东方富海 ),  and many other famous private equity LPs, such as the 
Zhejiang Venture Capital (浙商创投), the Zheshang Haipeng (浙商海鹏创投), 
the Richlink International Capital fund (嘉富诚国际资本) and the Shenzhen 




In the Shenzhen Oriental Fortune Capital, the investment advisory committee 
comprises three general partners and one limited partner (the so-called ―3+1‖ 
model).
 599
 The limited partner is changeable annually. Each investment 




In the Zheshang Haipeng fund, the investment advisory committee comprises 
four general partners, one limited partner and two experts.
 601
 Each investment 
project must be approved by five votes in the committee. Meanwhile, the limited 
partner committee is also established to decide on important investment issues, 
such as the investee projects which require large amounts of capital. Generally, 
members in the limited partner committee are those who are initial contributors 
to the LP or those who are elected by the general partners.
 
 
                                                 
599 See Hao, ―Annual Investigation on Limited Partnerships‖, supra note 517. 
600 Ibid. 
601 Ibid.  
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In the Richlink international capital fund,
602
 the investment strategy committee 
consists of two general partners, three limited partners and two external experts 
in law or finance. This committee restricts the management rights of the general 
partners, and prevents general partners from abusing their management rights.
603
 
3.2 Joint Meeting (联席会议) 
Another extreme internal governance mechanism is the joint meeting. The East 
Ocean Limited Partnership has established this mechanism. In this partnership, 
the joint meeting plays a decisive role in the management of the fund. Although 
this meeting consists of all partners, the chairman of this meeting is not the 
general partner, but the limited partner who provided largest amount of capital to 
the fund, namely, Mr. Hu Xucang.
604
 Each investment proposal must be approved 
by more than 2/3 votes. The number of the votes of each member depends on 
their respective capital contributions to the fund. Each vote requires a capital 
contribution amount to 5 million RMB.  
In this case, the limited partners ―replace‖ the general partners and actually 
control the management of the fund. The general partner has no substantial 
management right at all. Due to the conflicts between limited partners and 
general partners, the East Ocean Limited Partnership was dissolved in October 
2007.    
                                                 
602 Ibid. 
603  For further information on the internal governance of the Richlink International Capital Fund, see 
Richlink‘s Homepage, online: <http://www.richlink.com.cn/cn/business/01.asp>.          
604 See Lin, ―East Ocean Dissolution‖, supra note 523. 
169 
 
3.3 Other Internal Governance Mechanisms  
There are other internal governance mechanisms, such as the Expert Consultation 
Committee‖ (专家咨询委员会), the Investment Advisory Committee (投资咨询
委员会) and the ―Limited Partner Committee‖ (有限合伙人委员会) in China‘s 
private equity LPs. They serve a similar function in private equity LPs – 
reviewing and approval of all proposed fund investments. It usually consists of 
limited partners, general partners and external investment experts. Members in 
the committee are entitled to veto the proposed investment.
605
 Some private 
equity LPs have more than one committees. 
Interestingly, in some private equity LPs, both the limited partner and the general 
partner are controlled by the same group company. For example, in a venture 
capital fund raised by the Legend Capital Company (联想投资), the single 
limited partner of the fund is the holding company (the Legend Holding) of the 
general partner (the Legend Capital).
606
   
Recently, there is a new approach which may avoid the conflicts between limited 
and general partners in investment allocation – it is for general and limited 
partners to identify the portfolio companies first and raise funds later. This model 
is very different from the international practice where the fund is raised earlier 
                                                 
605 Chen, ―Distance Between LP and GP‖, supra note 517. 
606 Xu Gang (CEO of IManagers Group), speech at the Equity Investment Seminar (28 February 2009), 
online: He Xun News <http://news.hexun.com/2009-03-09/115434637.html> (copy in Chinese).  
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than identifying targeted investee firms.
607
  
As a matter of fact, limited partners in the above mentioned private equity LPs 
have already violated Article 68 of the PEL because they have participated in the 
management of the firm. However, as the PEL fails to provide the control rule, 
these limited partners are able to do so without losing their limited liability.  
As a separate note, the partnership meeting (合伙人会议)608  does not have 
decisive role in the fund‘s management.609 As observed by the author‘s empirical 
study, some private equity LP agreements even specify that the partnership 
meeting shall not discuss any matters relating to investment.
610
 
In view of the above, the management right in China‘s private equity LPs is 
actually exercised by various internal governance committees which consist of 
                                                 
607 Zhang, ―Three Future Kingdoms in China‘s Private Equity Market‖, supra note 545 . 
608 For further information on the practice of partnership meetings in China, see Zou; supra note 24 at 56-
57. 
609 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 31 lists those items which require unanimous consent of all 
partners. However, those issues are irrelevant to the investment strategies and investment portfolio. It also 
provide that, unless otherwise provided by the partnership agreements, the following events should be 
decided with unanimous consent of all partners.  
 Examination on the Annual report of general partners; 
 Authorization on transferring general partner‘s interests in the partnership; 
 Decision on association and dissociation of a partner; 
 Expelling a general partner from the partnership; 
 Conversion from a general partner to a limited partner or vice versa; 
 Dissolution of the partnership, constitution of the liquidation team, and examination on the 
liquidation report; 
 To change the name of the partnership enterprise; 
 To change the business scope and the address of the main business place of the partnership 
enterprise;  
 To dispose of the real property of the partnership enterprise;  
 To assign or dispose of the intellectual property and other property rights of the partnership 
enterprise; 
 To provide a guaranty to others on behalf of the partnership enterprise; and 
 To hire a non-partner to act as a business manager of the partnership enterprise. 
610 The author collected three limited partnership private equity agreements from Chongqing Zhonghao Law 
Firm and Shenzhen Huashang Law Firm.  
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limited partners and/or general partners, but is not by general partners solely. 
This is very different from the LP practice in the US market where the decisive 
role of the fund is generally vested with general partners.
611
 The following Chart 
2 and Chart 3 indicate the different internal governing structures in the typical 
Chinese private equity LP and the typical US private equity LP.   
                                                 
611 Lee, supra note 86 at 262-263. 
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3.4 A Good Practice? 
In fact, the various investment mechanisms, e.g., the advisory board or the 
investor board are not unknown in the US.
612
 These advisory committees usually 
made up of investor representatives who monitor the fund's performance.
613
  
                                                 
612 See Lee, supra note 86 at 293. See also Gulinello, ―Venture Capital Funds, Organizational Law, and 
Passive Investors‖, supra note 364 at 309 (venture capital funds sometimes have "investor boards"). 
613 See William A. Sahlman, ―The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations‖ (1990) 27 J. 




From the perspective of investors, as the various internal governance 
mechanisms grant them rights to vote on business decisions, and in turn provide 
them with some assurance that their opinion will be incorporated into the fund‘s 
business decisions, this assurance gives them a greater incentive and make them 
more comfortable to invest in the fund.  
Moreover, investors, especially those have rich experience and knowledge in 
private equity industries would make invaluable non-capital contributions to the 
fund. Allowing these competent limited partners to participate in the control may 
also facilitate the development and success of the fund.  
However, monitoring through these internal mechanisms is a costly means of 
reducing the variance of general partner performance. Moreover, it is argued that 
the investment advisory committee may not be cost-efficient because it would be 
difficult for all or major members in the committee to reach agreement on every 
investment. Once they fail to reach an agreement, it will hinder the investment 
progress or the daily operation of the fund.
614
  
4. Why A Strong Desire to Control? 
Why are there so many Chinese limited partners seeking for controlling power in 
private equity LPs? Why is there conflict between limited partners and general 
partners? Chapter 3 provides in-depth analysis on a likely reason - there is a 
                                                 
614 Chen, ―Distance Between Limited Partners and General Partners‖, supra note 517. 
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Of course, conflicts can arise even between qualified limited partners and general 
partners. For example, when the corporate general partner is represented by a 
junior member, it is likely for a qualified limited partner with more experience 
and knowledge in the private equity industries to question the competence of the 
junior general partner.
616
    
Conflicts can also arise between limited partners and qualified general partners in 
the daily operation of the fund, especially in investment allocations. For example, 
when several funds are operated by the same fund managers, limited partners 
may question the allocation of investment opportunities. While the fund manager 




4.1 Constraining Agent Misbehaviour 
Constraining misbehavior of general partners is another reason why limited 
partners are seeking management rights in the firm.  
                                                 
615 See supra text accompanying notes 542-549.  
616 See Gulinello, ―Venture Capital Funds, Organizational Law, and Passive Investors‖, supra note 364 at 
359. 
617 Ronald J. Gilson, ―Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience‖  





  and agency costs typically arise in agency relationship under 
which the principals engage the agents to perform on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to the agent.
619
 The agent will not 
always act in the best interests of the principal if both the agent and the principal 
are utility maximizes. To limit divergences from his interest, the principal will 
need to spend some monitoring expenditures. There are also bonding expenditure 
borne by the agents to ensure that they will not take actions which would harm 
the principal‘s interest. In addition, there are ―residual loss‖ which is born by the 
principal due to the divergence between agent‘s decisions and those decisions 
which would maximize the welfare of the principal.
620
 
Properly understood, the agency problem also exists in a typical LP. In the 
context of China, limited partners generally desire high risk-adjusted 
performance at low cost; while general partners want to maximize assets under 
managements and the resulting management fees and carried interests. 
Nevertheless, the structure of the LP creates obstacles for investors to monitor 
how their investment is deployed.
621
 The default rule of the LP restricts limited 
partners from taking part in the management of the firm. To ensure that their 
                                                 
618 For general discussion on the agency problem, see Bengt Holmström, ―Moral Hazard and Observability‖ 
(1979) 10 (1) The Bell Journal of Economics 74; Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, ―Theory of 
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure‖ (1976) vol. 3, No. 4 Journal of 
Financial Economics 305; [Jensen and Meckling, ―Theory of the Firm‖] Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. 
Jensen, ―Agency Problems and Residual Claims‖ (1983) 26 (2) Journal of Law and Economics 327. 
619 Oliver Hart, ―An Economist‘s Perspective on The Theory of The Firm‖ (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1757 
at 1759. Jensen and Meckling, ―Theory of the Firm‖, supra note 618 at 308. 
620 Oliver Hart, ―An Economist‘s Perspective on The Theory of The Firm‖ (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1757 
at 1759. 
621 See generally in Lee, supra note 86; William A. Sahlman, ―The Structure and Governance of Venture-
Capital Organizations‖ (1990) 27 J. FIN.ECON. 473 at 489-516; George G. Triantis, ―Financial Contractual 
design in the World of Venture Capital‖ (2001) 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 305 at 310.  
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interests would not be infringed and the management rights of the general partner 
would not be abused, it is reasonable for limited partners to spend monitoring 
costs to limit divergences from their firm. In addition, economic analysis also 
identifies the moral hazard problem within partnerships.
622
  
4.2 Regulatory and Structural Constrains 
75BRegulatory factors indeed play a role in the establishment of active-and passive-
investor funds.
623
 As discussed in Chapter 3,
 624
 the PRC LP regime provides 
insufficient legislative protections for limited partners: (1) the lack of fiduciary 
duty on general partners; and (2) the lack of the limited partner derivative action. 
Indeed, without sufficient legal protection, limited partners are likely to seek for 
greater controlling rights in the management of the firm. 
In addition, the lack of sound credit system in China also increases limited 
partners‘ concern in the funds‘ management. Until now, China has not set up a 
sound credit system. A national credit reporting system is has not been 
established. There is no efficient punishment mechanism for people who breach 
their duty of good faith. 
As the long-lived "control rule", to varying degrees, serves as a punitive and 
deterrent function to prevent limited partners from participating in the 
                                                 
622 Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz,"Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization" (1972) 
62 American Economic Review 777 [Alchian and Demsetz, ―Production, Information Costs and Economic 
Organization‖] at 780. 
623 Gulinello, ―Venture Capital Funds, Organizational Law, and Passive Investors‖, supra note 364 at 309. 
624 See supra text accompanying notes 566-575. 
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management of the firm. A historical review of the control rule may shed light on 
the inherent value of the rule itself and would provide a clear clue for us to 
discuss whether such an aged-old rule should be adopted in China today.  
5. A New Understanding of the Control Rule 
5.1 The Origin and Development  
The control rule relates to a tradeoff between limited liability and management 
rights in a LP - limited partners who enjoy limited liability cannot participate in 
the management or control of the firm. Such a tradeoff was developed from the 
medieval commenda to meet the business needs of the maritime traders at that 
time. As the commenda usually lasted only for a single or round-trip voyage,
625
 
the passive partner had to give up the control of the assets since the assets were at 
sea or in foreign ports for the period of the overseas venture.
626
 Nevertheless, the 
medieval commenda did not require a passive partner who did participate in the 
management of the firm to bear personal liability.  
The control rule that made limited partners lose limited liability if they took part 
in the management of the firm was derived from the French société en 
commandite simple. France transplanted the commenda and sanctioned the 
société en commandite simple in the 525HCommercial Ordinance of 526H1673;
627
 and later 
                                                 
625 Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78 at 1372.  
626 Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78 at 1373. 
627 However, the Commercial Ordinance of 1673 did not provide comprehensive definition of the société en 
commandite simple, but left the task to contemporary jurists. See Kessler, supra note 305 at 519. 
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regulated it in the French Commercial Code.
628
 In the Old Regime France, 
noblemen were traditionally prohibited from practicing commerce due to the 
particular social order.
 629
 Nobles who engaged in commercial activities would 
risk the loss of noble status. To enable noblemen to invest in commerce without 
threatening their noble status, the société en commandite simple set forth a legal 
rule that allowed noblemen to engaged in investment without letting outsiders 
know their names and status; and without having to participate in the 
management of the business.
630
 
The rule that passive partners‘ participation in the management of the firm would 
lead to the imposition of full personal liability was a moral consequence of the 
separation of ownership and management in the société en commandite simple.
631
 
As observed by Kessler, the merchant court at that time frequently imposed 
limited liability based on its own ex post determination of fairness under the 
                                                 
628 Under the French Commercial Code, limited partners are liable for the debts of the partnership only up to 
the limit of the amount of their contribution. A limited partner may not undertake any act of external 
management, otherwise the limited partner is held to be jointly and severally liable with the general partners 
for all or some of the debts and obligations of the partnership according to the number and importance of the 
act. See French Commercial Code Art. 222. See Lamoreaux and Rosenthal, ―Legal Regime and Contractual 
Flexibility‖, supra note 312 at 34.  
629 The reasons were twofold. Firstly, under the Christian theological tradition, ―a man‘s love for his own 
selfish, personal interests- a self-love that necessarily detracted from man‘s ability to love God above all 
others and thus, lay at the root of all evil.‖ Secondly, ―there were three estates constituting the social order in 
the Old Regime social society, namely, the clergy, which was committed to serving God; the nobility, which 
were committed to serving the state; the majority of people, who were concerned only with their own 
selfish, personal interest‖. Kessler, supra note 305 at 516-517. 
630 ―Toubeau, Jean. 1700. Les institutes du droit consulaire ou les elemens de la jurisprudence des 
marchands, d'un tres-grand secours au palais, utiles à tous marchands et négociants, et necessaires aux 
juges et consuls. 2 vols. Bourges: Chez Nicolas Gosselinat 2:73‖, citing in Kessler, supra note 305 at 516-
517; During the 1830s and the 1840s, one-third to one-half of new firms took this business form. However, 
the popularity of the société en commandite simple seems to be reduced by the adoption of the new business 
entity with stronger limited liability shield. In France, the number of the LP was reduced during the period 
of 1880 and 1913 due to the introduction of the new corporation form: the société anonyme. See Naomi R. 
Lamoreaux and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, ―Entity Shielding and the Development of Business Forms‖, supra 
note 80. 
631 Kessler, supra note 305 at 521. 
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specific circumstances. They would decide whether to impose partners with 
limited liability based on the extent to which ownership and management were 
separated. ―Arbiters sometimes imposed limited liability because they concluded 
that it would be morally unjust to impose full liability on a partner who played no 
role in management and thus bore no responsibility for the partnership's 
losses.‖632 Likewise, the court would impose unlimited liability for those who 
participate in the management and incurred debts to the firm. In essence, these 
―moral necessities‖ were factors that largely influenced by the natural-law 
scholarship in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, which, generally speaking, 
considered the existence of law as an idea based on human nature.
633
 
In early nineteenth century, the French société en commandite simple was 
transplanted to the US. The New York 1822 statute represented the first 
introduction of the LP form into any common law jurisdiction.
634
 New York 
1822 statute copied the French law and likewise prohibited limited partners from 
participating in management on the penalty of being held liable as general 
partners.
635
 The New York 1822 statute required that ―no special partner shall 
transact any business on account of the partnership‖ and those who participate in 
managing the business would be ―under the penalty of being liable as a general 
                                                 
632 Kessler, supra note 305 at 523-524. 
633 Caenegem, R. C. Van, An Historical Introduction to Private Law (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992) at 118. 
634 Eric Hilt and Katharine E. O'Banion, ―The Limited Partnership in New York, 1822-1853: Partnerships 
without Kinship‖ (2008) NBER Working Papers 14412, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc at 8. 
635 Kessler, supra note 305 at 541. 
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partner‖.636 The early test for finding a limited partner liable for the debts of the 
LP was ―whether he ‗interfered‘ with the general management of the partnership 
business.‖637  
Within the following hundred years, the control rule has seen a great legislative 
change in the US. In 1916, the control rule was firstly enacted in the ULPA 1916.  
Section 7 of the ULPA 1916 provides that a limited partner will be personally 
liable as a general partner if ―in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers 
as a limited partner, he takes part in the control of the business.‖ However, the 
ULPA 1916 did not provide legislative guidance as to when to impose liability on 
limited partners when participation in the control of the business. It was left for 
courts to decide this issue.
638
  
The control rule became less restrictive and was watered down in the following 
amendments to the original ULPA 1916. The ULPA 1976 provides a lengthy safe 
harbor list of the activities that do not constitute participating in the control of the 
business. To make the limited partner liable to persons who transact business 
with the LP, section 303 of the ULPA 1976 requires the creditor possess ―actual 
knowledge‖ of the participation of control. The ULPA 1985 further expanded the 
―safe harbor‖ list and increased the burden of proof in finding a limited partner 
did ―participate in the control of the business‖.639  
                                                 
636 Laws of New York §5 (1822). 
637 Basile, supra note 329 at 1202. 
638 See Basile, supra note 329 at 1209. 
639  Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act §303(b) (1985). 
182 
 
In 2001, the control rule was finally abolished by the ULPA 2001.
640
 The ULPA 
2001 provided a full shield against limited partner liability for entity obligation. 
The reason for abolishing the control rule was the fact that, ―in a world with 
Limited Liability Partnerships, Limited Liability Companies and, most 
importantly, Limited Liability Limited Partnerships, the rule is an 
anachronism‖.641  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that although the control rule has been recently 
abolished by the ULPA 2001, some American states (including Delaware) have 
not adopted the ULPA 2001
642





 also adopted the control rule in their new LP Acts 2008. The 
UK Law Commissions also propose to maintain this rule. Their assertion is that 
―there is no strong policy reason for depriving a partnership creditor of recourse 
against a limited partner‘s general assets while the LP remains in business, if the 
limited partner has by his actions lost the limitation on his liability‖; 645  in 
addition, to give this additional protection would blur the distinction between the 
two categories of partner.
646
 
                                                 
640  See Uniform Limited Partnership Act Prefatory Note (2001). 
641  Ibid. 
642 States adopted the ULPA 2001 include: Arkansas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Virginia, etc. ―ULPA 2001 legislative 
Fact Sheet‖, online: NCCUSL <http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-
ulpa.asp>. 
643 Limited Partnership Act 2008 (Singapore) s.6. 
644 Limited Partnership Act 2008 (New Zealand) s.30. 




5.2 Inherent Defects within the Control Rule 
5.2.1 What Constitutes “Control”?  
Firstly, the connotation of ―control‖ and ―management‖ remains to be interpreted.  









 the limited partners are excluded from management 
of the firm rather than from ―control‖ of the firm. In the US, however, the limited 
partner is excluded from control of the firm. Nevertheless, neither the meaning of 
―management‖ nor that of ―control‖ is clearly defined in the partnership Acts in 
these jurisdictions. Although various RULPAs provide a lengthy list of activities 
which are not to be regarded as amounting to participation in control, there is 
some doubt as to whether the list is complete enough to cover all situations in 
different business environments.
651
 It is always left for courts to decide whether 
specific activity would be deemed as control; but courts have not been unable to 
provide a satisfactory interpretation of the rule either.
652
 Such uncertainties create 
boundaries for potential investors to calculate the risk of investing in the LP and 
                                                 
647 Limited Partnership Act 1907 (UK) s. 6. (1) provides that: ―A limited partner shall not take part in the 
management of the partnership business, and shall not have power to bind the firm: Provided that a limited 
partner may by himself or his agent at any time inspect the books of the firm and examine into the state and 
prospects of the partnership business, and may advise with the partner thereon. If a limited partner takes part 
in the management of the partnership business he shall be liable for all debts and obligations of the firm 
incurred while he so takes part in the management as though he were a general partner.‖ 
648 Limited Partnership Act 2008 (Singapore) s. 6: ―If a limited partner takes part in the management of the 
limited partnership, he shall be liable for all debts and obligations of the limited partnership incurred while 
he so takes part in the management as though he were a general partner.‖ 
649  Limited Partnership Act 2008 (New Zealand) s. 20: ―A limited partner must not take part in the 
management of the limited partnership.‖ 
650 Partnership Act 1958 (Australia) s. 67 provides that a limited partner cannot take part in the management 
of the business of the limited partnership. If he or she does so, they will be liable as general partners. 
651 Basile, supra note 329 at 1221. 
652 Basile, supra note 329 at 1228. 
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reduce the popularity of the LP.
653
 
5.2.2 When Control Rule Liability Arises? 
The test for finding a limited partner be liable for the ―control rule liability‖ is 
unclear. Under the ULPA 1916, the limited partner has to be personally liable as 
a general partner if he or she takes part in the control of the business.
654
 However, 
the ULPA 1916 did not provide legislative guidance as to when to impose 
liability on limited partners when participation in the control of the business. It 
was left for courts to decide this issue.
655
 This defect increased uncertainty of the 
control rule itself.  
To solve the problem, the American courts developed two basic tests on deciding 
when to impose limited partners with general liability for the debts of the LP. 
One is the ―Quantitative Power Test‖, that is to assay ―the amount of the limited 
partner‘s involvement in the partnership‘s business‖; the other is ―the Specific 
Reliance Test‖, that is to require ―a creditor to show reliance on the limited 
partner‘s conduct.‖656 Case law post the ULPA 1916 determined the issue based 




                                                 
653 Ibid. at 1201.  
654 Uniform Limited Partnership Act §3 (1916). 
655 See Basile, supra note 329 at 1209. 
656 See Basile, supra note 329 at 1209. See further in R. Kurt Wilke ―Limited Partnership Control: A 
Reexamination of Creditor Relliance‖ (1984) 60 Ind. L.J. 515. (analyzing the reliance approach to the 
control provision and demonstrates its advantages by introducing a system for applying the reliance test to 
factual situations). 
657 Bishop, supra note 579 at 687. 
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The RULPAs develop the test and provide that the control rule liability for 
limited partners should be contingent on whether a third party is aware of the 
limited partner‘s participation in management. Section 303 of the ULPA 1976 
provides that if the limited partner's participation in the control of the business is 
so extensive as to be ―substantially the same as the exercise of the powers of a 
general partner‖, he or she is liable only to persons who transact business with 
the LP with actual knowledge of his participation in control. The ULPA 1985 
removes the ―substantially the same‖ requirement and requires the creditor to 
possess ―reasonably belief‖ of the participation in control. 
Some LP forms, such as the Delaware LP
658
 also require that the control rule 
liability is dependent on the knowledge of the third party of his participation in 
management. To establish a control rule liability on limited partners under the 
DRULPA, the third party has to prove that he or she believed the contracting 
party ―was a general partner at the time of transaction‖ and that he or she ―acted 
in good faith in ―reasonable reliance on such belief‖ and ―on the credit of such a 
person‖, 659 he or she ―extended credit to the partnership‖.  
Making the control rule liability contingent on a third parties‘ particular reliance 
limits the circumstances under which the exercises of ―control‖ could lead to 
imposition of this liability on limited partners. It is suggested that a third party 
should not benefit himself merely because a limited partner takes part in the 
                                                 
658 Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 17–303; Limited Partnerships Law (Jersey) Art 
19(4). 
659 See also Delaware Revise Limited Partnership Act §17-304(a) (2006). 
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management of the firm, ―when the decision of the third party to deal with the LP 
has been made on the basis that the general partners (and the general partners 
alone) are liable.‖660  
Nonetheless, some jurisdictions do not agree with this position.
661
 Under the 
Singapore Limited Partnership Act 2008, the liability of the limited partner is not 
contingent on the knowledge of the third party.
662
 The UK Law Commissions 
also proposes that the loss of protection for a limited partner who takes part in 
management should not be contingent upon knowledge of a third party dealing 
with the partnership.
663
 It is argued that the conceptual basis for the control rule 
liability is simply the limited partner‘s lack of managerial responsibility. In other 
words, the reason for imposing the control rule liability on the limited partner is 




In view of the above, how to find a control rule liability is a comprehensive issue. 
When considering whether to adopt the control rule in China, one must bear in 
mind the possible judicial difficulty in interpreting and implementing the rule in 
                                                 
660 See UK Joint Consultation Paper on Partnership, supra note 46 at 34; See also Singapore LP Report, 
supra note 72 at para.8.3. 
661 UK Joint Consultation Paper on Partnership, supra note 46 at 34. Singapore LP Report, supra note 72 at 
para.8.3.  
662 Limited Partnership Act 1907 (UK) s. 6 (1) simply provides that ―if a limited partner takes part in the 
management of the partnership business he shall be liable for all debts and obligations of the firm incurred 
while he so takes part in the management as though he were a general partner‖. Limited Partnership Act 
2008 (Singapore) s. 6(2) provides ―If a limited partner takes part in the management of the limited 
partnership, he shall be liable for all debts and obligations of the limited partnership incurred while he so 
takes part in the management as though he were a general partner.‖ 
663 See UK Partnership Law Report, supra note 47 at 282. 
664 UK Joint Consultation Paper on Partnership, supra note 46 at 34. See Singapore LP Report, supra note 
72 at para.8.3; Uniform Limited Partnership Act Prefatory Note (2001).  
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the context of China. 
5.3 The Control Rule: An Anachronism? 
The above indicates that the control rule is a complicated statutory rule which 
requires substantial judicial interpretation for a better implementation. A question 
that follows is: should such an aged-old rule be maintained in the business world 
today? My answer is that, while the control rule was useful in the old days, there 
is little reason to believe that it continues to be in the business world. 
First, the long-standing control rule is an anachronism in the US partnership 
history.
665
 There was no practical need to duplicate the control rule into the US at 
the time the 1822 New York statute transplanted the French société en 
commandite simple. The reason was that 1822 New York shared a very different 
social and economical environment as that of the Old Regime France.
 666
 In the 
seventeenth century, the société en commandite simple was enacted to enable 
noblemen to participate in new commercial business without risk to their 
traditional and honourable status. It was the natural-law principle that made the 
limited partner who did not participate in management enjoyed limited liability. 
It was also the natural-law principle that imposed the partner who participates in 
managing the business with full liability.  
Unlike the société en commandite simple which was originally enacted to 
                                                 
665 See Basile, supra note 329; Kessler, supra note 305; Uniform Limited Partnership Act Prefatory Note 
(2001). 
666 See generally, Kessler, supra note 305. 
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enabled noblemen to invest without jeopardizing their nobility, the US LP was 
enacted to provide readily available limited liability to investors so as to promote 
the democratic pursuit of wealth.
667
 There was no such a noblemen community in 
1822 New York similar to that in the Old Regime France. In this sense, it was of 
less pragmatic value for the 1822 New York legislation to reinforce the French 
control rule which against the limited partner‘s participation in management.668  
Second, there is some doubt whether a LP with a control rule would continue to 
be popular in the business world today. Today, there are various limited liability 
vehicles available for businessmen in the US, such as the Limited Liability 
Partnership, the Limited Liability Company and the Limited Liability Limited 
Partnership.
669
 Businessmen can easily avoid the personal liability by forming as 
one of these limited liability vehicles or other unincorporated business entity 
available. A LP with a control rule may inevitably threaten the potential users of 
the LP since they will be exposed to personal liability should they participate in 
the management of the firm. 
Third, the private equity LPs are usually large investment organizations 
consisting of a large number of members. Presumably, for the limited partners 
who are passive and professional institutional investors, i.e. pension funds, they 
may not wish to participate in the management of the fund as any wrong 
decisions may have a material effect on the value of their own investment. 
                                                 
667 Kessler, supra note 305 at 544. 
668 See generally Kessler, supra note 305. 
669 See Uniform Limited Partnership Act Prefatory Note (2001). 
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Therefore, it seems unnecessary to impose them personal liability should they 
violates the control rule.  
Last but not least, whether a legal rule will serve a satisfactory function depends 
on whether it will meet the present or future business needs of a particular 
business community. We shall now turn to the discussion on whether China shall 
adopt the control rule. 
6. Is the Control Rule an Effective Rule in China?  
6.1 An Urgent Need for the Control Rule? 
As discussed in Section 4 of this chapter, there is a strong desire for limited 
partners to participate in the control of China‘s private equity LPs. However, 
general partners generally do not wish to give limited partners authority in their 
day-to-day investment decisions as it makes them slower and less competitive in 
transactions. From the perspectives of general partners, it seems that the control 
rule should be adopted in China so as to deter limited partners‘ meddling in the 
firm‘s business. However, one may not ignore the following facts and trends 
taking place in China.  
6.1.1 The Rise of the Limited Partners Class 
The fact that Chinese limited partners are active is a temporary problem and may 
be released with the development of China‘s private equity market.   
190 
 
Recently, some positive steps
670
 have been taken by the Chinese government. 
More and more qualified institutional limited partners are allowed to engage in 
the venture capital and private equity investment in China. This may maximize 
the value of investor input and increase the expertise of the limited partner class. 
For instance, in September 2007, eleven securities companies were approved to 
establish subsidiary companies to engage in direct investment.
671
 In June 2008, 
the National Council for Social Security Fund (NSSF) permitted ten percent of 
China‘s national pension funds to be invested in the private equity sector.672 The 
NSSF fund (up to a hundred billion RMB) will be used in private equity 
investments by 2010.
673
 Since November 2008, the insurance institutions have 
been permitted to make equity investment in unlisted enterprises, and have been 
given consent to pilot projects for insurance capital to invest on equity of 
financial institutions and other qualified or blue chip enterprises.
674
 Since 
December 2008, commercial banks have been permitted to make equity 
investment.
675
 Since July 2008, trust companies have been permitted to engage in 
the private equity investment.
676
 In addition, several batches of industry funds 
                                                 
670 See Ada Pearson (Zero2IPO Research Centre), ―RMB PE Funds still Expanding; Domestic LPs yet to Be 
Mobilized‖ (4 June 2009), online: Zero2ipo news < http://research.zero2ipo.com.cn/en/n/2009-6-
4/200963141220.shtml>. 
671 Since May 2009, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has reduced the criteria for 
securities companies to engage in direct investments. See Zhu Jiang, ―Less Requirements for Direct 
Investment by Securities Brokers‖ Securities Times (7 May 2009), online: Zero2ipo news 
<http://news.zero2ipo.com.cn/n/2009-5-7/20095790002.shtml> (copy in Chinese). 
672―China Pension Fund are Allowed to Invest in Private Equity Funds‖ Xinhua News (6 June 2008), online:  
<http://en.ec.com.cn/article/eninvest/ennews/200806/619299_1.html>. 
 673 Economic Reference News (11 June 2008), online: 
<http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20080611/08242268523.shtml> . 
674 ―Zero2IPO Research Centre, ―2008 Saw Rational Return in the Private Equity Market, with Growth in 





approved by the State Council have already entered the capital raising stage.  
Meanwhile, Chinese limited partners are also taking steps to improve themselves. 
In September 2008, the Limited Partners Association of China (LPACN) aiming 




Indeed, some recent practical observations
678
 and interviewees‘ feedback679 also 
prove that Chinese limited partners have become more mature and sophisticated.  
It is believed that with the broadening scope of eligible intuitional limited 
partners in China, China‘s limited partners would become more sophisticated and 
would be more willing to entrust the investment to professional fund managers. 
Hence the chance for Chinese limited partners to interfere in the management 
would be less. By then, a control rule would be of little pragmatic value.  
6.1.2 The Rise of General Partners Class 
The very nature of the LP structure-passive limited partner and active general 
                                                                                                                                    
676The China Banking Regulatory Commission promulgated a Notice to permit trust company to engage in 
the private equity investment; but not more than 20% of its total assets. See Dan Youwei, ―China Banking 
Regulation Commission Promulgated New Guidelines for Trust Companies to Engage in Private Equity 
Investment‖ Shanghai Securities News (16 July 2008) (copy in Chinese).  
677 Zero2ipo Research Centre, ―China Limited Partnership Association was Established in Hong Kong‖ (24 
September 2008) News Release (24 September 2008), online: Zero2ipo news 
<http://www.zero2ipo.com.cn/n/2008-9-24/2008924114426.shtml> (in Chinese).  
678 Lin Xianghong (CEO of the Suzhou Venture Capital Investment Group) speech at 2008 Global Private 
Equity Beijing Forum (4 December 2008), online: 
<www.bpea.net.cn/article//zjsd/200812/20081200006269.shtml> (in Chinese). 
679 E.g., telephone interview with Mr. Feng (anonymity requested), (associate, Chongqing Zhonghao Law 
Firm) on 27 October 2009 (on file with the author). 
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partner- makes the general partner‘s expertise and absolute requirement. 680  
Meanwhile, the number of qualified fund managers may influence the number of 
active or passive investor funds. ―If there are fewer qualified managers, then 
there may be more funds with active investors whose expertise and industry 
connections supplement the performance of less qualified fund managers. 
Conversely, a greater number of qualified fund managers in the market may 
result in more passive-investor funds.‖681  
Statistics show that the experiences, management skills and professional 
expertise of Chinese fund managers have been increased gradually. In 2006, 
among 1852 fund managers, only 9.53% of them had more than ten year‘s 
experience in the venture capital investment. However, this percentage has 
increased to 17.66% in 2007 and 26.46% in 2008.
682
 In 2007, among 1699 fund 
managers, only 31.44% of them have relevant background on equity investment, 
while this percentage was increased to 33.9% in 2008.
683
  
In addition, the scope and specialization of China‘s fund management companies 
have been expanded and deepened in recent years. A survey indicates that the 
number of fund management companies with more than 20 investment 
professionals had increased from 5.36% in 2006 to 7.24% in 2007, and 8.86% in 
                                                 
680 Gulinello, ―Venture Capital Funds, Organizational Law, and Passive Investors‖, supra note 364 at 341. 
681 Gulinello, ―Venture Capital Funds, Organizational Law, and Passive Investors‖, supra note 364 at 308. 
682 China Venture Capital Yearbook 2009, supra note 10 at 234-235. 





   
For venture capitalists, reputation is likely to be particularly important where 
there are a large number of competitors and weak industry concentration.
685
 
Therefore, the venture capitalist will work hard to manage the fund and ensure a 
best exit for the fund within the limited period so that they can establish a good 
reputation in this competitive industry. Thirdly, since the compensation of the 
venture capitalists is comprised of management fees and a certain percentage 
(usually 20%) of the profits generated by the funds, it provides incentive for the 
venture capitalists to work effectively but not opportunistically.
686
 
With the growing expertise of China‘s general partners‘ community and the 
increasing institutional funding, it is believed that Chinese limited partners, 
particular the individual limited partners, would have less desire to participate in 
the management of the LP. 
6.2 Other Arguments 
6.2.1 Protection of Creditors? 
In essence, the control rule is created to give the creditor of the LP legal recourse 
against a limited partner‘s assets should the limited partners participate in the 
                                                 
684 China Venture Capital Yearbook 2009, supra note 10 at 234. 
685 See Krishnan, C.N.V., Masulis, Ronald W. and Singh, Ajai K., ―Does Venture Capital Reputation Affect 
Subsequent IPO Performance?‖ (10 April 2007), online: SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=910982>. 
686 McCahery and Vermeulen, supra note 346 at 72.  
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management and control of the partnership business.
687
 The control rule in the LP 
structure is that ―it protects creditors from mistaking a limited partner who 
actively participate in the control of the firm as a general partner.‖688 It is argued 
that creditors of the LP are entitled to have a legally protected interest in the 
identity of the individuals who actually manage the LP. Creditors may not be 
willing to deal with the LP if they realize that the LP or the general partners who 
they are dealing with is actually governed by a limited partner.
689
  However, this 
justification is questionable for the following reasons.  
First, this justification assumes that creditors of LPs have ―expectations 
regarding the limited partner‘s liability‖, but not every creditor has such 
―expectations‖, such as tort creditors, institutional creditors and trade creditors.690 
As commentator Basile observed, since tort creditors become creditors of a LP 
involuntarily, they have no expectations regarding limited partners‘ general 
liability. Institutional creditors are sophisticated thus it is possible for them to 
know the identity of each partner by examining the LP agreement and certificate. 
Trade creditors might seek for credit agency ratings to ensure the debtor‘s 
liability in practice instead of expecting the debtor to have unlimited liability for 
                                                 
687 Basile, supra note 329 at 1204 See also Hanover National Bank v. Sirrett 15 Abb. N. Cas. 334 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1883) at 336. ―The interference by transacting business or acting as agent for the firm, upon which 
the penalty of liability as a general partner is imposed by the statute, means an interference by intrusion 
into the office of a general partner, and the performance of acts that pertain to the office of the general 
partner, and which might therefore deceive the public with the idea that he who so appears to be, is in fact a 
general partner.‖ cited in supra note 590 at 1204.  
688 Basile, supra note 329 at 1224.  
689 Clement Bates, The Law of Limited Partnership (Little, Brown, 1886) at 20, cited in Basile, supra note 
329 at 1226.  
690 Basile, supra note 329 at 1225.  
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the debts for the LP.
691
  
Second, creditors of the LP firm would not necessarily be harmed if the limited 
partner does take part in the control of the firm.
692
 In the context of China‘s 
private equity market, it is not clear whether private equity LPs would engage in 
the sort of activities that would result in extensive liabilities for the fund.
693
 In 
fact, the major purpose of many private equity LPs in China is pure fund raising. 
Highly leveraged debt financing (LBO) is rarely used in China‘s private equity 
investment for the time being.
694
 Therefore, the risk that the private equity fund‘s 
investment would result in extensive liabilities is low. A limited partner who 
participates in the management of the firm would not be subject to excessive 
liability of a large magnitude.
695
 
Third, under the PEL, even if the limited partner does not participate in the 
management or control of the partnership business, he or she may be personally 
liable for the debts of the firm. Under Article 2 of the PEL, ―limited partners 
have limited liability to the debts of the partnership up to the amount of their 
promised contributions‖. In other words, if the asset of the LP is insufficient to 
                                                 
691 Basile, supra note 329 at 1226.  
692 Basile, supra note 329 at 1224.  
693 William A. Sahlman, ―The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations‖ (1990) 27 J. 
Fin. Econ. 473 at 490 
694 However, it is noted that there is a trend that LBO financing has become more popular in obtaining for 
private equity funds. See Duan Ningning, ―RMB Private Equity Funds Booming, Local LP Reserve Wait to 
be Encourage‖ (3 June 2009), online: Zero2IPO, <http://research.zero2ipo.com.cn/n/2009-6-
3/200961111937.shtml> (copy in Chinese); Xu Gang, China Limited Partners Development Report 2007-
2008, supra note 541. 
695 As professor Gulinello observed, ―the control rule would do little to prevent investor participation in U.S. 
limited partnership venture capital funds because there would be a very low probability that the investor's 
activities would actually violate the prevailing control rule and the magnitude of her potential liability would 
be very small.‖ Gulinello, ―Venture Capital Funds, Organizational Law, and Passive Investors‖, supra note 
364 at 339. 
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satisfy the judgment, a judgment creditor of the LP has the right to levy 
execution against the limited partner who has not make contribution to the firm 
as promised.
696
 This is different from the US LP which generally does not impose 
direct personal liability on limited partners.
697
 
In view of the above, protection of creditors is too weak to stand as a justification 
for the control rule in China.  
6.2.2 Prophylactic Function? 
From a functional perspective, one may argue that the control rule is ―justified as 
a prophylactic against the improvidence of the limited partners.
698
 Such a 
justification is flawed too. As the limited partner has a sustainable stake in the 
equity of the firm, the significant capital contribution made by the limited partner 
is an effective incentive for them to avoid too risky actions. Some interviewees
699
 
indicated that the reason why limited partners intend to participate in the 
management of the firm is to deter mismanagement and risky investment by 
general partners. 
                                                 
696 Under the Partnership Enterprise Law, a judgment creditor of a LP in debt must levy execution against 
the assets of the LP first. If the asset of the LP is insufficient to satisfy the judgment, all partners in the firm 
are jointly liable up to the full amount of the relevant debts. General partners shall bear unlimited liability 
for the debts of the firm; while limited partners shall bear limited liability up to the amount of their promised 
capital contributions. If the partnership asset is sufficient to satisfy the judgment, the partners do not have to 
bear any personal liability to the debts. However, the limited partner is liable to pay up to their promised 
contributions only. See Wang Baoshu, ―Limited Liability for Limited Partners: Risk Allocation and 
Protection for Creditors‖ (2009) vol.6 Legal Studies 87 at 92 (copy in Chinese). 
697 See, e.g., Uniform Limited Partnership Act §303 (2001); Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act §303 
(1985); Limited Partnership Act 1907 (UK) s. 4 (2).  
698 See Bayse, ―A Survey of the Limited- Partnership Form of Business Organization‖ 42 OR.L.REV.35 at 
49 cited in Basile, supra note 329 at 1227.  
699 Personal interview with Mr. Liu (anonymity requested), partner of the Guangdong Everwin Law Office, 
Guangzhou, China on 18 October 2008. Telephone interview with Mr. Feng (anonymity requested), 
associate of the Chongqing Zhonghao Law Firm, Chongqing, China on 27 October 2009. 
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6.2.3 Encourage Productivity?  
One may argue that the control rule can ensure general partners, who have 
personal liability, manage the firm. It may thus encourage the productivity of the 
LP. However, general partners are eligible to delegate the management to any 
individuals other than limited partners. In fact, the control rule may ―weaken the 
quality of management since the risk of liability for participation in control deters 
limited partners from monitoring the generals‖.700  
Moreover, from the perspective of investors, the control rule gives general 
partners a potent weapon in negotiations over partnership agreements. Limited 
partners are disadvantaged when they attempt to manage the firm.
701
 This may 
inevitably discourage investment in China‘s private equity market and is 
inconsistent with the legislative objective of the PEL.  
The most important rationale for limited liability is that it can encourage public 
investment.
702
 Presumably, without limited liability, private equity firms may 
have difficulties in raising large amounts of capital from investors. 
Given the aforesaid reasons, there is no strong legitimate or pragmatic reason for 
adopting the control rule in the context of China. 
                                                 
700 GA.Code Ann. § 14-9-303 (1988) cited in Bishop, supra note 579 at 711. 
701 Basile, supra note 329 at 1222.  
702 Paul L. Davies, Introduction to Company Law (Oxford University Press, 2002) at 63. 
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6.3 Alternative Rules under the PEL  
The next question for consideration is: are there any alternative rules in the PEL 
which may prevent the limited partner from ―meddling‖ of the partnership 
business so as to reduce the agency costs in the context of PRC LP? 
6.3.1 “Ultra Vires” liability 
The PEL allows for a special situation which may achieve a similar objective as 
that of the control rule. The second sentence of the Article 76 of the PEL 
provides: 
  “Where a limited partner conducts, without authorization, a transaction 
with any other person in the names of the partnership and causes any 
losses to the limited partnership enterprise or to other partners, he shall 
be liable for compensation.”703  
Under this provision, a limited partner shall be personally liable for the debts of 
the partnership incurred during his participation of the partnership affairs.
704
 
Namely, the limited partners without authority shall compensate any loss caused 
by their ultra vires actions with their personal assets. 
Article 98 of the PEL also provides:   
  “where a partner who does not have executive right of partnership‟s 
                                                 
703 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 76. 
704 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 24; See also Li, Interpretation of Partnership Enterprise 
Law, supra note 369 at 157. 
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affairs (事务执行权 ), carry on partnership affairs, and in so doing 
causes loss to the partnership or to other partners, he shall bear 
compensation liability to the partnership and other partners according to 
law.”705  
Article 98 serves as a similar function as the above provision in the sense that it 
can also be used as a legal basis to make limited partners without authority to 
bear personal liability should they carry on partnership affairs without authority.  
However, Article 98 is different from Article 76 in the sense that Article 98 
applies to both general partnerships and LPs while the control rule only applies 
to LPs.  
6.3.2 “Estoppel” Rule under the PEL 
The PEL provides another rule in finding a partner who acts without authority, be 
liable for the debts of the firm. The first sentence of Article 76 of the PEL 
provides: 
  “where a third party reasonably believes that a limited partner is a 
general partner and accordingly proceeds to make a transaction with the 
limited partner, such a partner shall bear the same liability as a general 
partner for that particular transaction; 
706
 
The above provision is similar to the estoppel rule under common law and 
                                                 
705 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 98. Partnership Enterprise Law 2006, Art. 97. 





 It would also make a limited partner personally liable to 
those creditors who relied upon that participation to extend credit upon its belief. 
It also serves the purpose of protection of creditors.
708
 To establish an estoppel 
liability under the UPA 1914, the creditor must prove that he or she relies on the 
representation to extend credit to the actual or apparent partnership.
709
   
To establish liability under Article 76 of the PEL, the third party must prove that: 
(1) the creditor reasonably believes that a limited partner is a general partner; and 
(2) he or she accordingly proceeds to make a transaction with the limited partner.  
Whilst the onus of proof lies on the third party,
710
 this burden is not difficult to 
discharge: as the PEL generally does not allow a limited partner to participate in 
the partnership activities, those who actively control or act on behalf of the 
partnership will be the ―apparent‖ general partner. Moreover, the PEL does not 
require the creditor to possess ―good faith‖ in reasonably believing that the 
limited partner is a general partner.  
                                                 
707 The estoppels statute applies to the limited partnerships established under the ULPA 1916, the ULPA 
1976, the ULPA 1985 and the ULPA 2001. See Bishop; supra note 579 at 701 and 704. 
708 Bishop, supra note 579. 
709 Uniform Partnership Act (1994) §308(a) provides that ―If a person, by words or conduct, purports to be a 
partner, or consents to being represented by another as a partner, in a partnership or with one or more 
persons not partners, the purported partner is liable to a person to whom the representation is made, if that 
person, relying on the representation, enters into a transaction with the actual or purported partnership. If the 
representation, either by the purported partner or by a person with the purported partner's consent, is made in 
a public manner, the purported partner is liable to a person who relies upon the purported partnership even if 
the purported partner is not aware of being held out as a partner to the claimant. If partnership liability 
results, the purported partner are liable with respect to that liability as if the purported partner was a partner. 
If no partnership liability results, the purported partner is liable with respect to that liability jointly and 
severally with any other person consenting to the representation.‖ Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act 
§303 (1985) provids the creditor-specific reliance control liability. 
710 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 24; see also Li, Interpretation of Partnership Enterprise 
Law, supra note 369 at 123. 
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As a separate matter, it is submitted that the ―good faith‖ requirement is 
necessary in establishing the estoppel liability on the limited partner. The reason 
is that the rationale for estoppel liability is to protect the interest of the bona fide 
creditor rather than those with ―bad faith‖. 
6.3.3 Summary of Section 6.3 
It concludes that although the PEL does not provide the control rule, it provides 
alternative rules to deter limited partners from participating in the management 
of the firm. There is no need to adopt the control rule and to give another legal 
recourse to the third party. The mechanisms under the PEL are reflected in the 
two scenarios:   
 If a limited partner who has no authority to conduct partnership‘s affairs, 
but who does conduct partnership‘s affairs and causes loss to the 
partnership and other partners, the creditor of the partners or the other 
partners can take an action against the limited partners acting ultra vires 
on the basis of Article 76 of the PEL.  
 If a third party reasonably believes that the contracting party was a 
general partner and conduct transactions with the limited partners, the 
third party may bring an action against the limited partners based on 
Article 76 and seek for compensation. 
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7. Management Rights for Limited Partners: A Case Study in China 
7.1 How Does One Regulate Limited Partners’ Management Rights? 
A subsequent question that follows is: to what extent shall we provide 
management rights to the limited partner in a PRC LP? At the outset, two 
practical observations should be highlighted. 
 On the one hand, there exists a strong desire for limited partners to 
control the private equity LPs. This phenomenon is caused by various 
cultural and institutional reasons, including the agency problem within 
the LP and other regulatory constraints. Hence, it is unrealistic to ignore 
the real business needs of the businessmen and to exclude limited 
partners from management. Also, as discussed earlier,
711
 limited partners‘ 
non-capital contribution, especially qualified investors‘ expertise and 
experience are invaluable assets to the success of the fund. Therefore, the 
PEL should not deprive the management rights of limited partners.  
 On the other hand, in order to participate in the management the firm, 
Chinese limited partners have developed several internal governance 
mechanisms. However, from economic perspective, these mechanisms 
are time-consuming and costly. They also create conflicts between limited 
partners and general partners. The collapse of East Ocean Limited 
Partnership is one example.
712
 For the avoidance of costs and to ensure 
                                                 
711 See section 3.4 of Chapter 5 in this thesis. 
712 See supra text accompanying notes 523-524. 
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investors understand the limits of their permitted participation in the 
conduct of the firm‘s business, it is necessary to revise Article 68 of the 
PEL.  
The how does one specify limited partners‘ management rights so as to balance 
the interest of both limited and general partners? One may argue that the 
allocation of managerial authority is a matter inter se the partners. It shall be left 
for partners to design in their partnership agreements. Nevertheless, the contract 
theory has long acknowledged that there are limits of contracts.
713
 The role of 
law is crucial in several ways:
714
 Particularly, (1) it simplifies contracting among 
the parties involved; and (2) it serves a protective or information-revealing 
function so as to avoid the default outcome.  
Overseas practice may shed light on this matter. Appendix IV - Table 4 
highlights the UK, Delaware and Singapore legislation on this matter. Appendix 
V - Table 5 compares the safe harbor lists under the PEL, the UK Partnerships 
Bill, the DRULPA and the Singapore Limited Partnership Act 2008. 
These Tables indicate that: 
 The default rule in the LP is that limited partners are generally prevented 
from participating in the management and control of the firm.  
                                                 
713 Hart, Oliver and Moore, John, ―Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation‖ (1988) 56(4) Econometrica 
755. 
714 See Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law, supra note 427 at 30-31. 
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 The extent of limited partners‘ management right is not clearly defined 
under the PEL.  
 The safe harbor list under Article 68 of the PEL is much shorter and more 
restrictive as compared to its counterpart in Delaware, Singapore and 
New Zealand.
715
 The PRC list only provides six safe events under which 
a limited partner may conduct and would not be treated as ―carrying out 
partnership affairs‖. It stands to reason that the PEL‘s abridged list cannot 
be envisaged to encompass all circumstances where a limited partner 
could be involved in some form of control-like activity. Moreover, it is 
not clear whether the list is exhaustive.  
7.2 More Management Rights to Limited Partners 
7.2.1 What Constitutes “Carrying Out the Partnership Affairs”?  
Article 68 of the PEL provides that a limited partner may neither carry out the 
partnership affairs nor represent the LP when dealing with other parties. However, 
it is not clear what constitutes ―carrying out the partnership affairs‖ within the 
meaning of Article 68. There is no Judicial Interpretation as to the meaning of 
―carrying out the partnership affairs‖ either.716   
                                                 
715 See Table 4 and Table 5 in this Thesis. 
716 In China, the judicial interpretation is referred to the interpretation made by the national supreme judicial 
authorities on questions relating to specific application of laws in their judicial practices according to the 
authorization of the National People‘s Congress. As at the date of this thesis, there is no Judicial 
Interpretation on this matter. 
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Literally, the scope of partnership affairs which may be ―carried out‖ by limited 
partners is broader than the partnership affairs which may be ―controlled‖ by 
limited partners. Literally, ―control‖ means ―the power or authority to manage, 
direct, or oversee‖;717 ―management‖ means ―the people in a company who are 
responsible for its operation‖. 718  However, ―carrying out‖ means ―execute, 
perform or transact‖.  
Some Chinese commentators interpret ―carrying out the partnership affairs‖ as 
―managing the partnership for the purpose of achieving the partnership goal and 
dealing with internal and external affairs of the partnership‖.719 They explain that 
the connotation of the ―partnership affairs‖ for the purpose of Article 68 shall 
include partnerships‘ external transactions with outsiders and internal affairs, 
such as accounting issues and financial management.
720
  
Therefore, it is suggested that in order to provide necessary flexibility to the LP, a 
right approach for the PEL is to allow limited partners to participate in the 
management of their investment at a strategic level, such as participating in the 
key decision making activities in the firm.
721
  
The overall suggestion is that, on the one hand, since allowing the limited partner 
to participate in daily running of the firm would unduly reduce the efficiency of 
                                                 
717 Black's Law Dictionary, 8th ed., s.v. ―control‖.  
718 Black's Law Dictionary, 8th ed., s.v. ―management‖. 
719 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 24; See also Li, Interpretation of Partnership Enterprise 
Law, supra note 369 at 110. 
720 Ibid. 
721 UK Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Form, Legislative Reform Order to Repeal and 
Replace the Limited Partnerships Act 1907: A Consultation Document (August 2008) at 75.  
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the LP firm, especially in big size LP firms with a large number of limited 
partners, the PEL should prevent the limited partner from taking part in day-to-
day running of the firm. On the other hand, considering the status quo of China‘s 
venture capital and private equity markets, the law should allow limited partners 
to share their expertise or information within fund‘s management or assist in 
finding investment opportunities. 
7.2.2 An Exhaustive List? 
Article 68 does not clarify whether the list is exhaustive.
722
 Such an uncertainty 
clearly places a burden on the limited partner who may carry out activities 
outside the safe harbor list. Then should the PEL provide an exhaustive list of 
activities that do not amount to taking part in the control of the LP? Or should the 
PEL provide a list of principles that could be applied by limited partners to 
determine what activities involve taking part in the control of the LP? 
It is submitted that providing a list of principles is not feasible. (1) It is difficult 
to summarize all the permitted activities into principles. Even it is possible to do 
so, a list of principles is uncertain and insufficient to provide guidance to limited 
partners about what activities they could be involved in without participating in 
control.
723
 (2) It is an international practice that many jurisdictions, such as 
Delaware, Singapore, New Zealand
724
 provide comprehensive safe harbor lists 
with specific permitted activities that do not amount to taking part in the control 
                                                 
722 Some commentators suggest that it is not an exhaustive list. See Liu, supra note 596 at 101. 
723 Ibid. 
724 See Table 5 in this thesis. 
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of the LP. It is thus reasonable to provide a safe harbor list that is recognised and 
accepted by international investors. 
It is also submitted that providing an exhaustive list of activities is unfavourable. 
In the first place, it would be difficult to provide a safe harbor list in full. In the 
second place, providing an exhaustive list of activities would be unnecessary 
restrictive, especially in the changing business environment and practice. As the 
LP is a new business vehicle in China, it would be difficult to predict all the 
circumstances where a limited partner could be involved with the LP while do 
not amount to participating in the control of LPs.  
New Zealand and Singapore‘s approach is more flexible in the sense that their 
safe harbor lists are not exhaustive.
725
 It can accommodate the possibility of 
other activities not originally envisaged by the Chinese legislature.
 
It also 
provides some flexibility to the potential users about what activities do not 
amount to participating in the control of LPs.  
7.2.3 What Activities should be Defined as “Safe”?  
Appendix V - Table 5 indicates that the current list in the PEL is too 
conservative. The following activities deserve a careful scrutiny by the Chinese 
legislature.  
a. Taking part in a decision about the variation of the partnership 
                                                 







b. taking part in a decision about whether to approve, or veto, a class of 
investment by the limited partnership;
727
 
c. taking part in a decision about whether the general nature of the 
partnership business should change;
728
 
d. taking part in a decision about whether to dispose of the partnership 
business or to acquire another business;
729
 
e. taking part in a decision about whether the partnership should end;730 




g. enforcing his rights under the partnership agreement (unless those rights 
are to carry out management functions);
732
 
h. approving the accounts of the LP;733 
i. being engaged under a contract by the LP or by a general partner in the  
LP (unless the contract is to carry out management functions);
734
 




k. taking part in a decision which involves an actual or potential conflict of 
                                                 









735 Draft Partnerships Bill (UK) 2003, cl 55 and Schedule 6; Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act §303 
(b) (1) (1985). 
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interest between a limited partner (or limited partners) and a general 
partner (or general partners);
736
 
l. discussing the prospects of the partnership business;737 
m. consulting or advising a general partner, or general partners, about the 
activities of the LP or about its accounts (including doing so as a member 
of an advisory committee of a limited partnership);
738
 
n. requesting or attending a meeting of partners;739 
o. matters related to the business of the LP not otherwise enumerated in this 
list, which the partnership agreement states in writing may be subject to 
the approval or disapproval of limited partners;
740
 and 
p. exercising any right or power permitted to limited partners under this Act 
and not specifically enumerated in this (safe harbor) list.
741
 
Due to limited empirical material the author has, it is beyond the author‘s 
capacity to analyze each of the provision within the safe harbor list in the context 
of China. Nevertheless, there are two recommendations regarding the safe harbor 
list under Article 68 of the PEL. 
First, it is suggested that the PEL should select the above categories of activities 
to the existing safe harbor list. For example, the PEL may consider adding 
                                                 
736 Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act §303(b) (6) (vii) (1985). Draft Partnerships Bill (UK) 2003, cl 
55 and Schedule 6. 
737 Draft Partnerships Bill (UK) 2003, cl 55 and Schedule 6. 
738 Ibid. 
739 Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act §303(b) (5) (1985). 
740 Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act §303(b) (6) (ix) (1985).  
741 Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act §303(b) (8) (1985). 
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category (j) to the existing list under Article 68. The reason is that there may be a 
danger that a limited partner could be a managing director or controlling 
shareholder in the corporate general partner. In such a case, the limited partner is 
in fact a de facto manager of the LP. Particularly, in a private equity LPs, it is 
common for a limited partner who is a director or shareholder of the general 
partner to operate the LP fund.
742
  
Second, the PEL should maintain necessary flexibility to the limited partners. 
The statutory list should be formatted in a default way rather than a mandatory 
way. This would allow partners to contract out or select the list in the partnership 
agreement, so as to best meet the business needs of the partners. 
Third, it is suggested that Chinese legislature should review the current list 
frequently to see whether it covers major problems. For example, the PEL should 
make it clear that the legislature have power to amend the list of permitted 
activities under legal procedure. This can ensure the law meets the changing 
needs of the business community.  
8. Conclusions and Recommendations 
It concludes that although the control rule has once been a useful device to deter 
limited partners‘ meddling into the management of the firm, there is little reason 
to believe that it continues to be effective in the business world today. There is no 
                                                 
742 See UK Partnership Law Report, supra note 47 at 284.  
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need to adopt the control rule in China.  
(1) Given a genuine business desire to manage within the Chinese investor 
community and the value of qualified limited partners‘ expertise and 
experience in the fund‘s management, totally preventing a limited partner 
from management is not feasible in the context of China. 
(2) The PEL has alternative rules which serve a similar deterrent function as 
the control rule. If a limited partner who has no authority to conduct 
partnership‘s affairs, but who does conduct partnership‘s affairs and 
causes loss to the partnership and other partners, the creditor of the 
partners or the other partners can take an action against the ultra vires 
limited partners on the basis of Article 76.  
(3) With the broadening scope of eligible intuitional limited partners and with 
the growing expertise of general partners, Chinese limited partners may 
become more sophisticated. Hence there will be less chance for them to 
interfere in the management of the firm in the future.  
(4) The key to promote investment is the liability shield provided to the 
limited partners. To achieve the legislative goal of the PRC LP, namely, to 
encourage venture capital investment in China, the law shall make the 
business vehicle more appealing to investors.  
It is suggested that the PEL shall ensure limited partners more management 
rights through their ability to participate in broader and clearer safe harbor 
212 
 
activities. The legislature shall also review on a regular basis the rules governing 
the LP in tandem with the developments of China‘s private equity market — so 
as to meet rapidly-changing business needs as well as to balance the interests of 
the different parties involved. 
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1. Introduction  
Chapter 4 points out that there is a severe limited partner-general partner conflict 
within China‘s private equity LPs. Indeed, some empirical evidence shows that 
there is an imperative need to regulate the conduct of general partners in the 
context of China. For example, in 2009, two noted angel investors and fund 
managers in China, Mr. Huang Hao (the executive partner of the Tianjin DoHodd 
Capital Fund) and Mr. Liu Xiaoren (the director of the Hangzhou Hongding 




In common law jurisdictions, there are two basic themes underlying the internal 
relationships among partners – the fiduciary duties arising out of the fiduciary 
relationship and contractual duties and obligations arising from the partnership 
agreement.
745
 The fiduciary duty is the heart of partnership law.
746
 In addition, 
                                                 
743 Parts of this chapter have been published in Lin Lin, ―Limited Partnership - the New Business Vehicle in 
China‖ (with HY Yeo), (2010) 25(2) Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 104. 
744 See Zhu, ―Failed Cases: Venture Capital Industry May be in Crisis‖, supra note 556. See ―Noted angel 
investor arrested for fundraising fraud in China‖ (12 June 2009) People‟s Daily, online < 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/90857/90861/6677621.html> .  
745 See Geoffrey Morse, Partnership Law, 6th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2006). [Morse, Partnership Law 
at 160. Yeo, Hwee Ying, Partnership law in Singapore (Singapore: Butterworths Asia, 2000) at 167. For 
further discussion on fiduciary duties in partnerships, see J. Dennis Hynes, ―Freedom of Contract, Fiduciary 
Duties, and Partnerships: The Bargain Principle and the Law of Agency‖ (1997) 54 Wash. & Lee. L. Rev. 
439.[Hynes, ―Freedom of Contract, Fiduciary Duties, and Partnerships‖]; Larry E. Ribstein, ―Fiduciary Duty 
Contracts in Unincorporated Firms‖ (1997) Washington and Lee Law Review 537; Robert W. Hillman, 
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many American and English partnership statutes provide default codes governing 
the internal relationship among partners which come into effect whenever the 
partners fail to agree or set out the terms.
747
 
However, the PEL, like its German and French counterparts,
 748
  does not share 
any equivalent concept of fiduciary duty on partners. Moreover, the PEL does not 
provide detailed statutory duties between partners. As a result, duties of partners 
are largely left for partners to decide in the partnership agreement.  
Arguably, the lack of fiduciary duty and default statutory duties on partners is 
one of the reasons which make the limited partners so ―active‖ in China‘s private 
equity LPs. Without strong duty constraints on general partners, limited partners 
would generally be less willing to entrust the entire investment to a fund manager. 
If a general partner is subject to comprehensive fiduciary duties, limited partners 
may have less desire to supervise the firm through participating in the 
management of the firm. Moreover, if a limited partner will be subject to 
fiduciary duties for her participation in the fund, then it might have a chilling 
effect on her decision to participate.
749
 Interestingly, Taiwan also has relatively 
more active venture capital investors as compared to those in American venture 
                                                                                                                                    
―The Bargain in the Firm: Partnership Law, Corporate Law, and Private Ordering within Closely-Held 
Business Associations‖  (2005) 1 Illinois Law Review 171. 
746  Jesse H. Choper, John C. Coffee, Jr., Ronald J. Gilson. Cases and Materials on Corporations (New 
York: Aspen Publishers, 2008) at 715. 
747 See Yeo, Partnership law in Singapore, supra note 745 at 187. The Uniform Partnership Act (1997) 
§103 also provides that ―relations among the partners and between the partners and the partnership are 
governed by the partnership agreement. To the extent the partnership agreement does not otherwise provide, 
this Act governs relations among the partners and between the partners and the partnership.‖  
748 They are referred to Kommanditgesellschaft, société en commandite simple (合資会社).  





 The slow development of fiduciary duties in Taiwan helps to 
explain the predominance of active-investor funds in Taiwan.
751
 
In view of the above, it is necessary to discuss whether sufficient duties must be 
imposed on general partners for investor protection as well as for internal 
supervision of the general partner‘s conduct. Moreover, although fiduciary duties 
in general partnerships
752
  and in LPs
753
 have been explored extensively, hardly 
any papers discuss duties of partners in the PRC LP. Little has been written about 
                                                 
750 Gulinello, ―Venture Capital Funds, Organizational Law, and Passive Investors‖, supra note 364 at 352. 
See also, Christopher John Gulinello, ―The Revision of Taiwan's Company Law: The Struggle Toward a 
Shareholder: Oriented Model in One Corner of East Asia‖ (2003) 28 Del. J. Corp. L. 75.  
751Ibid. 
752 See, e.g., Weidner, Donald J, ―RUPA and Fiduciary Duty: The Texture of Relationship‖ (1995) 58 Law 
& Contemp. Probs. 82; Hynes, J. Dennis, ―Fiduciary Duties and RUPA: An Inquiry into Freedom of 
Contract Partnerships‖ (1995) 58 Law & Contemp. Probs. 29; Larry E. Ribstein, ―Fiduciary Duty Contracts 
in Unincorporated Firms‖ (1997) 54 Wash. & Lee. L. Rev. 539; Claire Moore Dickerson, ―Cycles and 
Pendulums: Good Faith, Norms, and the Commons‖ (1997) 54 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 399; Claire Moore 
Dickerson, ―Equilibrium Destabilized: Fiduciary Duties Under the Uniform Limited Liability Company 
Act‖ (1995) 25 STETSON L. REV. 417; Claire Moore Dickerson, ―From Behind the Looking Glass: Good 
Faith, Fiduciary Duty & Permitted Harm‖ (1995) 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 955; Claire Moore Dickerson, ―Is 
It Appropriate to Appropriate Corporate Concepts: Fiduciary Duties and the Revised Uniform Partnership 
Act‖ (1993) 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 111; J. Dennis Hynes, ―Fiduciary Duties and RUPA: An Inquiry into 
Freedom of Contract‖ (1995)58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29; J. Dennis Hynes, ―The Revised Uniform 
Partnership Act: Some Comments on the Latest Draft of RUPA‖ (1992)19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 727; 
Lawrence E. Mitchell, ―The Naked Emperor: A Corporate Lawyer Looks at RUPA's Fiduciary Provisions‖ 
(1997) 54 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 465; Larry E. Ribstein, ―Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated 
Firms‖ (1997) 54 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 537; Larry E. Ribstein, ―The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: 
Not Ready for Prime Time‖ (1993) 49 BUS. LAW. 45; Allan W. Vestal, ―Advancing the Search for 
Compromise: A Response to Professor Hynes‖ (1995) 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55; Allan W. 
Vestal, ―Assume a Rather Large Boat . . .: The Mess We Have Made of Partnership Law‖ (1997) 54 Wash. 
& Lee. L. Rev. 487; Allan W. Vestal, ―Choice of Law and the Fiduciary Duties of Partners Under the 
Revised Uniform Partnership Act‖ (1994) 79 IOWA L. REV. 219; Allan W. Vestal, ―Fundamental 
Contractarian Error in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1992‖ (1993) 73 B.U. L. REV. 523; Allan 
W. Vestal, ―The Disclosure Obligations of Partners Inter Se Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 
1994: Is the Contractarian Revolution Failing?‖ (1995)36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1559 [Vestal, ―The 
Disclosure Obligations of Partners Inter Se Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1994‖]; Donald J. 
Weidner, ―RUPA and Fiduciary Duty: The Texture of Relationship‖ (1995) 58 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 81; Donald J. Weidner & John W. Larson, ―The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: The Reporters' 
Overview‖ (1993) 49 BUS. LAW. 1; Donald J. Weidner, ―Three Policy Decisions Animate Revision of 
Uniform Partnership Act‖ (1991) 46 BUS. LAW. 427;  Andrew S. Gold, ―On The Elimination Of Fiduciary 
Duties: A Theory Of Good Faith For Unincorporated Firms‖ (2006) 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 123; Larry E. 
Ribstein, ―Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Firms‖ (1997) 54 Wash. & Lee. L. Rev . 539. 
753 This type of papers include: Larry E. Ribstein, ―Fiduciary Duties and Limited Partnership Agreements‖ 
(2004) 37 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 927; Myron T. Steele , ―Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware 
Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies‖ (2007) 32 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 1; 
Kenneth M. Jacobson, ―Fiduciary Duty Considerations in Choosing between Limited Partnerships and 
Limited Liability Companies‖ (2001) 36 Real Prop. PROB. & Tr. J. 1.  
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the function and social meaning of default duties in constraining partner 
misbehavior in the context of China‘s private equity LPs. 
This chapter attempts to justify statutory duties in the PRC LP and proposes the 
contents of partners‘ duties in the context of China. Part one argues that there is a 
practical problem and legislative gap within the PRC LP with regards to duties of 
partner. Part two argues that while fiduciary duties are fundamental in regulating 
the internal relationship among partners in common law jurisdictions, they are 
incompatible with China‘s legal tradition and culture. Part three argues that while 
contractual designs are considered by some commentators as desirable resolution 
of the agency problem, they have severe shortcomings and may not function 
effectively in anticipating and mitigating managerial abuse of general partners in 
the context of China‘s private equity LPs. Considering the codification tradition 
of Chinese law, the recent international trend of codifying partners‘ duties and the 
pressing business needs in China‘s private equity market, selected statutory 
duties are proposed. 
This chapter seeks to fill the literature gap and to consider the following 
questions: 
 What is the nature and function of fiduciary duties in the LP?  
 Can any civil law institution or contractual design replace fiduciary 
duties in China?  
 What kinds of duties shall be imposed on general partners in the 
PRC LP? To what extent should legislation specify the duties? 
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2. The Problem: Various Conflicts of Interest in the PRC LP 
As demonstrated in Chapter 4,
754
 conflict of interest between limited partners and 
general partners has become a pressing issue within China‘s fledgling private 
equity market. It calls for necessary legal solutions. In essence, there are conflicts 
between (1) the self-interests of general partners to be paid management fees, 
carried interests and other compensation; and, (2) the self-interests of limited 
partners (capital contributions to the private equity funds) to desire high risk-
adjusted performance at low cost and to make profits from investment.  
Particularly, due to the restrictions on foreign private equity investment in China 
and the shortage of qualified general partners, it is common for a Chinese general 
partner (e.g., the fund management company) to act for several foreign and local 
limited partners. Conflict of interest would easily arise in this scenario. If there is 
a promising portfolio company or investment project, shall the general partner 
make investment in this portfolio company with funding from the local fund or 
those from the foreign fund? Moreover, if the Chinese general partner makes an 
investment in a portfolio company with funding from both the foreign fund and 
the local fund, how do they allocate their time and share profits equally among 
these funds?  
Similar conflict of interest would also arise in an ordinary LP with a sole 
corporate general partner.
 
As the PEL allows partnerships to be formed by 
                                                 
754 See supra text accompanying notes 515-535. 
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individuals and legal persons, it is common for corporate general partner(s) to 
direct the LP‘s business. This hybrid vehicle combines the advantages of 
corporate identity and limited liability of companies with the contractual 
flexibility and tax advantages of partnerships.
755
 However, one should not 
overlook the possibility of potential problems arising under certain situations: 
 A general partner may consider his own interest prior to the interest of the 
fund he or she manages when facing a potential portfolio company. He or 
she may invest in this portfolio individually rather than disclosing the 
information to the other investors of the fund he or she worked with. This 
is common in China‘s private equity market.756 
 Unlike an individual general partner who is able to make decisions on his 
own, a corporate general partner can only act through its directors and 
corporate officers. For the US LP model, conflicts of fiduciary duties may 
arise where the corporate general partner (acting through its directors and 
corporate officers) owes fiduciary duties to the partnership firm and its 
limited partners but then these corporate representatives at the same time 
owe fiduciary duties to their own corporation. Although there is no 
equivalent concept of fiduciary duty under PRC law and the PEL does not 
address this issue, similar conflicts of interest may still arise for PRC LPs 
with corporate general partners. Should the managers representing the 
                                                 
755J Rinzer, ―English Private and Public Limited Company as Managing General Partner in a German 
Limited Partnership‖ (1994) Comp Law 285. 
756 See Kuang Ye and Luo Nuo, ―Investigation on China Private Equity Market‖ 21st Century Journal (18 
April 2009), online: < http://finance.jrj.com.cn/2009/04/1801224157180.shtml> (copy in Chinese). 
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corporate general partner consider their employer‘s interests over those of 
the limited partners in the LP? How is one to determine whose interests 
ought to prevail in situations of conflict?  
3. The Lacuna within PRC Law 
3.1 Limited Statutory Duties on Partners  
Unfortunately, there are insufficient rules to solve these conflicts of interest 
within the PRC LP. The PEL neither provides detailed statutory duties on 
partners nor share any equivalent concept of fiduciary duty present in common 
law jurisdictions. In stark contrast to the comprehensive common law fiduciary 
duties and detailed default rules in the DRULPA governing the internal 
relationships between general partners and limited partners, the PEL only 
outlines the following provisions.  
 The managing general partner should regularly report to the other partners 




 The general partners should not carry on any business competing with 
that of the partnership solely or cooperatively; 
758
  




                                                 
757 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 28. 




 The partners should not engage in activities which may harm the interests 
of the partnership;
760
 and  
 The duty to account to the firm for any benefit derived by the general 
partner from any transaction competing with that of the partnership, or 
from any self-dealing business by him with the partnership. The general 
partner shall bear compensation liabilities
 
if any loss is caused to the 
partnership or to other partners.
 761
   
Obviously, these provisions are inadequate to address the fiduciary concern in the 
LP. (1) They are insufficient to cover improper conduct by the general partner in 
the LP. Particularly, it fails to impose the duty of confidentiality and the duty of 
care on partners. (2) These provisions apply to both the general partnership and 
the LP.
762
 In other words, the duties of the general partner in the general 
partnership are the same as the general partner in the LP. (3) the PEL fails to 
specify the legal liability for partners‘ violation of each of the duty of partners.   
It is argued that various types of improper conduct by partners might escape 
sanction if the statue does not specify it,
763
 especially in the case of a LP with a 
sole corporate general partner.  
                                                 
760 Ibid. 
761 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 99.  
762 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 60 provides that the PRC LP is regulated under the Chapter 
III of the PEL which contains 25 provisions. Where Chapter III does not specifically provide for the relevant 
situation, there is a fall-back clause that the provision on general partnership and its partners. 
763 Vestal, ―The Disclosure Obligations of Partners Inter Se under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 
1994‖, supra note 752 at 1559. 
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3.2 Why Are There Limited Statutory Duties on Partners? 
Like many civil law jurisdictions (e.g., Germany and France)
 764
 which do not 
impose the fiduciary duty on partners, there is no equivalent concept of fiduciary 
duty in the PRC partnership law either. It is readily understandable why there is 
no fiduciary duty concept in China.  
First of all, the fiduciary duty is a longstanding concept originally developed out 
of equity and trust in common law jurisdictions. However, as a civil law 
jurisdiction, China does not have the equivalent concept of equity and trust.
765
  
Moreover, the preceding discussion in Chapter 3 has mentioned that the PEL is 
an enterprise law but not a pure business law. The promulgation of the PEL 1997 
is a part of the State‘s strategy to establish legislative system on enterprises.766 
The major task of this law is to regulate the external relations between 
partnerships and the outsiders, rather than the internal relations of partners.  
Further, as the PEL was drafted during the dramatic economic transitional period 
in the 1990s, the failure to draw on sufficient duties is probably due to the limited 
                                                 
764 They are referred to Kommanditgesellschaft, société en commandite simple (合資会社, GoShi Kaisha).  
765 Even though China transplanted the concept of trust into the PRC Trust law in 2001, the concept of trust 
under this law is different from that under the English law. See generally Rebecca Lee, ―Conceptualizing the 
Chinese Trust‖ (2009) 58 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 655. 
766 Liu, General Review on Enterprise Law, supra note 266 at 67. 
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judicial and practical experience of partnerships and the draftsmen‘s inadequate 
understanding of the fiduciary duties at the very period.
767
  
4. Fiduciary Duties in the LP: An Overview 
Before we proceed to fill the legislative gap within the PEL, it would be useful to 
review partners‘ fiduciary duties in other jurisdictions768 and see whether their 
experience would provide a useful guideline to the Chinese reform. 
At common law, partners have long been regarded as fiduciaries among 
themselves.
769
 The very early description of a clear fiduciary duty in partnerships 
can be found in Helmore v. Smith
770
 and Aas V. Benham
771
.  The leading cases in 
this area include Corley v. Ott (duty of loyalty during formation of 
partnership);
772
 Rosenthal v. Rosenthal
773
 (which set forth the conditions of the 
duty of care) and Latta v. Kilbourn
774
  (which held that the partners must refrain 
from self-dealing).  
                                                 
767 Further legislative background of the promulgation of the PEL is available Huang, ―Explanations on the 
Draft Partnership Enterprise Law of the PRC‖, supra note 268; Lin Yanqin, The Legal Position of Private 
Enterprises under the PRC law (Beijing: China Procurator Press, 2007) at 205 (copy in Chinese). 
768 Papers discussing partners‘ fiduciary duties at common law include: Larry E. Ribstein, ―Fiduciary Duties 
and Limited Partnership Agreements‖ (2004) 37 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 927; Myron T. Steele , ―Judicial 
Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies‖ (2007) 32 
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 1; Jacobson, ―Fiduciary Duty Considerations in Choosing between 
Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies‖, supra note 753. 
769 Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership, supra note 68 at vol. 2 at 6:67; Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 
458, 463, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928). 
770 (1885) 35 Ch D 436, 444, per Bacon V-C. It states that: ―if fiduciary relation means anything I cannot 
conceive a stronger case of fiduciary relation than that which exists between partners. Their mutual 
confidence is the life blood of the concern. It is because they trust one another that they are partners in the 
first instance; it is because they continue to trust each other that the business goes on.‖ 
771 (1891) 2 Ch 244 at 256. 
772 485 S.E.2d 97 (S.C. 1997). 
773 543 A.2d 348, 352 (Me.1988). 
774 150 U.S. 524, 541 (1893) 
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 First, fiduciary duties are implied duties among partners. 
Fiduciary duties can ―fill in the gap‖ when there is no express 
duty specified in the partnership agreement or in the partnership 
Act.  
 Second, fiduciary duties have prophylactic/preventive function.776 
Imposing fiduciary duties on a specific party is to ―encourage 
good behavior in persons other than the parties in the instant case‖.  
 Third, fiduciary duties have exemplary function, for the purse of 
―safety of mankind‖.777 Thus anyone who breaches the fiduciary 
duty must bear necessary legal liability.  
 Fourth, fiduciary duty serves a protective function to the 
vulnerable party and to restrain opportunistic behavior of 
parties.
778
 As a commentator observed, ―one way to protect the 
principal is to subject the agent to a general ‗fiduciary‘ duty of 
unselfishness‖.  
                                                 
775 See Stephen I. Glover, Craig M. Wasserman, Partnerships, Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances (Law 
Journal Seminars Press, 2003) at 5.02[1]. 
776 See Gary Watt, Trusts and Equity (Oxford University Press, 2008) [Watt, Trusts and Equity] at 338. 
777 Ibid. See also Parker v. McKenna (1894)  LR 10 Ch App 96. 
778 See Thomas Eger et al. eds., Economic Analysis of Law in China (MA: Edward Elgar, 2007) at 153; 




As to the LP, fiduciary duties are imposed on the general partner for the purpose 
of protecting the non-controlling limited partner.
779
 As observed by commentator 
Ribstein, ―the passivity of the limited partners requires an important distinction 
between limited and general partners regarding fiduciary duties.‖780 Logically, as 
the general partner in the LP has substantial management rights compared to the 
passive limited partner, the fiduciary duties imposed on the general partner 
should be more intense than those of a general partner in a general partnership.
781
  
In the US, there are generally two major sources of fiduciary law in the area of 
the partnership – common law and the various partnership Acts. The statutory 
duties of partners provided in the UPA 1994 do not encompass all aspects of 
fiduciary duties at common law.
782
 Given that the US has rich legislative and 
judicial experience in this issue, when analyzing the codification of partners‘ 
duties; references will be made to the cases and several uniform Acts, especially, 
the UPA 1997, the Delaware Revised Uniform Partnership Act (DRUPA), the 
ULPA 1976, the ULPA 1985, the ULPA 2001 and the DRULPA. A brief review 
                                                 
779  Jacobson, ―Fiduciary Duty Considerations in Choosing between Limited Partnerships and Limited 
Liability Companies‖, supra note 753 at 6. See also J. William Callison, ―Blind Men and Elephants: 
Fiduciary Duties under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, and 
Beyond‖ (1997)1 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 109 for further discussion of general partners‘ fiduciary 
duties in the limited partnership.  
780 Ribstein, ―Fiduciary Duties and Limited Partnership Agreements‖, supra note 753 at 939. 
781 Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership, supra note 68 at vol. II §6.71; Bassan v. Investment Exch. Corp., 
83 Wash. 2d, 524 P.2d 233 (1974). 
782 See, e.g., Thomas R. Hurst, ―Will the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1994) ever be Uniformly 
Adopted?‖ (1996) 48 Fla. L. Rev. 575 ; Robert M. Phillips, ―Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under the 
Revised Uniform Partnership Act‖ (1993) 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1179; Allan W. Vestal, ―Fundamental 
Contractarian Error in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1992‖ (1993) 73 B.U. L. Rev. 523 . 
Michael L. Kelley, Note, ―Whose Partnership is it Anyway?: Revising the Revised Uniform Partnership 
Act's Duty-Of-Care Term‖ (1994) 63 Fordham L. Rev. 609; Gerald C. Martin, ―Comment, Duties of Care 
Under the Revised Uniform‖ (1998) 1331 Partnership Act, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1307; Vestal, ―The Disclosure 




on the American partnership legislation may shed light on the PRC law. 
5. Alternatives to Mitigate Agency Costs 
Statistics show that China lacks the experienced and highly qualified fund 
managers for an adequately functioning private equity system.
783
 Thus there is a 
concern within Chinese limited partners‘ community as to the proper conduct of 
general partners. In addition, the lack of a sound credit system in China
784
 may 
also increase the risk of investment.  
This section argues that without strong duty constraints on general partners, 
tensions and agency costs between limited partners and general partners are 
likely increased. Although there are alternatives to mitigate agency problem 
within the PRC LP, these mechanisms appear to be an uncertain solution to the 
problem of agency costs and have severe shortcomings. 
5.1 Personal Liability? 
One may argue that the personal liability borne by the general may discourage 
general partners from pursuing those activities (such as excessive borrowings and 
overleveraged activities) so as to safeguard the interest of limited partners and 
the LP.  
                                                 
783 See OECD Synthesis Report, ―Reviews of Innovation Policy: China‖‖ (2007), online: OECD 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/20/39177453.pdf > at 18. 
784 There is no personal bankruptcy law in China. Neither debtors nor creditors obtain sufficient relief when 
insolvency happens. In addition, PRC lacks a nation-wide private credit record system which can assess 
consumer credit risks and set rating standards. 
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Admittedly, the general partners' personal liability for the debts of the LP is 
generally acknowledged as direct benefits to deter general partners‘ risky 
action.
785
 With this liability threat, personal liability would induce general 
partners to make more cautious decisions, select projects more carefully, avoid 
investment risks of negative net asset outcomes etc.
786
   
However, such optimism is arguably misconceived. In the opinion of 
commentator Ribstein, “personal liability has little effect on the general 
partner‟s incentives to self-deal, for example, by taking partnership opportunities 
or excessive compensation”.787 Particularly, when the general partner is actually 
organized as a corporation, the issue of unlimited liability has effectively been 
sidestepped.  
Moreover, this device only reduces creditors‘ risks without alleviating the 
concern of limited partners. Put another way, it is useful for creditors of the firm, 
but it may not be helpful for limited partners.  
In the context of China‘s private equity market, the personal liability of general 
partners may not be an effective way to deter mismanagement
 
 because there is a 
little chance that a private equity LPs would be insolvent.
788
 As most LPs are 
                                                 
785  For direct benefits of personal liability, see Larry E. Ribstein, ―An Applied Theory of Limited 
Partnership‖ (1988) 37 Emory L.J. 835 at 848.  
786 Ibid.  
787 Larry E. Ribstein, ―Unlimited Contracting in the Delaware Limited Partnership and Its Implications for 
Corporate Law‖ (1991) 17 J. Corp. L. 299 at 304.  
788 See Ruo Shui, ―Interpretation on the Unlimited Liability of General Partner‖  (Interview with Zhang 
Ying, the Representive of the Beijing Office of the Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP) Chinese Venture 
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private equity funds with a pool of assets, insolvency of those funds rarely exists. 
In addition, in real business practice, partnership agreements would usually set 
forth a ―Degree of Financial Leverage‖ (DFL) to prevent investment with highly 
leveraged debt financing.  
As observed by an experienced Chinese lawyer, the personal liability of general 
partner does not help to release limited partners‘ concern in China. The real 
concern of the limited partner is not whether the general partner would be able to 
bear personal liability for the debts of the firm, but whether the general partner 




In view of the above, the personal liability of general partners may not be an 
effective device to solve agency problem or to deter their mismanagement of 
general partners. The only sensible solution to the difficulties limited partners 
faced is the limited partner derivative action. 
5.2 Market Constraints? 
One may also argue that the nature of the market would be able to rein in any 
rogue behavior of general partners and mitigate the agency cost.
790
 Typically, in a 
highly competitive private equity market, a general partner ought to have a 
                                                                                                                                    
(14 September 2009), online: <http://www.chinavcpe.com/news/hot/2009-09-14/47d851398d3df741.html> 
(in Chinese).  
789 Ibid.  
790See Krishnan, C.N.V., Masulis, Ronald W. and Singh, Ajai K., ―Does Venture Capital Reputation Affect 
Subsequent IPO Performance?‖ (10 April 2007), online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=910982> 
presented at Financial Markets Research Centre Workshop on 4 August 2006. 
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strong incentive in enhancing his reputation in order to ensure a ready exit with 
good returns for the fund within a reasonable period.
791
 As typical venture capital 
and private equity fund usually has a ten-year life and the fund must be returned 
to the investors eventually, thus a poor fund performance will eventually hurt her 
efforts to raise capital for a new fund.
792
 Such a ―finite‖ nature of the LP as well 
as the cyclical nature of the venture capital and private equity investment serves 
as an effective tool to constrain fund managers‘ improper exercise of discretion. 
The assumption is that venture capital and private equity fund will work with due 
diligence and in best interests of the firm to manage in order to ensure a good 
performance of the fund. Otherwise it will make raising successor funds more 
difficult. 
Nonetheless, while reputation may be useful in deterring mismanagement of 
general partners, it is a long-term measure that works best only if those who 
depend on reputation are relatively stable and routinely rely on it to generate new 
deal flow.
793
 As venture capital and private equity investment are generally long-
term investment (l0 years), it may take time for investors to redirect investments 
away from fund managers with sullied reputation and toward the reputable fund 
                                                 
791 David Rosenberg, ―The Two ‗Cycles‘ of Venture Capital‖ (2003) 28 J. CORP. L. 419 at 426. Recent 
scholarship regarding Delaware limited partnerships suggests that reputational concern plays a major role in 
the extra-judicial enforcement of fiduciary-type obligations, as do financial incentives. See Smith, Team 
Production in Venture Capital Investing, 24 J. Corp. L. 949, 969-72 (1999) (describing the importance of 
reputation for venture capitalists); Rosenberg, ―Freedom of Contract‖, supra note 361; Krishnan et al. supra 
note 790. 
792 Ronald J. Gilson, ―Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience‖  
(2003) 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1067 at 1074-1075. 





 Also, the recent credit crunch, hedge fund scandals and numerous 
hedge fund collapses suggest that it is ―no longer possible to rely primarily on 
manager reputation and historical track record."
795
  
5.3 Private Contractual Designs? 
Commentators have noted that private contract is one of the principal ways to 
mitigate agency costs in partnership context. On the one hand, terms of the 
partnership agreement would reflect accurately the actual concern of the 
partners.
796
 On the other hand, private contract is effective in the sense that it 
avoids the high costs of litigation and protects partnership assets.
797
 One may 
further argue that there are a few of private contractual arrangements which 
limited partners may be used to constrain general partners‘ misbehavior.  
Indeed, good distribution and compensation arrangement may serve as an 
incentive to encourage general partners to work in the interests of the LP so as to 
reduce the prospect of fund manager misbehaviour. As observed by commentator 
Rosenberg, the interests of general partners and limited partners are aligned ―to a 
                                                 
794 Ibid. 
795 Castle Hall Alternatives, Hedge Fund Investing in a New World: Five Questions for Investors and 
Managers 2 (2008). Cited in Ryan Sklar, ―Hedges or Thickets: Protecting Investors from Hedge Fund 
Managers' Conflicts of Interest‖ (2009) 77 Fordham L. Rev. 3251 at n 525. 
796 Stephen E. Roulac, ―Resolution of Limited Partnership Disputes: Practical and Procedural Problems‖ 
(1975) 10 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 276 at 279. See, private contract is also an effective way in mitigating 
agency costs in corporate context. See, e.g., Ann E. Conaway, ―Lessons to be Learned: How the Policy of 
Freedom to Contract in Delaware's Alternative Entity Law Might Inform Delaware's General Corporation 
Law‖ (2008) 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789. 
797See Janet L. Eifert, ―Removal of General Partners: A Method of Intrapartnership. Dispute Resolution for 
Limited Partnerships‖ (1986) 39 Vand. L. Rev. 1407 at n 56. 
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great extent by making the general partner's compensation dependent on the 
success of the firms in the partnership's portfolio‖.798  
Nevertheless, recent cases indicate that such a contractual arrangement may not 
achieve a desirable function for agent abuse in China.
799
 Many Chinese limited 
partners are not satisfied with the compensation paid to the general partners. 
There are severe conflicts of interest regarding the general partner‘s 
compensation in China‘s private equity LPs. 800  The East Ocean Limited 
Partnership
801
 is a typical case. In this case, besides the limited partners‘ 
―meddling‖ of the management of the LP, the fact that the limited partner were 
not satisfied with the general partner‘s compensation is one of the reasons which 
cause the LP dissolved.  
In China, it is common for private equity LPs to set forth various prerequisites of 
profit distribution. For instance, profits can only be distributed when there are 
successful IPOs of invested portfolio companies; or when certain amounts of 
money has been paid to original investors; or when the full-year profit has 
reached a certain level.
802
 Some domestic limited partners even suggested that 
investment profits should be firstly distributed to limited partners then be 
distributed to general partners according to the capital contribution to the firm.
803
  
                                                 
798 See Rosenberg, ―Freedom of Contract‖; supra note 361 at 390-391.  
799 See Hao, ―Annual Investigation on Limited Partnerships‖, supra note 517. 
800 See supra note 533-535 and accompanying text. 
801 See supra note 523-524and accompanying text. 
802 For further introduction on Parallel funds in China, see Zou, supra note 24 at 102. 
803 Xu, supra note 522. 
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Indeed, Chinese practice is inconsistent with international practice where the 
management fees typically range from 1.5% to 3% of total capital commitments 
of the fund would be paid to the general partners on an annual basis; and a 
carried interest typically up to 20% of the profits of the fund would be paid to 
general partners as a performance incentive.
804
 It is indeed difficult for general 
partners to be entitled for an attractive compensation in many Chinese private 
equity LPs.  
Path dependent reason may shed some light on this issue.
805
 As discussed 
earlier,
806
 the corporate form has once been the common business vehicle of 
private equity funds in China. Investors have got used to the corporation 
structure and its management compensation scheme. Path dependence makes 
limited partners reluctant to accept the new compensation scheme under the LP 
model which entitles general partners carried interest up to 20% of the profits of 
the fund and an annual management fee up to 2% - 3% of the committed capital. 
Another reason is that, in the economic downturn, limited partners generally 
have stronger bargaining power in the private equity market, especially in fund 
raising exercise.
807
 Especially, during the global financial crisis from 2007 to 
                                                 
804 James M. Schell ―Private Equity Funds: Business Structure and Operations‖ (Ring-bound - January 28, 
1999) at §1.03 (3). 
805 For the theory of path dependence, see generally in Liebowitz, S.J. & Margolis, S.E. ―Path Dependence, 
Lock-In, and History‖ (1995) 11 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 205. 
806 Supra text accompanying notes 548-549. 
807 A 2009 survey indicated that, 43% of the interviewees were of the opinion that limited partners had more 
bargaining power; while only 2% of them were of the opinion that general partners had more bargaining 
power. See Lü Sheng, ―Post Financial Crisis –Changes of Fundrainsing Conditions and Terms‖ China 
Venture (7 July 2009) (copy in Chinese). 
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2009, general partners are facing difficulties in fundraising. Arguably, the 
distribution or compensation provision may not serve as an effective way to 
constrain misbehavior of general partners in PRC LPs. On the contrary, from the 
standpoint of general partners, such an ―unfair‖ arrangement would serve as a 
―disincentive‖ in their management.  
5.4 Internal Governance Mechanisms 
One may also argue that the possible value of a derivative action scheme is 
arguably low in China because Chinese limited partners are left with strong 




Nevertheless, empirical studies show that with the rise of qualified limited 
partners and general partners in China‘s private equity market, limited partners 
may become less active in the future.
 809
 If that is the case, these internal 
governance mechanisms may become less common. Whether these mechanisms 
will still be widely used in the future is uncertain. Without these mechanisms, 
limited partners would have limited way to challenge decisions of general 
partners and to keep track of how the decisions are executed in a private equity 
fund.  
Given the aforesaid reasons, it is submitted that imposing necessary duties on 
                                                 
808 For the governance structure in typical PRC private equity LPs, see discussion in Chapter 5 of this thesis, 
supra text accompanying notes 598-611. 
809 See discussion in Chapter 5 of this thesis, supra text accompanying notes 671-685. 
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general partners is a preferred way to constrain misbehavior of general partners 
in the PRC LP.  
6. How Does One Formulate Duties of Partners? 
There are several ways to formulate partners‘ duties in the PRC LP. 
6.1 Transplanting the Fiduciary Duties? 
Legal transplantation is the moving of an entire legal system or a legal rule from 
one country to another.
810
 There are generally two broad ways of legal 
transplantation: one is transplanting the detailed rules from other jurisdiction; the 
other is transplant the whole system of law. It is apparent that transplanting the 
whole system of fiduciary law into China is not feasible. A more feasible way is 
to adopt some principle fiduciary duties and codify them. 
First, according to the theory of incompleteness of law, ―the more incomplete the 
law, the less effective the transplant will be.‖811 An open-ended concept ―cannot 
provide clear guidance for actual behaviour or as an effective deterrent against 
violations.‖812 The fiduciary duty is deemed as one of the most elusive concepts 
                                                 
810 Watson, Alan, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic 
Press, 1974) at 29. 
811 Pistor, Katharina and Chenggang Xu ―Fiduciary Duty in Transitional Civil Law Jurisdictions: Lessons 
from the Incomplete Law Theory‖ in Curtis J. Milhaupt ed., Global Markets, Domestic Institutions : 
Corporate Law and Governance in A New Era of Cross-border Deals (New York : Columbia University 
Press, 2003) at 95. [Pistor and Xu]. 





 Since it has not been fully confined and defined at 
common law, it would be even more difficult to explain it and implement it in 
China.  
Second, the considerable different legal traditions and judicial cultures at 
common law and Chinese law will make the legal transplantation 
unsuccessful.
814
 At common law, the scope and standard of fiduciary duties are 
greatly enriched by abundant case laws. However, Chinese courts do not have 
any lawmaking powers. There is no strict precedential concept for case law and 
no principle of 527Hstare decisis in China. There is some doubt as to whether the 
fiduciary duty concept will work well in the context of Chinese legal system.  
Third, Japanese experience may shed some light on the effect of transplanting 
fiduciary duties. A typical example is the director‘s duty of loyalty under 
Japanese corporate law. Japan imported the director‘s duty of loyalty from the 
US law into the Japanese Commercial Code in 1950. However, such a duty has 
not been applied separately by the Japanese courts and played little function in 
Japanese law until 1980 when Japan‘s economic situation was largely changed, 
and when the body of case law was enlarged.
815
   
Since it is not feasible to transplant fiduciary duties; then whether we shall leave 
                                                 
813  DeMott, Deborah A., ―Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation‖ (1988) Duke Law 
Journal 37 at 879. 
814 Otto Kahn Fruend, ―On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law‖ (1974) Modern L. Rev. 1.  
815 Kanda, Hideki and Milhaupt, Curtis J., ―Re-Examinging Legal Transplants: The Director's Fiduciary 
Duty in Japanese Corporate Law‖ (24 March 2003) Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 219. 
Online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=391821 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.391821> at 3.  
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the problems to partners and let them to specify their duties in their partnership 
agreements?  
6.2 Contractual Duties? 
Perhaps many people would suggest that since the legal nature of partnership is 
contractual,
816
 duties of partners should be regulated in a contractual way.  
Indeed, this is the most frequent reason in favor of freedom of contract in 
partnership.
817
 Moreover, as partnerships vary greatly in size and nature, it 
further illustrates the flexibility and informality of partnership. Thus the internal 
relationship among partners shall be best tailored by the partners themselves, 
instead of mandatory rules.   
These arguments have obvious merit, but leaving partners to tailor all their duties 
is undesirable in the context of the PRC LP.  
(1) The theory of incomplete contract 818  has proved that parties cannot 
negotiate terms specifically to cover all contingencies because they 
cannot foresee every future event or know precisely how their own 
                                                 
816 In support of this approach, see Larry E. Ribstein, ―The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Not Ready for 
Prime Time‖ (1993) 49 BUS. LAW. 45 at 57-58.  
817 See Hynes, ―Freedom of Contract, Fiduciary Duties, and Partnerships‖, supra note 745 at 452 Larry E. 
Ribstein, ―The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Not Ready for Prime Time‖ (1993) 49 BUS. LAW. 45 at 
57-58. 
818 See Ayres, Ian, and Gertner, Robert, ―Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: A Theory of Default Rules‖ 
(1989) 99 Yale LJ 87; Hart, Oliver and Moore, John "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation" (1988) 56(4) 
Econometrica 755; Tirole, J. ―Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?‖ (1999) 67 Econometria 741; 
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961) [Hart, The Concept of Law] 






As LP agreements are frequently investment agreements, partners may 
not properly conceive the future event when the contract is made. There 
is some doubt as to those duties drafted by partners or partners‘ counsels 




(2) Advocates of transaction cost argue that contract is not always effective in 
every transaction.
821
 In the context of private equity LPs, regulating 
general partners‘ conduct by agreements would incur high transaction 
costs because the agreements are complicated and costly to negotiate.
822
 
Indeed, many interviewees also argued that it was difficult to an 
exhaustive list to cover all the possible duties of the general partner.  
Some contractual provisions, such as those governing distribution and 
compensation required heavy negotiation in practice.
823
  
(3)  ―Risk of negotiating or drafting error, uncertainty regarding the terms' 
                                                 
819 Barnett, Randy E, ―Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent‖78 Va. L. Rev. 1992 at 
822. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational 
Contracting (London: Collier Macmillan, 1985), [Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism] at 
70. 
820  Letter from Eisenberg to RUPA drafters (July 17, 1992), cited in Allan W. Vestal, ―Fundamental 
Contractarian Error in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1992‖ (1993) 73 B.U. L. Rev. 523 at 560-
561. 
821 Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, supra note 819 at 70. 
822 Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner, ―The Use of Covenants: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Partnership 
Agreements‖ (1996) 39 J.L. & ECON. 463 at 464.  
823 Telephone interview with Mr. Feng (anonymity requested), (associate, Chongqing Zhonghao Law Firm) 
on 27 October 2009; Telephone interview with Mr. Lin (anonymity requested), (legal adviser, Shanghai 
Private Equity Mgmt. Co.) (Anonymity requested) on 27 October 2008. 
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validity, lack of judicial precedent concerning the terms' meaning or 
effect, and lack of investor or other third-party familiarity with the 
terms‖824 would also affect the efficiency of the contractual duties. 
(4) In China, as the LP is a new business entity, it is unlikely that the newly 
established LP firms, especially the small LP firms will have a well-tailor 
made partnership agreement to regulate the relations between partners. 
Chinese limited partners are also less likely to focus on the language of 
duties or to appreciate the significance of the language. Lay investors 
may not apprehend what duties a general partner should have.  
The author has examined some private equity LPs agreements.
825
 There 
are a few contractual restrictions on the general partners‘ behavior. One 
interviewee also questioned the efficiency and functions of imposing 
duties in partnership agreements. He said that market mechanism would 
play a more effective role in constraining general partners‘ malpractice.826 
In addition, most of interviewees observed that there was a severe 
shortage of qualified lawyers who were specialized in the venture capital 
and private equity markets in China. As the legal education was stopped 
due to the Cultural Revolution, the percentage of lawyers in China 
                                                 
824  J. William Callison, ―Venture Capital and Corporate Governance: Evolving the Limited Liability 
Company to Finance the Entrepreneurial Business‖ (2001) 26 J. Corp. L. 97 at 116. 
825 Supra note 610. 






 It is not clear whether the very limited number of 
qualified lawyers would provide sufficient or appropriate legal advice in 
drafting the comprehensive LP agreements for the private equity investors 
in China today. 
The next question for consideration is whether the PEL ought to impose statutory 
duties on general partners.  
6.3 Statutory Duties? 
The following discussion justifies the imposition of statutory duties on general 
partners in the PRC LP.  
(1) Setting out partners‘ duties in statutory form provides a set of rules in the 
event of the partners falling out. Due to the diversity of partnerships, 
smaller partnerships may not have any tailor made agreements. Especially 
in the LP, because of the dramatic information asymmetry between 
general partners and limited partners,
828
 individual investors, unlike the 
sophisticated institutional investors, are less likely to attend to the 
language of the partnership agreement. Considering that the LP is a new 
business vehicle in China, it is necessary to provide statutory duties in the 
PEL to guide the practice of the LP. 
                                                 
827  Zhang Zhiming, ―The Number and Allocation of Lawyers‖, online: <http://www.china-
lawyering.com/main/list.asp?unid=1021> (in Chinese). 
828 See Weidner, RUPA, supra note 752 at 100. 
239 
 
(2) The statutory duties play a valuable ex ante informative and preventive 
role ex ante. Statutory duties clearly specify what parties may or may not 
do. Unlike fiduciary duties which are broad and open-ended, statutory 
duties are more certain and accessible. In fact, the idea that the legislation 




(3) As China has a long legal tradition of codification830, regulating partners‘ 
duties in statutory form is a natural choice and is consistent with China‘s 
legislative culture and tradition. It would also encourage certainty, 
predictability and accessibility of the PEL.   
(4) Imposing duties on partners in statutory form is conforms to PRC 
company law practice and is in line with the practice in the US and the 
UK. In recent years, several fundamental fiduciary duties have been 
codified in RUPAs.
831
  Partners‘ duty of good faith and duty of disclosure 
have also been proposed for codification in the UK.
 832
  
In China, the PRC Company Law 2005 has recently specified the 
statutory duties of loyalty and diligence on the directors, supervisors and 
senior managers of the company. Under the PRC Company Law 2005, 
                                                 
829 Hart, The Concept of Law, supra note 818 at 126.  
830 Codification exercises in China can be traced back to 536 BCE in Chinese history, see John W. Head 
―Feeling the Stones When Crossing The River: The Rule of Law in China‖ (2010) 7 Santa Clara J. Int'l L. 
25. 
831 See, e.g., Revised Uniform Partnership Act §404 (1997); Partnership Act 1890 (UK), s. 29 and 30. 
832 See UK Partnership Law Report, supra note 47 at 189–192. 
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directors‘ duty of loyalty and duty of care are mandatory and cannot be 
contracted around by parties. Similar analogy can be made to partnership 
law because a general partner in a LP serves a similar function as that of a 
director in a PRC company (either the Joint Stock Company or the 
Limited Liability Company).
833
 Both directors in a PRC company and 
general partners in a PRC LP have managerial rights in the firms. 
However, one may counter argue that, the general partner and the director 
bear different liability for the debts of the firm. Unlike directors who are 
protected by limited liability, general partners have to bear unlimited 
personal liability for the debts of the firm. Therefore, there is no need to 
impose statutory duties on general partners who already have great 
liability exposure in the event of insolvency.  
Such an argument is not difficult to attack. In the first place, the functions 
of personal liability and duties of partners are different. Personal liability 
is a protective mechanism for the creditors of the LP, but not the limited 
partner; while the duty on general partner is designed to protect the 
interest of the limited partner and the LP. In the second place, even 
though personal liability may prevent the general partners from bringing 
harm to interests of the LPs or may induce them to make more cautious 
decision, it may not prevent general partners‘ opportunistic self-interested 
                                                 
833See similar argument in Hynes, ―Freedom of Contract, Fiduciary Duties, and Partnerships‖, supra note 
745 at 453. 
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behaviors or to ensure that all general partners‘ action be motivated by 
the best interests of the LP.
834
  
(5) One may argue that imposing statutory duties on partner would lead to the 
loss of flexibility. It is true that any statutory imposition will inevitably 
have some side affect on the operation of the partnership. However, to 
what extent will the imposition affect the flexibility of the LP? There is 
no clear answer at the moment.  
(6) From economic perspective, setting out partners‘ duties in statutory form 
will minimize contracting costs.
835
 In reality, partners have to spend much 
time in negotiating their duties if the law is uncertain and unclear.
836
 
Statutory duty enables the duties to be easily understood and widely 
known by partners. Moreover, imposing statutory duties on partners 
would minimize agency costs. The potential exposure to limited partners‘ 
claims against general partners work as a chilling tool to prevent general 
partners‘ mismanagement.  
In view of the above, it is suggested the PEL should impose statutory duties on 
general partner so as to regulate the internal relationships within the LP.   
                                                 
834 Carter G.Bishop, ―A Good Faith Revival of Duty of Care Liability in Business Organizational law‖ 
(2005) 41 Tulsa L.Rev. 477, [Bishop, ―A Good Faith Revival of Duty of Care Liability‖] at 505. 
835 See similar discussion of the function of fiduciary duty in Costs of fiduciary duties may even outweigh 
the benefits. See Larry E.Ribstein, ―Are Partners Fiduciaries?‖ (2005) U. Ill.L.Rev.209 [Ribstein, ―Are 
Partners Fiduciaries?‖] at 213. 
836 Delaware lawyers also expressed such view. See Martin I. Lubaroff, Paul M. Altman, Lubaroff and 
Altman on Delaware Limited Partnerships (2005 Aspen Publishers) at §11.2.2. [Lubaroff and Altman].  
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7. Mandatory Duties or Default Duties?  
The default rules govern only if the parties do not explicitly provide for 
something different; the mandatory rules leave parties no option but to conform 
to them.
837
 The next question for consideration is: should the proposed statutory 
duties in the PEL be in the mandatory or default form? Does the general partner 
have the right to contract around the statutory duties?  
To answer this question, it would be useful to discuss the waiver of fiduciary 
duties issue in the US.  
7.1 Waiver of Fiduciary Duties in the US Partnership Law 
7.1.1 Legislative Trends 
Fiduciary duties are generally mandatory in nature. In the US, various 
partnership Acts have codified several fiduciary duties as mandatory statutory 
duties. For instance, section 103 of the UPA 1997 and section 110 of the ULPA 
2001 clearly delineate that the duty of loyalty, duty of care and obligations of 
good faith are mandatory. The UPA 1997 also provides that the partnership 
agreement may not ―eliminate the duty of loyalty‖ or ―unreasonably reduce the 
duty of care‖, or ―eliminate the obligation of good faith and fair dealing….‖838    
In recent decades, however, there has been an evolution in American partnership 
                                                 
837 Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law, supra note 427 at 31. 
 838 Uniform Partnership Act §103 (1997). 
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legislation for a broader contractual power to parties. The RUPAs elect to govern 
the relationship of the partners via the greater use of default rules rather than 
mandatory rules. Delaware takes a very literal approach to approach to this 
matter. The DRUPA, the DRULPA and the Delaware Limited Liability Company 
Act (DLLCA) all embrace such an approach. Particularly, the DRULPA provides 
that partners may expand, restrict or eliminate the partner‘s duties (including 
fiduciary duties) in the partnership agreement.
839
  
7.1.2 Contractarian versus Fiduciarian Debate 
In academia, there has been a severe debate regarding the waiver of fiduciary 
duties and the freedom of contract in American academia. One is the 
―contractarian‖ argument which suggests parties craft the limits of their 
obligations and to waive those fiduciary duties.
840
 The other is the ―fiduciary‖ 
argument which is against parties‘ waiver of fiduciary duties and against 
enforcing fiduciary duties waivers.
841 
 
                                                 
839 Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 17-1101(D)  provides, ―To the extent that, at law 
or in equity, a partner or other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited partnership or to 
another partner or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a partnership agreement, the 
partner's or other person's duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the 
partnership agreement; provided that the partnership agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.‖ See also Joseph L. Lemon, ―Just How Limited Is That Liability?: 
The Enforceability of Indemnification, Advancement, and Fiduciary Duty Modification Provisions in LP, 
LLP, and Limited Liability Company Agreements in Delaware Law‖ (2003) 8 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 289. 
840 See, e.g., Ribstein ―Fiduciary Duties and Limited Partnership Agreements‖ supra note 753; Larry E. 
Ribstein suggested that a restriction on contracting regarding fiduciary duties is misguided. J. Dennis Hynes, 
―Fiduciary Duties and RUPA: An Inquiry into Freedom of Contract‖ (1995) 58 Law and Contemp.Prob. 29. 
See Hynes, ―Freedom of Contract, Fiduciary Duties, and Partnerships‖, supra note 745. 
841 See, e.g., Claire Moore Dickerson, ―Cycles and Pendulums: Good Faith, Norms, and the Commons,‖ 
(1997) 54 Wash. & Lee. L. Rev. 399; Allan W. Vestal, ―Fundamental Contractarian Error in the Revised 
Uniform Partnership Act of 1992‖ (1993) 73 B.U.L.Rev. 523; Donald J. Weidner, ―RUPA and Fiduciary 
Duty: The Texture of Relationship‖ (199) 58 Law & Comtemp.Probs. 81; Donald J. Weidner & John W. 
Larson, ―The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: The Reporter‘s Overview‖ (1993) 49 Bus. Law.1.  
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The most frequent reason raised by contractarian in favor of freedom of contract 
in partnership is that, ―partnerships are viewed most appropriately as essentially 
contractual in nature.‖ 842  As observed by Weidner, ―the basic contractarian 
argument against mandatory minima is that individuals are in the best position to 
allocate rationally their own resources‖.843  
Particularly, there are at least four features of private equity LPs which are 
important in determining the scope and contractibility of fiduciary duties.
844
 The 
most important feature is that the LP form is suited for investment firms that 
involved assets management, and such firms ―may be able adequately to 
constrain managers through covenants that restrict particular types of bad 
decisions that are known in advance.‖845 Also, those sophisticated firms would 
frequently want to limit general partners‘ fiduciary duties.846 
―Fiduciary‖ supporters frequently argue from the perspective of the unequal 
bargaining power between partners. As Callison and Vestal observed, since LP 
agreements frequently are investment contracts which are drafted by the general 
partner's counsel with little limited partner input or feedback, the risks that 
overreaching duty amendment language will be included in the agreement is 
                                                 
842See Hynes, ―Freedom of Contract, Fiduciary Duties, and Partnerships‖, supra note 745 at 452. Larry E. 
Ribstein, ―The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Not Ready for Prime Time‖ (1993) 49 BUS. LAW. 45  at 
57-58. 
843 Weidner, RUPA and Fiduciary Duty: The Texture of Relationship, supra note 752 at 98. 
844 Ribstein, ―Fiduciary Duties and Limited Partnership Agreements‖, supra note 753 at 934-935. 
845 Ibid. at 934. 
846 Ibid. at 927. 
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heightened in the LP.
847
 Making partners‘ duties in a mandatory way can thus 




Another significant argument raised by ―fiduciary‖ supporters is that, making the 
fiduciary duties mandatory can reduce the cost of negotiation,
849
 and may reduce 
agency costs between partners. In addition, there are many problems with parties‘ 
self-contracting. Even though partners are able to tailor their own duties to their 
precise situation, it may involve high drafting costs, risk of negotiating or 
drafting error and uncertainty regarding the duties‘ validity.  
7.2 Default Statutory Duties in the PRC LP? 
The American experience and scholarly debate provide a useful analogy in a 
discussion of the contractual freedom to tailor relations among partners in the 
PRC LP. Indeed, every legislative approach has its own advantages and weakness. 
Generally speaking, too many mandatory duties may destroy the contractual 
nature of partnerships, and too many default duties may make parties be 
exploited easily and may increase transaction costs.
850
  
In the context of the PRC LP, it is essential to provide sufficient flexibility for 
                                                 
847 Callison, William J. and Allan W. Vestal, ―The Want of a Theory, Again‖ (2004) 37 Suffolk L. Rev. 719 
at 729. 
848 See Weidner, RUPA and Fiduciary Duty: The Texture of Relationship, supra note 752 at 107. 
849 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interest 
and Formulating a Statement of Duties (1998), Joint Consultation Paper No.153 at 36. 
850 Wang Wenyu, Corporation Law (Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law, 2004) at 23 
(copy in Chinese). 
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partners to deal with their internal relations. Making all duties mandatory may 
not accurately ―fit‖ in partnership relationships and would result in excessive 
intervention in the course of the partnership businesses. In fact, default duties can 
also achieve similar protective or information-revealing function.  
However, it does not imply that a unitary approach would be desirable. It is 
submitted that some proposed duties are appropriate to be made mandatory while 
the others may be made as default duties. The following section discusses the 
contents of duties one by one and considers which one should be made in a 
mandatory form.  
8. Proposed Contents of Duties on General Partners in the PRC LP 
8.1 Introduction 
First of all, the PEL ought to specify that the statutory duties are owed by general 
partners to limited partners and the LP. The reason is that the ultimate goal of the 
PRC LP is to pursue the economic interests of the LP and the individual interests 
of each partner, rather than to the LP or individual partner only. This is also in 
line with the practice in the US
851
 and the UK.
852
 
                                                 
851 In the US, the duty of loyalty and the duty of care are both owned to the LP and the other partners. See, 
e.g., Uniform Limited Partnership Act §408 (2001). Lubaroff and Altman, supra note 836 at §11.2.2; 
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E.545 (N.Y.1928) holds a general partner of the LP owes fiduciary duties to the 
other partners in the LP. Boxer v. Husky Oil Co., 429 A.2d 995 (Del.Ch.1981) holds a general partner of the 
LP owes fiduciary duties to the LP. 
852In the UK, as the partnership is considered as an aggregate in the English partnership law, generally the 
fiduciary duty is owed by a partner to his/her co-partner only. Recently, the UK Law Commission has 
proposed that, generally partners should owe duties to the partnership, but for certain fundamental duties, 
such as those arising out of the duty of good faith, should be owed to both to the partnership and to the 
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Second, there are generally two options on imposing statutory duties: one 
extreme option is to provide a detailed list of all duties in the PEL; the other is to 
select some principle duties and codify them into the PEL. 
Providing an exhaustive list is not feasible and it would easily become outdated 
with the rapid development of LPs in China. A wiser approach is imposing 
fundamental duties in general terms would ensure its generality and flexibility. It 
enables the law to evolve as the circumstance requires.
853
  
Hart has observed the open-textured nature of legislation.
854
 He observes that, as 
long as a statutory duty is ―certain in its effect, clear in its expression and 
comprehensive in its scope,‖ it would achieve desirable effect. 855 In fact, no 
matter what kind of language we use in regulating partners‘ behavior, such a 
language will be more or less indeterminate in their application in specific cases. 
Therefore, we should not be bothered with the length of the provision, instead, 
we should ensure the statutory provision encompass the merits of duties.   
Because of the complexity and the diversity of duties on partners, it is impossible 
to provide an exclusive list of duties. In order to provide a legal basis on the 
                                                                                                                                    
partners. See UK Partnership Law Report, supra note 47 at 188, Para. 11.67- 11.70. See Draft Partnerships 
Bill (UK) 2003, cl 9(1). 
853  See Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of 
Interest and Formulating a Statement of Duties, Joint Consultation Paper No.153, online: Law Commission 
<http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/cp153.pdf> at 275. 
854 Hart, The Concept of Law, supra note 818 at 128. “Which device, precedent or legislation, is chosen for 
the communication of standards of behaviour, these, however smoothly they work over the great mass of 
ordinary cases, will, at some point where their application is in question, prove indeterminate; they will 
have what has been termed an open texture.” 
855 Hart, The Concept of Law, supra note 818 at 275. 
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imposition of duties in the PRC LP, we would only discuss the fundamental 
fiduciary duties. According to scholars in the area,
856
 and common law,
 857
 the 
following duties are considered as the most important duties in partnerships: 
(1) duty of loyalty, 
(2)  the duty of care,  
(3) the duty of good faith; and  
(4) the duty of disclosure. 
This part would consider two basic questions: 
(1) what duties should a general partner undertake in a PRC LP; and 
(2) to what extent should the PEL specify the duties? 
8.2 The Duty of Loyalty in the PRC LP 
8.2.1 Problems in China’s Private Equity Market 
In the context of PRC LPs, many limited partners have concerns as to whether 
                                                 
856 Morse, Partnership Law, supra note 745 at chapter 5 mainly discusses the duty of care, the duty of good 
faith and the duty of honesty and full disclosure; See also, Paul M. Altman, Srinivas M. Raju, "Delaware 
Alternative Entities and the Implied Contractual Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under Delaware 
Law (2005) 60 BUS. LAW. 1469 (arguing the Delaware law on the contractual duty of good faith and fair 
dealing); Ann E. Conaway, ―The Multi-facets Of Good Faith In Delaware: A Mistake In The Duty Of Good 
Faith And Fair Dealing; A Different Partnership Duty OF Care; Agency Good Faith And Damages; Good 
Faith And Trust Law‖  (2008) 10 Del. L. Rev. 89 
(arguing the contractual nature of duty of good faith); Ribstein, ―Fiduciary Duties and Limited Partnership 
Agreements‖, supra note 753; Larry E. Ribstein, ―Fiduciary Duty Contracts In Unincorporated Firms‖, 
(1997) 54 Wash. & Lee. L. Rev . 537‖.  
857 See Charles Hollander and Simon Salzedo, Conflicts of Interest, 3rd ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 
2008) at 20. 
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general partners would act in the best interests of the limited partners and the 
firm, especially when a fund manager is acting as the sole general partner in 
different LPs.
858
 When the interests of one LP is adverse to or is conflicted with 
that of another LP, will such a general partner refrain from dealing with both of 
the LP? Will a general partner account to the LP for any property, profit, or 
benefit derived from a use of the LP‘s property, including the appropriation of a 
LP‘s opportunity? 
However, based on the author‘s empirical studies, the above issues are generally 
not stipulated in partnership agreements, or even fully aware in partnership 
negotiation.
859
   
8.2.2 Lacuna within the PEL 
Under the PEL, although there is no statutory imposition of the duty of loyalty, 
there is a provision containing similar contents as that of the duty of loyalty 
specified in the UPA. Article 32 of the PEL provides that (general) partners must 
not engage in self-dealing businesses or to compete with the partnership together 
with other individuals. (General) partners must not conduct any activities which 
may harm the interests if the partnership.” 860  Under this Article, a general 
                                                 
858 See Yin Xian Kai, (interview with Kong Xiangfei, the partner of the Jade Invest Management Company) 
―LP Investors shall be Mindful of the Interests Allocation‖ 21st Century Econmic Journal (27 July 2008) 
(copy in Chinese). 
859 Telephone interview with Mr. Feng (anonymity requested), (associate, Chongqing Zhonghao Law Firm) 
on 27 and 29 October 2009. 
860 Emphasis added by the author. Art. 70 and 71 of the PEL allow for two exceptions to limited partners: 
unless otherwise provided by the partnership agreements, limited partners are permitted to deal with the 
limited partnership; unless otherwise provided by the partnership agreements, limited partners are 
permitted to compete with the limited partners by themselves or by working with other parties. 
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partner shall not: 
  engage in self-dealing businesses;  
 compete with the partnership; or  
  harm the interests of the partnership.  
Properly understood, it appears that Article 32 covers the situation which is very 
common in the venture capital and private equity markets. That is the situation 
where a corporate general partner works for several limited partners at the same 
time while one limited partners‘ business is competing with the others or the 




In addition, Article 96 and 99 of the PEL provide two provisions which, to some 
extent, set forth some legal remedies for violation of the Article 32: 
862
 
 Partners shall return to the partnership any profit which has been usurped 
by the partner or any partnership property usurped by the partner in the 
conduct of the partnership business. If the partners‘ conduct causes any 
loss to the partnership enterprise or to other partners, the partner shall 
bear the compensation liabilities according to law. 
863
 
                                                 
861 Müller, Kay, Investing in Private Equity Partnerships: the Role of Monitoring and Reporting (Wiesbaden 
: Gabler, 2008). 
862 Nevertheless, these two provisions are inadequate as it only covers situations where the partners‘ conduct 
cause loss to the partnership. Then what if the partner‘s conduct does not cause any loss?--and may even 
have caused a gain--to the partnership? See similar argument in director‘s duties under PRC Company Law 
2006 in Lee Rebecca, ―Fiduciary Duty without Equity: 'Fiduciary Duties' of Directors under the Revised 
Company Law of the PRC‖ (2007) 47 Virginia Journal of International Law 897 [Lee, ―Fiduciary Duty 
without Equity‖] at text accompanying notes 49-50. 
863 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 96.  
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 Partners shall account to the partnership enterprise any profits derived by 
the partner in the transactions which competes with the partnership 
enterprise or in any self-dealing business with the partnership enterprise.  
If any loss is caused to the partnership enterprise or to other partners, the 
partner shall bear compensation liabilities.
864
 
However, Article 32 is defective in the following:  
 ―The duty not to harm the interests of the partnership‖ under the Article 
32 is too conservative and passive as compared to the ―duty to act in the 
best interests of the partnership‖. The nature of the LP business requires 
that the general partner shall act in the best interest of the LP and the 
limited partners. 
 Article 32 fails to specify the direct legal remedies accompanying 
violation of this provision.
865
 The plain language of this provision 
indicates that these duties are not mandatory.   
 Article 32 applies to both general partnerships and LPs. It ignores the 
differences between general partnerships and LPs. Common law, however, 




                                                 
864 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 99. 
865 Art. 96 and 99 of the PEL only specify some liabilities for violations of parts of the Art. 32.  
866 See Callison and Sullivan, Partnership Law and Practice, supra note 872 at § 12:4.  
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8.2.3 Duty of Loyalty in Case Law 
Case law has long recognized partners‘ undivided loyalty duty to each other,867 
such as Orley v. Ott, (finding duty of loyalty during formation of partnership);
868
 
Meinhard v. Salmon (finding duty of loyalty in pre-empting business 
opportunities);
869
 Starr v. Fordham
870
 (finding duty in partnership's self-dealing 
in allocating profits to departing partner); Smith v. Brown & Jones,
871
 (finding 
duty in determining partners' compensation). The fiduciary duty of loyalty on 
partners is comprehensive. As summarized by Callison and Sullivan, the duty of 
loyalty encompasses three major situations: self-dealing, competition with the 
firm and diversion of business opportunities.
872
 
Particularly, case law has long imposed a stricter fiduciary duty on ―managing 
partners‖ in an ordinary partnership, 873  such as Meinhard v. Salmon 874  and 
                                                 
867 See generally in J. Dennis Hynes, Agency, partnership, and the LLC: the law of unincorporated business 
enterprises: cases, materials, problems (Charlottesville, VA.: LEXIS Law Pub., 1998) at 638-658. 
868 326 S.C. 89, 92 n.1, 485 S.E.2d 97, 99 n.1 (1997). 
869 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928). 
870  420 Mass. 178, 648 N.E.2d 1261 (1995). 
871 167 Misc. 2d 12, 633 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Sup 1995). 
872 J. William Callison and Maureen A. Sullivan, Partnership Law and Practice: General and Limited 
Partnership (West Pub Co: 2008), [Callison and Sullivan, Partnership Law and Practice] at § 12:4. These 
three situations are: (1) ―Partners act in the interest of the partnership rather than in their own personal 
interests when conducting transactions related to the partnership business‖; (2) ―partners not represent a 
party adverse to the partnership, not secretly compete against the partnership, not use confidential 
partnership information for their own benefit, and not usurp business opportunities that might be taken by 
the partnership if they are offered to the partnership‖; (3) ―Partners deal fairly with the partnership and 
communicate to their copartners all material facts related to partnership affairs. Partners must refrain from 
making false representations to their co-partners and may not deceive their co-partners by concealing 
material facts.‖ 
873 Meinhard v. Salmon , 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928); Slingerland v. Hurley, 388 So. 2d 587, 589 
(Fla. 4th DCA) (a managing partner ‗cannot take in-house advantage of his co-partners'), appeal dismissed, 
394 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 1980). See, e.g., Slingerland v. Hurley, 388 So. 2d 587, 589 (Fla. 4th DCA). 





 Likewise in the LP, because the general partners are the 
ones who manage the firm, they have been held to higher standards than ordinary 
partners in general partnerships.
876
  
8.2.4 Statutory Duty of Loyalty 
Although the duty of loyalty is not specifically imposed on general partners in 
the German, French and Japanese LP regimes,
877
 such a duty is not absent in civil 
law jurisdictions. It is worth mentioning that the duty of loyalty is stipulated in 
the Taiwan Limited Partnership Law 2007(draft).
878
 This draft clearly states that 
―the persons who are responsible for the limited partnership shall carry on 
business loyally and shall exercise duty of care as a bona fide manager. The one 
who violates this provision and causes damages to the limited partnership shall 
bear compensation liability.‖  
American partnership law places great emphasis on the duty of loyalty. Both the 
UPA 1997 and the ULPA 2001 provide three specific and exclusive rules that 
comprise a partner‘s duty of loyalty. 879  The partnership agreement may not 
eliminate a general partner‘s duty of loyalty, but may limit the scope of the duty 
                                                 
875 1 Ill. 2d 72, 78, 115 N.E.2d 323, 326 (1953) ("As [the defendant] was the managing partner the duty [of 
good faith] rested more heavily on him."); cf. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 468, 164 N.E. 545, 548 
(1928),  cited in John Geschke, ―REGULATING ROLLUPS: GENERAL PARTNERS' FIDUCIARY 
OBLIGATIONS IN LIGHT OF THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ROLLUP REFORM ACT OF 1993‖ 
(1994) Stanford Law Review.  
876 See Callison and Sullivan, Partnership Law and Practice, supra note 872 at § 12:4.  
877 They are referred to Kommanditgesellschaft, société en commandite simple, GoShi Kaisha(合資会社) 
and Japan Limited Partnership for Investment (tōshi jigyō yūgen sekinin kumiai). 
878 Taiwan Limited Partnership Law (draft) 2007 Art. 22.  
879 Uniform Limited Partnership Act §408 (2001) provides that, the duty of loyalty and duty of care are the 





 Under the ULPA 2001, a general partner's duty of loyalty to the LP 
and the other partners is limited to the following:
881
  
(1) to account to the LP and hold as trustee for it any property, profit, or 
benefit derived by the general partner in the conduct and winding up of the LP‘s 
activities or derived from a use by the general partner of LP property, including 
the appropriation of a LP opportunity;   
(2) to refrain from dealing with the LP in the conduct or winding up of 
the LP‘s activities as or on behalf of a party having an interest adverse to the LP; 
and  
(3) to refrain from competing with the LP.  
In the UK, although the duty of loyalty is not codified by statutes, the English 
Partnership Act 1890 provides two duties
882
 which are similar to the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty under the UPA 1997:
883
 
 the duty not to compete with the firm;884 and 
 the duty to account to the firm for any benefit derived by him 
without the consent of the other partners from any transaction 
                                                 
880  Uniform Limited Partnership Act §110(b)(5) (2001) provides: A partnership agreement may not: 
―eliminate the duty of loyalty under Section 408, but the partnership agreement may: 
(A) identify specific types or categories of activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly 
unreasonable; and 
(B) specify the number or percentage of partners which may authorize or ratify, after full disclosure to all 
partners of all material facts, a specific act or transaction that otherwise would violate the duty of loyalty.‖ 
881 Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 408 (b) (2001). 
882Notably, these duties are not categorized as duties of loyalty but as duties of good faith. 
883 The statutory duties of the general partner in the LP can be fall back to those provided in the UPA. 
884 Partnership Act 1890 (UK), s. 30. 
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concerning the partnership, or from any use by him of the 
partnership property name or business connection.
885
 
8.2.5 Duty of Loyalty in the PRC LP- Arguments and Recommendations 
First, a statutory duty of loyalty would make general partners be mindful of 
various conflicts of interest. As is often the case in China‘s venture capital and 
private equity markets, the general partner operates multiple parallel RMB funds. 
Actions taken in one parallel fund may affect the interests of the other. 
Second, as discussed earlier in this Chapter,
886
 because the PRC Company Law 
2005 also imposes a general duty of loyalty on directors, supervisors, and senior 
managers in companies, one may argue that an analogy can be made to general 
partners in the LP as well.
887
  
Third, one may also argue that, the LP is established on the mutual trust and 
understanding of each partner. The limited partners will not select those they do 
not believe in to be the general partner. Therefore, it is not necessary to impose a 
statutory duty of loyalty on the general partner. However, such an assumption is 
too optimistic as it ignores the existence of ethical and psychological egoism.
888
 
In fact, many limited partners in China‘s private equity market have expressed 
their considerable concern regarding the loyalty and ability of the general 
                                                 
885 Partnership Act 1890 (UK), s. 29. 
886 See supra text accompanying note 834. 
 887 See Lee R.W.C., ―Fiduciary Duty without Equity: 'Fiduciary Duties' of Directors under the Revised 
Company Law of the PRC‖ (2007) 47 Va. J. Int'l L. 897. 
888 See, e.g., Alchian and Demsetz, "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization", supra note 






Fourth, loyalty has long been considered as a standard of conduct in Chinese 
society. Legalizing the duty of loyalty on specific group of people is in line with 
the social culture and historical background of China. (1) In Chinese literature, 
―loyalty‖ (忠诚) generally means devoting oneself to others (including state, 
people, career, leader, friends etc) faithfully.
890
 Moreover, the Chinese character 
―忠‖ was a fundamental moral character and standard of conduct in ancient 
China.
891
 (2) As mentioned in Chapter 2, it has long been recognized that a 
partner‘s relationship is based upon the "trust" between the partners in China. In 
ancient China, partners are usually friends and relatives to each other.
892
 
Therefore, all partners would likely to act "in the best interests" of the 
partnership since they trust each other.  
Providing a statutory interpretation on the duty of loyalty on partners is also in 
line with PRC Company law‘s approach as the PRC Company Law 2005 also 
outlines the content of the obligation of loyalty.
893
 
                                                 
889 See Hao, ―Annual Investigation on Limited Partnerships‖, supra note 517.  
890 See, e.g., Modern Chinese Dictionary, 5th ed., s.v. Zhongshi; The Explaining Simple and Analyzing 
Compound Characters, (Zhonghua Book Company, 2002) at 696.  
891 The earliest Chinese work of narrative history which covers the period from 722 BCE to 468 BCE, the 
Chronicle of Zuo (左传), has given some interpretations of ―loyalty‖ in that period. For example, it stated 
that ―If you do not forget your country during the hard time, you should be considered as loyalty to your 
country.‖ ―If you do things beneficial to other people, you should be considered as loyalty to the people.‖ 
892 See supra text accompanying notes 225-226. 
893 Articles 148(2) and 149 of the PRC Company Law 2005 list a number of specific proscriptions which are 
within the contents of the duty of loyalty, such as prohibitions against acceptance of bribes, 
misappropriation of company funds, exploitation of business opportunities that belong to the company, 
transactions with the company, competition with the company's business, and disclosure of confidential 
information. See Lee R.W.C., "Fiduciary Duty without Equity: 'Fiduciary Duties' of Directors under the 
Revised Company Law of the PRC" (2007) 47 Virginia Journal of International Law 897. 
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In view of the above, an overriding duty of loyalty should be imposed on general 
partners in the PRC LP and shall not be eliminated by partnership agreement.  
Nevertheless, a general duty of loyalty is too vague and would create uncertainty 
in the application and implementation of the duty.
894
 China is still in the initial 
stage of building rule of law.
 895
  At this stage of the development of rule of law 
in China, it is inappropriate to rely too much on Chinese judges' roles in 
interpreting the duty of loyalty.
 896
  Not only that the expertise of judges varies 
from place to place, but also that there is a shortage of qualified judges in rural 
and poor places in China.
897
 Therefore, a few more interpretation provisions shall 
be provided to make the duty of loyalty more accessible and certain in the PRC 
LP. 
8.3 The Duty of Care in the PRC LP   
The duty of care is a principle duty at common law. Originally, the idea of a 
general duty of care was created based on the special relations between the 
parties.
898
 Unlike the duty of loyalty which requires the fiduciary to act in the best 
                                                 
894  See also Luc Thévenoz and Rashid Bahar eds., Conflicts of Interest: Corporate Governance and 
Financial Markets (Alphen an den Rijn, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2007) [Thévenoz and 
Bahar, Conflicts of Interest: Corporate Governance and Financial Markets] at 311. 
895 Chen Guimin, Guan Yu Faguan "Zao Fa" [About "Judge Making Laws"], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO 
[PEOPLE'S COURT DAILY(30 October 2002) (copy in Chinese). 
896 Ibid. 
897 See generally in Zhou Chonghua, ―A Shortage of Judges in Ningxia due to Four Difficulties‖ Legal Daily 
(19 November 2007) (copy in Chinese); ―A Severe Shortage of Judges in Yun Nan Area‖ Legal Daily (20 
November 2007) (copy in Chinese); ―Report of Severe Shortage of Judges in Guizhou‖ Legal Daily (21 
November 2007) (copy in Chinese); ―A Severe Shortage of Minorities Judges in Xin Jiang‖ Legal Daily (22 
November 2007) (copy in Chinese). 
898 Lord Atkin‘s ―neighbor‖ principle is a classic interpretation of the duty of care.  See Donoghue v. 
Stevenson [1932] AC 562, judgment at 580. 
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interest of the beneficiary, the duty of care is a management duty.
899
 It generally 
requires the person who owed such a duty to perform in accordance with a 
minimum standard of skill, judgement, competence etc.
900
 In partnerships, the 
duty of care requires a general partner to exercise reasonable care and diligence 
when making decisions and exercising his or her role as a general partner.
901
 It 
generally involves refraining from engaging in "grossly negligent or reckless 
conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law."
902
 In the context 
of private equity LP, the fund managers‘ obligations to perform the duty would 
serve as a check on managerial misconduct and errant decision making. If general 
partners breach the duty, investors could bring a suit to enforce duty.
903
 
In civil law jurisdictions, such as Germany, France and Japan, the statutory duty 
of care is not imposed on general partners.
904
 Nevertheless, Taiwan has recently 
proposed the duty of care in the Taiwan Limited Partnership Law 2007 (draft).
905
  
8.3.1 A Need for the Duty of Care in the PRC LP? 
In China, there is no statutory duty of care imposed on partners in the PRC LP. 
Little academic work has been written on partners‘ duty of care in Chinese 
                                                 
899 J.C. Shepherd, The Law of Fiduciaries (Toronto: Carswell, 1981) [Shepherd, The Law of Fiduciaries] at 
48. 
900 Ibid. at 49.  
901 There are some arguments against a duty of care among the partners during the debates over the Revised 
Uniform Partnership Act, on the grounds that each general partner had the ability to watch over each other. 
See Michael L. Kelley, Note ―Whose Partnership is it Anyway?: Revising the Revised Uniform Partnership 
Act's Duty-Of-Care Term‖ (1994) 63 Fordham L. Rev. 609; see also Gerald C. Martin, Comment ―Duties of 
Care Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act‖ (1998) 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1307.  
902 Ribstein, ―Fiduciary Duties and Limited Partnership Agreements‖, supra note 753 at 962. 
903 Lee, supra note 86 at 273. 
904 German Commercial Code, French Commercial Code and Japanese Commercial Code do not provide 
the duty of care on partners. 





 It is suggested that the duty of care merit special scrutiny in the 
context of the PRC LP. 
First, as discussed in Chapter 4, there seems to be a desire for the duty of care in 
China‘s private equity market.907 Particularly, as the private equity market is still 
emerging with insufficient experienced and sophisticated general partners, many 
Chinese limited partners are concerned about whether their general partners 
would act with sufficient care and diligence in the operation of funds. The fact 
that limited partners create various internal mechanisms to supervise the 
management of the LP demonstrates such a concern. Arguably, limited partners 
would be placed in a vulnerable position if there is not enough legal strategy to 
prevent general partners‘ negligent conduct or malpractices.  
Second, the special nature of the LP requires a general partner to be diligent and 
prudent in managing the LP affairs. The theory of reliance in the law of fiduciary 
suggests that ―a fiduciary relationship exists where one person reposes trust, 
confidence or reliance in another.‖ 908  As the LP is a cooperative venture 
established on the basis of reliance and trust between the limited partner and the 
general partner, it is logical for general partners to exercise reasonable care on 
the investment.  
                                                 
906 The existing scholarly commentaries mainly focus on the duty of care in corporate law or tort law area. 
For example, Qu Maohui, ―The Duty of Care in Civil Law‖, (2007) Northern Legal Science vol.1 at 22 
(copy in Chinese); Papers discussing duty of partners in LP include Ren Xiaohong, ―Fiduciary Duties of 
General Partners in the Limited Partnership‖ in Wang Baoshu ed., Contemporary Development Non-
Company Enterprises Legal System (Social Science Press, 2008) at 253-259 (copy in Chinese). This article 
only introduced the duties of general partners in common law jurisdictions.  
907 See supra text accompanying notes 598-609.  
908 Shepherd, The Law of Fiduciaries, supra note 899 at 56. 
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Third, imposing statutory duties of care for general partners is in line with the 
PRC Company Law 2005 and international practice. On the one hand, the PRC 
Company Law 2005 also imposes a statutory duty of care on directors, 
supervisors and managers in companies. On the other hand, as showed in the last 
section, the duty of care has been long recognized at common law. The ULPA 
2001 also imposed a statutory duty of care on general partners.  
Given the aforesaid reasons, it seems that imposing a duty of care on general 
partners is necessary. Nevertheless, one may still argue that partners do not need 
a statutory duty of care because they share the risk of the venture together. 
Particularly when the LP and limited partners earn profits from the investment, 
general partners make money as well because general partners‘ carried 
interests
909
 are closely related to their performances. However, in practice, there 
is always a possibility where a partner is culpably negligent and causes losses to 
the firm, especially when a sole general partner is working for more than one LP 
firms at the same time.  
One may also argue that if there is implied liability to the general partner for loss 
to the firm caused by his lack of reasonable care in operating the LP, it may 
                                                 
909 Carried interest refers to a share of the profits of a successful partnership that is paid to the manager of 
the partnership (e.g., a private equity limited partnership) as a form of compensation that is designed as an 
incentive to the manager to maximize performance of the investment fund. The bulk of the general partner's 
compensation comes in the form of a carried interest, which is usually 20% of the venture capital fund's 
ultimate profits is- distributed to the general partners when realized profits are distributed to the investor 
limited partners. For further definition of the carried interest, see Gompers and Lerner, The Venture Capital 
Cycle, supra note 50 at 91-92 and fig. 5.1. 
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encourage litigation between the limited partner and the general partner.
910
 
Admittedly, there is such a risk. However, it is unforeseeable whether the 
imposition of the duty of care will effectively ―encourage‖ litigation between the 
partners. The purpose of codifying the duty of care duty is to make it widely 
known by general partners so as to ―prevent‖ potential problems. Particularly, in 
the context of China, a statutory duty of care is necessary because it addresses 
the concern of Chinese business community and would in turn reduce transaction 
costs in covenant drafting and negotiation. 
8.3.2 How Does One Define the Duty of Care in the PEL?  
The US and UK‘s experience provides a helpful guideline as to how does one 
formulate the duty of care. At common law, a partner‘s duty of care to the 
partnership was to act without ―culpable‖ negligence.911 In the US, it is widely 
recognized that partners owe each other a fiduciary duty ―to use appropriate care 
in managing the partnership business and they can be held accountable for poor 
business management which violates the requisite duty.‖912 The UPA 1997913 and 
the ULPA 2001 make clear statements of the duty of care of the general partner.
 
914
   
                                                 
910 See UK Partnership Law Report, supra note 47 at 194. 
911 Bury v. Allen (1845) 1 Coll 589, 604; 63 ER 556, 562; and Thomas v. Atherton (1878) 10 Ch D 185, 199. 
912 Callison and Sullivan, Partnership Law and Practice, supra note 872 at § 12:2. However, some scholars 
do not consider the duty of care as fiduciary in nature. See Ribstein, ―Are Partners Fiduciaries?‖ supra note 
835 at 220; Shepherd, J.C. Shepherd, Law or Fiduciaries (Toronto, Canada: Carswell, 1981) at 49. See 
Bishop, ―A Good Faith Revival of Duty of Care Liability‖, supra note 834 at 499. 
913 See Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1997) comments on §404(c). 
914 Bishop, ―A Good Faith Revival of Duty of Care Liability‖, supra note 834 at 497; Noted that the original 
Uniform Partnership Act (1914) does not codify a duty of care owed by a partner to the other partners. 
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Under the ULPA 2001, the duty of care is only owed by the general partner, but 
does not attach to a limited partner solely by reason of that status. However, if 
the limited partner does participate in the management of the LP, he or she will 
be subject to the duty of care.
915
 In addition, the duty of care is not permitted to 
be unreasonably reduced by the partnership agreement.
916
  
Arguably, a general duty of care is too abstract and leaves too much room for 
interpretation. As one commentator put it, ―this is a principle taken out of the air, 
an ethical or moral imperative.‖917  In the context of China, as there is no case 
law system, and judges normally have few discretion in interpreting legal terms; 
it is necessary to provide guidance for practitioners and the judiciary to evaluate 
partners‘ duty of care.  
Regrettably, there remains considerable uncertainty as to the circumstances in 
which partners owes a duty of care to their partners and the partnership.
918
 At 
common law, there are three general standards in defining the duty of care. (1) 
Initially, American courts tend to use ―reasonable care standard‖ as the test for 
finding a duty of care in partnerships. Under the reasonable care standard, a 
partner is held to be liable if his or her conduct is unreasonable. (2) Later a ―good 
faith standard‖ prevailed and became the accepted standard for determining 
                                                 
915 Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001) comments on § 305 (a). See also Bishop, ―A Good Faith 
Revival of Duty of Care Liability‖, supra note 834 at 502. 
916 Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 408 (3) (c) (2001). In other words, the duty can be ―reasonably‖ 
reduced by the partnership agreement. See Uniform Partnership Act (1997) comments on § 404. 
917 Shepherd, The Law of Fiduciaries, supra note 899 at 57. 
918 See generally in Callison and Sullivan, Partnership Law and Practice, supra note 872 at § 12:2. See also 
See UK Partnership Law Report, supra note 47 at 186. 
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partners‘ duty of care. Under the good faith standard, a partner is not liable to the 
partnership or his or her co-partners for acts which are not fraudulent or wanton 
and which are undertaken in good faith.
919
 (3) In recent years, there has been a 




8.3.2.1 A “Gross Negligence” Standard? 
The gross negligence standard is a frequently used test for defining the duty of 
care in American courts. The ULPA 2001 provides: “A general partner‟s duty of 
care to the limited partnership and the other partners in the conduct and winding 
up of the limited partnership‟s activities is limited to refraining from engaging in 
grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing 
violation of law.”921 In 528HRosenthal v. Rosenthal,922  it is held that the duty of care 
is limited to acting in a manner that does not constitute gross negligence or 
willful misconduct. However, the exact meaning of ―gross negligence‖, ―reckless 




                                                 
919 See generally in Callison and Sullivan, Partnership Law and Practice, supra note 872 at § 12:2. 
920 See Callison and Sullivan, Partnership Law and Practice, supra note 872 at §12:2 (2005); see J. William 
Callison, ―The Law Does Not Perfectly Comprehend…‖: the Inadequacy of the Gross Negligence Duty of 
Care Standard in Unincorporated Business Organizations‖ (2005) 94 Ky. L.J. 451 at 451. 
921 Uniform Limited Partnership Act §408 (3)(c) (2001). 
922 543 A.2d 348, 352 (Me.1988). 
923  J. William Callison, ―The Law Does Not Perfectly Comprehend…‖ the Inadequacy of the Gross 
Negligence Duty of Care Standard in Unincorporated Business Organizations‖ (2005) 94 Ky. L.J. 451 at 




In addition, the gross negligence may not fit in every particular structure model 
of LP because the management rights of general partners vary from case to 
case.
924
 In the context of China, general partners may exercise different levels of 
care or skill in different portfolio companies. For instance, when general partners 
make investment with funding from National Social Security Fund or Pension 
Fund, they shall endeavor to make prudent and responsible investment as the 
sensitive and essential nature of funding investment
925
  For another example, in a 
LP which general partners‘ management power is restrictive, and limited partners 
in that LP have certain monitoring rights, imposing a gross negligence standard 
for the general partner seems to be reasonable.
926  
However, in a typical LP where 
all management powers are vested with general partners, it seems more 
appropriate to impose an ordinary care standard than the gross negligence 
standard on the general partners.
927
  
In view of the above, it is inappropriate to provide a fixed statutory imposition of 
gross negligence standard of care on every limited partner. 
                                                 
924 Callison, ―The Inadequacy of the Gross Negligence Duty of Care Standard in Unincorporated Business 
Organizations‖, supra note 923 at 477-480.  
925See Sun Ruihua, interview with Mr. Wu Shangzhi (CEO of the CDH Investment) ―Consider Investors‘ 
Interests First‖, Chinese Venture online: <http://www.wabei.com/news/200809/159125.html> (in Chinese). 
926  See Callison, ―The Inadequacy of the Gross Negligence Duty of Care Standard in Unincorporated 
Business Organizations‖, supra note 923 at 478.  
927 Callison, ―The Inadequacy of the Gross Negligence Duty of Care Standard in Unincorporated Business 
Organizations‖, supra note 923 at 478.  
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8.3.2.2 The Business Judgment Rule? 
In the US, the corporate business judgment rule is a tool of judicial review in 
determining director‘s liability for duty of care breaches.928 The rule enables the 
directors to be free from possible liability due to the violation of the fiduciary 
duty.
929
 The rationale of this rule is to ―encourage competent individuals to 
assume directorships‖; to provide ―directors the broad discretion they need in 
formulating dynamic and effective company policy without fear of judicial 
second-guessing‖ and to ―keep courts from becoming enmeshed in complex 
corporate decision-making.‖930 
Although the business judgment rule is a corporate law concept,
931
 there has been 
a trend in using this rule to define gross negligence in partnerships. For example, 
in Jackson v. Marshall, 
932
 it is held that ―the duty of the general partner to the 
limited partners is a duty to discharge his responsibilities according to the 
business judgment rule.‖933  In Rosenthal v. Rosenthal,934  the Maine Supreme 
Court applied the business judgment rule to determine general partners‘ liability 
                                                 
928 F.Balotti and J.Finkelsten, The Delaware Law of Corporations and Business Organizations §§ 4.6 and 
4.7, at 74 and 94.17 (1988), cited in Dennis J. Block, Nancy E. Barton and Stephen A. Radin, The Business 
Judgment Rule: Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors (Prentice Hall Law and Business, 1989) [Block et 
al., The Business Judgment Rule: Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors] at 3. 
929 Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 608 (Del. Ch. 1974); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 
1984). 
930 Block et al., The Business Judgment Rule: Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors, supra note 928 at 6. 
931  See Elizabeth S. Miller and Thomas E. Rutledge, ―The Duty of Finest Loyalty and Reasonable 
Decisions: The Business Judgment Rule in Unincorporated Business Organizations?‖ (2005) 30 Del. J. 
Corp. L. 343, 388. 
932 140 N.C. App. 504, 537 S.E.2d 232 (2000). 
933 140 N.C. App. 504, 537 S.E.2d 232 (2000) at 6.  
934 543 A.2d 348 (Me. 1988). 
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for breach of the fiduciary duty.
935
 It is also held that the ―business judgment rule 
does not protect business decisions that result from fraud or bad faith.‖936  As 
observed by Beveridge, ―unless there is exculpatory language in the partnership 
agreement, a general partner is subject to a duty to use ordinary care in the 
transaction of partnership business and is entitled to the protection of the 
business judgment rule.‖937  
Then whether China shall adopt the business judgment rule in the context of PRC 
LP?  
One may argue that Japan, which is also a civil law jurisdiction has developed 
doctrines based primarily on case law that are similar to the US business 
judgment rule in its corporate law.
938
 However, it is submitted that Japanese 
experience may not be analogous in the context of China. 
Firstly, Japan has more experience and a larger body of case law in interpreting 
the business judgment rule than China. In Japan, the judicial discussion on the 
business judgment rule began in the 1970s.
939
 One of the earliest cases discussing 
                                                 
935 It is held that, ―if good faith and prudent business judgment is applied to decisions made in operation of a 
business, then disagreement with results, or application of hindsight to suggest a different action should 
have been taken, is not a basis for complaint‖.543 A.2d 348 (Me. 1988) at 2. 
936 543 A.2d 348 (Me. 1988) at 3.  
937 Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., ―Duty Of Care: The Partnership Cases‖ (1990) 15 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 753 
at 766. 
938  For discussion on the business judgment rule in Japanese corporate law, see Kenji Utsumi, ―THE 
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AND SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SUITS IN JAPAN: A 
COMPARISON WITH THOSE IN THE UNITED STATES‖ (2001)14 N.Y. Int'l L. Rev. 129.  
939 See Vicki L Beyer, ―Judicial Development of a Business Judgment Rule in Japan‖ (1993) 5(2) Bond Law 
Review 209 at 212. 
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business judgment rule in Japan was found in 1977.
940
 Today, the basic concepts, 
the business standards in general and the application of the business judgment 
rule in Japan are quite similar to that in the US.
941
 However, the business 
judgment rule has not been adopted in China, either in corporate or partnership 
law areas. Arguably, Japanese courts would be more comfortable than their 
Chinese counterpart in interpreting the open-ended standard of the business 
judgment rule. 
Second, Japanese courts have been known to make law by interpreting a 
statutory provision broadly.
942
 However, the role of the judiciary in the law-
making process is extremely limited in China. Although the Supreme Court of 
China may occasionally address situations which are only vaguely covered by 
statutory provisions by issuing the Judicial Interpretation (司法解释), they are 
not entitled to develop doctrines in judgment-making process.
 943
 
Third, due to the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and the 1970s, China‘s legal 
education was interrupted. China's law schools were not reopened until 1979.
 944
 
Today, there is still a shortage of qualified judges who are well legally trained,
 
                                                 
940 See Hanrei Jiho (No 893) 88 (September 1978). (One of the earliest cases discussing business judgment); 
See also Ikenaka v. Tabuchi 1469 HANREI JIHO 25 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Sept. 16, 1993).(One of the leading 
cases indicating a standard for the business judgment rule in Japan) 
941See generally Kenji Utsumi, ―The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Suits in Japan: A 
Comparison with Those in The United States‖ (2001)14 N.Y. Int'l L. Rev. 129. 
942 Vicki L Beyer, ―Judicial Development of a Business Judgment Rule in Japan‖ (1993) 5(2) Bond Law 
Review 209 at 211. 
943 For discussion on the judiciary reform in China and Japan, see Stephan Landsman and Jing Zhang, ―A 
Tale of Two Juries: Lay Participation Comes to Japanese and Chinese Courts" (2008) 25 UCLA Pac. Basin 
L.J. 179. 
944 See generally, Carlos Wing-Hung Lo and Ed Snape, ―Lawyers in the People's Republic of China: A 
Study of Commitment and Professionalization‖ (2005) 53 Am. J. Comp. L. 433. 
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especially in the rural and poor places of China.
 945
 In fact, many Chinese judges 
today were in army before joining the judicial system. 
946
 All these may hinder 
the application of the business judgment rule in China. 
Of course, the fact that Chinese judges do not have rich experience and 
sophisticated techniques in applying precedents should not be an excuse for not 
adopting the business judgment rule in the PRC partnership law. In fact, the 
Japanese experience also shows that the practical significance of the statutory 
fiduciary obligation depends on how prepared the legislature and judiciary are to 
create a favorable legal infrastructure for the invocation of the fiduciary 
principle.
947
 It is therefore suggested that, Chinese legislature and judiciary may 
take a steady manner in introducing the concept of business judgment rule in the 
context of the PRC LP.  
8.3.3.3 An Objective Test? 
In the UK, the standard of the duty of care has become more objective. In Ross 
Harper & Murphy v. Banks,
948
 Lord Hamilton suggested that the standard 
applicable was “a standard which requires the exercise of reasonable care in all 
the relevant circumstances. Those circumstances will include recognition that the 
relationship is one of partnership (which may import some mutual tolerance of 
error), the nature of the particular business conducted by that partnership 
                                                 
945 See text accompanying notes 895-897 and text accompanying note 946. 
946 See generally, He Weifang, ―Retiring Army Officers Joining Courts‖ Southern Weekend (2 January 
1998) . 
947 Lee, ―Fiduciary Duty without Equity‖, supra note at 915-916. 
948 2000 SLT 699. 
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(including any risks or hazards attendant on it) and any practices adopted by 
that partnership in the conduct of that business.”949 
To promote clarity and certainty, the UK Law Commission provisionally 
proposed a standard to determine the duty of care in general partnerships. That is, 
“partners are expected to act with such care and skill as can reasonably be 
expected of those with the general knowledge, skill and experience that the 





It is proposed that general partners‘ duty of care can be formulated as the follow: 
“General partners of the LP are expected to act with such care and skill as 
would be exercised by a reasonable person having both (i) the knowledge and 
experience that may reasonably be expected of a person in the same position as 
the partner; and (ii) the knowledge and experience which the partner has.” 
8.4 The Duty of Good Faith in the PRC LP 
8.4.1 Duty of Good Faith - An Overview  
It is generally acknowledged that the notion ―good faith‖, or bona fides, was 
                                                 
949 2000 SLT 699 at 705J. 
950 See UK Partnership Law Report, supra note 47 at 186. 
951 Ibid. However, this proposal was not taken by the law commission ultimately because the majority of 
consultees opposed the proposal for a statutory statement of the duty of skill and care in Draft Partnerships 
Bill (UK) 2003. 
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derived from Roman law.
952
 Bona fides and/or aequitas (equity) was a 
fundamental principle of the medieval and early modern lex mercatoria. 
953
 In 
civil law jurisdictions, good faith is an aged old and essential principle. Today, 
the principle of good faith still exists in many civil codes in continental 
Europe.
954
 For example, under the German Civil Code (BGB),
955
 ―contracts are 
to be interpreted as required by good faith, taking customary practice into 
consideration.‖ 956  ―An obligor has a duty to perform according to the 
requirements of good faith, taking customary practice into consideration.‖ 957  
In common law jurisdictions, the duty of good faith is also regarded as the 
overriding duty of partners.
958
 Generally, the duty of good faith requires ―a 
partner to act in good faith towards the partnership and each of the other partners 
                                                 
952 Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker eds., Good Faith in European Contract Law (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 16 [Zimmermann and Whittaker, Good Faith in European Contract 
Law]; Yu Ronggen, ―Good Faith- A Long-lasting Civil Law Principle‖- Lu Yu and Our Civil Law Culture‖ 
(1993) Modern Law Science vol.2, [Yu] at 89 (copy in Chinese). 
953 Zimmermann and Whittaker, Good faith in European contract law, supra note 952  at 17; See Yu, ibid. 
at 89. 
954 See generally in Zimmermann and Whittaker, Good Faith in European Contract Law, supra note 952 at 
17-37. For instance, Art.134 and 135, French Civil Code provides that, “Agreements legally formed have the 
force of law over those who are the makers of them. They cannot be revoked except with their mutual 
consent, or for causes which the law authorizes. They must be executed with good faith.” “Agreements bind 
not only as to what is expressed therein, but further as regards all the consequences which equity, usage, or 
law attribute to an obligation by its nature.” See also French Civil Code Art. 1134 and 1135; German Civil 
Code,  s. 242. 
955In early nineteenth century, capitalism was developed from mercantilism to monopolism.  The civil law 
principle was then changed from individual oriented to social oriented. Good faith was given more 
emphasizes in the German Civil Code. See Yu, supra note 952 at 90. 
956 German Civil Code, s. 157. 
957 German Civil Code, s. 242. Although the German Civil Code does not provide clear definition of ―good 
faith‖, judges have discretion to interpret the connotation of ―good faith‖ on a case by case basis. See Yu, 
supra note 952 at 91. 
958 See UK Partnership Law Report, supra note 47 at 190. Lindley, Nathaniel Lindley, Baron, Lindley and 
Banks on Partnership, supra note 70 at 469. Holman v. Cole, 11 Wash.App. 195, 522. P.2d 515 (Wash.App. 
Div. 3 1974). However, it is hardly characterized as a fiduciary in nature in American case law.See J. 
Dennis Hynes, Agency, partnership, and the LLC: the law of unincorporated business enterprises: cases, 
materials, problems (Charlottesville, VA.: LEXIS Law Pub., 1998) at 665. See generally Claire Moore 
Dickerson, From Behind the Looking Glass: Good Faith, Fiduciary Duty and Permitted Harm, 22 Fla. St. U. 
L. Rev. 955 (1995). 
271 
 
in relation to any matter affecting the partnership.‖959 In Lawlis v. Kightlinger & 
Gray
960, ―good faith,‖ for purposes of expulsion of partner from partnership 
under no cause expulsion clause, means state of mind indicating honesty and 
lawfulness of purpose; belief in one's legal title or right; belief that one's conduct 
is not unconscionable; absence of fraud, deceit, collusion, or gross 
negligence.‖961 Under the ULPA 2001, both general partners and limited partners 
are subject to the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
962
 It provides that this duty 
cannot be eliminated by the partnership agreement.
963
 The UK Law Commission 
has also proposed to codify the duty of good faith in their Partnership Act.
964
 
The difference between the fiduciary duty of good faith at common law and the 
principle of good faith in civil law is that, the former one is a duty among parties; 
while the latter one is a fundamental principle which is applicable to all matters 
relating to civil law, including contracts, civil procedures etc. 
8.4.2 Lack of Good Faith in Modern China  
In Chinese literature, the term ―chengxin‖, (诚信) is most close to the western 
                                                 
959 See UK Partnership Law Report, supra note 47 at 190. 
960 562 N.E.2d 435, 59 USLW 2386. 
961 562 N.E.2d 435, at 15. 
962 See Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001) comments on § 304.  
963  Revised Uniform Partnership Act §103 (1997); Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 110 (2001). 
Nevertheless, the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001) does not regard the obligation of good faith and 
fair dealing as a fiduciary duty, and provides no definition of ―good faith‖. See Uniform Limited Partnership 
Act (2001) comments on § 305 (b); Uniform Partnership Act (1997) comments on § 404. 
964 See the UK Law Commissions, Draft Partnerships Bill (UK) 2003, cl 9 and 10. It is also proposed that 
the proposed duty shall apply to general partners in a LP as well. See UK Partnership Law Report, supra 
note 47 at 48. ―The principal duty of the general partner is to manage the business of the limited partnership. 
He must exercise this power with the utmost good faith, and has the same fiduciary duties as an ordinary 
partner in an ordinary partnership. All the comments and provisional recommendations on the duty of good 
faith, the duties in sections 28 – 30 of the 1890 Act, and the duty to exercise reasonable skill and care, 
discussed in Part XIV of the Joint Consultation Paper, apply to general partners in a limited partnership‖. 
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word of ―good faith‖. 965   In ancient China, ―chengxin‖ has the meaning of 
honesty (诚实);966  ―trust and faithful‖.967 Today, ―chengxin‖ bears the meaning 
of ―honesty and credibility (信用).‖968 ―Chengxin‖ has also been recognized in 
Chinese philosophy
969
  and society for a long history.
970
 The term ―chengxin‖ 
was not codified in ancient China, but was specified in customs which were 
largely existed in the form of ―Li‖ (礼) in ancient China.971 As a fundamental 
principle in Confucianism,
972
 it had tremendously influenced Chinese society.
973
  
Unfortunately, ―chengxin‖ as a social and moral doctrine was damaged seriously 
during the culture revolution period and the transitional period of the 1990s in 
China. Today, the lack of good faith has become a major social problem in 
Chinese society. The many serious social incidents, such as poison milk 
                                                 
965 ―Chengxin‖ is a combined term of two Chinese characters -―Cheng‖ and ―Xin‖. These two words are 
always used interchangeably. See Explaining Simple and Analyzing Compound Characters (Beijing: 
Zhonghua Book Company, 2002) at 144 and 145. 
966 See Su Yigong, ―Good Faith and China Moral Background‖ (1998) 3 Legal Science 46, [Su] at 46 (copy 
in Chinese). 
967 Su, ibid. at 46, 48 and 49. 
968  Modern Chinese Dictionary (Commercial Press, 2005) s.v. ―Chengxin‖; Han Dongyu, ―Legalists‘ 
Contractual Good Faith and its Modern Implication‖ (2007) The Journal of Ancient Culture vol.1, at 53 
(copy in Chinese). 
969 Yu, supra note 952 at 91. 
970  The said earliest historical origin of ―chengxin‖ was the Book of Lord Shang (Shang Jun Shu), which 
can be dated back to the Qin Dynasty.  
971  See Yu, supra note 952 at 89. 
972 For instance, in the Tang Dynasty, ―chengxin‖ was used widely as a fundamental principle in civil 
dealings between ordinary persons. See Wang Yanhua, ―Good Faith Principle in Civil Activities in the Tang 
Dynasty- From the Exploration on Several Contracts‖ (2006) 2 Journal Shanxi Coal-Mining Management 
Colleage107 (copy in Chinese).  
973 See, e.g., Su, supra note 966  at 48; See Zhang Hongbo, ―The Scope of ‗Cheng‘ in ZhongYong‖ (2007) 4 
Wuhan University Journal (Philosophy and Social Sciences) 615 (in Chinese); Yu, supra note 952 at 89-91; 





 and the "toufu" building incident in Sichuan earthquakes
975
 all call for 
an establishment of good faith in Chinese society.   
In the context of China‘s private equity market, a recent survey shows that the 
lack of good faith/trust is a major obstacle in the development of the PRC LP.
976
 
Limited partners have considerable concerns as to general partners‘ investment 
intentions. For example, general partners may take advantage of one another by 
misrepresentation or concealment. Typically, in 2009, two noted angel investors 
and fund managers in China were arrested for fraudulent fundraising in China.
977
 
It is reported that Mr. Liu fraudulently promised high interest rates and profit 
distributions to creditors, knowing that he would never be able to repay the debts. 
He was arrested for fraud involving 210 million yuan (30.8 million US 
dollars).
978
   
8.4.3 A Duty of “Good Faith” in the PRC LP? 
Although there is a social and business desire for the duty of good faith, I am of 
the view that it is unnecessary for the PEL to provide an additional duty of good 
faith on partners. 
                                                 
974  For further information on this incident, see BBC News (22 September 2008), online: BBC 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7628622.stm>.  
975 For further information on this incident, see ―China earthquake: Building work blamed for child death 
toll‖ (May 2008), online: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/1969382/China-
earthquake-Building-work-blamed-for-child-death-toll.html >. 
976 For detailed information on the survey, see China Venture Capital Yearbook 2009, supra note 10 at 270. 
977 See supra note 744 and accompanying text. 
978 Supra note 744. 
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First, the General Principles of Civil Law, the PRC Contract Law,
 979
 and the 
PEL all set forth a general principle of good faith. Article 4 of the General 
Principles of Civil Law provides that ―the principles of willingness, fairness, 
reciprocity and good faith shall be abided by parties in the course of civil 
activities.‖ Article 5 of the PEL reads “the principle of willingness, equality, 
fairness and good faith in the conclusion of a partnership agreement and in the 
establishment of a partnership enterprise shall be abided by parties.”980 Since all 
these general principles are applied to partners, there is no need to impose any 
other statutory duties on partners.   
Second, the principle of good faith (诚实信用原则) is an overriding principle 
(帝王条款) in PRC civil law.981 This principle has supplementary function in the 
implementation of specific civil issue. Where there is no specific legal provision 




                                                 
979 See PRC Contract Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 3 to 6. 
980 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 5. 
981 Liang Huixing, ―Principle of Good Faith and Gaps Filling‖ (1994) Chinese Journal of Law vol. 2 (in 
Chinese) at 23. 
982 Wei Zhenying ed., Civil Law (Peking University Press and High Education Press, 2000)] [Wei, Civil Law 
at 23 (copy in Chinese). For good faith in PRC law, see also Jiang Ping, Cheng Hehong and Shen Weixing, 
―Freedom of Contract and Principle of Good Faith under the New Contract Law‖ (1999) Journal of China 
University of Political Science and Law vol. 1 (copy in Chinese). 
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8.5 Duty of Disclosure in the PRC LP 
8.5.1 Duty of Disclosure Per Se 
The duty of disclosure is an important fiduciary duty at common law.
983
 In 
general partnerships, each partner is required to make full disclosure of all 
material facts within his or her knowledge in any way relating to the partnership 
affairs. In the area of LPs, general partners generally have a duty to disclose all 
material facts in connection with LP transactions.
984
  
For example, in Band v. Livonia Associates,
985
 there was disclosure of the profits 
and commissions to some limited partners, but it was held that the general 
partner was still liable because the duty of full disclosure was owed to all 
partners. In Sherman v. Lloyd,
986
 the limited partners were entitled to rely on 
                                                 
983 See Morse, Partnership Law, supra note 745 at Chapter 5; Peskin v. Deutsch, 134 Ill. App. 3d 48, 89 Ill. 
December. 28, 479 N.E.2d 1034 (1st Dist. 1985); Band v. Livonia Associates, 176 Mich. App. 95, 439 
N.W.2d 285 (1989). Steeby v. Fial, 765 P.2d 1081 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Krebs v. Mull, 727 So. 2d 564 
(La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1998), writ denied, 740 So. 2d 119 (La. 1999); Band v. Livonia Associates, 176 Mich. 
App. 95, 439 N.W.2d 285 (1989); Covalt v. High, 100 N.M. 700, 675 P.2d 999 (Ct. App. 1983); Klotz v. 
Klotz, 202 Va. 393, 117 S.E.2d 650 (1961).  
984 In Union Pacific Resources Group, Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 247 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2001) (when 
partner without disclosure obligation elects to make partial disclosure concerning transaction, partner has 
obligation to make full disclosure); Fleck v. Cablevision VII, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 622 (D.D.C. 1991) (general 
partner has fiduciary to disclose information concerning value of limited partnership's assets when acquiring 
interests from limited partners); In re Marriott Hotel Properties II Ltd. Partnership, 26 Del. J. Corp. L. 424, 
2000 WL 128875 (Del. Ch. 2000) (tender offer disclosure obligation); F and S Enterprises, Inc. v. Cure, 690 
So. 2d 263 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1997) (duty to disclose that causing dissolution); Appletree Square I Ltd. 
Partnership v. Investmark, Inc., 494 N.W.2d 889 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (sellers, who were general partners 
in purchasing partnership, had duty to disclose information about asbestos; RULPA and agreement 
provisions requiring disclosure on demand did not negate duty to disclose all material facts); Hughes v. St. 
David's Support Corp., 944 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. App. Austin 1997), reh'g overruled (May 22, 1997) and writ 
denied, (January. 16, 1998) and reh'g of writ of error overruled, (February. 26, 1998) (general partner in 
master limited partnership had duty to disclose sale of partnership's interest in operating partnerships). 
However, in Exxon Corp. v. Burglin, 4 F.3d 1294 (5th Cir. 1993), the court applied Alaska law and held that 
the duty of disclosure is defined by the partners' agreement and can be modified. See also Anthony v. 
Padmar, Inc., 320 S.C. 436, 465 S.E.2d 745 (Ct. App. 1995) (disclosure concerning voting rules in limited 
partnership assets sale). 
985 176 Mich. App. 95, 439 N.W.2d 285 (1989). 
986 181 Cal. App. 3d 693, 226 Cal. Rptr. 495 (2d Dist. 1986).  
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information supplied by the general partner. Where misinformation was provided, 
the general partner shall be treated as a breach of fiduciary duty. In a latest 
case 529HFarber v. Breslin 
987
  the former limited partner brought an action against 
the general partner, alleging that the general partner concealed material 
information when she sold her interest in partnership property. The Court found 
that there was a breach of fiduciary duty where misinformation was provided.   
In the US and the UK, partners‘ duty of disclosure is not specifically stipulated 
by statutes, but is one of the rights of partners.
988
 The UK law commission has 
also proposed codification of this duty in the Partnership Bill.
989
 
8.5.2 A Duty of Disclosure in the PRC LP? 
―Accurate information is a prerequisite to investor oversight.‖ 990  Investment 
opportunities and information are a particularly sensitive area for private equity 
fund investors. Arguably, a duty of disclosure should be imposed on the general 
partner in a LP firm. Especially, the full disclosure of any conflicts of interest, 
documentation of a well-reasoned analysis, and a determination that a particular 
action is in fact in the best interests of the LP are crucial to the limited partners 
                                                 
987 47 A.D.3d 873, 850 N.Y.S.2d 604 (2d Dep't 2008). 
988 For instance, the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001) §407(b)(1) provides that ―each general partner 
and the limited partnership shall furnish to a general partner: (1) without demand, any information 
concerning the limited partnership‘s activities and activities reasonably required for the proper exercise of 
the general partner‘s rights and duties under the partnership agreement or this [Act]; and  (2) on demand, 
any other information concerning the limited partnership‘s activities, except to the extent the demand or the 
information demanded is unreasonable or otherwise improper under the circumstances.‖ See also Uniform 
Partnership Act §403(c) (1997); Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 17-305.  
989 It is proposed that: “a partner must (a) keep each of the other partners fully informed of partnership 
matters; (b) account to the partnership for any secret profit; (c) account to the partnership for any profits of 
a competing business.” See Draft Partnerships Bill (UK) 2003, cl 9 and 10. 
990 Brumder, supra note 575 at 103. 
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and the smooth operation of the fund. In the context of China, many fund 




Nevertheless, it is suggested that, there is no need to impose a duty of disclosure 
on general partners in the PRC LP because there are already some provisions 
granting partners the right to access to the partnership‘s financial information. 
For example, Article 28 of the PEL provides that “where one or several partners 
execute partnership activities, they shall regularly report to the other partners 
about the process of the relevant activities, the business operations and financial 
status of the partnership enterprise.” Article 28 also provides that ―in order to 
know the business operations and financial status of the partnership enterprise, 
the partners have the right to consult the account books and other financial 
materials of the partnership enterprise.” Germany also provides a similar ―Right 
of Inspection‖ in the German LP regime.992 
Although Article 28 is not ―mandatory‖ in the sense that there is no direct 
liability imposed on those partners who received secret profits from the 
partnership dealings, a disclosure duty may, under some circumstances, spring 
from the principle of good faith under the General Principles of Civil Law. 
Moreover, considering the diversity of various private equity LPs, it seems 
                                                 
991 See Chen Wei, (CEO of ShenZhen OFC Investment Management Ltd.) ―The Less Intervene By Limited 
Partners, the More Mature the RMB Funds‖, online: ChinaVenture < 
http://column.chinaventure.com.cn/u/chenwei1/archives/2009/2163.shtml > (copy in Chinese). 
992 German Commercial Code §166.  
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impossible to require every private equity LP to disclose the information to a 
certain degree. Whether specific information should be disclosed should be 
decided by the general partners and limited partners.  
In view of the above, it is unnecessary to provide an extra duty of disclosure on 
the PRC partnership. 
9. Corporate General Partner Issue 
As mentioned in Section 2 of this chapter, in China‘s private equity market, it is 
common for a fund management company to work as the sole corporate general 
partner for different LPs at the same time. It is also predicted that such a structure 
will become the mainstream in China.
993
 The advantage of such a hybrid vehicle 
is obvious - it combines the advantages of limited liability of companies with the 
contractual flexibility and tax advantages of partnerships.
994
 In the US and 
Germany, the LP with a company as the general partner is a popular vehicle as 
well. 
995
   
Considering that the problem of corporate general partner attracts little attention 
in Chinese legal academia,
 996
 this section inquiries into how does one regulate 
                                                 
993 See Huang Yaling, ―Limited Partnership ‗N+1‖ Model will become the New Trend of Private Equity 
Structures‖ Securities Times (27 June 2009) (copy in Chinese). 
994 See J Rinzer, ―English private and public limited company as managing general partner in a German 
limited partnership‖ (1994) Comp Law 285 at 285. 
995 Hamilton, supra note 40 at 74. J Rinzer, ―English private and public limited company as managing 
general partner in a German limited partnership‖ (1994) Comp Law 285. 
996 Even in American academia, there are a few articles discussing this issue. Hamilton mentioned that it ―is 
a novel business form that raises unique problems. These problems have received virtually no attention or 
comment.‖ See Hamilton, supra note 40  at 842. 
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the duties of corporate general partner in the PRC LP. 
9.1 Conflict of Fiduciary Duties  
The LP with corporate general partner is different from an ordinary LP in various 
ways.
997
  Two issues with regards to partners‘ fiduciary duties are significant.  
(1) ―A claim of breach of fiduciary duty against a general partner is 
not worth very much if the general partner itself is a corporation 
with nominal assets. If there is to be recovery, it must be based on 
a theory that holds the parties that manage the general partner 
liable for the general partner's breach of duty . . . .‖998  
(2) ―There are potential conflicts of fiduciary duty whenever a 
corporation (as contrasted with an individual) is the general 
partner of a limited partnership. The general partner obviously 
owes fiduciary duties to the limited partnership and to the limited 
partners. Corporate officers and directors also owe fiduciary 
duties to the shareholders of a corporate partner. These fiduciary 
                                                 
997  Robert W. Hamilton has summarized the differences between LPs with individual general partners and 
LPs with corporate general partners. These differences include: ―a corporate general partner is subject to the 
control of somebody whose identity may not be known to the limited partners while an individual general 
partner is easily identified by the limited partners‖; ―it is more difficult to control transfers of managerial 
authority to third party when the general partner is a corporation because a corporate general partner may be 
purchased, sold or mergered‖; ―it is more difficult to recover from a corporate general partner with nominal 
assets for breach of fiduciary duty‖; ―the assets of a corporate general partner may be shifted or reduced 
without the consent of the LP‖; ―corporate officer‘s and director‘s fiduciary duties to the shareholders of a 
corporate general partner may conflict with the general partner‘s fiduciary duties to the LP.‖ See Hamilton, 
supra note 40 at 86 and 87.   
998 Hamilton, supra note 40 at 86. 
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duties may conflict‖. 999 
Traditionally, however, neither the shareholder nor the controlling managers of 
corporate general partners owe a direct duty to the limited partners.
1000
 In recent 
years, there is a trend in the US that the directors and controlling managers of 
corporate general partners owe a direct duty to the LP and the limited partners. 
These cases include Tobias v. First City National Bank and Trust Co.,
1001
 
Remenchik v. Whittington, Tex.Ct.App.,
1002
 In re Integrated Resources, Inc.
1003
, 
and 530HIn re USACafes, L.P. Litigation.
1004
  Among these cases, the opinion from 
Delaware Court of Chancery in In re USACafes, L.P. Litigation is worth 
exploration.  
 
 In re USACafes, L.P. Case 
USACafes General Partner, Inc. (the "General Partner") is a Delaware 
corporation that acts as the general partner of a Delaware LP, the USACafes 
Limited Partnership. Sam and Charles Wyly, who together own stock of the 
general partner, sit on its board, and who also own 47% of the units of the LP. 
Sam Wyly chairs the Board of the general partner. The plaintiffs alleged that the 
                                                 
999 Ibid.  
1000 See Bromberg and Ribstein, Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership (Boston: Little, Brown, 1988) at 69. 
1001 709 F.Supp. 1266, 1277-78 (S.D.N.Y.1989). 
1002  757 S.W.2d 836 (1988). 
1003 Case No. 90-B-10411 (CB) (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. October. 22, 1990). 
1004  600 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 1991). 
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corporate general partner received substantial side payments from Metsa 
Acquisition Corp. (Metsa) for between $ 15 and $ 17 million. Those payments 
are alleged to induce the directors of the general partner to sell substantially all of 
the corporation's assets to Metsa at a low price. The defendants argued that the 
individual directors of the general partner only owed fiduciary duties to the 
corporate general partner and its shareholders but owed the limited partners no 
duty of loyalty or care.
 1005
 
In recognition of no precedent in corporation law area justifying expanding the 
scope of a director's fiduciary duty to the limited partner, Chancellor Allen 
referred to general principles and trust law. Given that the duty had been 
recognized in directors of trustees, the court held that it was appropriate to extend 
the general partner directors' duty in an analogous manner.
1006
 Specifically, 
Chancellor Allen pointed out that the central aspect of the fiduciary relationship 
is ―fidelity in the control of property for the benefit of another.‖1007 It was held 
that the corporate directors were fiduciaries and owed fiduciary duties to the 
limited partners. 
The USACafes case makes it clear that directors of a corporate general partner of 
a Delaware LP owe fiduciary duties to the firm and its limited partners. Two 
points are worth noting. Firstly, the scope of a director‘s fiduciary duty remains 
                                                 
1005 In re USA Cafes, LP Litigation 1, 5 600 A2d 43 (Del Chi 1991). 






 The court stated that ―it is not necessary here to attempt to 
delineate the full scope of that duty. It may well not be as broad as the duty of the 
director of a corporate trustee. But it surely entails the duty not to use control 
over the partnership's property to advantage the corporate director at the expense 
of the partnership.‖ 1009  Second, the USACafes case may leave officers and 
directors of a corporate general partner at risk in any transaction with conflict of 
interest. It is likely that their duties to the limited partners of the LP would 
always be prior over their duties to the corporate general partner.
1010
   
9.2 Corporate General Partner in the Context of China 
Although there is no equivalent concept of fiduciary duty under PRC law and the 
PEL does not address this issue, conflicts of interest still exist in PRC LPs with 
corporate general partners. Particularly, should the managers representing the 
corporate general partner consider their employer‘s interests over those of the 
limited partners in the LP? How is one to determine whose interests ought to 
prevail in situations of conflict?  
 Piercing Corporate Veil? 
One may suggest that, piercing of corporate veil may be a useful solution to this 
problem. Indeed, as a practical matter, the corporate piercing rule is useful where 
                                                 
1008 Lubaroff and Altman, supra note 836 at § 11.2.12. 
1009 In re USA Cafes, 600 A2d 43 at 49.  
1010 Robert B. Robbins, Elizabeth Harris, ―The Fiduciary Duties of Directors of Corporate General Partners; 
Ten Years after USACAFES‖ (2002) 35(6) The Review of Securities and Commodities Regulation 57. 
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shareholders of a corporate general partner in a LP use the corporate form in an 
abusive and inequitable manner. Under this situation, ―piercing‖ will apply to the 
corporate general partner so that the shareholder would not be protected by the 
corporate liability shield.  
Although the PEL does not codify the corporate piercing rule, the concept of 
piercing the corporate veil is present in Article 20 of the PRC Company Law 
2005. It states that: “where any of the shareholders of a company evades the 
payment of its debts by abusing the independent status of juridical person or the 
shareholder's limited liabilities, and thus seriously damages the interests of any 
creditor, it shall bear joint liabilities for the debts of the company.”  
However, as in other jurisdictions, the technique of piercing is fraught with 
uncertainty and inconsistencies under PRC law. In essence, it is a tool for justice, 
but it is ineffective in practice. It is suggested that, a possible safeguard is to 
impose on the corporate general partner some minimum capital contribution or 
the maintenance of a certain percentage net worth throughout the existence of the 
LP.
1011
 Some interviewees also agree with such a position.
1012
 
9.3 Defining Officers and Directors’ Duties: by Contract or by Statue? 
Logically, managers and directors of the corporate general partner would 
                                                 
1011 See WB Brueggeman, Real Estate Finance and Investments (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2005) at 508.  
1012 Telephone interview with Mr. Feng (anonymity requested), associate, Chongqing Zhonghao Law Firm 
on 27 October 2009; Telephone interview with Mr. Lin (anonymity requested), legal adviser, Shanghai 
Private Equity Mgmt. Co. (anonymity requested) on 27 October 2008. Telephone interview with Mr. Ye 
(anonymity requested), associate of the Shenzhen Huashang Law Firm, Shenzhen on 17 October 2008. 
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reasonably have controlling power in the LP. Thus it seems plausible to impose 
duties owed by the general partner upon those managers.
1013
 There are another 
two legal strategies to deal with the problem. (1) Parties should preempt such 
potential conflicts by prescribing the specific roles and duties of the parties in the 
partnership agreement or the corporate articles.
1014
 (2) Legislature should impose 
statutory duties on the stockholders and directors of a corporate general partner.   
It is suggested that duties of officers and directors of corporate general partner 
shall be left for partners to draft in their partnership agreements. 
In the first place, LPs with corporate general partner are highly diverse in terms 
of internal governance. If the officers of directors of the sole corporate general 
partner have more potential interests (e.g., they have more compensation from 
the LP than from the corporate general partner) in the LPs than in the corporation, 
these persons may ―illogically‖ consider the LP‘s interests and limited partners‘ 
interest first. In such a case, it is inappropriate to impose fixed statutory duties on 
officers and directors in the corporate general partner. Moreover, as observed by 
Professor Ribstein, ―firms involved in asset management may be able adequately 
to constrain managers through covenants that restrict particular types of bad 
decisions that are known in advance.‖ 1015  Therefore, the law should be 
essentially facilitative rather than prescriptive. Imposing fixed statutory duties on 
                                                 
1013 Hamilton, supra note 40 at 88. 
1014 Some scholars defining duties of stockholders and director of a corporate general partner contractually is 
the best way to protect a general partner of the LP or a controlling stockholder of a corporate general partner 
of the LP or a director of a corporate general partner of the LP. Martin I. Lubaroff, Paul M. Altman and R. 
Franklin Balotti, Lubaroff and Altman, 2nd ed. (Aspen Publishers Online, 1995) at § 11.2.12. 
1015  Ribstein, ―Fiduciary Duties and Limited Partnership Agreements‖, supra note 753 at 935. 
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officers and managers of the corporate general partner would inevitably 
―discourage‖ those persons from acting actively in the LP firm.  
In the second place, in order to safeguard the limited partners‘ interests, the 
parties can explicitly prescribe the duties and obligations of the sole corporate 
general partner by specifying the latter‘s scope of authority in the LP agreement. 
For example, there ought to be a provision in the PEL enjoining that the 
corporate general partner‘s duty to the LP should prevail over the duty to the 




As usages of the LP may change, new problems may arise, it is infeasible to 
provide fixed duties by law to the officers and directors of a corporate general 
partner.  
10. Duties of Limited Partners 
The above section considers the imposition of duties on general partners in PRC 
LPs. One may ask: is it fair that limited partners do not bear any duty to the LP or 
their co-partner, even when the limited partners participate in the management of 
the LP? 
                                                 
1016 Admittedly, a contractual arrangement may prove unrealistic if the corporate partner is not a special-
purpose entity but an investment or trading company with a diversified business. It is difficult to reach an 
agreement with regards to officers or directors‘ duties in such an entity. 
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10.1 Practices in the UK and the US 
In the US, the ULPA 1916 and its amendments do not specify any fiduciary duty 
of limited partners. The ULPA 2001 contains a new statement on the limited 
duties of limited partners. It emphasizes that “a limited partner does not have 
any fiduciary duty to the limited partnership or to any other partner solely by 
reason of being a limited partner. 
1017
 “A limited partner does not violate a duty 
or obligation under this [Act] or under the partnership agreement merely 
because the limited partner‟s conduct furthers the limited partner‟s own 
interest.” 1018  
Nevertheless, the ULPA 2001 provides that limited partners shall ―… exercise 
any rights consistently with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing.”1019  
Moreover, it provides that such an obligation shall not be eliminated or waived, 
“but the partnership agreement may prescribe the standards by which the 
performance of the obligation is to be measured, if the standards are not 
manifestly unreasonable”. 1020   
The UK regards the limited partner‘s fiduciary duties in a different light 
compared to that of the US. In the English partnership theory, limited partners 
are under the same fiduciary duties as the general partner.
1021
 Recently, however, 
                                                 
1017 Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 305(a) (2001). 
1018 Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 305 (c) (2001).  
1019 Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 305 (b) (2001).   
1020 Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 110 (B) (7) (2001).  
1021 See UK Partnership Law Report, supra note 47 at 293.  
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the UK Law Commission has suggested that the scope of limited partners‘ 
fiduciary duties should be narrower than that to the general partner.
1022
 The draft 
Limited Partnership Bill even restrict the duties of limited partners by stating that 
“a limited partner should not be under a duty to keep the other partners fully 
informed of partnership matters or a duty to account to the partnership for 
profits made by him in a competing business”; and “should not be under duties 
to ensure that accounting records are maintained and to co-operate with persons 
keeping partnership records.”1023 
Some commentators argue that the ULPA‘s position on duties of limited partner 
is undesirable in the emerging trends in partnership law.
1024
 Case law takes a 
similar approach. In Tri-Growth Centre City, Ltd. v. Silldorf, 
1025
 it is held that 
“while a limited partner normally would not be involved in the management or 
otherwise participate in the partnership so as to incur fiduciary obligations to 
other partners, limited partner might be involved in partnership in such a 
manner, for example, allowing him access to confidential information, so as to 
create fiduciary duties.”  
                                                 
1022 See UK Partnership Law Report, supra note 47 at 294. 
1023 See the UK Law Commissions, Draft Partnerships Bill (UK) 2003 at cl 59 (1); See UK Partnership Law 
Report, supra note 47 at 294. 
1024 J. William Callison and Allan W. Vestal, ―The Want of A Theory, Again‖ (2004) 37 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 
719 at 729. 
1025 265 Cal. Rptr. 330 (Ct. App. 1989). see also S. Atl. Ltd. P'ship of Tenn., LP v. Riese, 284 F.3d 518 (4th 
Cir. 2002); In re Villa W. Assocs., 193 B.R. 587 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1996) , 146 F.3d 798 (10th Cir. 1998). 
Bond Purchase, LLC v. Patriot Tax Credit Props., L.P., 746 A.2d 842 (Del. Ch. 1999); KE Prop. Mgmt., 
Inc. v. 275 Madison Mgmt. Corp., CA No. 12683, 1993 WL 285900 (Del. Ch. July 21, 1993).  
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10.2 Justifications in the Context of China’s Private Equity Market 
As it is common that limited partners are seeking more and more management 
rights in the management of the private equity LPs in China, it is suggested that 
the aforesaid ULPA‘s approach should be given consideration by Chinese 
legislators and other law practitioners in China. That is, it is reasonable to impose 
some duties on limited partners should they participate in the management or 
control of the firm. Nevertheless, it is suggested that these duties shall not be 
stipulated in law, but should be specified in partnership agreements on a case by 
case basis. The reason is that different LPs will have different internal 
governance. Logically, there is no need to impose duties of care or loyalty to 
those limited partners who have no management power in the firm. However, for 
those LPs which grant the limited partners substantial management rights, 
necessary duties shall be imposed on them.   
Additionally, an important obligation owned by limited partners is the duty to 
make full contribution to the LP. The PEL provides that a limited partner is 
obliged to make contribution in full as per the partnership agreement. A failure to 
do so shall constitute a breach of partnership agreement on the part of the 
defaulting partner. He has then to make up for the contribution and compensate 
the innocent partner for damages that may have been suffered.
1026
  This statutory 
obligation is of important pragmatic value in China‘s private equity market. Due 
                                                 
1026 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 65. 
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to the financial downturn since 2007, more and more limited partners have 
stopped making contributions to the private equity LPs in China.
1027
 For those 
who breach the duty, they shall bear necessary liability to the firm and the 
general partners. 
11. Conclusion and Recommendations 
This chapter is an inquiry into the theoretical and pragmatic value of fiduciary 
duties in the PRC LP and an attempt to postulate some duties on general partners 
in the PRC LP. Without fiduciary duties and clear statutory duties to cover 
improper conduct by partners, how does one protect the interests of the partners 
and the partnerships become an imperative issue in China. 
First, the chapter concludes that it is not feasible to transfer the fiduciary duty 
from common law to the PRC law because of the different legal cultures and 
judicial systems. This chapter also concludes that many of the contractual 
designs have shortcomings in the context of China. They are uncertain and 
incomplete solutions to the problem of agency costs in private equity LPs. 
Second, the chapter concludes that, as there are relevant provisions providing 
similar protection to the limited partners in the PRC LP, the duty of good faith 
and the duty of disclosure are not necessary to be specified by law. Nevertheless, 
the PEL should provide the statutory duty of loyalty and duty of care on general 
                                                 
1027 See Chen Changquan, (Director of Hangzhou Hi-Tech Venture Capital Co., Ltd) ―Wealth is not equal to 
Limited Partners‖ (2009) Investment and Cooperation vol. 4 (copy in Chinese). 
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partners in the PRC LP. In order to suit the flexible nature of partnerships and to 
make the law predictive, it is suggested that partners shall be permitted to adjust 
or shape their duties through partnership agreements. 
Third, how does one make those duties accessible, certain and feasible in the 
changing business environment in China is a tricky problem for the legislature. 
Admittedly, because of the open-textured nature of the law, draftsmen cannot 
foresee all future circumstance and provide sufficient statutory duties to partners. 
Nevertheless, the primary role of law in this particular matter is to provide a 
menu of different standards to regulate the behavior of partners. Statutory duties 
would serve not just ―prescriptive‖ or ―punitive‖ function, but may enhance the 
freedom of contract among partners, by making it easier for the partnership to 
signal, to respond, and to bond partners to their choices.  
Fourth, simply imposing duties on general partners is not enough to solve the 
conflicts of interest and agency problem within the PRC LP. With constant 
economic and social development, we would realize more ambiguous provisions 
and legislative vacuum regarding partners‘ duties in the PEL. To solve this 
problem, Chinese legislators and courts can refer to the common law cases to see 
how the fiduciary duties of partners are interpreted and implemented there. 
Moreover, the practical significance of the statutory obligation depends on how 
prepared the legislature and judiciary is to create a favorable legal infrastructure 
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for the invocation of the fiduciary principle.
1028
 To make the statutory duties 
more effective in constraining partners‘ malpractice and conduct, Chinese law 
makers and courts shall constantly refine the precise meaning of various duties.  
Fifth, in essence, the duty of loyalty, the duty of good faith and the duty of care 
are ―moral‖ duties. Their value lies on the deep understanding and appreciation 
of mutual trust and good faith among partners. Therefore, fostering a culture of 
trust in China‘s private equity market is vital. Moreover, as private equity is a 
people business in which the investment decisions are mainly taken on the merits 
of people, on the trust that is inspired by teams and managers,
1029
 it is believed 
that sufficient trust and good faith between limited partners and general partners 
would effectively prevent immoral and improper conduct by partners. 
Sixth, without doubt, there are costs and problems for imposing statutory duties 
on partners in the PRC LP. However, it is difficult to quantify the trade-offs 
between the benefits and costs. It is suggested that, the legislature shall not be 
bothered with those arguments against the impositions, but shall promote default 
rules that attract investors and can be expected to be efficient by the targeted 
business community.  
After all, to postulate a duty is simple. To ensure compliance is a more strenuous 
                                                 
1028 See Lee, ―Fiduciary Duty without Equity‖, supra note 862 at text accompanying n 49-50. 
1029 Dominique Peninon (managing partner, of Paris-based fund of funds Access Capital Partners) ―The GP-






 The next chapter will then discuss the legal remedies for breach of the 
duties.  
                                                 
1030 Thévenoz and Bahar, Conflicts of Interest: Corporate Governance and Financial Markets, supra note 
894 at 26. 
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CHAPTER 7  THE LIMITED PARTNER’S DERIVATIVE ACTION  
1. Introduction 
As we discussed in the previous chapter, the duties imposed on general partners 
are important internal mechanisms intended to ensure that general partners act in 
the best interests of the limited partner and the LP. However, there is an 
enforcement problem regarding the breach of duties by general partners that 
results in harm to the LP. 
The limited partner derivative action is an important remedy available to limited 
partners in the LP.
1031
 Since the ULPA 1976, limited partners have been 
authorized to bring the derivative action.
1032





 provide the legal standing for limited partners to bring a 
derivative action ―… in the right of a limited partnership to recover a judgment in 
its favor if general partners with authority to do so have refused to bring the 
action or if an effort to cause those general partners to bring the action is not 
                                                 
1031 In partnership law area, derivative action does not exist in general partnerships. RUPAs do not authorize 
derivative actions. In fact, there is no need to have such judicial mechanism because every partner in a 
general partnership has equal rights and obligations. General partners are not passive investors like minority 
shareholders in the corporation.  
1032 See Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1985) Prefatory Note. The ULPA 1985 and the ULPA 
2001 maintained and improved the derivative action. See §1001-1004 of the Revised Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act 1976 with 1985 Amendments; Uniform Limited Partnership Act §1002-1005 (2001). 
1033 The 1916 and 1976 versions of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act were adopted in 49 states. Uniform 
Limited Partnership Act (2001) was adopted by 15 states. These states all include a derivative action 
provision in their legislation on the LP. See NCCUSL's Legislative Fact Sheet and list of states adopting 
ULPA online:  NCCUSL <http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ulpa.asp> 
1034 Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act Chapter 17.   
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likely to succeed.‖1035 The limited partner‘s derivative action is also frequently 
used to prosecute actions for breaches of fiduciary duty by general partners.
1036
 
In China, Article 68(7) of the PEL, for the first time, provides legal standing for 
the limited partner to pursue a legal action in its own name to safeguard the 
interests of the LP where the executive partner responsible for the conduct of the 
partnership affairs has neglected the exercise of his rights. Strictly speaking, the 
PEL does not provide a regulatory framework governing the derivative action. It 
does not set forth the requirements and procedurals for bringing such an action. 
There is some doubt as to a single legal provision would work effectively as a 
remedy to protect the interests of the limited partner and the LP.  
This chapter seeks to fill the perceived literature and legislative gaps in this 
matter. First, as Article 68(7) is a new provision, there is little academic research 
and judicial practice on this matter in China.
1037
 Moreover, although the 
derivative action issue is widely discussed in corporate law area,
1038
 the limited 
partner derivative action is under-researched.
1039
 Further, many jurisdictions do 
not provide the limited partner derivative action in their LP regimes, such as the 
                                                 
1035 Ibid.  
1036  See Patricia Collins McCullagh, ―Partnership Derivative Suits: Jennings V. Kay Jennings Family 
Ltd.Partnership‖ (2009) 44 U. Rich. L. Rev. 167 [McCullagh]. 
1037 There is a few articles written in Chinese discussing the limited partner derivative action in detail. There 
are some articles discussing this issue briefly. These articles include Mao Ronghua, ―Judicial Responses to 
the Revision to the Partnership Enterprise Law‖ Legal Application (2007) vol.3 (copy in Chinese); Liu Jian, 
―The Establishment of the Limited Partnership System in China‖ Northern Industry University Journal 
(2008) vol.4 (copy in Chinese). 
1038 Arad Reisberg, Derivative Actions in Corporate Governance: Theory and Operation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007) [Reisberg, Derivative Actions in Corporate Governance: Theory and Operation]. 
1039 There are limited articles or books discussing the limited partner‘s derivative action. These papers 
include Helen Hubbard, ―ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES IN MINORITY PARTNERS' SUITS ON 
PARTNERSHIP CAUSES OF ACTION‖ (1986) 39 Sw. L.J. 1021 McCullagh, supra note 1036; Bromberg 
and Ribstein on Partnership, supra note 68 at vol. IV, §15.01.  
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UK, Germany, France and Japan.
1040
 Therefore, in this Chapter, references will 
be mainly given to the US legislation as the limited partner derivative action has 
an over thirty-year history in the US.
1041
  
This chapter seeks to provide an in-depth analysis on the merits and demerits of 
the limited partner derivative action in the context of China. This thesis argues 
that compared to alternative legal remedies available to limited partners in the 
PRC LP, the derivative actions is more effective in reducing agency costs in the 
LP because of its strong deterrent and compensation functions. By examining the 
US‘ legislation on and judicial experience in the limited partner derivative action, 
this chapter identifies the lacuna and problems within the PRC LP and proposes 
recommendations.  
2. Deficiencies within Article 68 of the PEL 
Strictly speaking, the PEL does not provide a regulatory framework governing 
the limited partner derivative action. The requirements and procedurals for 
bringing such an action are not specified by law. The only relevant and 
innovative provision relates to this action is Article 68 of the PEL.  
                                                 
1040 The author has checked the relevant legislation in these jurisdictions and no limited partner derivative 
action is found. See, e.g., Japanese Commercial Code, German Commercial Code and French Commercial 
Code. 
1041 See supra text accompanying note 1033. 
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In fact, the only legal foundation for limited partners to bring an action against 
the ―executive general partners who neglected the exercise of their rights‖ is 
―hiding‖ in the safe harbor list under Article 68. Let us recall this provision:1042 
 “A limited partner may neither carry out the partnership affairs nor 
represent the LP when dealing with other parties. 
The following activities of limited partners shall not be deemed as 
„executing the partnership affairs‟: 
(1) participation in a collective decision to admit or remove a general 
partner; 
(2) making a proposal relating to the business management of the LP firm;  
(3) participation in the selection of an accounting firm to audit the LP firm; 
(4) receiving an audited financial report of the LP firm;  
(5) inspection of accounting books and other financial information of the 
LP business which involve self-interest;  
(6) commencement of legal proceedings against an accountable partner 
when the LP‟s interests have been infringed;  
(7) initiation of legal action in one‟s own name to safeguard the LP‟s 
interests where the executive partner responsible for the conduct of 
partnership affairs has neglected the exercise of his rights; and 
(8)  Providing guarantee for the LP”.   
                                                 
1042 Emphasis Added. 
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In fact, the intended purpose of the Article 68 is to restrain limited partners from 
interfering in management of the business. The safe harbor list merely clarifies 
what activities by limited partners do not constitute ―carrying out partnership 
affairs‖, but does not intend to provide a legal ground of the limited partner 
derivative action.  
The sub-clause (7) of Article 68 is merely one of the safe activities which a 
limited partner can carry out without being deprived of his/her liability shield.
1043
  
Article 68 of the PEL bears substantial resemblances to § 303 of the ULPA 1985 
and § 17-303 of the DRULPA.
1044
 The following Table 6 highlights the 
similarities among these provisions. 
                                                 
1043 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 68(7) states a limited partner will not be deemed as 
managing or conducting the LP‘s activities when it lodges a ―derivative‖ action. 
1044 Although the drafter does not state that the PEL follows American approach in drafting the law. 
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Table 6: Article 68 of the PEL, §303 of the ULPA 1985 and § 17-303 of the 
DRULPA: A Comparison 
Article 68(7) of the PEL §303(b)(4) of the 
ULPA 1985 
§ 17-303 (b) (6) of the 
DRULPA 
Limited partners do not carry 
on partnership affairs, and 
shall not act on behalf of the 
limited partnership. 
The following activities of 
limited partners shall not be 
deemed as ‗executing the 
partnership affairs‘: 
….. 
(7) where the executive 
partner responsible for 
the conduct of 
partnership affairs has 
neglected the exercise 
of his rights, urging the 
partner exercise his 
rights; or initiating a 
legal action in one‘s 
own name to safeguard 
the LP‘s interests; 
…  
 
(b) A limited 
partner does not 
participate in the 
control of the 
business within the 
meaning of 
subsection (a) 
solely by doing one 
or more of the 
following: 
… 
(4) taking any 
action required or 
permitted by law to 
bring or pursue a 
derivative action in 





(b) A limited partner does not 
participate in the control of 
the business within the 
meaning of subsection (a) of 
this section by virtue of 
possessing or, regardless of 
whether or not the limited 
partner has the rights or 
powers, exercising or 
attempting to exercise 1 or 
more of the following rights 
or powers or having or, 
regardless of whether or not 
the limited partner has the 
rights or powers, acting or 
attempting to act in 1 or more 
of the following capacities: 
…… 
(6) To take any action 
required or permitted by law 
to bring, pursue or settle or 
otherwise terminate a 
derivative action in the right 
of the limited partnership. 
… 
§ 303 of the ULPA 1985 and §17-303(b) (6) of the DRULPA are not intended to 
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emphases on the limited partner derivative action because all these Acts have 
already provide a separate section on the derivative action. The purpose of these 
provisions is to clarify that a limited partner‘s participation in a derivative suit 
would not constitute participation in the control of the partnership‘s business and 
thereby would not expose the limited partner to personal liability.  
Unlike the DRULPA, the ULPA 1985 and the ULPA 2001
1045
 which provide 
specific provisions for the limited partner derivative action, the PEL does not 
contain such a foundational provision. The PEL does not define what a derivative 
action is. It fails to spell out any procedural rules:  
 The PEL fails to specify who can be a proper plaintiff of a derivative action. 
For example, whether the plaintiff must be a partner at the time of 
instituting the action?  
 The PEL is silent on whether the limited partner has to meet any eligibility 
requirements. For example, it is not clear whether the limited partner 
should first exhaust its remedies before bringing the derivative action.
1046 
 
 Article 68(7) merely states that ―where the executive partner has neglected 
the exercise of his rights,‖ the limited partner may ―urge the executive 
partner exercise his rights‖. Is it one of the remedies which the plaintiff 
must exercise before pursuing the derivative action? 
 The PEL states that the defendant should be the partner who is responsible 
                                                 
1045 Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act subchapter X; Uniform Limited Partnership Act 
(2001) §1002 and Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1985) Art. 10. 
1046 See Company Law 2005 (PRC) Art.152. See also Qiu, ―The Impact of New Partnership Enterprise Law 
on Venture Capital Activities‖, supra note 532. 
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for the conduct of the partnership affairs but who has neglected to vindicate 
partnership rights. However, what constitutes ―neglect in exercising of 
partner‘s rights‖ remains to be clarified.  
 Who shall bear the expenses of the litigation is missing under the PEL. 
 Who may receive the proceeds or any benefits of a successful action?  
The above lacuna within the PEL is a major problem with regards to limited 
partners‘ right in pursuing a derivative action. Without a clear definition of and 
detailed procedures for the derivative action, the current bare provision cannot be 
viewed as affording effective protection for the limited partners (who lack rights 
to participate in the LP‘s management). 
3. Limited Partners’ Derivative Action: Rationale and Functions 
(1) In corporate law area, the derivative action is an important judicial 
mechanism to protect the interests of the corporation and the minority 
shareholders. It originated as an equitable remedy intended to protect passive 
owners against management abuses.
1047
 It is "... an action brought by one or 
more shareholders [not on the shareholders' own behalf, but on behalf of the 
corporation to remedy or prevent a wrong to the corporation as such rather 
than to the shareholders personally".
1048
 "... by which defrauded minority 
shareholders may call directors, officers, promoters, and controlling 
shareholders [and other wrongdoers] to account for mismanagement, 
                                                 
1047 Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001) comments on §110 (b) (11). 
1048 Robert W. Hamilton, Corporations, 4th ed. (St Paul, Minn: West Publishing Co, 1997) at 509. 
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diversion of assets, and fraudulent manipulation of corporate affairs."
1049
  
Admittedly, the limited partner derivative action is a statutory creation 
analogizing the position of the limited partner to that of the shareholder in 
corporations. Before the ULPA 1976 amendment, a number of courts had 
held that ―just as the cestui que trust and shareholder have the right to 
maintain a derivative action on behalf of the entity, so should the limited 
partner‖.1050  
In the case of Klebanow v. New York Produce Exchange,
1051
 Judge Friendly 
first likened a limited partner to a corporate shareholder and stated that both 
―expecting a share of the profits, subordinated to general creditors, having 
some control over direction of the enterprise by his veto on the admission of 
new partners, and able to examine books and ‗have on demand true and full 
information of all things affecting the partnership‖. 1052 He argued that while 
the corporate shareholder could seek redress through a derivative action, the 
limited partners should also be allowed to pursue claims on behalf of the 





concluded that a limited partner derivative action was the best 
                                                 
1049 James D. Cox and Thomas Lee Hazen, Corporations, 2nd ed. (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2003) at 
419. 
1050 Debra E. Wax, J.D. ―Right of limited partner to maintain derivative action on behalf of partnership‖   26 
A.L.R.4th 264 at § 2. See also Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 298 (2d Cir.1965) 
(New York). 
1051 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965). 
1052 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965). at 5. 
1053  B. Troy Villa, "THE STATUS OF ENFORCING FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN A LIMITED 




alternative in enforcing fiduciary duties.  
(2) The reason that a limited partner can enforce partnership obligations through 
the derivative action in the US is not just because the passive roles of limited 
partners resemble minority shareholders in corporation; but also because 




In fact, limited partners‘ derivative suits are easier to justify than 
shareholders‘ derivative suits. On the one hand, it is more difficult to remove 
a general partner than that in a corporation. Directors of corporations are 
periodically elected but general partners have permanent tenure. Removal of 
general partners usually requires unanimous consent of all the partners. It is 
even more difficult to expel a general partner when there is only one general 
partner who is in charge of the partnership affairs. On the other hand, as 
observed by Bromberg and Ribstein, ―there is no public market for the 
interests in most limited partners, so dissatisfied limited partners cannot 
follow ‗the Wall Street rule‘ and sell out‖.1055 
(3) In the US, the LP‘s strong entity character is another factor justifying limited 
partners‘ derivative actions.1056 In the US, as the LP is a separate legal entity 
from its partners, logically, it is for the LP to enforce rights of action vested 
                                                 
1054  The case has drawn the analogy between limited partners and trust beneficiaries or corporate 
shareholders.  Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership, supra note 68 at vol.IV, §15.01(a) at 15:43. 
1055 Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership, supra note 68 at vol.IV, §15.01(a) at 15:44. 
1056 See generally in Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership, supra note 68 at vol.IV, §15.01(b). 
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in the LP and to sue for wrongs done to it. A limited partner, not being the 
executive general partner of the LP firm, is not allowed to bring a direct suit 
on behalf of the LP firm. Therefore, only a ―derivative‖ action would enable 
the limited partner to pursue a remedy for the interests of limited partners 
and the LP as a whole.  
Of course, such an argument does not apply to the partnership in those 
jurisdictions which do not consider it as a separate legal entity. For example, 
the UK Limited Partnership Act 1907 and the German Commercial Code 
does not regulate the limited partner derivative action. In the UK, a limited 
partner does not have such an authority to bring a derivative action; or even 
to bring an ordinary action on behalf of the firm.
1057
 In Germany, limited 
partners are not entitled to represent the partnership.
1058
 In China, as it is 
clear from the provisions of the PEL that the LP is separated from its 
partners, it is justifiable for the PRC LP to adopt the limited partner 
derivative action.   
(4) Deterrence and compensation are frequently considered as the two major 
justifications of derivative actions in corporate law area.
1059
 On the one hand, 
                                                 
1057 See Limited Partnership Act 1907 (UK) s. 6(1); Lindley and Banks on Partnership, supra note 29 at 
869-870. 
1058 German Commercial Code Book II, § 170. 
1059  For derivative actions‘ deterrent and compensate functions, see John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. 
Schwartz, ―The Survival of The Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and A Proposal for Legislative Reform‖ 
(1981 ) 81 Colum. L. Rev. 261. Reisberg, Derivative Actions in Corporate Governance: Theory and 
Operation, supra note 1038 at 54-66. J Cox ―Compensation, Deterrence and the Market as Boundaries for 
Derivative Suit Procedures‖ (1983) 52 George Washington Law Review 745. J Cox ―The Social Meaning of 
Shareholder Suits‖ (196) 65 Brooklyn Law Review 3.  
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the liability rules enforced by derivative actions play a fundamental role in 
aligning the interests of managers and shareholders.
1060
 In the context of the 
LP, bonding costs incurred by general partners with the purpose of assuring 
limited partners that their interests are being pursued and assuring limited 
partners that they are not simply work for their own personal interests. By 
imposing the threat of liability and therefore align the interests of limited 
partners and general partners, derivative actions operate to reduce these 
bonding costs and deter mismanagement. One the other hand, the derivative 




4. The Need for the Limited Partner Derivative Action in China 
The above two justifications for the limited partner derivative action are readily 
recognisable and can be applied to China. Nevertheless, we shall also consider 
the need for the limited partner derivative action in the context of China. 
4.1 The Practical Desire in China’s Private Equity Market  
From a functional perspective, every creation of judicial remedy shall meet the 
needs of its potential users, namely the plaintiffs, so as to be a valuable and 
                                                 
1060 Reisberg, Derivative Actions in Corporate Governance: Theory and Operation, supra note 1038 at 
section 2.3.3.1. 
1061 Nonetheless, it is admitted that either deterrence or compensation function has its own advantages and 
limitations. Arguably, which of these purposes should be primary justification is important only in designing 
the detailed rules of the derivative suit. John C. Coffee, Jr. and Donald E. Schwartz, ―THE SURVIVAL OF 
THE DERIVATIVE SUIT: AN EVALUATION AND A PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM‖ 
(1981) 81 Colum. L. Rev. 261. 
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feasible legal device.  
Some interviewees pointed out that it was necessary to provide specific rules on 
limited partners‘ derivative actions. They predicted that Chinese limited partners 
would use this legal tool to protect their legitimate rights in the near future.
1062
  
As discussed in Chapter 4, in China‘s private equity and venture capital market, 
it is common for a Chinese fund management company to act as the sole general 
partner for more than one fund at the same time.
1063
 Conflicts of interest 
regarding investment allocation are inevitable in this situation because general 
partners may not treat each fund equally. Thus a private equity LP may suffer 
loss because of the general partner‘s negligent actions or breach of the duty of 
loyalty. It may then in turn diminish or render worthless the interests of the 
limited partner. This seems to be a justification for the limited partner derivative 
action through this remedy limited partner can enforce the LP‘s rights if the 
general partners are unwilling or unable to do so. In this manner, they can 
indirectly protect their interests in the firm.  
4.2 Will Limited Partners Sue? 
Will Chinese limited partners sue? In China, the answer is unclear at the moment 
because the LP was just enacted in 2007. As at the date of this thesis, the author 
                                                 
1062 Telephone interview with Mr. Hu (anonymity requested), associate, Chongqing Zhonghao Law Firm, in 
Chongqing, China (27 October 2009) (on file with author). Telephone interview with Ms. Dai (anonymity 
requested) Associate, Chongqing Zhonghao Law Firm, Chongqing, China (24 October 2009) (on file with 
author). 
1063 See supra text accompanying notes 527-529. 
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has not noticed any case which is initiated by limited partners in China.
1064
 We 
may look for the cultural norms, public image or expressive idea of the derivative 
action in China, and the institutional environment including the level of 
attorneys' fees, the competence of judges etc. 
1065
 
First, in ancient China, the Chinese dislike conflict and strive to maintain group 
cohesiveness and harmony, the peculiarly Chinese concept of he (和) is well 
recognized. 531HConfucius has a famous saying that ―there is no difference between 
judgments made by me and those made by others. My objective is to persuade 
people not to pursue litigation.‖ (听讼 , 吾犹人也 , 必也使无讼乎 ). 1066  
Influenced by Confucianism, ―non-litigation‖ ( 无 讼 ) becomes a special 
phenomenon widely accepted in ancient Chinese society.
 1067
 The essence of 
―non-litigation‖ is that people shall settle dispute through traditional Chinese 
ethics and Chinese patriarchy rather than litigation.  
However, in recent decades, although this traditional negative attitude towards 
litigation still persists, there is a trend that people are becoming more litigious 
                                                 
1064 There is no official national case database in China, thus it is unknown whether there is any suit been 
brought by limited partners. As at the date of 8 July 2010, no limited partner derivative action suit is filed 
with the private online case database developed by Peking University, the Lawyee Net, 
<http://www.lawyee.net/ >. 
1065  For general discussion on the social meaning of shareholders derivative actions, see Reisberg, 
Derivative Actions in Corporate Governance: Theory and Operation, supra note 1038 at 66-75. Arad 
Reisberg ―Shareholders' remedies: the choice of objectives and the social meaning of derivative actions‖ 
(2005) 6(2) E.B.O.R. 227. 
1066《论语》之《颜渊》[Lun Yu at Yan Yuan].  
1067 Chen Xiuping, ― ‗Wu Song‘ and Its Implication on the Establishment of Rule of Law‖ (2005) Journal of 
Hehai University vol.7, No.4 (copy in Chinese). 
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and are more willing to make use of litigation to protect their legal rights.
1068
 
Some interviewees also expressed the positive view that derivative actions will 
be deployed by limited partners in the near future.
1069
 Moreover, it is worth 
mentioning that, although the shareholder derivative action was just transplanted 
into the PRC Company Law 2005,
1070
 it has witnessed the supportive attitudes of 
Chinese courts.
1071




Second, one may not ignore the importance of market reputation in the private 
equity LPs,
1073
 especially in investors‘ selecting process. If a limited partner 
brings an action against a general partner, even it is for the interest of the LP, the 
reputation of the defendant general partner would be adversely affected by the 
law suit. This may make limited partner derivative action an effective deterrence 
for general partners‘ improper managerial acts. 
Indeed, decisions on whether to bring derivative actions are primarily determined 
not by culture, but by economics. In the US corporate law area, the leading cause 
                                                 
1068 See Zhu Xinlin, ―Are Chinese Litigious?‖ (2009) Legal System and Society vol.36 (copy in Chinese). 
1069 An interview with Mr. Hu (anonymity requested), associate of Chongqing Zhong Hao Law Firm on 23 
October 2009. 
1070 For discussion on derivative action under the PRC Company Law 2005, see Zhong Zhang, ―Making 
Shareholder Derivative Actions Happen in China: How Should Lawsuits be Funded?‖ (2008) 38 HKLJ 523; 
Fidy Xiangxing Hong and S.H. Goo, ―Derivative Actions in China: Problems and Prospects‖ (2009) 4 J.B.L. 
376; Hui Huang, ―The Statutory Derivative Action in China: Critical Analysis and Recommendations for 
Reform‖ (2007) 4 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 227. 
1071  In fact, there were some derivative suit cases even before the PRC Company Law 2005. 
See, e.g., Beijing Shidu Merchandise Co, Ltd v. Beijing Shidu Tongmeng Commercial Management Co, Ltd. 
online: <http:// vip.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/slc.asp?db=fnl&gid=117455446> (Accessed on 13 
March 2009). 
1072 ―Shareholder's Derivative Action Involving the Largest Claims in China - 500 Million Awards in the 
First Instance Judgment‖, online: < http://www.mzfz.gov.cn/weiquan/44/2007042329781.html>. 
1073 See supra text accompanying note 792. 
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of derivative suits is plaintiffs' attorneys.
 1074
 If attorneys can win sufficient fee 
awards, and so long as an attorney can find a nominal shareholder willing to lend 
her name to the complaint, suits will be filed.
1075
 In China, it is difficult to 
ascertain exactly what benefits accrue to attorneys in derivative action because 
attorney‘s fee agreements are confidential. Moreover, owing to the uneven 
development of the economy in different places of China, attorneys‘ fee varies 
significantly from place to place.
1076
 The existing fee rules for attorneys have no 
binding effect in practice, but are general guidance only. I leave the difficult task 
of assessing Chinese attorney‘s fees in derivative suits in the future research. 
Third, lawsuits involving the limited partner derivative actions rely heavily on 
the intervention of the power of the judiciary and the support of judicial 
judgment.
1077
 As demonstrated earlier,
1078
 there is a shortage of qualified judges 
in China, especially in those poor and rural places. Arguably, there may be less 
qualified judges in dealing with this technical derivative suit.  
Of course, it is too early to assess how effective and popular the limited partner 
derivative suit will be in China since the LP was enacted in 2007. The following 
section argues that the limited partner derivative action is an effective alternative 
                                                 
1074  Mark D. West, "Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence From Japan" (2001) 30 J. Legal Stud. 351 at 
364. 
1075  Ibid. 
1076 Ascertaining attorneys‘ fees in corporate derivative actions is difficult. Unlike Japanese Commercial 
Code which stipulates that attorneys are entitled to ―reasonable amount‖ of attorneys‘ fees upon plaintiff's 
motion, the PRC Company Law 2005 is silent on this matter. Based on the limited number of published 
judgements of shareholder derivative action in China, no court-awarded derivative-suit fee is found. 
1077 Annie Y.S. Li and Simon S.M. Ho, ―Rebuilding Market Confidence: China's Revised Company Law‖ 
(2006) 27(10) Comp. Law.311 at 315. 
1078 See supra text accompanying notes 895-897 and supra text accompanying note 946. 
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as compared to the other remedies for limited partners in the PRC LP. 
5. Other Remedies for Limited Partners in the PRC LP 
One may then argue that a derivative action system for limited partners is 
redundant because there are alternative devices in the PRC LP which serve 
similar functions as that of the limited partner derivative action. This section 
seeks to examine the possible ways for limited partners to counter general 
partner‘s mismanagement or abuse of discretion under the PRC law and discuss 
whether there are effective, efficient and sufficient enough to mitigate agency 
costs and protect the interests of limited partners and the LP. 
5.1 Actions to Counter Abuses by General Partners 
5.1.1 An Action for Accounting   
Partners are entitled to bring an action against another partner to compel the 
defendant to account to the partnership for civil penalties or to recover proceeds 
or properties wrongfully withheld by the errant partners. For instance, Article 96 
of the PEL provides that a partner shall account to the firm for any benefit 
received by taking the advantage of his position, or for any partnership‘s benefits 
seized by him; or for any illegal obtained partnership property. If his wrongful 
actions cause any loss to the partnership or to other partners, he shall bear the 
compensation civil liabilities as well.   
The PEL also provides that partners shall account to the firm for any benefit 
310 
 
derived by the general partner from any transaction competing with that of the 
partnership, or from any self-dealing business by him with  the partnership. The 
general partner shall bear compensation liabilities
 
if any loss is caused to the 
partnership or to other partners.
 1079
   
It is argued that these enforcement mechanisms serve a strong compensation 
function as that of the derivative action. However, they only deter limited abuses 
by general partners. The scope of application for plaintiffs is much narrower than 
that of the limited partner derivative action. 
5.1.2 An Action for Removal  
Article 49 of the PEL provides that: “Where a partner is under any of the 
following circumstances, a resolution may be made to remove the said partner 
upon the unanimous consent of the other partners: … (2) Causing any loss to the 
partnership enterprise due to intentional or gross negligence; (3) conducting any 
improper action in executing the partnership affairs; and (4) other causes as 
stipulated in the partnership agreement. ” 
While a threat to compel general partners to dissociate from the firm may be an 
effective way to counter abuses of rights by general partners, it may lead to 
significant ramifications, for instance, Article 75 of the PEL provides that a LP 
with only limited partners shall be dissolved. When there is only one general 
                                                 
1079 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art.99. 
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partner in the firm, it may lead to dissolution of the partnership. 
5.1.3 Dissolution 
Article 85 of the PEL also provides several grounds for dissolution of a 
partnership.
1080
 One of the events is that ―the objectives of the partnership cannot 
be achieved.‖ In other words, if it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the 
partnership business, the partnership must be dissolved. As to limited partners, if 
they can prove that the LP could not be reasonably carried on because of the 
alleged wrongdoing of the general partner, the partnership would be at risk of 
dissolution.  
Although aggrieved limited partners may pursue the above two remedies to deter 
errant general partners‘ wrongdoings or omitted action, these remedies might not 
be efficient. There are significant ramification result from dissolution of a 
partnership, especially the financial costs and tax consideration of partners. 
Particularly in the private equity private equity LP which has already made 
substantial investment in portfolio companies, the dissolution might come at 
substantial expense of investors. Furthermore, if the business is profitable, and 
the objective of the derivative action is to counter abuse, it is not helpful to have 
                                                 
1080 These events include: (1) The term of partnership expires and the partners decide not to operate it any 
longer; 
(2) Any of the dissolution causes as stipulated in the partnership agreement occurs;  
(3) All partners make a decision to dissolve it;  
(4) 30 days have lapsed since the number of partners fails to reach the quorum; 
(5) The partnership aim as stipulated in the partnership agreement has been realized or is unable to be 
realized; 
(6) Its business license is revoked, or it is ordered to close up or to be revoked; or 
(7) Other reasons as provided for by any law or administrative regulation.  
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the profitable going concern wound up. Even in the US, dissolution, is often an 
expensive way to enforce fiduciary duties.
1081
 
5.1.4 Limited Partners’ Withdrawal from the LP  
A limited partner may attempt to disassociate and withdraw from the partnership 
if the entire body of limited partners is injured by the actions or omitted actions 
of a general partner. This may be an effective deterrent tool when there is only 
one general partner in the partnership.  
Withdrawing from the partnership when there were still existing claims meant 
that the withdrawing partner would receive too little for his interest
1082
 Also, 
However, withdrawal may not be an optimal solution under the PEL. Pursuant to 
Article 75 of the PEL, in the event that the firm is left with only general partners, 
the LP must be converted to a general partnership enterprise.
1083
 As there is 
specific rule governing the conversion from a LP to a general partnership, if all 
limited partners do not wish to carry on business in conformity with the 
partnership agreement and threaten to dissociate or withdraw from the 
partnership; the general partners would have to dissolve the LP first then convert 
it to a general partnership. This would incur unnecessary formation and 
dissolution costs and would have significant ramification to the business of the 
                                                 
1081  B. Troy Villa, ―THE STATUS OF ENFORCING FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN A LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP AFTER DUPUIS v. BECNEL CO.‖ (1989) 49 La. L. Rev. 1217 at text accompanying n 
24. 
1082 See supra note 1053. 
1083 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 24; See also Li, Interpretation of Partnership Enterprise 
Law, supra note 369 at 122. However, the precise manner in which a LP converts to a general partnership 




5.2 Summary of Section 5 
The foregoing discussion in Section 4 suggests that there are various intra-
partnership solutions for a Chinese limited partner to deter abuses of rights by 
general partner, but these mechanisms are not entirely effective or efficient. 
There are limitations and constraints on the effectiveness of these tools in 
reducing agency costs. The limited partner derivative action is arguably more 
effective in achieving these objectives; even though it involves substantial 
litigation costs, and may not be necessarily efficient. At the very least, it grants 
limited partners an additional right to sue for the interest of the LP and the whole 
limited partners. 
Besides the aforesaid remedies to limited partners, Chapter 6, Section 5.4 also 
examines the effectiveness of the personal liability of general partner, the 
contractual designs, the market reputation and the internal governance 
mechanisms in preventing general partners‘ mismanagement and abuse in the 
PRC LP. However, it concludes that these mechanisms appear to be an uncertain 
or ineffective solution to the problem of agency in China‘s private equity LPs.1084 
Particularly, although the market reputation of the general partners may be 
alternative external mechanisms to mitigate agency costs within a LP, unforeseen 
contingencies still exist. Moreover, the market reputation cannot replace the 
                                                 
1084  Supra text accompanying note 805. 
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derivative action as it does not have the compensation function. Moreover, the 
function of this internal governance mechanism is different from that of the 
limited partner derivative action in the sense that the latter has deterrent and 
compensation function should general partners breach their statutory duties or 
fail to act within their authority to exercise the legitimate rights of the LP. The 
former, however mainly serves as a monitor in general partners‘ decision making 
process.  
The next section will focus on the derivative action under the PEL and discuss in 
what ways the existing rules can work effectively.  
6. Making the Limited Partner’s Derivative Action Work in China 
6.1 Scope of Application 
6.1.1 Who are the Defendants? 
Pursuant to Article 68(7) of the PEL, the defendant of the limited partner 
derivative action is limited to the ―executive partner who has neglected to 
vindicate partnership rights‖ only. However, the PEL is silent on what constitutes 
―neglect in exercising of partner‘s rights‖.  
At common law, a derivative claim exists when the entire body of limited 





 Limited partners are entitled to bring a derivative action to 
enforce a LP‘s right or remedy a wrong to the LP where the general partner, or 
other party authorized to act for the partnership, fails or refuses to do so.
1086
 The 
ULPA 1985 provides that a limited partner may bring a derivative action if 
general partners with authority to do so have refused to bring the action or if an 




Compared to the DRULPA and the ULPA2001, the scope of application under 
Article 68(7) is too narrow.
1088
 It is suggested that the PEL ought to provide a 
broader scope of application for a limited partner plaintiff. It is suggested that the 
gravamen of the limited partner plaintiff should include any injury or wrong done 
by the general partner to the partnership; and the legitimate rights of the 
partnership which are sought to be vindicated.  
6.1.2 Derivative Action Against a Former General Partner? 
Another question needs to be considered is whether the derivative action could 
be brought against a former general partner who fails to exercise the legitimate 
rights of the LP. The ULPA 1985 and ULPA 2001 do not consider a former 
                                                 
1085 See Fletcher, B William Meade et al., Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations (Thomson West, 
2009) at § 5911. 
1086 See Callison and Sullivan, Partnership Law and Practice, supra note 872 at Chapter 28. 
1087 Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act §1002 (1985). 
1088 See Table 4 in this thesis. 
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general partner as a proper defendant.
1089
 
In the context of China, it is undesirable to pursue a derivative action against a 
former general partner. The reason is that the PEL has provided a compensation 
mechanism for a former partner to bear liability for the debts incurred before his 
joining to the firm. Pursuant to Article 44 of the PEL, a general partner will 
assume joint liability with the existing partners for the debts incurred by the 
partnership before his joining to the firm.
1090
  In addition, Article 53 of the PEL 
provides that dissociated general partners shall bear jointly liability for the debts 
of the firm incurred before his dissociation from the firm. 
Given the fact that these statutory provisions actually impose liability burden 
should a former general partner fails to exercise his or her rights and cause harm 
to the firm, there is no need to additionally burden former director with the 
liability arising from a derivative suit.  
6.2 Who is the Proper Plaintiff? 
Article 68(7) of the PEL indicates that the right to bring a derivative action 
belongs to limited partners; but it is silent on whether the limited partner must be 
a limited partner at the time of the impugned transaction(s) that is the subject of 
complaint; or whether the limited partner must be a limited partner at the time of 
                                                 
1089  Uniform Limited Partnership Act §1002 (2001); Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 
1001(1985). 
1090 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 44; Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 77 
provides that a new limited partner must bear liabilities to the extent of his capital contribution even for the 
firm‘s debts incurred before he joins the firm.  
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suit. It is the purpose of the following part to inquire into these important issues. 
6.2.1 A Limited Partner at the Time of Transaction or Suit? 
Pursuant to ULPA 1985 and the ULPA 2001,
1091
 a proper plaintiff of a derivative 
action: 
(1) must be a partner at the time of bringing the action‖, and that was 
a partner when the conduct giving rise to the action occurred‖; or 
(2) whose status as a partner devolved upon the person by operation 
of law or pursuant to the terms of the partnership agreement from 
a person that was a partner at the time of the conduct. 
 
These provisions actually permit a partner to bring a derivative claim in respect 
of wrongs committed after he becomes a partner, but not prior to his becoming a 
partner. This is understandable as it prevents those incoming partners who tend to 
get the benefits of successful derivative actions.  
In the context of the PRC LP, Article 24 of the PEL provides that an external 
assignee of partnership shares can be a partner after revision of partnership 
agreements. If the law permits an external assignee of partnership shares to bring 
                                                 




a derivative claim in respect of wrongs committed prior to his becoming a partner, 
it may induce opportunistic litigation by the partner.  
Therefore, the PEL ought to prevent those incoming partners from gaining illegal 
benefits from derivative suits. The PEL shall follow the ULPA 2001‘s approach 
by requiring a limited partner to possess the requisites before bringing a 
derivative action.  
6.2.2 Fairly and Adequately Representing the LP? 
Another policy question that follows is: whether the limited partner plaintiff can 
fairly and adequately represent the LP? Put differently, whether the limited 
partner plaintiff is acting in good faith in bringing the derivative action? This 
question is crucial because unlike the direct action which belongs to the plaintiff 
individually, the limited partner derivative action belongs to the LP as a whole. In 
addition, this requirement would arguably serve as a function to deter any abuse 
of the derivative action by bad faith limited partners. 
It is useful to look at other jurisdictions‘ approach when addressing this issue. 
US-Virginia is advanced in dealing with this issue. It provides statutory provision 
requiring that “the derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the 
plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the limited 
partners and the partnership in enforcing the right of the partnership”.1092 It also 
                                                 
1092 Va. Code Ann. § 50-73.62 (Repl. vol. 2009). 
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requires that, ―on termination of the derivative action, the court may require the 
plaintiff to pay any defendant's reasonable expenses, including reasonable 
attorney's fees, incurred in defending the action if it finds that the action was 
commenced without reasonable cause or the plaintiff did not fairly and 
adequately represent the interests of the limited partners and the partnership in 
enforcing the right of the partnership.‖ 1093 
How does one define the meaning of ―fairly and adequately representing the 
interests of other limited partners and a partnership‖? There are cases which rule 
that a plaintiff whose interest is adverse to the limited partners is not an adequate 
representative of the LP firm.
1094
 In 2009, the Supreme Court of Virginia in the 
case Jennings v. Kay Jennings Family Ltd. Partnership,
1095
 established the 
criteria for determining when a limited partner ―fairly and adequately represent[s] 
the interests of other limited partners and a partnership‖.1096 
In Jennings v. Kay Jennings Family Ltd. Partnership, a limited partner filed a 
derivative action on behalf of the partnership. The case suggested that the 
―economic antagonisms between plaintiff limited partner and other limited 
partners‖ was a key factor in precluding a plaintiff from representing the interests 
of the limited partners or the partnership for purposes of bringing the derivative 
action.  
                                                 
1093 Ibid. 
1094 Frazier v. Manson, 651 F. 2d 1078, 1081 (5th Cir. 1981). Allright Missouri, Inc. v. Billeter, 829 F.2d631, 
639 (8th CIR. 1987), cited in Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership, supra note 68 at vol.IV, §15.05(d) at 
15:54, n 49.  
1095 275 Va. 594, 659 S.E.2d 283 (2008). 
1096 For discussion on this case, see McCullagh, supra note 1036. 
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The Supreme Court of Virginia cited the Davis v. Comed Inc 
1097
 and concluded 
that the limited partner lacked standing to bring the suit because he had economic 
interests different from those of the partnership. In the Davis v. Comed In, an 
eight-part test was established to determine the standing requirement of fair and 
adequate representation in derivative suits. They are ―(1) the economic 
antagonism between the plaintiff limited partner and other limited partners, (2) 
the plaintiff's enumerated remedy, (3) whether the plaintiff is the driving force 
behind the litigation, (4) the familiarity of plaintiff with the litigation, (5) other 
existing litigation between the parties, (6) the magnitude of the plaintiff's 
personal interest compared with his interest in the derivative claims, (7) any 
vindictiveness between the parties, and (8) any support or approval obtained 
from other limited partners.‖1098 
Judge McWeeny in Jennings v. Kay Jennings Family Ltd. Partnership mainly 
focused on two major elements and found that: (1) the plaintiff‘s interests were 
different from those of the partnership. There are several examples for such an 
economic antagonism.
1099
 A significant consideration is whether there is a 
conflict of interest between his interest as the owner of the dealership in 
                                                 
1097 619 F. 2d 588 (6th Cir. 1980). 
1098 Davis v. Comed, Inc., 619 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1980) at 593-94. Cited in McCullagh, supra note 1036 at n 
45. 
1099 Patricia Collins McCullagh summarized the five examples from the judgement of the case ―First, as a 
principal of DAMN, LLC--the owner of the Property--Michael had an adverse economic interest in securing 
as much rental income from the Partnership as possible. Second, as the subtenant to the Lease, he had the 
adverse economic interest of paying the Partnership as little rent on the Lease as possible. Third, Michael 
had a personal interest in expanding the dealership by subordinating the Partnership's interest to his own 
construction loan. Fourth, when offering to purchase his siblings' partnership interest in the Partnership, 
Michael had expressed an interest in "control [ling] the partnership and the land." Finally, on behalf of 
DAMN, LLC, he had instigated and participated in arbitration proceedings against the Partnership regarding 
a rent dispute.‖  McCullagh, supra note 1036 at text accompanying n 49-53. 
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diminishing rent and the partnership‘s interest in maximizing the rent. (2) The 




In the context of China, the eight-part test established in Davis v. Comed Inc and 
the requirement of "fairly and adequately represent the interests of the limited 
partners and the partnership in enforcing the right of the partnership" might not 
be viable currently as there is still a shortage of qualified judges in China.
 1101
  
Nevertheless, Chinese court may nonetheless refer to the body of Anglo-
American cases to see how they interpret vague and open-ended standards in 
limited partner derivative suits.  
6.3 Exhaustion of Remedies? 
The prerequisites for limited partners to bring a derivative action are not 
addressed by the PEL: 




(2) Article 68(7) merely state that ―where the executive partner responsible 
for the conduct of partnership affairs has neglected the exercise of his rights,‖ the 
limited partner may ―urge the executive partner to exercise his rights‖. However, 
                                                 
1100 McCullagh, supra note 1036 at n 57. 
1101 See supra text accompanying notes 895-897 and supra text accompanying note 946. 
1102 See PRC Company Law (2005) Art. 152; Qiu, ―The Impact of New Partnership Enterprise Law on 
Venture Capital Activities‖, supra note 532. 
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the PEL fails to state that the plaintiff must urge the executive partner to exercise 
his rights first before bringing a derivative action.  
Without clarification of the above matters, the limited partner derivative action 
would be difficult to pursue and a defendant would easily defend the pleading. It 
is suggested that prerequisites of a derivative action is necessary to reduce or 
avoid unnecessarily litigation costs and expenses. 
At common law, limited partners shall take certain procedural steps prior to filing 
a derivative action.
1103
 Under various RULPAs and the ULPA 2001, procedurally, 
the limited partner must firstly show that the limited partner has made a demand 
and the general partners‘ response to the demand, such as general partner(s) have 
failed to act upon the request of the limited partner. The limited partner does not 
need to make a demand if the general partner can show that such a demand 
would be futile.
1104
 For example, when the errant general partner is the 
defendants; the limited partner plaintiffs were denied access to the partnership 
books or investment materials; the only third party is the defendant. 
1105
 
It is suggested that the PEL or the future judicial interpretations on the PEL ought 
to provide similar guidelines as below: 
                                                 
1103 See Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership, supra note 68 at vol.IV, §15.05(d) at 15:51-15:53. 
1104 Uniform Limited Partnership Act §1004 (2001) provides ―In a derivative action, the complaint must 
state with particularity: 
            (1) the date and content of plaintiff‘s demand and the general partners‘ response to the demand; or 
            (2) Why demand should be excused as futile.‖ 
1105 See Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership, supra note 68 at vol.IV, §15.05(g) at 15:65. 
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  In a derivative action, the complaint must state with particularity: 
(1) The date and content of plaintiff‟s demand and the general partners‟ 
response to the demand; or 
(2) Why demand should be excused as futile. 
Additionally, while the law has not made any effort to revise the existing rule, 
partners may always prescribe prerequisites for bringing a derivative action in 
the partnership agreement, such as: 
(1) waiting for the expiration of the time deadline for the general partner 
to act after receiving such a request from the limited partner in spite of urgent 
circumstances that may cause incurable damage to the LP in the absence of 
immediate action; and  
(2) consulting other limited partners and ascertaining whether other 
limited partners would support the derivative action. For example, a demand of 
limited partner can be satisfied by the errant general partner‘s exercising of 




It is believed that a consultation or conversation among limited partners may 
reduce or eliminate the prospect of a limited partner to bring an action. It may 
                                                 
1106 See Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership, supra note 68 at vol. IV, §15.05(d). 
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also prevent a bad faith limited partner (who is not seeking the whole interest of 
limited partners, but who is holding an economic conspiracy for himself) from 
bringing a derivate action.    
6.4 Security, Expenses and Proceeds 
6.4.1 Security for Expenses 
The PEL is silent on the security requirement of bringing a derivative action. 
Security for expenses is an effective mean to deter abuse of derivative actions in 
practice, so as to avoid unnecessary expenses for both sides. However, the 
security for expenses is useful only when the limited partner plaintiff acts in bad 
faith in bringing such a derivative action. A burdensome security for expenses 
may become an inappropriate disincentive to the aggrieved limited partner.  
Various RULPAs and the ULPA 2001 do not provide such requirements either. 





security for expenses is required. Particularly, California placed several 
conditions for requesting a security for expenses,
1109
 including: ―after hearing, 
the court determines that the party asking security has established a probability 
that (1) there is no reasonable possibility that the cause of action will benefit the 
partnership or the partners or (2) the party asking security (other than the 
                                                 
1107 NewYork Partnership Law §121-1003. See Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership, supra note 68 at vol. 
IV, §15.05(g) at 15:66. 
1108 California Corporation Code §15702(a) (1) and (e). See Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership, supra 
note 68 at vol. IV, §15.05(g) at 15:66. 
1109 California Corporation Code §15702(e). See Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership, supra note 68 at 
vol. IV, §15.05(h) at 15:70. 
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partnership) did not participate in the transaction that is the subject of 
complaint.‖   
It is suggested that California‘s approach, where there appears an appropriate 
balancing of the parties‘ interests, is noteworthy; it could perhaps be emulated 
with the appropriate modifications. The Californian model bears some obvious 
merits: on the one hand, it provides a security for expense to prevent 
unmeritorious suits (such as, the plaintiff sues for the benefit of another; or there 
is reason to belief that he will be unable to pay the costs of the defendant). On the 
other hand, it provides conditions to avoid making security for expenses an 
inappropriate disincentive to the aggrieved limited partner.
1110
   
Considering that the professionalism expertise of Chinese judges vary from place 
to place, and different courts may set forth different conditions to order security 
for expenses, it is suggested that  that People‘s Courts of PRC ought not be given 
such a wide discretion to order security whenever it thinks fit. The requirements 
and conditions of security for expenses should be specifically spelt out by law.  
6.4.2 Who Bears the Expenses? 
The issue of who is to bear the expenses of the derivative action is not addressed 
by the PEL. Indeed, the issue of costs has a great impact on the utility of the 
                                                 
1110 Note that Japan does not have limited partner derivative action. Japanese corporate rules, modelled after 
that of California, allow the court, at the request of the defendant, to order the shareholder-plaintiff to 
furnish adequate security. See Mark D. West, ―The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions in Japan and 





 From the economic perspective, the cost of litigation is a 
major disincentive for limited partners to bring a derivative action. Meanwhile, 
the possibility of recovering costs and fees are important incentives for limited 
partners to commence derivative actions.
1112
 
In the US, a limited partner shall by default pay the expenses of the derivative 
suit. “If a derivative action is successful in whole or in part, the court may award 
the plaintiff reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorney‟s fees, from the 
recovery of the limited partnership.”1113  
In Smith v. Croft,
1114
 Walton J held that a shareholder‘s ability to finance the 
action himself will be a relevant question of whether the court will make a costs 
order. It is suggested that an analogy can be made to the limited partner 
derivative action in China. We need to consider a limited partner‘s ability to 
finance the action himself. 
On the one hand, in the context of PRC private equity LPs, the majority of 
limited partners are private enterprises and wealthy individuals. There is a trend 
that National Pension Funds, Industrial Investment Funds, insurance companies 
and other institutional limited partners will become the mainstream of Chinese 
                                                 
1111 Reisberg, Derivative Actions in Corporate Governance: Theory and Operation, supra note 1038 at 225. 
See generally Mark D. West, ―Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence From Japan‖ (2001) 30 J. Legal Stud. 
351; A Williams, ―Japan‘s Recipe for Dispute Resolution‖ (1996) International Commercial Litigation 24. 
1112 See Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership, supra note 68 at vol. IV, §15.05(d) at 15:56. 
1113 Uniform Limited Partnership Act §1005 (2001); Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 
17-1004(b).  
1114 [1986] 1 WLR 580. 
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limited partner‘s community.1115 There is little doubt as to these limited partners 
will be unable to pay the expenses of the derivative suit. Therefore, it is 
reasonable for China to follow the international practice and to require limited 
partners to pay the expenses of the derivative suit.  
On the other hand, for cases of economic nature in China, plaintiffs of civil suits 
have to advance the filing fees based on the sliding scale relative to the amount 
of damages claimed.
1116
 Plaintiffs will have to pay application fees for 
enforcement of the judgments. The application fees is payable according to the 
amounted claimed for enforcement.
 1117
 In this respect, Chinese plaintiffs would 
have to pay substantial financial fees if the claims of amount are large. Therefore, 
it is also appropriate for the court to award the plaintiff reasonable expenses, 
including reasonable attorney‘s fees, filling fees and application fees, from the 
recovery of the LP. 
Perhaps Japanese experience in dealing with corporate derivate action may shed 
light on this issue. In Japanese shareholder derivative action, pursuant to the 
commercial code, attorneys are entitled to ―reasonable amount‖ of attorneys‘ fees 
upon plaintiff's motion. Japanese courts also routinely used the specific Fee 




                                                 
1115 See supra text accompanying note 540 and supra text accompanying notes 671-676. 
1116 Regulation Measures on Filling Fees 2007 (PRC) State Council No.481, Art. 13.  
1117 Regulation Measures on Filling Fees 2007 (PRC) State Council No.481, Art. 14.  
1118 Mark D. West, ―Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence From Japan‖ (2001) 30 J. Legal Stud. 351 at 367. 
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In view of the above, it is suggested that the PEL ought to provide that, generally, 
it is for limited partner plaintiffs to pay the expense of the suit, but the court may 
award the plaintiff reasonable expenses if the derivative action is successful.  
6.4.3 Who Receives the Proceeds? 
The PEL is silent as to who shall receive the proceeds or benefits of a successful 
derivative proceeding. To answer this question, one may recall that a limited 
partner‘s derivative claim is a protection of the LP firm when the entire body of 
limited partners is injured by the actions or omitted actions for which a complaint 
has been submitted. Derivative claims are ones that belong to firm rather than the 
individual limited partner.
1119
 Therefore, the proceeds of benefits of a derivative 
action should be owned by the LP firm but not to the derivative plaintiff.  
The international practice is that, the benefit goes to the LP firm. The RUPAs and 
the ULPA 2001 specify that any proceeds or other benefits of a derivative action, 
whether by judgment, compromise, or settlement, belong to the LP and not to the 
derivative plaintiff. If the derivative plaintiff receives any proceeds, the 
derivative plaintiff shall immediately remit them to the LP.
1120
 
One may argue that if China adopts such an approach, limited partners‘ 
derivative claims would be extremely rare in China. The reason is that those who 
bring an action will not directly benefit from the suit, but have to share the 
                                                 
1119 See McCullagh, supra note 1036 at 168. 




proceeds with other limited partners and general partners. Nevertheless, it is 
argued that the interests of the LP and the interests of limited partners are 
generally aligned, especially in China‘s private equity LPs. Over the long run, 
limited partners and the LP firm may benefit together from these proceeds. 
Moreover, one shall recall that a derivative action is necessary because of its 
compensation and deterrence functions. The expectation for limited partners to 
bring a derivative action is not just to receive the proceeds from successful 
litigation, but also to deter misconduct of the errant general partner.   
It is thus recommended that the proceeds of a successful action ought to be 
awarded to the LP and not to the limited partner(s) who initiated the litigation. 
7. Conclusion and Recommendations 
Though the PEL does not endorse a good intent to set up a derivative action 
system, Article 68(7) of the PEL indeed grants the right for limited partners to 
lodge an 532Haction in the name of the LP against errant executive general partners 
who have neglected exercising his or her right for the interests of the LP. 
Arguably, compared to other intra-partnership dispute resolutions and external 
mechanisms for restricting agency problem, such as dissolution of partnership, 
removal of general partners, and market reputation of general partners, the 
derivative action may not be more efficient; but it is more effective in the sense 
that it has strong deterrent functions. It is suggested that the limited partner 
derivative action shall be adopted in China. 
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To balance the interests of plaintiff limited partners and defendant general 
partners, it is recommend that the derivative action should be brought by a simple 
and modern procedure; but should be subject to tight judicial control at all stages. 
First, the proposed gravamen of the limited partner plaintiff should include any 
injury or wrong done by the general partner to the partnership; and the legitimate 
rights of the partnership which are sought to be vindicated. Second, the limited 
partner must have been a partner or possessed the rights of a partner at the time 
the claim arose and at the commencement of the action before bringing a 
derivative action. Third, in a derivative action, the complaint must state with 
particularity the date and content of plaintiff‘s demand and the general partners‘ 
response to the demand; or why demand should be excused as futile before 
bringing a derivative action. Fourth, a derivative plaintiff shall post a certain 
amount of security for the expenses and attorneys fees of the partnership and 
defendants under specific circumstances. Fifth, the limited partner plaintiff shall 
pay the expense of the suit, but the court may award the plaintiff reasonable 
expenses if the derivative action is successful. The proceeds of a successful 
action ought to be awarded to the LP and not to the limited partner who initiated 
the litigation. 
Finally, it is believed that with the development of China‘s limited partners‘ 
community and the future possible amendments to the PEL, the limited partner‘s 
derivative action may be a handy remedy to aggrieved limited partners. Since the 
LP was adopted in 2007 and there is little judicial practice on this matter, we 
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have to wait and ascertain whether the derivative action would be an effective 
and efficient remedy for limited partners in China. 
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PART III EXTERNAL RULES WITHIN THE PRC LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP 
CHAPTER 8 LIABILITY OF LIMITED PARTNERS AND CREDITORS’ 
RIGHTS UNDER THE PRC LP 
1. Introduction 
After examining the internal relations between limited partners and general 
partners, it is time to discuss the external rules govern the external relations 
between the LP and outsiders.
1121
 
Liability of partners and creditors‘ rights in the bankruptcy of the partnership are 
the two major issues regarding the external relationships between a LP and 
outsiders.
1122
 ―It is universally accepted that liability issues in business drive a 
number of decisions that business persons make in today's environment.‖1123 It is 
also universally acknowledged that creditors‘ rights affect the creditworthiness of 
a particular business firm.  
Unfortunately, the PEL fails to address these two issues adequately. First, there is 
                                                 
1121 The PEL provides a separate chapter dealing with the external relationship between the partnership 
enterprise and its third parties.  
1122 Partners‘ liability issue and creditors‘ rights in the LP has been explored extensively in literature, see, 
e.g., Daniel S. Kleinberger, ―A User's Guide to the New Uniform Limited Partnership Act‖ (2004) 37 
Suffolk U. L. Rev. 583 (discussing the Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability under the Uniform 
Limited Partnership Act 2001); Wilke, supra note 590 (examining three recurrent partnership scenarios in 
which the underlying dispute implicates agency norms).  
1123 Lauris G.L. Rall, ―A General Partner‘s Liability under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001)‖ 
(2004) 37 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 913 at 914. 
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no consensus as to the scope of protection of limited partners in a PRC LP. It is 
not clear whether limited liability provided by the PEL can shelter the personal 
assets of the limited partners from the creditors of the LP. Second, the PEL fails 
to cover the situation when there are ―concurrent debts‖ for both the partnership‘s 
creditors and the partners‘ creditors. It is not clear which creditor has priority 
over the assets of the partnership or the assets of individual partners. 
In the context of China‘s private equity market, how does one protect the rights 
of creditors of a debtor partnership and creditors of debtor partners is a major 
issue. Recent news has reported that due to recent economic crisis, a number of 
limited partners failed to make full contributions to the firm as promised.
1124
  
Moreover, two noted private equity firms collapsed due to the fraudulent 





 also observed that the ambiguity within the PEL was a 
major defect of the PEL. Such legislative gaps would inevitably affect the 
stability and creditworthiness of the LP, thus may reduce the popularity of the LP.   
This chapter attempts to discover these ―blind spots‖ with regards to the external 
issues of the PRC LP from the asset partitioning perspective. This thesis suggests 
that whether a strong or weak entity shielding should be adopted in the PRC LP 
                                                 
1124 Chen Wei, ―The Fact that Limited Partners Stop Making Contribution has Become a New Problem in 
the Private Equity Market‖ Securities Times (11 October 2008) (copy in Chinese). 
1125 See supra note 744. 
1126 Telephone interview with Ms. Li (anonymity requested), Legal Counsel of the China Construction 
Bank, Shanghai branch on 23 September 2009; telephone interview with Ms. Shao (anonymity requested) 
associate of the Beijing Global Law Firm on 16 October 2009. 
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depends on the legislative objective of the PRC LP and the business needs of the 
users of the PRC LP. Considering that the PRC LP is commonly structured as an 
asset-pooling vehicle in China, partners‘ creditors shall be precluded from 
recovering out of partnership's assets when they have exhausted efforts to get 
recovery out of partners‘ assets. Namely, a stronger entity shielding shall be 
adopted. This would help shield partnerships' assets from the claims of personal 
creditors and protects the assets of the fund.  
This chapter also argues that the PRC LP is not embodied with a strong owner 
shielding in the sense that limited partners still have to be personally liable for 
the debts of the firm in specific circumstances. Given the importance of limited 
liability in the usage of the LP, and the legislative goal of the PRC LP, this 
chapter suggests that a fuller owner shielding shall be provided to the limited 
partners.   
2. Problems regarding Concurrent Debts within the PRC LP 
The PEL fails to cover the situation when there are ―concurrent debts‖ (双重债
权) for both the creditor of the partnership and the creditor of the partners. 
Particularly, the PEL is silent on the following question: if both the partnership 
and its partners are insolvent, it is not clear whether partnership creditors have 
prior claim over partners‘ creditors in the division of partnership assets or 
whether partners‘ creditors have prior claim over partnership creditors in the 
division of partners‘ assets.  
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2.1 The Dual Priority Rule? 
Solvent partners of bankrupt partnerships have a self interest in minimizing their 
contributions toward the payment of the firm's liabilities. Conversely, creditors of 
bankrupt partnerships want to maximize their debts at minimum cost and leave to 
the partners the costs of apportioning the partners' liability.
1127
 Thus, to fill the 
legislative gap within the PEL, we need to balance the interests of both parties.  
The Dual Priority Rule is also termed as the ―Jingle‖ Rule.1128 This rule is still in 
force in England.
1129
 Although formalizing the 1683 case Craven v. Knight
1130
 
and 1715 case Ex parte Crowder,
1131
 the rule remains effective in England. This 
rule gives partnership creditors priority as to partnership property and partners‘ 
creditor priority as to partner‘s property. Only when there is excess of the assets 
of a bankrupt partnership, can the remaining assets be made available to the 
partners‘ personal creditors. Only when there is excess of the assets of a bankrupt 
partner, can the remaining assets be made available to the partnership creditors.  
From the perspective of asset partitioning, the Dual Priority Rule exhibits a weak 
entity shielding and a weak owner shielding, thus a weak level of asset 
partitioning. It does not shield a partnership‘s assets from the personal creditors 
of its partners. Personal creditors of partners may still levy on partnership assets, 
                                                 
1127 Ribstein, Larry E., ―The Illogic and Limits of Partners' Liability in Bankruptcy‖ (1997) 32 Wake Forest 
L. Rev. 31 at 34.  
1128 In Chinese, it is termed as ―双重优先权原则‖. 
1129 Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78 at 1381. 
1130 (1683) 21 Eng. Rep. 664 (Ch.). 
1131 (1715) 23 Eng. Rep. 1064(Ch.). 
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but only if the partnership creditors have first been paid in full. Meanwhile, it 
does not shield a partner‘s assets from the creditors of the firm. 
By the early nineteenth century, the US courts had followed England and adopted 
the Jingle Rule.
 1132
 The US courts held that ―personal judgment creditors of a 
partner could demand immediate liquidation of partnership assets and reduction 
of the partner's share to cash, even if the partnership was for a defined term that 
had yet to expire or the partners had otherwise agreed among themselves to 
restrict liquidation.‖1133  
However, the Dual Priority Rule was in force in the United States until 1978.
 1134
 
The UPA also removed this rule in 1994 so as to follow the Bankruptcy Code 
1978.
 1135
 It removes partners‘ creditors‘ priority in partners‘ assets where both 
the partner and the partnership are debtors in bankruptcy.
1136
  
2.2 Recommendations  
Many Chinese judges and legal practitioners support the Dual Priority rule.
 1137
 
They argue that the Dual Priority Rule balances the interests of both the 
                                                 
1132 Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78 at 1388. 
1133 Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78 at 1388. See, e.g., Renton v. Chaplain, 
9 N.J. Eq. 62, 64 (Ch. 1852); Marquand v. President of the N.Y. Mfg. Co., 17 Johns. 525, 528-29 (N.Y. 
1820). 
1134 Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78 at 1381. 
1135 Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1997), comments on §807. 
1136 Bankruptcy Code §723(c) (1978).  
1137See, e.g., Shi Huifang, ―How Does One Pay Debts when there is Conflicts Between Partnerships‘ Debts 
and Partners‘ Individual Debts‖, online: Chinese Court Net 
<http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=211216>; cf. Li Shenglan and Feng Xi, ―An Economic 
Analysis on the Rules of Partnership‖ (2006) Academic Research vol.10 (arguing that partnership creditors 
shall always have a prior claim over the firm assets) (copy in Chinese). 
337 
 
partnership‘s creditor and the partners‘ creditors.1138  
It is suggested that whether this approach should be taken in the PRC 
partnerships (including general partnerships and LPs) is largely depends on the 
legislative objective of PRC partnerships and the actual business needs of the 
users of the partnerships. Particularly, in the context of the PRC LP, if the 
objective is to favor limited partners, e.g., the investors in the private equity fund, 
a stronger owner shielding shall be provided to the partners. Pursuant to this 
regime, if the partnership‘s assets are insufficient to pay its debts and the 
partner‘s personal assets are insufficient to pay his or her personal debts, 
partnership creditors cannot levy on the assets of the limited partners. 
On the contrary, if the legislature intended more to protect the partnership 
creditors than to make assets available to personal creditors of partners, then a 
stronger entity shielding shall be provided to the partnerships. Pursuant to this 
regime, in the context of the PRC LP, if the partnership‘s assets are insufficient to 
pay its debts and the general or limited partner‘s personal assets are insufficient 
to pay his or her personal debts, partnership creditors have priority over the 
general or limited partners‘ individual creditors in the assets of the partnership.  
It is worth mentioning that, in the context of China, a private equity fund is 
usually set up as a LP to make investment in portfolio companies. Generally, the 
source for the portfolio companies mainly comes from the private equity fund 
                                                 
1138See, e.g., Shi, supra note 1137.  
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and/or from debt financing. There is a situation where creditors of the LP may 
play a substantial part in funding the portfolio companies. That is the situation 
where the private equity investment is highly leveraged with debt financing (the 
so-called ―leveraged buy-out‖ (LBO)). Under this circumstance, creditors of the 
LP (or the LBO sources) are often commercial banks or other financial 
institutions. To ensure more LBO sources to finance the portfolio companies, it is 
essential to have a well-designed legal rule to protect the interest of the creditor 
of the LP. In this circumstance, a stronger entity shielding shall be provided to 
the firm so as to enhance the creditworthiness of the firm and to attract more 
investment.   
3. Liability Shield for Limited Partners 
3.1 The Existing Uncertainties 
1139
 
In most jurisdictions, such as Delaware and New Zealand, limited partners are 
generally not personally liable for the debts and obligations of the LP.
1140
 The 
ULPA 2001 even provides a “full, status-based liability shield for each limited 
partner” by stating that “an obligation of a limited partnership, whether arising 
                                                 
1139 Note that property rights (物权) and contractual rights (债权) are different under the PRC law in the 
sense that the former is the right over a thing and the latter is the right arising from a contractual 
relationship. Under PRC law, the property law (物权法) and the law of obligations (债法) are two major 
components of the law regulating civil matters. The former is meant to protect the property rights against 
any other person; while the latter is meant to protect the right of a creditor against a debtor.  
1140 See, e.g., Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act §303 (1985); Delaware Revised Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act § 17-303. Delaware Limited Partnership Act (2007) § 17-303; New Zealand Limited 
Partnership Act (2008) s. 30. However, English law does not provide a full liability shield to limited 
partners. If a limited partner loses his status as such by participation in management or otherwise, creditor of 
the firm can also obtain a personal judgment against a limited partner to the extent of his contribution the 
amount so contributed. See section 4(2) of the UK Limited Partnership Act 1907. 
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in contract, tort, or otherwise, is not the obligation of a limited partner. A limited 
partner is not personally liable, directly or indirectly, by way of contribution or 
otherwise, for an obligation of the limited partnership solely by reason of being a 
limited partner, even if the limited partner participates in the management and 
control of the limited partnership.”1141 
In Germany, § 171 (1) of the commercial code clearly specifies that ―the limited 
partners shall be directly liable to the creditors of the partnership up to the 
amount of his contribution; additional liability shall be excluded to the extent that 
contribution has been made.‖ 1142  Meanwhile, ―in the event that insolvency 
proceedings are commenced with respect to the property of the partnership, the 
rights of the partnership‘s creditors pursuant to Sub-section 1 shall be exercised 
by the insolvency administrator or the property administrator during the 
pendency of the proceedings‖.1143 This indicates that German limited partners do 
not enjoy full liability shield. Likewise, France also provided that ―limited 
partners are liable for the debts of the partnership only up to the limit of the 
amount of their contribution.‖1144 
Under the PEL, the basic operational provision for partners‘ liability in a LP 
appears in their definitions. Article 2 of the PEL states that: “the general 
partners shall bear unlimited joint and several liabilities for the debts of the 
                                                 
1141Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001) comments on §303. 
1142 German Commercial Code § 171 (1). 
1143 German Commercial Code § 171 (2). 
1144 French Commercial Code Art. 222-1. 
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limited liability partnership enterprise. The limited partners bear the liabilities 
for its debts to the extent of their capital contributions.” 
However, it is not clear whether creditors of the partnership can levy on the 
personal assets of the limited partners. There are two different understandings on 
this provision:
1145
 The following Chart 4 and Chart 5 illustrate the limited 
partners‘ liability shield under the ULPA 2001 and the PEL. 
 Opinion 1: Creditors of the LP do not have the right to levy execution 
against the personal assets of limited partners.
1146
 Once limited partners 
make full contribution to the firm as promised, they are discharged of 
their liability for the debts of the firm.  
 Opinion 2: Creditors of the LP have the right to levy execution against the 
personal assets of the limited partner to the extent of his or her promised 
capital contribution
1147
 only when the following two requirements are 
met:
1148
 (1) when the assets of the LP are insufficient to pay the debts of 
the firm; and (2) when the limited partner has not made promised capital 
contribution to the LP.
1149
 Nevertheless, this personal liability is only 
                                                 
1145 There are two different views towards this issue. See Wang Baoshu, ―Limited Liability for Limited 
Partners: Risk Allocation and Protection for Creditors‖] (2009) 6 Legal Studies 87 at 92 (copy in Chinese). 
Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 24; See also Li, Interpretation of Partnership Enterprise Law, 
supra note 369 at 146. 
1146 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 24; See also Li, Interpretation of Partnership Enterprise 
Law, supra note 369 at 146. 
1147 Wang, ―Limited Liability for Limited Partners‖, supra note 696 at 92. 
1148 Ibid. 
1149 This then caps their maximum capital contribution to the firm. Beyond the promised capital contribution 
of the limited partner, limited partner are not liable for any further debts of the LP. Nevertheless, even when 
the above two recruitments are met, creditors of the LP may have a choice to levy execution against assets 
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limited to the promised capital but not the actual provided capital by the 
limited partners. 
Properly understood, the implied ramifications of these two opinions are similar. 
That is if assets of the partnership are insufficient to satisfy its debts, the only 
threat to the limited partner is ―providing promised contribution to the firm.‖ 
However, creditors of the partnership have different creditors‘ rights under the 
two opinions. Under Opinion 1, creditors of the firm are not entitled to levy on 
personal assets of the limited partner; while under Opinion 2, creditors of the 
firm are entitled to obtain a personal judgment against a limited partner 
conditionally. 
Most of interviewees suggest that limited partners shall not be personally liable 
for debts of the firm even if they have not made full contribution to the firm as 
promised and when the LP has insufficient assets to pay the outsiders. The author 
has asked interviewees if there is a need to clarify the effect of Article 2 under 
the PEL by stating that it excludes any form of liability, which is direct or 
indirect, or beyond the amount of the limited partner‘s contribution. The majority 
of interviewees suggest that the limited partner shall be protected in any court 
order against the firm. 
                                                                                                                                    
of general partners or to levy execution against assets of limited partner. See Wang, ―Limited Liability for 
Limited Partners‖, supra note 696 at 95. 
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In the context of China, the legislative objective of adopting the LP is to attract 
investment to venture capital and private equity sectors. Investors are likely to be 
disappointed when they learn that their liability shield is handicapped and is not a 
full liability shield. Apparently, there is a gulf between the commercial 
perception of, and the legal characterization of the PRC LP. This may reduce the 
attractiveness of the PRC LP. 
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Chart 4: Creditor’s Rights in the LP under the ULPA 2001 
 
Chart 5:  Creditor’s Rights in the PRC LP1150 
 
                                                 
1150 This Chart is created based on the Opinion 2 as illustrated in supra text accompanying notes 1147-1149. 
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3.2 Full Liability Shield? 
The rationale of limited liability in corporate and partnership context has been 
extensively explored in literature.
1151
 The economic value of limited liability 
include reducing monitoring costs, promoting free transfer of shares, permitting 
flexibility in the allocation of risk and return between equity holders and debt 
holders, reducing transaction costs of collection in case of insolvency, facilitating 
delegated management etc.
1152
 Today, limited liability is widely accepted as an 
effective contracting tool and attractive financing device. This limitation of 
owner liability not only exists in traditional corporate forms, but also survives in 
particular partnerships.  
Then whether China shall follow the ULPA 2001 in granting a full liability shield 
to limited partners? 
Asset partitioning theory provides a new perspective in solving this problem 
                                                 
1151 See, e.g., John Morey Maurice, ―A New Personal Limited Liability Shield for General Partners: But Not 
All Partners Are Treated The Same‖ (2007) 43 Gonz. L. Rev. 369. J. William Callison, Federalism, 
―Regulatory Competition, and The Limited Liability Movement: The Coyote Howled and the Herd 
Stampeded‖ (2001) 26 J. Corp. L. 951 ; Larry E. Ribstein, ―The Evolving Partnership‖ (2001) 26 J. Corp. L. 
819; Susan Pace Hamill, ―The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company‖ (1998) 59 Ohio St. L.J. 1459; 
Larry E. Ribstein and Bruce H. Kobayashi, ―Uniform Laws, Model Laws and Limited Liability Companies‖ 
(1995) 66 U. Colo. L. Rev. 947; John Morey Maurice, ―Operational Overview of the Washington Limited 
Liability Company Act‖ (1995) 30 Gonz. L. Rev. 183; Carol R. Goforth, ―The Rise of the Limited Liability 
Company: Evidence of a Race Between the States, But Heading Where?‖ (1995) 45 Syracuse L. Rev. 1193 ; 
Larry E. Ribstein, ―The Deregulation of Limited Liability and the Death of Partnership‖ (1992) 70 Wash. U. 
L.Q. 417; Robert W. Hamilton, ―Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present At the Birth‖ (Nearly) 
(1995) 66 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1065; Carter G. Bishop, ―The Limited Liability Partnership Amendments to the 
Uniform Partnership Act (1994)‖ (1997) 53 Bus. Law 101. 
1152 See generally in Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fischel, Daniel R., ―Limited Liability and the Corporation‖ 
(1985) 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89; Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock and Stuart Turnbull, ―An Economic 





 According to asset partitioning theory, it is the degree of 
assets partitioning that labels different types of commercial firms.
1154
According 
to the degree of defensive asset partitioning/owner shielding, legal entities can be 
divided into entities with weak owner shielding and entities with complete owner 
shielding. 
1155
 Limited liability is a form of defensive asset partitioning/owner 
shielding. It shields owners' personal assets from a firm's creditors. 
As to the LP, a complete limited liability fully severs the claims of the creditors 
of the LP to the personal assets of the limited partners.
1156
 By doing so, creditors 
of the firm cannot levy execution on the limited partner‘s personal assets to 
satisfy his or her claims to the LP. Put it another way, the limited partners do not 
have to be ―personally‖ liable for the debts of the firm. From the perspective of 
limited partners, e.g., investors, granting them a complete owner shielding would 
definitely increase their interests in choosing the LP as their business 
organization. It would also likely to channel potential investments to the targeted 
venture capital and private equity markets. As the objective of the PRC LP is to 
provide a structure that is recognized and accepted by investors, it is necessary to 
grant limited partners a full liability shield. 
One may argue that granting the limited partner a full liability shield dramatically 
alters a limited and a general partner's responsibility for partnership obligations. 
                                                 
1153  Commentators have discussed the virtue of limited liability from asset partitioning perspective in 
corporate context. See Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law, supra note 427 at 8-10. 
1154 Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78 at 1337. 
1155 Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78  at 1339-1340. 
1156 Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78 at 1340. 
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As the limited partner no longer has to be personally liable for the debts of the 
firm; all the downside business risk was shifted to the general partner.  
Indeed, this change seems to be significant in literature but in fact it is vital in 
practice. On the one hand, as illustrated in Section 3.1 of this Chapter, at the end 
of the day, no matter whether the limited partner has to be personally liable for 
debts of the firm or not, in the case that there are insufficient assets of the 
partnership to satisfy the firm‘s debts, the only threat to the limited partner is 
―making promised contribution to the firm.‖   
On the other hand, it is true that the joint and several vicarious liability of general 
partners for partnership obligations would be ―increased‖ if limited partners have 
full liability but the liability of general partners is only to the extent that the 
partnership obligations exceeded the partnership assets. In the context of China, 
because the LP is generally used as a fundraising vehicle, the risk that the private 
equity fund‘s investment would result in extensive liabilities is low. Therefore, a 
full liability shield would not make too much difference as to partners‘ 
responsibility for partnership obligation. 
Admittedly, changing the fundamental liability provision of the PEL would 
inevitably incur legislative costs, including the consultation, drafting and 
discussion expenditures of the provision. In particular, as this is a fundamental 
provision providing the liability shield of partners, any change of it would incur 
tremendous legal effect in the area of partnership law. Nevertheless, it is believed 
that the benefits of this change outweigh the costs it incurred.   
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3.3 Recommendation  
There are basically two ways to endow a LP with a substantial degree of owner 
shielding/ limited liability: (1) by providing a special rule of law; or (2) by 
requiring the limited partners to negotiate clauses in the partnership agreement 
whereby LP‘s creditors agree to limit or waive their right to levy on the limited 
partner‘s personal asset. 
From the perspective of asset partitioning, limited liability is of secondary 
importance in organizational law and the liability issue can be contracted by 
parties easily.
 1157
 Although limited partners can obtain complete owner shielding 
by negotiating clause in the partnership agreement whereby creditors of the LP 
agree to limit or waive their right to levy on the limited partners‘ person assets, 
this may entail moral hazard problems.
1158
 This would also involve high 
transaction costs. 
Given the aforesaid reasons, the PEL ought to make it clear that in a PRC LP, if 
the assets of the LP are insufficient to satisfy its debt, the creditors of the LP 
cannot levy against the limited partner. Article 2 of the PEL shall be changed to: 
“An obligation of a limited partnership, whether arising in contract, tort, or 
otherwise, is not the obligation of a limited partner. A limited partner is not 
personally liable, directly or indirectly, by way of contribution or otherwise, for 
                                                 
1157 Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78 at 1340 
1158 Hansmann et al., ―Law and the Rise of the Firm‖, supra note 78 at 1340-1343 
348 
 
an obligation of the limited partnership solely by reason of being a limited 
partner.” 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter points out the existing problems regarding limited partners‘ limited 
liability, the creditors‘ rights within the PRC LP and the legal nature of 
partnerships. This chapter makes three suggestions to solve the able problems by 
applying asset partitioning theory.  
 The PEL shall provide a complete owner shielding/full liability shield to 
limited partners. This attribute affords a high degree of protection to 
limited partners against partnerships‘ creditors. It is also in line with 
international practice and the common expectation of investors. Thus it 
would help to achieve the legislative goal of the PRC LP - encouraging 
venture capital investments in China.  
 The PEL shall provide a set of rules granting the partnership‘s creditor a 
priority claim over the assets of the partnership. It would enhance the 
creditworthiness of the firm so as to attract more investment. 
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CHAPTER 9  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
199BPART I: The PRC LP: Problems Ahead 
From Chapter 2, we saw a vibrant history of partnerships in ancient China. 
Although the rise of large firms in ancient China, especially the maritime Song 
partnership and the Qing salt well partnership indicated a substantial logic to the 
forms of asset partitioning, it appeared that Chinese written law did not grant 
weak or strong entity shielding to these ancient firms. Moreover, it appeared that 
there was no written law for general-purpose commercial firms in ancient China.   
This thesis does not imply that ancient Chinese law lagged behind its Italian 
counterpart in recognizing partnerships, or the medieval law was more successful 
in addressing creditors‘ rights. This chapter instead argues that ancient China‘s 
reluctance to codify partnerships and to deploy entity shielding was caused by 
many reasons, inter alia, a deep anti-commercial cultural norm, the strong desire 
for centralized imperial control, the long-existed agriculture-based civilization, 
the lack of a national-wide commodity market, the lack of workable accounting 
method and bankruptcy concept, the well-recognized tradition of non-forgiveness 
of debts in feudal Chinese society, a cultural aversion to litigation and 




Indeed, all these factors influenced the level of entity shielding displayed by 
firms. In ancient Chinese society, although some of these elements were missing, 
there were alternative means for ordering behavior and protection of creditors, 
such as the well-recognized Confucianism which rejected the general use of 
formal laws to achieve social order; the strict cultural tradition towards debts; the 
local business rules and clan rules which provided strict punishment for 
fraudulent conduct and the long-existed social norms and mores which 
emphasize citizens‘ proper behaviors etc. 
The evidence in this chapter also proves that the law of partnership was 
developed in a piecemeal way in China. After the victory of China Communist 
Party in 1949, all Republican legislation on partnerships was discarded. Due to 
socialist ideology and public ownership economy, no separate partnership law 
was promulgated during the twenty-decade Mao‘s China. Before the first 
consolidated PEL was promulgated in 1997, partnerships were simply regulated 
by different regulations. With this historical background, it is not surprise to find 
that the PEL today is not developed naturally out of the partnership practice. It is 
promulgated as a part of the state‘s economic and legal reform in the transitional 
period. Under this premise, the PRC partnership enterprise does not succeed the 
legal tradition and legacy in its Chinese ancestors. It is simply a creation of law 
which has only a-decade history.  
As demonstrated in Chapter 3, for more than 5000 years from the Middle Ages 
commenda, to the Old Regime French société en commandite simple, to the 
modern LP form of the nineteenth century US, and to the LP regimes which have 
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been adopted recently in various jurisdictions, the LP has existed as a vibrant 
business form across the world. The fact that the LP persists and plays an 
important role in the venture capital and private equity markets is not merely 
because the LP enjoys tax transparent treatment, but because of the incentives 
inherent in its structure – the combination of limited and unlimited liability, 
privacy and flexibility.  
Chapter 3 concludes that the PRCL LP is a mixture of western and Chinese 
models. Some features of the PRC LP appear to be technically similar to its US 
or German counterparts. It also contains some features which largely exist in 
civil law partnerships, e.g., the lack of fiduciary duty. In addition, the PRC LP 
contains several mandatory rules which create difficulties in practice, such as the 
compulsory dissolution and conversion of the LP.  
The qualitative research presented in Chapter 4 identifies various problems in the 
context of private equity LPs. In particular, there are severe conflicts of interest 
between limited partners and general partners. Chinese limited partners are 
appeared to be very active and have a strong desire to control the private equity 
funds. Chapter 4 concludes that there are economic, cultural, regulatory and 
structural reasons for such conflicts. Particularly, there is a structural reason—as 
the default rules in the PEL centralize decision making power in the hands of the 
general partner. This make the limited partners face a familiar agency problem 
that the general partners may be emboldened to pursue their own self-interest at 
the expense of investor interest. It is argued that these rules may give rise to the 
conflicts of interest between limited and general partner. Moreover, the PEL fails 
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to provide sufficient legal protection of Chinese limited partners - no detailed 
statutory duty or fiduciary duty are imposed on general partners and no detailed 
procedure on the limited partner derivative action is provided. This legislative 
deficiency may undermine the LP structure in controlling agency costs within the 
LP firm. 
200BPART II: Internal Governance of the PRC LP 
Part II of this thesis examines the three basic themes underlying the internal 
relationships of the LP regime in the context of China: (1) the control rule which 
prevents the limited partners from participating in the control of the firm; (2) the 
duties of partners; and (3) the derivative action for limited partners to protect 
their interests in the LP and the interests of the LP. 
Chapter 5 concludes that although the control rule has once been a useful device 
in deterring limited partners‘ meddling into the management of the firm, there is 
little reason to believe that it continues to be effective in the context of China. In 
fact, the US story has indicated that it is an anachronism for the US legislature to 
transplant the control rule from France. Considering the genuine business needs 
of limited partners, the existing alternative rules in the PEL, and the positive 
trend of qualified limited partners and general partners in China, it is suggested 
that the control rule shall not be adopted in China. Moreover, given the 
significance of the non-capital contribution of limited partners, it is suggested 
that the PEL shall ensure limited partners more management rights through their 
ability to participate in a broader and clearer safe harbor activities.  
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Chapter 6 concludes that without clear statutory duties to cover improper conduct 
by partners, an investor would be more active in the management of the fund's 
business since there is no duty posing a significant risk of sanction on him. Given 
that many of the contractual designs have shortcomings in the context of China, 
it is suggested that default legal duties shall be imposed on general partners. In 
order to suit the flexible nature of partnerships and to make the law predictive, it 
is suggested that partners shall be permitted to adjust or shape their duties 
through partnership agreements. The legislature and judiciary shall also review 
on a regular basis the duties of partners in tandem with the developments of 
China‘s private equity market. 
Chapter 7 concludes that as the limited partner is generally more vulnerable than 
the general partner, he ought to be granted the right to lodge an 533Haction in the 
name of the LP against errant general partners who either wrongfully fail to 
prosecute a partnership claim or breach their partnership duties. Compared to 
other intra-partnership dispute resolutions for restricting agency problem, such as 
the dissolution of partnership and the removal of general partners, the derivative 
action may not be more efficient, but it is more effective since it has strong 
deterrent and compensation functions. Therefore, the limited partner derivative 
action is justifiable in the context of PRC LPs. To balance the interests of 
plaintiff limited partners and defendant general partners, it is recommend that the 
derivative action should be brought by a simple and modern procedure; and 
should be subject to tight judicial control at all stages.  
201BPART III: External Rules within the PRC LP 
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Chapter 8 emphasizes the essential role of organizational law in regulating the 
external relationships between partnerships and their outsiders within the PRC LP, 
specifically in regulating the liability shield of limited partners and creditors‘ 
rights with partnerships. This chapter suggests that whether a strong or weak 
entity shielding should be adopted in the PRC LP depends on the real business 
needs of the users of the PRC LP. Considering that the PRC LP is commonly 
structured as an asset-pooling vehicle in China, a stronger entity shielding shall 
be adopted. Partners‘ creditors shall be precluded from recovering out of 
partnership's assets when they have exhausted efforts to get recovery out of 
partners‘ assets. This would help shield partnerships' assets from the claims of 
personal creditors and protect the assets of the fund. 
Given the legislative objective of the PRC LP- - encouraging venture capital 
investments in China, it is suggested that the PEL shall provide a complete owner 
shielding to limited partners. This attribute affords a high degree of protection to 
limited partners against partnerships‘ creditors.  
2. BEYOND THE THESIS-FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
There are a number of further avenues of research relevant to the subject of this 
thesis.  
2.1 From Enterprise Law to Commercial Law 
The legal structure of the LP affects how investment based on that structure are 
made, because this dictates the restrictions and specifications imposed by the 
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legal requirements. To make the PEL meet its legislative goal, this thesis calls for 
a new approach towards the PEL. That is to make the PEL a commercial law that 
provides flexible rules and enforcement mechanisms regulating the most 
important relationships within the partnership.  
2.1.1 More Protection of Investors 
The PEL is an enterprise law but not a pure business law. In essence, the PEL 
does not simply consider a partnership as an agreement between partners, but 
considering it as an ―enterprise‖. It focuses more on the external relationship 
between the partnership and its outsiders from the perspective of the state; but it 
fails to emphasis on the internal relationship among partners adequately. 
Meanwhile, it contains too many mandatory rules which destroy the contractual 
nature of partnerships. This thesis advocates that the PEL ought to contain more 
flexible internal regulation.  
This thesis submits that the privileged role of investors, who are usually the 
limited partners, shall be given more emphasis by law. (1) There are efficiency 
considerations for taking this approach. As the primary usage of the PRC LP is 
raising venture capital and private equity funds in China, inadequate credible 
protection for limited partners will increase difficulties in fund raising.  Moreover, 
legal rules that attract investors and in line with their commercial expectations 
may reduce transaction costs and facilitate the development of the targeted 
market. (2) There are policy concerns as well. As the primary goal for PRC LP is 
to attract venture capital investment so as to promote scientific innovation of the 
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nation, and investors are the one who provide the capital, it is important to ensure 
them sufficient protection, e.g., by providing full liability shielding, rights to 
access to courts, rights to access to information etc.  
Effective protections to users of the LP through other bodies of law are also 
required, such as securities law, contract law and civil procedure law. 
2.1.2 More Theoretical and Practical Enquiry 
There are ambiguous and inconsistent concepts within the PEL. To avoid these 
pitfalls in the future law reform, it is suggested that: (1) draftsmen shall not 
simply borrow concepts and institutions from other jurisdictions, but shall 
inquiry into the theoretical rationale and social meaning of the concepts and 
institutions. (2) To make the transplanted business vehicle achieve a desirable 
effect in the context of China, draftsmen shall also seek for practical perspective 
and support from legal practitioners. 
2.1.3 Need for Flexibility 
As China‘s venture capital and private equity markets are still emerging and 
China‘s limited partners and general partners are evolving, the PEL ought to give 
more flexibility and freedom to partners so as to meet the changing business 
needs within the PRC LP.  Making legal rules in default nature would enhance 
the freedom of contract among partners.  
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2.2 From State-Oriented to Investor-Oriented  
China has taken a strong state control over the LP affairs. There is substantial 
discretion in the hands of national or local governments‘ bureaucrats over the 
establishment, licenses, exit, foreign exchange and taxation on private equity LPs.  
Admittedly, the adoption of the LP in China is not only a benefit to businessmen, 
but also beneficial to an increase of government revenue, job-creation and 
technology developments. However, ―markets, not governments, have the 
wisdom necessary to guide firms in an uncertain world‖.1159  Therefore, a set of 
investor-oriented institutional environment is desirable. .  
The US experience indicates five traits which facilitate an active venture capital 
market.
1160
 The US experience also tells us that the rise of Silicon Valley was 
bolstered by the development of appropriate legal infrastructure to support the 
rapid formation, funding, and expansion of high-tech companies, as well as the 
development of a critical mass of litigators and judges experienced in resolving 
disputes between such firms. 
It is suggested that, on the one hand, the government bureaucrats shall eliminate 
unnecessarily regulatory obstacles in the development of the LP. For instance, 
local governments shall not intervene in the operation of the various Industrial 
                                                 
1159 Larry E. Ribstein. ―The Evolving Partnerships‖ (2001) 26 J. Corp. L. 819 at 854. 
1160 Curtis J. Milhaupt, ―The Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan: Venture Capital and the 





 More qualified institutional investors, like national pension 
funds, corporate pension funds, universities, insurance companies and 
commercial banks shall be given legitimate rights in making private equity 
investment.  
On the other hand, a more hospitable regulatory environment for the robust 
venture capital market is required. Law makers and policy makers shall simplify 
the LP law framework, minimize the regulatory complexity; enhance a long-term 
investment culture; and provide flexibility in establishment, licenses, exit, 
foreign exchange and taxation on the LP.  
2.2.1 Solve Listing Problem 
This thesis calls for a smooth exit channel for the LPs. A recent survey indicates 
that the difficulty for private equity LPs to get listed on the stock exchange is one 
of the major obstacles in China‘s private equity market.1162 As the IPO is the 
major exit channel for private equity funds, the fact that companies with LPs as 
their shareholders are not permitted to list in stock exchange sounds outrageous, 
and has greatly undermined the attractiveness of the LP.
 1163
 
                                                 
1161 There is a large amount of Industrial Investment Funds established by local governments in China. As 
the major sources of the funds are governments, the fund managers are frequently appointed and supervised 
by the governments. This would inevitably affect the operation of venture capital and private equity funds.   
1162 For further information of the survey, see China Venture Capital Yearbook 2009, supra note 10 at 270. 
1163 Under the existing regulation and policy, companies with LPs as their shareholders‖ are not permitted to 
get listed on China‘s stock market. In order to generate a return by IPO, many LPs have to transfer their 
shares in the investee firms before the investee firms applying for listing. Many firms which are back by 
private equity LPs fail in the application of listing in stock exchange (See, e.g., the Guangdong Chaohua 
Technology company and the Jiuding Xinchai Company).  See Wang Hao, ―IPO Dream Collapsed for LPs‖ 
Investors Journal (18 October 2008) (copy in Chinese). Why the CSRC prevents the LP from listing in 
stock exchanges? CSRC contended that, according to Art. 166 of the PRC Securities Law, only Chinese 
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2.2.2 Clarify Registration Problem 
There is no unified registration rule on private equity LPs in China. Except 
Tianjin, Beijing and some other big cities, registration of LPs remains an 
unsolved issue.
1164
 Private equity LPs have to obtain approval from local 
administrative authorities before registration. It is suggested that such an 
administrative obstacle shall be removed.  
2.2.3 Clarify Taxation on the LP 
In China, the fact that the PRC LP does not enjoy substantial tax advantages has 
become a major concern among the existing and potential users of the PRC 
LP.
1165
 For example, a domestic venture capital company can enjoy a certain 
deduction of up to 70% of the capital invested in a qualified domestic venture 
capital; but there is no equivalent tax incentive on venture capital LPs.
1166
 A 
recent report indicates that due to the unfair tax treatments between private 
equity LPs and company-type private equity funds, more and more private equity 
                                                                                                                                    
citizens or legal person are eligible to open security trading accounts in order to conduct securities 
transaction. As the LP is not a legal person under PRC law, it is not allowed to conduct securities 
transaction. In fact, the real reason for the CSRC to prevent LPs from listing is complicated. The major 
concern is that there exist difficulties in ascertaining the real controller of the LP and request them to 
disclose relevant information before listing. Nevertheless, the above is just a tentative bureaucratic obstacle. 
It is believed that the newly launched Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) in China will remove such obstacle 
soon. 
1164 Private equity LPs are unable to register in many cities. See Chen Juxiang, speech on the 11th Venture 
Capital Investment Forum, ―Legal System on the Venture Capital and Private Equity Is Required to be 
Established‖  (8 June 2009), online: Xinlang News < 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/hy/20090608/02506315452.shtml > (copy in Chinese). 
1165 In 2008, China Venture Capital Association conducted a survey on the major obstacles of the LP in 
China. It is showed that the fact that the LP does not enjoy substantial tax advantages is one of the major 
obstacles. See China Venture Capital Yearbook 2009, supra note 10 at 270. 
1166 Individual Income Tax Law 2005 (PRC) Art. 3(1).  
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LPs are considering converting back to companies.
1167
  
2.2.4 Personal Bankruptcy Law 
There is no personal bankruptcy law in China. This thesis calls for a 
comprehensive personal bankruptcy legal framework to offer a fresh start for a 
failed entrepreneur; to stimulate demand for venture capital finance and to 
prevent debtors evading debts and liabilities.
1168
  
2.3 Cultivate the Culture of Trust and Establish the Market for Reputation 
The author‘s empirical study indicates the lack of mutual trust and good faith 
within China‘s private equity LPs. As Chinese limited partners are not willing to 
fully entrust their investment to the general partners, there are severe conflicts 
between general partners and limited partners. 
Indeed, there are historical and cultural reasons for China‘s lack of a culture of 
trust. Unlike the common law jurisdictions where the concept of trust and 
fiduciary are embodied with their business cultures, there is no equivalent 
concept within PRC law. However, it does not follow that such a problem cannot 
be solved. There are various possible ways to cultivate the culture of trust in 
China: (1) a ―qualified general partner system‖ ought to be set up to select 
                                                 
1167 Yang, supra note 512. 
1168 John Armour and Douglas Cumming, ―The Legislative Road to Silicon Valley‖ (2006) 58 Oxford 
Economic Papers 596. Many countries‘ bankruptcy laws allow a debtor to discharge outstanding credit 
obligations with a period of time. See Hallinan, C.G. ―The ‗Fresh Start‘ Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: a 
Historical Inventory and an Interpretative Theory‖ (1986) 21 University of Richmond Law Review 49. 
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qualified and experienced fund managers to participate in the private equity 
sectors; (2) a sound credit system through a comprehensive online personal credit 
system ought to be established; and (3) an effective judicial interpretation on the 
duty of loyalty and principle of good faith within partnerships is required; and (4) 
consistent education on the legal and business communities.  
2.4 Evolving Theory on Private Equity LPs  
It remains too early to assess how effective the PEL will be since its recent 
revision in 2007. A legal transplantation usually takes a few decades to observe 
its effect in the host country. With the rapid development of China‘s venture 
capital and private equity markets, investors have recently begun to create 
several innovative contractual arrangements to mitigate the agency problem 
within the firm. Whether these contractual arraignments are the best solution and 
to what is the role of law in the evolving private equity LPs in China is 
apparently an on-going topic relevant to the subject of this thesis.  
3. FINAL THOUGHTS 
There is little doubt as to the adoption of the LP marks a milestone in the 
evolution of PRC partnership law as well as the development of the venture 
capital industry in this new economic powerhouse. It provides a new and 
attractive investment vehicle for local and international firms to access the 
venture capital and private equity markets in China.  
Without a well-established venture capital market, a business-friendly regulatory 
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environment and legal infrastructure, a sophisticated business culture, and a 
greater commercial sophistication among PRC courts; the recently-introduced LP 
vehicle may not be widely adopted by investors in China.  
As the LP is a new business vehicle to the Chinese business community, the 
legislature and policy makers should review on a regular basis the existing rules, 
the business environment governing the LP and the overseas development and 
practice on the LP — in tandem with the developments of the venture capital 
market — so as to meet rapidly-changing business needs as well as to balance the 
interests of the different parties involved. 
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Appendix II - Table 2 
LPs under the PEL, the DRULPA and the ULPA 2001: A Comparison 
 
Characteristics The PEL The DRULPA The ULPA 2001 
Nature It is not a separate 
legal entity. The 
general impression 
is that the PRC LP 
appears to possess 
certain attributes 
that are consistent 
with the entity 
approach. 
Separate Entity Separate Entity 
Formation A LP is constituted 
from the date of 







It is formed at the 
time of the filing 
of the initial 
certificate of LP 
in the Office of 




It is constituted 
from the date of 
registration of the 
LP as stated in the 
certificate of 
registration. 
                                                 
1169 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 11. 
1170 Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 17-201(b). 
367 
 
Constituents There must be two 
to fifty partners; and 











shall not be general 
partners in a LP.
1172
 
There must be 
one or more 
general partners 





No upper limit on 
the number of 
partners. 
There must be one 
or more general 





No upper limit on 






The limited partner 
shall not act on 







rights of limited 
partners are 
subject to the safe 
harbor list. 
No control rule. 
A limited partner 
does not have the 
right or the power 
as a limited partner 






                                                 
1171 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art.61. 
1172 Li, Interpretation of Partnership Enterprise Law, supra note 369 at 4. 
1173 Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 17-101.  
1174 Uniform Limited Partnership Act §406 (a) (2001). 
1175 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art.2, 67 and 68. 









of the Firm 
No control rule 
liability 
The limited 
partner is liable 
only to persons 
who transact 
business with the 
LP reasonably 
believing based 
upon the limited 
partner‘s conduct, 
that the limited 





No liability for the 
limited partner even 
if the limited 
partner participates 
in the management 


















General partners are 
jointly and severally 
liable for the debts 
and obligations of 
the partnership. 
General partners 
are liable jointly 
and severally for 
all obligations of 
the LP unless 
otherwise agreed 





General partners are 
liable jointly and 
severally for all 
obligations of the 
LP unless otherwise 








Limited partners are 
personally liable for 
the debts of the firm 
to the extent of its 
promised 





partner is liable if 
he or she does 
participate in the 





shield to limited 
partners) 
No liability for the 
limited partner even 
if the limited 
partner participates 




(Full liability shield 
to limited partners) 
                                                 
1177 Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act §17- 303. 
1178 Uniform Limited Partnership Act §303 (2001).  
1179 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 68. 
1180 Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 17-303. 
1181 Delaware Revised Uniform Partnership Act § 15-306. 
1182 Uniform Limited Partnership Act §404(a) (2001).   
1183 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 2. 









Statutory duties of 
loyalty and care 





both duties are 
limited to certain 
circumstances 
only. 
Statutory duties of 

















A limited partner 
has duties to a LP 
or to another 
partner. 




provisions in the 
partnership 
agreement; 
provided that the 
partnership 
agreement may 
not eliminate the 
implied 
contractual 
covenant of good 




A limited partner 
does not have any 
fiduciary duty to the 
LP or to any other 
partner solely by 




                                                                                                                                    
1185 Uniform Limited Partnership Act §303 (2001). 
1186 Delaware Revised Uniform Partnership Act § 15-404 (a) and (b). 
1187 Uniform Limited Partnership Act §408(a) (2001).   
1188 Uniform Limited Partnership Act §408(b) (2001); Uniform Limited Partnership Act §408(c) (2001). 
1189 Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 17-1101(f). 






A general partner 
will assume joint 
liability with the 
existing partners for 
the debts incurred 
by the LP before he 
joins the firm. 
Correspondingly, a 
new limited partner 
will bear liabilities 
to the extent of her 
capital contribution 
even for the LP‘s 
debts incurred 




A person admitted 
as a partner into 
an existing 
partnership is not 
personally liable 
for any obligation 
of the partnership 
incurred before 
the person's 




A person that 
becomes a general 
partner of an 
existing LP is not 
personally liable for 
an obligation of a 
LP incurred before 








property, land use 
rights or other 
property rights, but 
limited partners 
cannot contribute in 





Cash, property or 
services rendered, 
or a promissory 
note or other 
obligation to 
contribute cash or 














other agreements to 
contribute cash or 
property, and 
contracts for 
services to be 
performed. 
 
                                                 
1191 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 44 and 77. 
1192 Delaware Revised Uniform Partnership Act § 15-306 (b). 
1193 Uniform Limited Partnership Act §404(b) (2001).  
1194 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 64 read with Art.16. 
1195Delaware Revise Limited Partnership Act §17-501. 
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Distributions Partners are not 
allowed to transfer 
or sever the 
partnership assets 
before the 




that a LP shall not 
distribute all profits 




Secret dealings by a 
partner of 
partnership property 
shall not affect bona 
fide third parties 




 The PEL 
is silent on the 
question of what 
happens in the event 
of capital 
withdrawal by a 
limited partner. 
 
A LP shall not 
make a 
distribution to a 
partner to the 
extent that at the 
time of the 
distribution, after 
giving effect to 
the distribution, 
all liabilities of 
the limited 
partnership… 
exceed the fair 





If the limited 
partner does 
know, at the time 
the distribution is 
made, is wrongful 
or improper, he 
shall be liable for 















knowing that the 
distribution was 
made in violation of 
the law is 
personally liable to 
the limited 
partnership but only 
to the extent that the 
distribution 
received by the 
partner or transferee 
exceeded the 
amount that could 
have been properly 





                                                 
1196 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art.21. 
1197 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 69. 
1198 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 21. 
1199 Delaware Revise Limited Partnership Act, §17-607(a) (2007). 
1200 Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 508(a) (b) (2001).  




Interests An assignee (of 
general or limited 
partners‘ shares) 
will become a 
partner (general or 
limited 
respectively) and be 
subject to the rights 
and obligations 





All the partners in 
the partnership have 
a preemptive right 
to purchase the 
partnership shares. 
This pre-emptive 
right can only be 







An assignment of 
a partnership 
interest does not 
dissolve a LP or 
entitle the 
assignee to 
become or to 
exercise any 




A transfer in whole 
or in part of a 
partner‘s 
transferable interest 
in the partnership 
does not entitle the 
transferee to 
participate in the 





                                                 
1202 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 24; See also Li, Interpretation of Partnership Enterprise 
Law, supra note 369  at 37. 
1203 For instance, if outsiders provide a better price to purchase the partnership shares, the existing partners 
shall not exercise his preemptive right. 
1204 Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 17-702(a) (2). 
1205 Uniform Partnership Act §503 (1997). 
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Dissolution The LP must be 
dissolved if the firm 
is left with only 
limited partners 
after the departure 




The LP must be 
converted to a 
General partnership 
if the firm is left 




The LP must be 
dissolved the LP is 





A LP will not be 
automatically 
dissolved if the 
sole remaining 
partner is either a 
limited partner or 
a general partner; 
instead, the 
Delaware LP is 
allowed to 
appoint another 
limited or general 
partner within a 
grace period of 90 
days (or such 
other period as 





A LP will not be 
automatically 
dissolved if the sole 
remaining partner is 
either a limited 
partner or a general 
partner; instead, the 
LP is allowed to 
appoint another 
limited or general 
partner within a 




                                                 
1206 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 75. 
1207 Partnership Enterprise Law 2006 (PRC) Art. 24; Li, Interpretation of Partnership Enterprise Law, supra 
note 369 at 122. 
1208  Ibid. 
1209 Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 17-801.  







No definition or 
detailed procedure 
on derivative 
actions. A limited 
partner may bring 
an action in its own 
name for the 
interest of the 
enterprise, when the 
executive partner 
neglects to exercise 
his rights. 
A limited partner 
or an assignee of 
a partnership 
interest may bring 
an action in the 
Court of 
Chancery in the 
right of a LP to 
recover a 
judgment in its 
favor if general 
partners with 
authority to do so 
have refused to 
bring the action or 
if an effort to 
cause those 
general partners 
to bring the action 




A partner may 
maintain a 
derivative action to 
enforce a right of a 
LP if the limited 
partners have made 
the request to the 
general partners but 
they do not bring an 
action within 
reasonable time; 
and a demand 
would be futile. 
                                                 






With the unanimous 
consent of all 
partners, a limited 
partner may convert 
to a general partner 
or vice versa. Any 
limited partner who 
has converted to a 
general partner will 
have to bear 
unlimited liability 
jointly and severally 
for the debts and 
obligations incurred 
by the firm during 
the period when he 
was a limited 
partner.  
Conversely, any 
general partner who 
has converted to a 
limited partner 
needs only to bear 
unlimited liability 
for the debts and 
obligations incurred 
by the firm during 
the period when he 




Not specified Not specified 
                                                 









A corporation, a 
statutory trust, a 
business trust, an 
association, a real 
estate investment 
trust, a common-
law trust, or any 
other 
unincorporated 











partnership) or a 
limited liability 
company can 






other than a LP may 
convert to a LP 
through 
filling a plan of 
conversion. 
                                                 







A domestic LP 
may convert to a 
corporation, a 
statutory trust, a 
business trust, an 
association, a real 
estate investment 
trust, a common-
law trust or any 
other 
unincorporated 
















A LP may convert 
to another 
organization 
through a plan of 
conversion. 
                                                 






One or more 
domestic LPs 
may merge or 
consolidate with 
or into One or 
more domestic 
LPs or one or 
more other 
business entities, 




A LP may merge 





Dual Partners Not specified A partner can be a 
limited partner 
and a general 
partner at the 
same time. 
There is no 
restriction 
preventing a partner 
being both a general 
partner and limited 
partner at the same 
time. 
                                                 
1215 Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 17-211(b). 
1216 Uniform Limited Partnership Act §1106 (2001).  
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Appendix III-Table 3 












Private Equity LPs 
Forms of 
Contribution 
Cash Cash Cash, tangible goods, 
intellectual property, land 
use rights or other property 
rights. Limited partners are 
not permitted to contribute 













Not specified Not specified 
                                                 






























2 to 50 partners with at 
least one general partner 
Liability of 
Investors 
Limited Limited Limited 
Liabilities of 
Fund Managers 










the trust plan 












General partners manage 
the fund 






on the trust 
plan 
 





Appendix IV- Table 4 
Limited Partners’ Management Rights under the UK Partnerships Bill, the 








The ULPA 2001 
A limited 
partner must 








partner is not 
prevented from 
doing anything 
which is a 
permitted 
activity under 







is not liable for 
the obligations 
of a limited 
partnership 
unless he or she 
is also a general 
partner or, in 
addition to the 
exercise of the 
rights and 
powers of a 
limited partner, 
he or she 
participates in 
the control of the 
business.  
However, if the 
limited partner 
does participate 
in the control of 
the business, he 
or she is liable 
(1) A limited 
partner shall not 




shall not have 
power to bind the 
limited 
partnership.  
(2) If a limited 





shall be liable for 
all debts and 
obligations of the 
limited 
partnership 
incurred while he 
so takes part in 
―An obligation of a 
limited partnership, 
whether arising in 
contract, tort, or 
otherwise, is not the 
obligation of a limited 
partner. A limited 
partner is not 
personally liable, 
directly or indirectly, 
by way of contribution 
or otherwise, for an 
obligation of the 
limited partnership 
solely by reason of 
being a limited 
partner, even if the 
limited partner 
participates in the 
management and 
control of the limited 
partnership.‖1221 
                                                 
1218 Draft Partnerships Bill (UK) 2003 s. 55. 
1221 Uniform Limited Partnership Act §303 (2001). 
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only to persons 
who transact 





upon the limited 
partner's 
conduct, that the 






as though he 
were a general 
partner.  
(3) A limited 
partner shall not 
be regarded as 




the purposes of 
this section solely 
by reason of his 
acting or 
attempting to act 
in one or more of 
the capacities 






                                                 
1219 Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 17-303 (a). 
1220 Singapore Limited Partnership Act 2008 s. 6. 
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Appendix V - Table 5 
38BSafe Harbor Lists under the PEL, the UK Partnerships Bill, the DRULPA 















1. Participation in a 
collective decision 
to admit or remove 
a general partner; 




3. Participation in 
the selection of an 
accounting firm to 
audit the LP firm; 
4. Receiving an 
audited financial 
report of the LP 
firm;  
5. Inspection of 
accounting books 
and other financial 
information of the 
1.Taking part in 
a decision about 
the variation of 
the partnership 
agreement. 
2.Taking part in 
a decision about 
whether to 
approve, or veto, 






3.Taking part in 
a decision about 
whether the 
1.To be an 
independent 
contractor for or 
to transact 
business with, 
including being a 
contractor for, or 
to be an agent or 
employee of, the 
limited 
partnership or a 
general partner, or 
to be an officer, 
director or 
stockholder of a 
corporate general 
partner, or to be a 




2.Acting as an 
agent or employee 
of the limited 
partnership within 
the scope of the 
authority 
conferred by the 
partners.  
3. Acting as an 
agent or employee 
of a general 
partner of the 
limited 
                                                 
1222 Note that this is subject to section 59(4) and (5) (default rules about decision-making) under the Draft 
Partnerships Bill (UK) 2003. 
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of legal proceedings 
against an 
accountable partner 
when the LP‘s 
interests have been 
infringed;  
7. Initiation of legal 
action in one‘s own 
name to safeguard 
the LP‘s interests 
where the partner 
responsible for the 
conduct of 
partnership affairs 
has neglected the 
exercise of his 
rights; and 
8. Providing 
guarantee for the 
LP.   
 




4.Taking part in 
a decision about 
whether to 
dispose of the 
partnership 





5.Taking part in 
a decision about 
whether a person 
should become 




6.Taking part in 






7.Taking part in 
a decision about 
how the 
partnership 




partnership that is 
a general partner 
of the limited 
partnership, or to 
be a trustee, 
administrator, 
executor, 
custodian or other 
fiduciary or 
beneficiary of an 
estate or trust 
which is a general 




beneficiary of a 
business trust or a 
statutory trust 
which is a general 
partner or to be a 
member, manager, 
agent or employee 
of a limited 
liability company 
which is a general 
partner; 
2.To consult with 
or advise a general 
partner or any 
other person with 
respect to any 
matter, including 
partnership or as a 
trustee or other 
fiduciary or 
beneficiary of an 
estate or trust 
which is a general 
partner of the 
limited 
partnership, or as 
a trustee, advisor, 
shareholder or 
beneficiary of a 
business trust or a 
statutory trust 
which is a general 
partner of the 
limited 
partnership, or as 
a director, officer 
or shareholder of a 
corporate general 
partner of the 
limited 
partnership.  
4. Consulting with 
and advising the 
limited 
partnership or any 
partners of the 
limited 
partnership with 
respect to the 
business, affairs or 
                                                 
1223 Ibid. 
1224 Note that this is subject to section 60(1) (default rule about admission of new partners) under the Draft 
Partnerships Bill (UK) 2003.   
1225 Ibid. 
1226  Note that this is subject to section 61(2), (4) and (5) (default rules about winding up of limited 

















engaged under a 
contract by the 
limited 
partnership or by 
a general partner 
in the limited 
partnership 
(unless the 






11.Acting in his 
capacity as a 
director or 
employee of, or 
a shareholder in, 
a corporate 
general partner. 
the business of the 
limited 
partnership, or to 
act or cause a 
general partner or 
any other person 
to take or refrain 








respect to any 
matter, including 
the business of the 
limited 
partnership; 
3.To act as surety, 
guarantor or 
endorser for the 
limited 
partnership or a 
general partner, to 
guaranty or 
assume 1 or more 
obligations of the 
limited 
partnership or a 
general partner, to 
borrow money 
from the limited 
partnership or a 
general partner, to 
lend money to the 
limited 
partnership or a 
general partner, or 






advising on the 
accounts or affairs 
of the limited 
partnership or 
exercising any 
rights as a limited 
partner of the 
limited 
partnership.  
6. Acting as surety 
or guarantor for 
the limited 
partnership or for 
a general partner 
of the limited 
partnership, either 
generally or in 
respect of specific 
obligations.  
7. Enforcing his 
rights under the 
partnership 
agreement (unless 













12.Taking part in 

















or advising a 
general partner, 
or the general 
partners, about 






so as a member 
of an advisory 
committee of the 
limited 
to provide 
collateral for the 
limited 
partnership or a 
general partner; 
4. To call, request, 
or attend or 
participate at a 
meeting of the 
partners or the 
limited partners; 
5.To wind up a 
pursuant to § 17-
803 of this title; 
6.To take any 
action required or 
permitted by law 
to bring, pursue or 
settle or otherwise 
terminate a 
derivative action 
in the right of the 
limited 
partnership; 
7.To serve on a 
committee of the 
limited 
partnership or the 
limited partners or 
partners or to 
appoint, elect or 
otherwise 
participate in the 
choice of a 
representative or 
another person to 
participating in a 
meeting of the 
partners or limited 
partners of the 
limited 
partnership.  
9. Approving or 
disapproving an 
amendment to the 
partnership 
agreement.  




disapproval of any 
transaction or 
proposed 
transaction of the 
limited 
partnership 
including —  
(a) the dissolution 
and winding up of 
the limited 
partnership;  





creation of a 
security interest, 
or other dealing in 






serve on any such 
committee, and to 
act as a member 
of any such 
committee directly 




8.To act or cause 
the taking or 
refraining from 








respect to 1 or 




winding up of the 
limited 




partnership or an 
election to 
continue the 




(c) the creation, 
renewal, 
refinancing or 
discharge of an 
obligation by the 
limited 
partnership;  
(d) a change in the 
nature of the 
activities of the 
limited 
partnership;  
(e) the admission, 
removal or 
withdrawal of a 
general partner or 






(f) transactions in 
which one or more 
of the general 
partners have an 
actual or potential 
conflict of interest 
with one or more 
of the limited 
partners;  
(g) any 








pledge or other 
transfer of, or 
granting of a 
security interest 
in, any asset or 












d. A change in 















any partner or 
other person;  
(i) the making of, 
or calling for, or 




(j) the making of 
investments or the 
making of other 
determinations in 




investments in any 
property, either 
directly or 
indirectly by the 
limited 
partnership;  
(k) Such other 
matters as are 




or instructing any 
person to 
commence or 
continue or defend 
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g. A transaction 
or other matter 
involving an 










i. The merger or 
consolidation of a 
limited 
partnership; 
j. In respect of a 
limited 
partnership which 




Company Act of 
1940, as amended, 
any matter 
required by the 
Investment 
Company Act of 
1940, as amended, 
or the rules and 






behalf of the 
limited 
partnership, if any 
one or more of the 
general partners 
with the authority 
to do so have, 
without good 
cause, refused or 
failed to 
commence, 
continue or defend 
any such 
proceedings.  
12. Winding up 
the limited 
partnership 
pursuant to any 
rights the limited 
partner may have 
under section 39 
of the Partnership 
Act.  
13. Having all or 
any part of his 
name included in 





thereunder, to be 
approved by the 
holders of 
beneficial interests 


















any partner or 
other person; 
l. The making 
of, or calling for, 





m. The making 
of, or the making 
of other 
determinations in 








real, personal or 
mixed, either 
directly or 
indirectly, by the 
limited 
partnership; or 
n. Such other 
matters as are 
stated in the 
partnership 
agreement or in 
any other 
agreement or in 
writing; 
9. To serve on the 
board of directors 
or a committee of, 
to consult with or 





agent or employee 
of, or to be a 
fiduciary or 
contractor for, any 
person in which 
the limited 
partnership has an 







or other services 
or products for, to 
or on behalf of, or 
otherwise having 
a business or other 
relationship with, 
the limited 
partnership or a 
general partner of 
the limited 
partnership; or 
10. Any right or 
power granted or 
permitted to 
limited partners 
under this chapter 
and not 
specifically 





Appendix VI - QUESTIONNAIRE 
This questionnaire was used during the author‘s empirical study (face to face 
interviews, email consultations and telephone consultations) in China from 
August 2008 to December 2009. The interviewees include twenty lawyers, 
partners, professionals and academics who specialize or interested in limited 
partnerships, venture capital and private equity investment in China. 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Management of the Partnership Business 
1. Is it common for limited partners to take part in the management of the 
partnership business?  
2. How do limited partners exercise management rights?  
a) What are the common internal governance mechanisms in a 
Chinese limited partnership?  
b) Who are the members in these internal governance committees?  




3. What do you think of the safe harbor list in Article 68 of the Partnership 
Enterprise Law?  
4. The Partnership Enterprise Law does not provide any fiduciary duty on 
partners. Do you think that there is a need for fiduciary duties on partners? 
5. Do you think that there is a need for the limited partner derivative action? 
 
Liability of Limited Partners 
1. The PRC partnership Enterprise Law is silent on whether a limited 
partner who participates in the management of the limited partnership 
would lose his or her limited liability status. Do you think that such a 
legislative vacuum would create practical problems? 
2. Do you agree that a limited partner who participates in the management 
of the limited partnership should lose his or her limited liability status?  
3. Do you agree that this should not be contingent on whether a third party 
is aware of the limited partner‘s participation in management? 
4. Do you think that the liability shield provided by the Partnership 
Enterprise Law is adequate and understood by Chinese limited partners? 
5. Do you agree that limited partners should be granted full liability shield 
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and should not be personally liable for any debt of the limited partnership? 
 
Legal Nature of the Partnership 
1. Do you think that the legal nature of partnerships is ambiguous?  
2. Do you think that separate personality shall be granted to Chinese 
partnerships?  
 
Limited Partnership and Venture Capital/ Private Equity Investment 
1. Are you aware of any typical conflicts of interest in China‘s private 
equity limited partnerships? What are the reasons for these conflicts? 
2. Which business vehicle is the most popular business form for China‘s 
private equity funds?  
3. What are the major difficulties in using the private equity limited 
partnerships in China?  
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